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PREFACE
IT is many years since an attempt has been made in
England to deal with the general history of the
Peninsular War. Several interesting and valuable diaries
or memoirs of officers who took part in the great struggle
have been published of late I, but no writer of the
present generation has dared to grapple with the details
of the whole of the seven years of campaigning that lie
between the Dos Mayo and Toulouse. Napier's splendid
work has held the field for sixty yeal's. :Meanwhile an
enormous bulk. of valuable material has been accumu-
lating in English, French, and Spanish, which has prac-
tically remained unutilized. Papers, public and private,
are accessible whose existence was not suspected in the
'thirties; an infinite nwnber of autobiographies and
reminiscences which have seen the light after fifty or
sixty years of repose in some forgotten drawer, have
served to fill up many gaps in our knowledge. At least
one formal history of the first import:mce, that of
General Arteche y :Moro, has been published. I fancy
that its eleven volumes are practically un~nown in
England, yet it is almost as valuable as Torefio's Guerra
de la. lndependencia in enabling us to understand the
purely Spanish side of the war.
I trust therefore that it will not be considered pre-
sumptuous for one who has been working for some ten
or fifteen years at the original som'ces to endeavour to
1 I need only mention the diaries of Sir Harry Smith, llIakene)", Shaw,
and Tomkinson 011 our side, and Foy's pri\'ate diary and the MeDloirs oC
Fllntin des Odoonls, St. Chamans, and Tbh!ooult on tIle Frcncll.
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summarize in print the results of his investigations; for
I believe that even the reader who has already devoted
a good deal of attention to the Peninsular War will find
a considerable amount of new matter in these pages.
:My resolve to take in hand a general history of the
struggle was largely influenced by the passing into the
hands of All Souls College of tbe papers of one of its
most distinguished fellows, the diplomatist Sir Charles
Vaughan. Not only had Vaughan unique opportunities
for observing the early years of the Peninsular War,
but he turned them to the best aCcoWlt, and placed all
his observations on record. I suppose that there was
seldom a man who had a greater love for collecting and
filing information. His papers contain not only his
own diaries and correspondence, but an infinite number
of notes made for him by Spanish friends on points
which he desired to master, and a vast bulk of pam-
phlets, proclamations. newspapers, and tables ofstatistics.
carefully bound together in bundles, which (as far as
I can see) have not been opened between the day of his
death and that on which they passed, by a legacy from
his last surviving relative, into the possession of his old
college. Vaughan landed at Corunna in September,
1808, in company with Charles Stuart, the first English
emissary to tbe Central Junta. He rode with Stuart to
Madrid and Aranjuez, noting everything that he saw.
from Roman inscriptions to the views of local Alcaldes
and priests on the politics of the day. He contrived to
interview many persons of importance-for example, he
heard from Cuesta's own lips of his treasonable plot to
overthrow the Junta, and he secured a long conver-
sation with Castm1.os as to the Capitulation of Baylen,
from which I have extracted some wholly new facts as
to that event. He then went to Aragon. where he
stayed three weeks in the company of the Captain-
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General Joseph Palafox. Not only did he cross·question
Palafox as to all the details of his fumous defence of
Saragossa. but he induced San Genis (the colonel who
conducted the engineering side of the operations) to
write him a memorandum. twelve pages long, as to the
character lUld system of his work. Vnughan accom-
panied Palafox to the front in November, but left the
Army of Aragon a day before tbe battle of Tudela.
Hearing of the disaster from the fugitives of CastaJios's
army. he resolved to take the news to :Madrid. Riding
hard for the capitnl, he crossed the front of.Ney's cavah'y
at Agredn, but escaped them and came safely through.
On arriving at :Madrid he was given dispatches for
Sir John Maore, and carried them to Salamanca. It
was the news which he brought that induced the Eritish
general to order his abortive retreat on Portugal. IV[oore
entl'Usted to him not only hi.;; dispatch to Sir David
Eaird. bidding him retire into Galicia, but letters for
Lord Castlereagh, which needed instant conveyance to
London. Accordingly Vaughan rode with headlong
speed to Baird at Astorga, and from Astorga to
Corunna. which he reached eleven days after his start
from TudeIa. From thence he took ship to England
and brought the news of the Spanish disasters to the
British Ministry.
Vaughall remained some time in England before re-
turning to Spain, but he did not waste his time. Not
only did he write a short account of the siege of Sara-
gossa. which had a great vogue at the moment, but he
collected new information from un unexpected source.
General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, the besieger of Sara-
gossa, arrived as a prisoner in England. Vaughan
promptly went to Cheltenham, where the Frenchman
was living on parole. and had a long conversation with
him as to the details of the siege, which he carefully
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compared with the narrative of Palafox. Probably
no other person ever had such opportunities for
collecting first-hand information as to that famous
leaguer. It will please those who love the romantic
side of history, to know that Vaughan was introduced
by Palafox to Agostina, the famous 'Maid of Sm'a-
gossa,' and heard the tale of her exploit from the
Captain-General less than three months after it had
occurrcd. The doubts ofNupicr and others as to her
existence are completely dissipated by the diary of this
much-travelled Fellow of All Souls College.
Vaughnn retwncd to Spain ere 1809 was out, and
served under various English ambassadors at Seville
and Cadiz for the greater part of the war. His papers
and collections for the later years of the struggle ;ne
almost as full and interesting as those for 1808 which
I have utilized in this volume.
I have worked at the Record Office on the British
official pl1pers of the first years of the war, especially
noting all the passages which are omitted in the printed
dispatches of l\ioore and other British generals. The
suppressed paragraphs (always placed within brackets
marked with a pencil) contain a good deal of useful
matter, mainly criticisms on individuals which it would
nofhave been wise to publish at the time. There are
a considerable number of intercepted French di'ipatches
in the collection, and a certain amount of correspondence
with the Spaniards which contains facts and figures
generally unknown. Among the most interesting are
the letters of General Leith, who was attached to the
head quarters of Blake; in them I found by far the best
account of· the operations of the Army of Galicia in
Oct.-Nov., 1808, which I have come upon.
As to printed source~ of information, I have read all
the }:>arliamentary papers of 1808-9, and the whole file
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of the JJ:lad1'id Ga-zcttc, as well as many scores of memoirs
and diaries, French, English, and Spanish. I think that
no important English or French book has escaped me;
but I must confess that some of the Spanish works
quoted by General Arteche proved unprocurable, both in
London and Paris. The British Museum Library is by
no means strong in this department; it is even short of
obvious authorities, such us the monographs of St. Cyr
and of Cabanes on the War in Catalonia. The memoirs
of tlle Peninsular veterans on both sides often require
very cautious handling; some cannot be trusted for
anything that did not happen under the author's eye,
Others were written so long after the events which they
record, that they are not even to be relied upon for facts
which must have been under his actual observation.
For example. General :Marbot claims that he brought to
Bayonne the dispatch from :Murat infonning Napoleon
of the insurrection of .Madrid on May 2, and gives
details as to the way in which the Emperor received
the news. But it is absolutely certain, both from the
text of :Murat's letter and from Napoleon's answer to
it, that the document was carried and delivered by a
Captain Hannecourt. The aged Marbot's memory had
played him false. There are worse cases. where an eye-
witness, 'writing within a short time of the events which
he describes, gives a version which he must have known
to be incorrect, for the 'glorification of himself or some
friend. l'hiebault and Le Noble are bad offenders in
this respect: Thiebault's account of some of the inci-
dents in Portugal and of the eomhat of Aldea del
Ponte, Le Noble's narrative of Corunna, seem to be
deliberately falsified. I have fOlUld one English au-
thority who faIls under the same suspicion. But on
both sides the majority of the mistakes eome either
from writers who describe that which did not pass under
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their OVi'11 eyes, or from aged narrators who wrote their
story twenty, thirty, or forty years after the war was over.
Their diluies written at the time are often invaluable
correctives to their memoirs or monographs composed
after an interval; e. g. Foy's rongh diary L,tely pub-
lished by Girod de rAin contains some testimonials to
'Vellington and the British army very much more
handsomely expressed than anything which the General
wrote in his formal history of the early campaigns of
1808.
I hope to insert in my second volume a bibliography of
all the works nseful for the first two years of the war.
rrhe inordinate size to which my first volume has swelled
has made it impossible to include in it a list of authori-
ties, which covers a good many pages.
It will be noticed that my Appendices include several
extensive tables, giving the organization of the French
and Spanish armies in 1808. For part of them I am
indebted to General Arteche's work; but the larger
half has been constructed at great cost of time and
labour from scattered contemporary papers-from re-
turns to be found in the most 'yaried places (some of the
most important Spanish ones survive only in the Record
Office 01' in Vaughan's papers, others only in the J:lad1id
Gazette). No one, so far as I know, had hitherto
endeavoured to construct the complete table of the
Spanish army in October, or of that of the exact com-
position of Napoleon's' grand army' in the same month.
I hope my Appendices therefore may be found of
some use.
More than one friend has asked me during the last
few months whether it is worth while to rewrite the
history of the Peninsular War when Napier's great work
is everywhere accessible. I can only reply that I no
more dream of superseding the immortal six volumes of
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that grand old soldier: than Dr. S. R. Gardiner dreamed
of superseding Clarendon's HiJ101'Y qf tlte Great Re-
bellion when he started to write the later volumes
of his account of the reign of Charles I. The books of
Napier and Clarendon:must remain as all-important con-
temporary narratives, written by men who saw clearly
one l:lSpect of the events which they describe; in each
the personal element counts for much, and the political
and individual sympathieS:and enmities of the historian
have coloured his whole work. No one would think of
going to Clarendoo for an unprejudiced account of the
chHracter Hod career of Oliver Cromwell. But I do
not think that it is: generally realized that it is just as
unsafe to go to Napier for an account of the aims and
undertakings of the Spanish Juntas, or the Tory govern-
mentli of 1808-14. As a narrator of the incidents of
war he is unrivalled: no onc who has ever read them
can forget his soul-stirring descriptions of the charge of
the Fusilier brigade at Albuera, of the assault on the
Great Dreach at Badajoz. or the storming of Soult's
positions on the Rhune. These and a hundred other
eloquent passages mJ.l survive for ever as masterpieces
of vigorous English prose.
But when he wanders oft' into politics. English Ol"
Spanish, Napier is a less trw:.tworthy guide, All his
views arc coloured by the fact that he was a bitter
enemy of the Tories of his own day. The kinsman
not only of' Charles James Fox, but of Lord Edwurd
Fitzgemld. he could never look with unprejudiced eyes
on their political opponents. Canning and Spencer
Perceval were in his ideas men capable of any foUy,
any gratuitous perversity, Cnstlereagh's splendid services
to England are ignored: it would be impossible to
discover from the pages of the Peninsular lYm' that
this was the man who picked out "Vellington for the
x PREFACE
command in Spain, and kept him there in spite of all
manner of opposition. Nor is this all: Napiel' was also
one of those strange Englishmen who, notwithstanding
all the evidence that lay before them, believed that Napo-
leon Bonaparte was a beneficent character, thwarted
in his designs for the regeneration of Europe by the
obstinate ~md narrow-minded opposition of the British
Government. In his preface, he goes so far as to say
that the Tories fought the Emperor not because he was
the dangerous enemy of the British Empire, but because
he was the champion of Democracy, nnd they the
champions of caste and privilege. ~'ben the tidings
of Napoleon's death at St. Helen,; reached him (as
readers of his Life will remember). he cast himself down
on his SOht and wept for three hours J Hence it was
that, in dealing with the Tory ministries, he is ever a
captious and unkind critic, while for the Emperor he
displays a respect that seems very strange in an en-
thusiastic friend of political liberty. Every one who has
read the first' chapters of his great work must see that
Bonaparte gets off with slight reproof for his monstrous
act of treachery at Bayonne, and for the even more
disgusting months of hypocritical friendship that had
preceded it. While pouring scom on Charles IV and
Ferwnand VII, the silly father and the rebellious son,
whose quarrels were the Emperor?s opportunity, Napier
forgets to rise to the proper point of indignation in
dealing with the false friend who betrayed them. He
almost writes as if there were some excuse for the
crimes of robbery and kidnapping, if the victim were
an imbecile or a bigot, or an undutiful son. The pre-
judice in f.'Lvour of the Emperor goes so far that he
even endeavours to justify obvious political and military
mistakes in his conduct of the I'eninsular War, by
throwing all the blame on the way in which his marshals
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executed his orders, and neglecting to point out that the
orders themselves were impracticable.
On the other hand, Napier was just as over·hard to
the Spaniards as he was over-lenient to Bonaparte. He
was one of those old Peninsular officers who could never
dismiss the memory of some of the things that he had
. seen or"heard. The cruelties of the Guerrillas, the dis-
graceful panic on the eve of Talavera, the idiotic pride
and obstinacy of Cuest.:'t, the cowardice of Imaz and La
Pefia, prejudiced him against all their countrymen. The
turgid eloquence of Spanish proclamations, followed by
the prosaic incapacity of Spanish performance, sickened
him. He always'accepts the French rather than the
Spanish version of a story. forgetting that Bonaparte
and his official writers were authorities quite as un-
worthy of implicit credence as their opponents. In
dealing with individual Spaniards-we may take for
example J oseph Palafox, or the unfortunate Daoi~
und Velarde-he is unjust to the extreme of cruelty.
His astounding libel on La Romana's army, I have had
occasion to notice in some detail on page 416 of this
work. He invariably exaggerates Spanish defeats, and
minimizes Spanish successes. He is reckless in the
statements which he gives as to their numbers in battle,
or their losses in defeat. Evidently he did not take the
trouble to consult the elaborate collection of morning-
states of armies and other official doc~ents which the
Spanish ''ITar Office published several years before he
'wrote his first volume. All his figures are borrowed
from the haphazard guesses of the French marshals.
This may seem strong language to use concerning so
great an author, but minute investigation seems to prove
that nearly every statement of Napier's concerning a
battle in which the Spaniards were engaged is dra\vn from
some French source. The Spaniards' version is ignored.
xii PREFACE
In his indignation at the arrogance and obstinacy with
which they often hampered his hero Wellington, he
refuses to look at the extenuating circumstances which
often explain. or even excuse, their conduct. After
reading his narrative, one should turn to Arguelles or
Torell0 or Arteche. peruse their defence of their country-
men, and then make one's ultimate decision as to facts.
Every student of the Peninsular~\raI', in short, must
read Napier: but he must not think that, when the
reading is fiRished, he has mastered the whole meaning
and impodance of the great struggle.
The topographical details of most of my maps are
drawn from the splendid Atlas published by the Spanish
1Var Office during the last twenty years. But the
detail'i of the placing of the troops are my own. I have
been particularly c!U'eful in the maps of Vimiero and
Cormma to indicate the position of every battalion.
French or English.
I am in duty bound to acknowledge the very kind
assistance of three helpers in the constmction of this
volnme. The first compiled the Index, after grappling
with the whole of the proofS. The second, Mr. C. E.
Doble, furnished me with a great number of suggestions
as to revision, which I have adopted. The third,
Mr. C. T. Atkinson, of Exeter College, placed at my
disposition his wide knowledge of British regimental
history, and put me in the way of obtaining many
details as to the organization of Wellesley's und
Moore's armies. I am infinitely obliged to all three.
C. OMAN.
ALL SoULS CoI,I.t:Gf:,
Mrl1'f::h 31. 1002.
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SECTION I
NAPOLEON AND THE SPANISH BOURBONS
CHAPTER I
THE TREATY OF FONTAL'\'EBLEAU
'I AM not the heir of Louis XIV, I am the heir of Charlemagne,'
wrote Napoleon, in OJlC of those moments of epigrammatic self-
revelation which are so precious to the students of the most
inlerestillg epoch and the most interesting personality of modern
history I, There are historians who have sought for the origins of
the Peninsular War far back in the eternal and inevitable conflict
between democracy and privilege t: there are other9 who-ac-
cepting the Emperor's own version of the facts-have represented
it as u fortuitom; development arising from his plan of forcing
the Continental System upon every state in Europe. To us it
seems that the moment beyond which we need not search hack.
ward was that in which Bonaparte formulated to himself the idea
that he was not the successor of the greatest of the Bourbons,
but of the founder of the Holy Roman Empire. It is lI. different
thing to claim to be the first of European monarchs, and to claim
to be the khlg of kings. Louis XIV had wide-reaching ambitions
for himself and for his family: but it was frolll his not very
~eep or accurate knowledge of Charlemagne that Na.poleon had
derived his iden. of 0. single impel'ial powel' bestriding Europe, of
a mOllarch whose writ ran alike at Paris and at Mainz, at Milan
ll.I~d o.t Hamburg, at Rome and at Barcelona, and whose vassul-
1 He works out the idea in his letter to Talleyrand of May 16, 1800.
2 Sucll is tile muin thesis of chapter I of Nnpier's Penimular War.
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princes brought hjm the tribute of !!oil the lands of the Oder, the
Elbc, and the middle Danube 1.
There is no need COl" us to trace back the growth of Napoleon's
conception of himself as the successor of Charlemagne beyond the
winter of 1805-6, the moment when victorious at Austerlitz and
master for the first time of Central Europe, he began to put into
execution his grandiose scheme for enfeoffing all the realms of the
Continent as vassal states or the French Empire. He had extorted
from Francis of Au~tria the renunciation of his meagre and time-
worn rights as head of the Holy Roman Empire, because he
intended to replace the ancient shadow by a new reality. The
idea that he n;tight be Emperor of Europe and not merely Emperor
of the French was already developed, though Pmssia still needed
to be chastised, and Russia to be checked and turned back on to
the ways of the East. It was after Austerlitz but before Jena
that the foundations of the Confederation of the Rhine were laid~,
and that the Emperor took in hand the erection of that series of
~ubjcct realms lmder princes of his own house, which WM to cul-
minate in the new kingdom of Spain ruled by' Joseph Napoleon
the First.' By the summer of 1806 the system was already wel]
developed: the first modest experiment, the planting out of his
sister Eliza and her insignificimt husband in the duchy of LUCClt
and Piombino was now twelve months old. There had followed
the gift of the old Bourbon kingdom of Naples to Joseph Bona-
parte in February, 1806, and the transfonnation of the Batavian
Republic into Louis Bonuparte's killl:,tdom of Hol1llld in Juue.
The Emperor's brother-in-law, Joachim Mural, had been made
Grand-Duke of Berg in March, his sister, Po.uline, Duchess of
Guastalla in the same month. It cannot be doubted that his
eye WiIS ulretldy rovi;lg all round Europe, markiug out every
region in which the system of feudatory states could be further
extended.
At the ill-governed realms of Spain and Portugal it is certain
tho.t he must have taken a specially long glnncc. He had against
the house of the Bourbons the grudbre that men always feel against
, It is curious to note how often the Dame of Charlemagne occurs ill
Napoleon's letters during the early months of 1806. It is especiall)' common
in hie correspondence about the relatione of the Papacy and Ule Empire.
2 The negotiutions for the Confederation were completed in July, and it
was formally constituted on Aug. 1, 1800.
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those whom they have injured. He knew that they could never
forgive! the disappointed hopes of 1799, Ilor the murder of the
Due d'Enghiell, however much they might disguise their senti·
ments by base servility. 'Whtt.t their real feelings were might be
guessed from the treacherous conduct of their kinsmen of Naples,
whom he had just expelled from the Continent. The Bourbons
of Spain were I\t this moment the most subservient and the most
ill·used of his allies. Under the imbecile guidance of his fa\'ourite
GOOoy, Charles IV had consistently held to the league with France
since 1195, and had thCl'Cby brought down untold calamities upon.
his realm. Nevertheless Napoleon was profoundly dissatisfied with
him as aD ally. The seventy·two million francs of subsidies which
he was nnnually wringing from his impoverished neighbour secmed
to him a trifle. The chief gain that he had hoped to secure, when
he goaded Spain into war with England in 1804', hud been the
assistance of her fleet, by whose aid he had intended to gaili the-
control of the nlllTOW seas, and to dominate the Channel long
enough to cnable him to launch his proj(.'Cb..>d invasion against the
shores of Kent and Sussex. But the Spanish navy, always more
fonuidable on paper than in bnttle, had proved a broken reed.
The flower of its wssels had been destroyed at Trafalgar. There
only remained in 1806 a few ships rotting in harbour at Cadiz,
C(LItagcna, and Ferrol, unable even to concentrate on account ae
the strictness of Collingwood's blockade, Napoleon was angry at
bis ally's impotence, and was already reflecting that in bands mOl'e
able and energetic than those of Charles IV Spain might give aid
of a very different kind, In after years men remembered that as
early as 1805 he had muttered to his confidants that a BOlll:bon
on the Spanish throne was a tiresome neighbour-too weak as
an ally, yet dangerous as a possible enemy I, For in spite of all
the subservience of Charles IV the Emperol' believed, and believed
quite rightly, that a Bourbon prince must in his heart loathe the
unnatural alliance with the child of the Revolution. But in 1806
Bonaparte had an impending war with Prussiu: on his hands, and
there was no leisure for interfering in the aftairs of the Peninsula,
1 See, for examplc, the ,"cry ultercsting swry wld by Marshal JouMan in
llis M€mQim (po 9) of the loug couversatiou whicb the emperor Imd with him
at Verona OlI Juno 16, 1805; 'Taut pour l'affermisscmeut de IlIa d}'uastie que
pour la. surete do Frallce; collcluded NallOlooll, 'Ull Bourbon sur le traue
d'Espague est UIl voisin trop dangereux.'
.2
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Spain, he thought, could wait, and it is improbable that he had
formulated in his brain any definite plan for dealing with her.
The determining factor in his subsequent action was undoubtedly
supplied in the autumn of 1806 by the conduct of the Spanish
government during the campaign of Jells.. There was a moment,
just before that decisive battle bad been fought, during which
European public opinion was expecting a. check to the Ft'ench
arms. The military prestige of Prussia was still very great, and
it was well known that Russia had not been able to put forth her
full strength at Austerlitz. Combined it was believed that they
would be too much for Napoleon. "'hile this idea was still
current, the Spanish king, or rather his favourite GOOoy, put forth
a strange proclamation which showed how slight was the bond
of allegiance that united them to Franc~ and how hollow their
much vaunted loyalty to the emperor 1. It was an impassioned
appeal to the people of Spain to take arms en 1lUlS8C, and to help
the government with liberal gifts of men, horses and money.
•Com~' it said, •dear fellow co~ntrYIllCJ1, come and swear loyalty
beneath the banners of the most benevolent ofsovereigns.' The God
of Victories was to smile on a people which helped itself, and a
happy and enduring peace was to be the result of a vigorous effort.
It might have been pleaded in defence of Charles IV that all this
was very ;vague, and that the anonymous enemy who was to be
crushed m'ight be England. But unfortunately for this interpre.
tation, tlrree whole sentences of the document are filled with
demands for horses and an instant increase in the cavalr)' ann
of the Spanish military establishment. It could hardly be urged
with seriousness that horsemen were intended to be employed
against the English fleet. And of naval armaments there was not
one word in the proclamation.
This document was issued on Oct. 5, 1806: not long after there
arrived in Madrid the news of the battle of Jena and the capture
of Berlin. The Prince of the Peace was thuuderstruck at the
non-fulfilment of his e.'l:pectations and the complete triumph of
Napoleon. He hastened to countermand his armaments, and to
shower letters of explanation and apology on the Emperor, pointing
out that his respected ully could not possibly have been the
'enemy' referred to in. the proclamation. That document had
1 For the full text of this bombastic appeal see Appeudix, No. l. Godoy
speaks throughout in his OlVn name:'llo~ in that ofbis master.
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reached Napoleon on the vcry battlefield of Jenn, and had caused
a violent paroxysm of rage in the august reader t , But, having
Russia still to fight, he repressed his wrath for a moment, affecting
to regunl as satisfactory GOOoy's servile letters of explanation.
Yet we can hardly doubt that this was the moment at which he
made up his mind that the House of Bourbon must cease to reign
in Spain. He must have reflected on the danger that southern
France had escaped; a hundred thousand Spaniards might ha\'c
marched on Bordeaux or Toulouse at the moment of Jena., and
there would have been no army whatever Oil the unguarded
frontier ot the Pyrenees to hold them in check. Supposing that
Jena had been deferred a month, or that no decisive battle at all
had been fOllght in the nrst stflofJ'C of the struggle with Prussia, it
was clear that GOOoy \,I'ould have committed himself to open war.
A slAb in the back, even if dealt with 110 better weapon than the
disorganized Spanish army, must have deranged all Napoleon's
plans, and forced him to turn southward the reser\'es destined to
f(.'e£1 the' Grand Army.' It was clear that such a condition of
affairs must never be allowed to recur, and we should naturalI)'
expect to find that, the moment the war of 1806-7 was ended,
Napolcon would turn ~"Uillst Spain, eithcr to dethrone Charles IV,
or at least to demand the dismissal from office of GOOoy. He
IlCknowlcdgro this himself at St. Helens.: the right thing to have
done, as he then conceded, would have been to declare open war
on Spain immediately after Tilsit ll•
After eight years of experience of Bonaparte as an ally, the
rulers of Spain ought to ha....e known that his silence during the
campaigns of Eylau and Friooland boded them no good. But his
present intentions escaped them, and the)' htultened to atone for
the proclamation of Oct. 5 by a servile obedience to all the ordenJ
which he sent them. The most important of these was the
command to mobilize and send to the Baltic 15,000 of their best
troops [March, 1807]. This was promptly done, the depleted
, • Je jurai des Ion; qu'ils me la paieraient, que je les meUnl.is hors d'etat de
me nuire/ said Nspoleon to De Pl'lldt, eighteen months later (Mtmoi'7U 8«1' la
Rlwlrdion d'E#pagne, p. lG). 'fhe archbishop's story is amply borne out by
the repeated allusioIIl:! to this unhappy proclamation in Napoleon's official
justification of his conduct in Spain. The Spanish ambassador at Berlin,
Don Benito Pardo; was told by Napoleon at the time that he had forgiven the
ProolRllllI.tion, but cOllld not forget it.
I C'orrnpondallCfl rh NapQNon, :J,:xxii. 69.
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battalions and squadrons being raised to war-strength, by drafts
of men and horses which disorganized dozens of the corps that
remained at homel. The reason alleged, the fear of Swedish and
English descents on the rear of the Grand Army, was plausible,
but there can be 110 doubt that the real purpose was to deprive
Spain of fL considerable part, and that the most efficient, of hCI'
disposable forces. If Godoy could have listened to the interviews
of Napolcon nnd Alexander of Uussia at Tilsit, he would haye
been terrified at the off1JfLnd way in which the Emperor suggested
to the Czar that the Balearic Isles should be taken fr'om Spain and
given to Ferdinand of Naples, if the latter would consent to cede
Sicily to Joseph Napoleon 2• To despoil hi8 alli($ was quite in the
usual style of BonfLparte-Godoy cannot have forgotten the lot of
Trinidad and Ccylon-but he hud not before proposed to tear frolll
Spain, not a distant colony, but' an ancient province of the
Arugoncsc crown. 'TIle projt.'l.{ 'I'M enshrined in the 'secret and
supplementary' clauses of the Treaty of Tilsit, which Napoleon
wished to conceal till the times we.re ripe.
It was only when Bonaparte had returned to France from his
long campaign in Poland that the affairs of the Iberian Peninsula
began to come seriously to the front. 'fhe Emperor arrived in
Paris at the end of July, 1801, and this was the moment at which
he might have been expected to produce the rod, for the chas-
tisement which the rulers of Spain had merited by their foolish
proclamation of the preceding year. But no sign of any such
intention was displayed: it is true that early in August French
troops in considerable numbers began to muster at Bayonne 8, but
I The demand was made in the most peremptory fashion, and in almost
threatening language. Napoleon writes to Talleyrand that the Spanish
division in Tuscany, \\'hich WIIS to form part of the expeditionary corps, mllst
march in tlVenty~four hours after receiving its orders. ' U they refuse,
everything is at an end; a most sinister phl'llSe (Napoleon to Talleyrond,
ilIarch 23, HI07).
~ 'l1lis Wl\S Article IV of the Seven' Secret Articles' of the Treaty of
Tilsit. See for this prOI)QSa! the notes in Vandal's NapoUon et A{erandre r",
vo!. i. .
~ The first notice of the' Corps of Observation of the Gironde' is to be
foulld ill 0. dislJawl1 of MaSStlromO, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, dated
July 30, which gives notice of the approaching concentration at Dayonne.
Rut the quiet movement of troops in this direction had begun long before
the Russian war was over.
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Bonaparte openly declared that ther were destined to be used, not
fig-dinst Spain. but agllinst Portugal. Onc of the articles of the
Peace of Titsit had been to the effect that Sweden and Portugal,
the last powers in Europe which had not submitted to the Con-
tinental System, should be compelled-if necessary by force-to
adhere to it, and to exclude the commerce of England from their
ports. It was Ilatural that now, as in 1801, a French contingent
should be sent to aid Spuiu in bringing pressure to bear on her
smaller neighbour. With this idea GOOoy and his master persisted
in the voluntary blindness to the signs of the times which they
hoo so long Ix."'ell cultivLl.ting. They gave their Llmbnssudor ill
.Lisbon orders to act in all things in strict conjunction with his
.French colleague.
On August 12, therefore, the representatives of Spain and
France delivered to John, the Prince-Regent of llortugal (his
mother, Queen Maria, wus ill$llue), ulmost identiCillnotes, in which
they declared that they should ask for their passports and leave
Lisbon, unless by the first of September the .Regent had declared
war on England, joined his fleet to that of the allied powers,
confiscated all British goods in his harbours, and arrested all
British subjects within the bounds of his kingdom. THe prince,
a timid and incapable person, whose only wish was to preserve his
neuhality, answered that he was ready to break oft· diplomatic
relations with England, and to close his porl'. against BI'itish
ships, but that the seizure of the persons and property of the
British merchants, without any previous declaration of war, would
be contrary to the rules Of international law and morality. Fot"
a llloment he hoped that this half.measure would satisfy Napoleon,
that he might submit to the ContinellW System without actually
being compelled to declare war on Great Britain. But when
dispatches had been interc1langed between the French minister
Rayneval and his master at Paris, the answer came that the
Regent's offer was insufficient, and that the representatives of
FrtuU,.'C and Spain were ordered to quit Lisbon at once. This they
did on September 30, but without issuing any formal declaration
of war.
On October 18, the French army. which had been concentrating
at Bayonne since the beginning of August, under the harmless
Ilame of the' Corps of Obsen'ation of the Gironde,' crossed the
DidtlSsoa at Irull and entered Spain. 11; had been placed under
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the orders of JUIlOt, one of Napoleon's most active and vigorows
officers, but not a great strategist after the style of Massenf\,
Soult, or Davoust. He was a good fighting-man, hut a mediocre
general. The reason that he received the appointment was that
he had already some knowledge of Portugal, from having held the
post of ambassador at Lisbon in 1805. He had been promised
a duchy and a marshal's baton if his mission was carried out to
his master's complete satisfaction.
It is clear that from the first Napoleon had intended that
Portugal should refuse the ignominious orders which he had given
to the Prince-Regent. If he had only been wishing to complete the
extension of the Continental System over all Southcm Europe, the
form of obedience which had been offered him by the Portuguese
govcl'Ilment would have been amply suRicient. But he was aiming
at annexation, and not at the mere assertion of his suzerainty over
Portugal. The fact that he began to IlUlSS troops at Bayonne
before he commenced to threaten the Regent is sufficient proof of'
his intentions. An army was not needed to eocrce the Portuguese:
for it was incredible that in the then condition of European affairs
they would dare to risk war with F'rwu.'c and' Spain by adhcriug
too stiffly to the cause of England. The Regent was timid and rus
submission WM certain; but Napoleon took cn.rc to dictate the
terms that he offered in such all offensive fonn that the Portuguese
government would be tempted to beg for changes of detail, though
it sorrowfully accepted the necessity of conceding the main point
-war wit.h England and the lLCCilptancc of the Continental System.
The Prillce~Regent,as might have beeh expected, made a feeble
attempt to haggle over tlfe more ignominious details, and then
Napoleon withdrew his ambassador and let loose his armies.
ShOlilyafter JllIlot had crossed the Bidassoa there wos signed
at Fontainebleau the celebrated secret treaty which marks the
sc(:ond stngc of the Emperol"'s designs against the Peninsula. It
was dravm up by Duroc, Napoleon's marshal of the palace, and
Eugenio Ir.quierdo, the agent of Godoy. For the official ambassndor
of Spain in Paris, the l)rincc of Masserano, was not taken into the
confidence of his Illaster I. All delicate matters were cunducted
by the favourite's private representative, an obscure but astute
personage, the director of the Botanical Gil.rdens at Madrid, whose
, Talleyrand dedares in his M&n&irn (i. 349) that Napoleon kept Cham-
pagny, his own minister of foreign affairs, ill equal darkness.
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positiOll was legitimized by fl. 1'O)'al sign-manual briving him powers
to treat fUl a plenipotentiary with France. 'Manuel is your pro-
tector; do what he tells you, and by serving him you serve me,' the
old king hud said, when giving him his commission.
The Treaty of Fontainebleau is a strange document, whose main
purpose, at 1\ first gJan~ seems to be the glorification of Goduy.
It is composed of fourteen articles 1, the most important of which
t:ontain the details of a projected dismembennent of Portugal.
The country WIts to be cut lip into t.hree pUl·t.s. Oporto find the
northern province of Entre-Douro-e·Minho were to become the
'Kingdom of Northern Lusitania,' and to be ceded to & Dourbon,
the young King of Etruria, whom Napoleon was just evicting from
his pleasant abode at Florence. All Southern Portugal, the large
province of Alemtejo and the coast region of Algarve, was to be
given HS nil independent principality to GOOoy, under the title of
'lJrince of the Algarves'2. The rest of Portugal, Lisbon and the
pro\,inccs of Beil1l, Estremudura llnd Tras-os-l\fontes were to be
sequestrated till the conclusion of a general peace, and meanwhile
were to be governed and administered by the French. Ultimately
they were to be restored, or not restored, to the house of Draganza
according fUl the high conb·acting parties might determine.
Instead thel"Cfore of receiving punishment for his escapade in the
all~Ulnll of 1806, GOOo)' was to be made by Napoleon a sovereign
prince! But Spain, as apart from the favourite, got small profit
fnlm this extmordinary treat)': Charles IV might t.nke, within the
next three years, the pompous title of 'Emperor of the Two
Americas,' and was to be "given some share of the transmarine
pOSl;Cssions of Portugal-which mcunwhile (treaties or no) would
inevit.nbl)' fall into the haIlds of Great Britain, who held the com-
IllIl11d of the seas, while Napoleon did llot.
It is incredible that Bonaparte ever seriously intended to carry
out the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau: they were not even
I See the text in Appendix, No. 1I.
t In the curious exculpatory memoirs which Godoy published in 1835-6,
with tile aid of d'Esm~nard, he endeavours to make out that he never desired
the principality, and that Napoleon pressed it upon him, because he wishcd to
remove him from ahout the perwn of Charles IV. 'The gift of tile princi-
pality of the Algarves was a banishment' (i. 54). This plea will Dot stand
in the fnce of the f.1ct tllat GOOoy had solicited just such )lrefenneut as far
back as the spring of lB06; 800 A:rteche, Gu.erra th kllndependencia, i. ]48.
His real object was to secure a place of refuge at tlle death of Charles IV.
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to be divulged (as Article XIV stipulated) till it was his pleasure.
GOOoy had deselTed badly of him, and the Emperor was never
forgiving. The fuvourite's whole position and character (as wc,
shall presently show) were so odious and disgraceful, that it would
huve re(luiroo UlI even gl"Ct\tcr cynicism than Napoleon poSSCSSL'<I,
to overthrow an ancient and respectable kingdom in order to make
him a sovereign prillcc. To pose perpetullUy as the regeneratol'
of Europe, and her guardian against the sordid schemes of Britain,
llnd then to employ as one's ogcnt for n~gcllcration the COITUpt and
,'cnal favourite of the wicked old Queen of Spain, would have been
too absurd. Napoleoll's kccn illlelligem:e would have repudiated
the idea, even in the state of growing autolatry into which he was
already lapsing in the ycur 1807. What profit could there be ill
giving a kingdom to a false friend, already convicted of secret
disloyalty, incupable, disTeputable, and univerAAlly detested?
But if we apply anotheT meaning to the Treaty of f'ontainebleau
we get a very different light upon it. If we adopt the hypothesis
that Bonaparte's real aim was to obtain an excuse for marching
French annies into Spain without e."i:citing suspicion, all iLs pro-
\'isions become intelligible. 'This Prince of the Peace,' he said
in one of his confidential moments, 'this mayor of the palace, is
loathed by the nation; he is the rascal who will himself open for me
the gates of Sllain 1.' The phantom principality that was dangled
before Godoy's eyes was only designed to attract his attention while
the annies of France were being poured across the Pyrenees, It is
doubtful whether the Emperor intended the project of the' Princi-
pality of the Algan'es' to become generally known. If he did,
it must have been with the intention of making the favourite more
odious than he already was to patriotic Spaniards, at the moment
when he and his master were about to be brushed away by a sweep
of the imperial arm. That Napoleon was already in October
preparing other annies beside that of Junot, and that he purposed
to overrun Spain when the time was ripe, is shown in the Treaty
itself, Annexed to it is a convention regulating the details of the
invasion of Portugal: the sixth clause of this paper mentions that
it was the emperor's intention to concentrate 40,000 more troops at
Bayonne-in case Great Britain should threaten an armed descent
I 'Le Prince de la Paix, veritable maire du palais, est en horreur a la
nation. C'est 1111 grcdin qui m'ouvriro lui-m~me les portes de l'Espagne'
(Fouche, Mhnoinl, i. 3(5).
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on Portugal-alld that this force would be reu.dy to cross the
:Pyrenees by November feO. Napoleon sent not 40,000 but 100,000
men, and pushed them into Spain, though no English invasion of
Portugal had taken place, or even been projected. After this is
it possible to believe for a moment in his good faith, or to think
that the Treaty of FontaillebJeau was unything more than a snare?
Those who could best judge what was at the back of the emperor's
mind, such as Talleyrand and Fouche, penetrated his designs long
before the treaty of Fontllincbleuu hnd been signed. Tallcyrnnd
declares in his memoirs I that the reason for which he was deprived
of t.he portfolio ofFol'cign Affairs in August, 1807, was that he had
disliked the scheme of invading Spain in a treacherous fashion, and
warned his master against it. No improbability is added to this
allegation by the fllCt that Napoleon at SI.. Helena repeatedly
stated that Talleyrand had first thought of the idea, and had
recommended it to him' while at the same time contriving to set
all opinion abroad that he was opposed to the design.' On the
other hand, wc are:not convinced of the Prince of Benevento's
innocence merely by the fact that he wrote in his autobiography
that he was n strenuous opponent of the plan. He says that the
emperor broached the whole scheme to him the moment that hc
I'ctumcd from Tilsit, asseverating tllat lie would never again expose
himself to the danger of a stab in the back at some moment when
he might be busy in Central Europe 2. He himself, he adds,
eombated the project by every possible argument, but eould not
move his master an inch from his purpose. This is probably true ;
but we believe it not because Talleyrand wrote it down-his bills
require thc endorsemcnt of somc backer of a lcss tarnished repu-
tation-but because the whole of the Spanish episode is c-xecuted
in the t1'ue NapoleonCS<}ue mannel'. Its scientific mixture of force
and fraud is clearly the work of the same hand that mantloO'Cd thc
oetaill of the fall of the Venetian Republic, alld of the dethroning
of Pope PillS VII, It is impossible to ascribe the plot to any other
author.
I Talleyraod, Mbnoim, i. 308-329.
, Ibid., i. 378,379.
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•SECTION I: CHAPTER II
THE COURT OF SPAIN
JUlwr's Ilrmy was nearing the POl'blb~ese frontier, and the
reserve at Bayonnc was already beginning to assemble-it was
now styled' the Second Corps of Observlttion of the Gironde ,-
when a series of startling c,'ents took place at the Spanish Court.
011 October 27, the \'cry dny that the treaty of Fontuillebleau was
signed, Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, was seized by his father
and thrown into (.'01I6ncmellt, Oil ll. charge of high b'CtlSOll, of
having plotted to dethrone or even to murder his aged parellt.
This astonishing development ill the situation need not be laid
to Napoleon's charge. There have been historians who think that
he deliberately stirred up the whole series of family quarrels at
Madrid: but all the materials for trouble were there already, and
the shape which they look was not particularly favourable to the
Emperor's present designs. 11ley sprang from the inevitable
revolt against the predominance of Godoy, which 11ad long 'been due.
The mere fact that an incapable upstart like Godoy had been
able to control the foreign and intel1lal policy of Spllin ever since
1792 is a sufficient evidence of the miserable state of the countr,)"
He was n mere court favourite of the worst class: to compare
him to Buckingham would be far too flattering-and even Piers
Gaveston had a pretty wit and no mean skill as a man-at-anns,
though he was: also a vain ostentatious fool. After a few years,
we may remember, the one met the dagger and the other the axe,
with the full approval of English public opinion. But GOOoy went
on flourishing like the green bay-tree, for sixteen years, decked with
titles and offices and laden with plunder, with no other support
than the queen's unconcealed partiality for him, and the idiotic old
king's desire to have trouble taken off his hands. Every thinking
man in Spain hated the favourite as the outward and visible sign
of corruption in high plo.ccs. Every patriot ~w that the would-be
statesman who made himself the adulator first of Barras and then
of Bonaparte, and played ~t's-paw to each of them, to tlle ultimate
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'ruin and bankruptcy of the realm, ought to be remO'·OO. Yet
there was no sign of any movement against him, save obscure
plots: in the household of the Prince Royal But for the inter·
ference of Napoleon in the affairs of Spain, it is possible that the
Prince of the Peace might have enjoyed many yeal"9 more of
power. Such is the price which nations pay for handing over their
bodies to autocratic monarchy and their souls to three centuries
of training under the Inquisition.
It is pel'hllP.'i necessm'y to gain some detailed idea of the UIl-
pleasant family party at Madrid. King Charles IV was now a
man of sixty years of age: he was so entirely simple and helpless
that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that his weakness
bordered on imbecility. His elder brother, Don Philip, was so
clearly wanting in intellect that he had to be placed in confine-
ment and excluded from the throne. It might occur to us that
it would have ~n well for Spain if Charles had followed him
to the asylum, if we hud not to remember that the crown would
then have fallen to Ferdinand of Naples, who if more intelligent
was also more morally worthless than his brother. Till the age
of forty Charles hllU been entirely suppressed and kept in tutelage
by an autocratic father: when he came to the throne he never
de"eloped any will or mind of his own, and remained the tool
and servant of those about him. He may be described as a good-
natured and bene\'olent imbecile: he was not cruel or malicious
or licentious, or given to extravllf,lfillt fl\l1cies. His one pronounced
taste was hunting: if he could get away from his ministers to
some country palace, and go out all day with his dogs, his gun,
and his gamekeepers, he was perfectly happy. His hrother of
Naples, it will be remembered, had precisely the same hobby.
Of allY other tastes, save a slight interest in some of the minor
handicrafts, which he shared with his cousin Louis XVI, wc find
no trace in the old king. He was very ugly, not with the fierce
clever ugliness of his father Charles ID, but in an imbecile fllShion,
with a frightfully receding forehead, a big nose, and a retreating
jaw generally set in a hannless gJ;n. He did not understand
business or politics, but was quite capable of getting through
speeches and ceremonies when properly primed and prompted
beforehand. Even his pri,'ute letterll were managed for him by
his wife and his favourite. He had just enough brains to be
proud of his position as king, and to resent anything that he re-
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gardcd as an attack on his dignity-such as the mention of old'
constitutional rights and privil~nes, or any allusion to a Cortes.
He liked, in fnet, to fl.'C1 himself und to be calk-d an absolute king,
though he wished to hand over all the duties and worries of king-
ship to his wife and his chosen SCfWlIlls. Quite eontmry to Spanish
usage, he often associated Maria Luisa's name with his own in
State documents, and in popular diction they were often called
'los Ueyes,' 'the Kings,' as Ferdiunnd and lsabella had been three
hundred years before.
'l'he Queen was about the most wlfit person in Europe to be
placed on lhe throne at the side of such an imbecile husband.
She was his first cousin, the daughter of his uncle Don Philip.
Duke of Parma-Dourbon on the mother's side also, for she was
the child of the daughter of Louis XV of France. Maria Luisa
was self-confident, flighty, reckless, and utterly destitute of con-
science of any SOl't. Her celebrated portrait by Goya gives us
at once an idea of the woman, bold, shameless, pleasure-loving,
and as COI'l1lPC as Suutherll COllrt morality allows-which is sa.yil]g
a good deaL She had from the first taken the measure of her
imbecile husband: she dominated him b)' her superior force of
will, made him her mere mouthpiece, and practically ruled the
realm, turning him out to hunt while she managed ministers amI
ambassadors.
For the last twenty years 11el' scandalous partiality for Don Manuel
GOOoy had been public property. When Charles IV came to the
t1lrone GOOny was a mere private in the bodyguard-a SOli of'
ornamental corps of gentJemen-at.arms. He was son of a decayed
noble family, a big handsome showy young man of twenty-one-
barely able to read and write, say his detractors-but it. good singer
and musician. Within four years after he caught the Queen's eye
he was a grandce of Spain, a duke, !lOd prime minister! He was
married to a royal princess, the Infanta Teresa, a cousin of the King,
a m6sa11iance unparalleled in the wholc history of the house of
Bourbon. Three years later, to commemorate his part in con·
eluding the disgraceful peace of BasIc, he was given the odd title
of 'Prince of the !leaee,' , Principe de la Pm': no Spanish subject
had e\'cr before been decorated with My title higher than that of
duke 1. In 1808 he was a man of forty, beginning to get a little
I The princes that occur in Spanish politics, e.g. EboJi or Castelfmnco,
were holders of Italian, generally Neapolitan, titles.
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plump and bald after so man,Y years of good (or evil) living, but
still a tine personable figure. He had stowed away enormous
riches, not only fmm the gifts of the King and Queen, but by the
sale of offices and commissions, the taking of all SOlts of illicit
percentages, and (perhaps the worst symptom of all) by colossal
speculations all the stock exchan{,.-e. A French ambus.<;ador recorded
the fact that he had to keep the treaty of peace of 1802 quiet for
three days after it was signed, in order that GOOoy might complete
his purclJUses 'for 11 rise' before the news got about 1, Gadoy
was corrupt and licentious, but not cruel or even tyrannical:
though profoundly ignomnt, he had the vunity to pose as a patron
of art und science. His foible was to be hailed as a universal
benefactor, and as the introducer of modern ci\'ilization into Spain.
He endeavoured to popularize the practice of vaccination, waged
0. mild 11Ild intermittellt. war with the Inquisition, alld (a most
astonishing piece of courage) tried to suppress the custom of
bull-fighting. l1le Imt two acts were by fal· the most creditable
items that can be put down to his (l.(.'<..'ount: unfortunately they
were also precisely those which appealed least to the populace of
Spain. GOOoy was a notable collector of pictures and antiquities,
and luu] a certain liking for, Ilnd skill in, Illllsic. 'l'iThen this hns
been said, there is nothing more to put down in his favour.
Fifteen years of power had so tumed his head that for Cl.. long
time be had been taking himself quite seriously, llnci his lUnbition
bad grown so monstrollS that, not contented with his alliance by
marriage with the royal house, he was dreaming of becoming
a sovereign prince. The bait by which Napolcon finally drew
him into the trap, the promise that he should be given the
Algarves and Alemtejo, wm not the Corsican's own invention.
It had oc'Cn an olJ idel~ of Goooy's which he brouched to his
ally early in 1806, only to receive a severe rebuff. Hence came
the joy with which he finally saw it take shape in the treaty of
FontaineblCllu 2• When sllch schemes were running in his head,
we CilI1 perfectly well credit the accusation which llrinec Ferdinand
brought against him, of having intended to change the succession
to the crown of Spllin, by n coup ll'etat on the death of Charles IV.
The man had grown capable of any outburst of pride and ambition.
1 Foy, Gllerre th III PlllilUfIIJe, ii. 2Gi.
rI See the proo& from papers in the Spanish Foreign Office, quoted in
Artccbo's G-uerr~ de la Il1depelldellciu, i. 148.
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Meanwhile he continued to govern Spain by his hold over the
imbecile and gouty old king and his worthless wife, who was now
fu.r over fifty, but us besotted on her fuvourite us ever. It was his
weary lot to be always in attendance on them. They could hardly
let him out of their sight. TorcflO l-elates a ridiculous story. that,
when Napoleon invited them to dinuer on the first night of their
unhappy visit to Btl-)'olme, he did not nsk the Prince of the Peace
to the royal table. Charles was so unhappy and uncomfortable
that he could not settle down to his meal till the empel'or had
sent for Godoy. and found a place for him near his master Md
mistress 1.
The fourth individual with whose personality it is necessary to
be acquainted when studying the court of Spain in 1808 is the heir
to the throne, Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias. Little \\'IIS known
of him, for his parents and GOOo)' had carefully excluded him from
political life. But whcn a prim.'C is getting on fOl" thirty, and his
father has begun to show signs of failing health, it is impossible
that eyes should not be turned on him from all quarters, Fenlinand
was not an imbecile like his father, nor a scandalous person like his
mother; but (though Spain knew it not) he was coward and a cur.
With such parents he had naturally been brought up very badl)'.
He was ignominiously excluded f!'Om all public business, and kept
in absolute ignorance of all subjects on which a print-'C should have
some knowledge: history, military science, modern politics, foreign
languages, were all sealed books to him. He had been educated, So
far as he was trained at all, by a clever and ambitious priest, Juan
Escoiqui:t., II cullon of Toledo, An obscure churchmun WWl not the
best tutor for a future sovereign: he could not instruct the prince
in the more necessary arts of go\'emal1l.~ but he seems to have
taught him dissimulation and superstition 2. For Ferdinand was
pious with a grovelling sort of piety, which made him curry about
strings of relics, spend much of his time in church ceremonies, and
I Torei'lo, i. 86. The story is con6nned by Sa.vnry, in his Mblloirnl, ii. 221.
1 11lat Escoiqui:t; was a clever wan, and not the mere intrigl1er that he is
often called, is (I think) shown not only by the impression which he made
upon Napoleon (who called him, in jest, le petit Ximb~8) aud on De l)radt at
Bayonne, but still more by his work, the Cmwer,ffltWIl Ut'etJ NupoMrm. If he
invented it, he must have been a genius, so wellltas he caught the Emperor's
a.tyla j if he unly reproduced it he was at least :m a.Umir-..aLle and picturesque
reporter.
•MARIA LUJSA
-RETNA DE ESP.tfNA.
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(ns rumour so.id) take to embroidering petticoats for his favourito
image of the Virgin in his old age.
The prince had one healthy sentiment, a deep hatred for GOOoy,
who had from his curliest youth excluded him from his proper
place in the court and the state. But he was too timid to resent
the favourite's influence by anything but sulky rudeness. If he
had chosen, he could at once have put himself at the head of the
powerful body of persons whom the favourite had disobliged or
offended. I-lis few intimate friends, and abo"e all his tutor
Escoiquiz, were always spurring him on to take some l\.Ctive
measures against the Prince of the Peace. But Ferdinand was
too indolent and too cautious to move, though he was in his secret
heart convim.·(.'<1 thl\t his enemy was plotting his destruction, and
intended to exclude him from the throne at his father·'s death.
To give a fair idea of the education, character, and brains of
this miserable prince it is only necessary to quote a couple of hig
letters. The first was written in November, 1807, when he had
been impri80ned by his father for ca.rrying on the famous secret
correspondence with Napoleon. It runs as follows:-
DEAR PAl'A I,
I ha.ve done wrong: I have sinned against your majesty,
both as king and as father; but I have repented, and I now offer
your majesty the most humble obedience. I ought to have done
nothing without your majesty's knowledge; but I was caught
ul1awu.rcs. I have given lip the lllUlles of the bruilty persons, tUld
[ beg your majesty to pardon me for having lied to you the other
night, hnd to allow your gratefltl son to kiss your royal feet.
(Signed) FERNANDO.
San Lorenzo (The Escurial~ Nov. 5, 1807.
It is doubtful whether the childish whining, the base betrayal of
his unfortunate accomplices, or the slavish tone of the confession
forllls the most striking point in this epistle.
But the seeolld document that we havc to quote' gives an
cven worse idea of Ferdinand. Several years after he had been
t Obscne < Papa Mio' iustead of 'l'adre Mio.· TIle Spanish text I have
printed as Appcndix 3 of this ,·olllme. Sume say that Godoy dictated the
wording of the letter, and did not merely insist that a letter of some sort
must be written to secnre a pardon. In allY case the terms were such as no
self-respecting person could have signed. '1116 sentence t pido a V. J\1. me
perdolle por haberle mentido la otra noclte; the most vile ill tlte whole composi-
tion, are onuth..'l1 by the courUy De Pradt II'holl he translates it into Frc.nt:h.
OUAN. I C
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imprisoned by Napoleon at Valen~y, a desperate attempt was
made to deliver him. Baron Colli, a daring Austrian officer,
entered France, amid a thousand dangers, with a scheme for de-
livering the prince: he hoped to get him to the coast, and to an
English frigate, by means of false passports and relays of swift
horses. The unfortunute adventurer was caugbt and thrown into
a dungeon at Vincennes 1. After the plot had miscarried Ferdinand
wrote Wl follows to his jailor :-
'An unknown person got in here in disguise and proposed to
wior Amczagu., my master of the horse and steward, tu ctUTy me
oH' from Valcn98-Y. asking him to pass on some papers, which he
hw:l brought, to my hands., und to aid in curr)'ing out this horrible
undertaking. My honour, ffi)' repose, and the good opinion due
to my principles might "aU have been compromised, if &l101'
Amezaga had not given proof of his devotion to His Imperial
Majesty and to myself, by revealing everything to me at once.
I write immediately to give information of the matter, and take
this opportunity of showing anew my inviolable fidelity to the
Emperor Napoleon, and the horror that I feel at this infernal
project, whose author, I hope, may be chastised according to his
deserts.'
It is not surprising to find that the man who was capable of
writing this letter also wrote more than once to congratulate
Joseph Bonaparte on his victories over the' rebels' in Spain.
It had bt.'Cll clear for some time that the bitter hatred which
the Prince Royal bore to Godoy, and the fear which the favourite
fclt at the prospect of his enemy's IlCC(,'SSion to the throne, would lead
to some explosion ere long. If Ferdinand had been a man of
ordinary ability and deternlination he could probably have orga-
nized a coup rf~tat to get rid of the favourite, without much
trouble. Dut he was so slow and timid that, in spite of aU the
exhortations of his partisans, he ne\'er did more than copy out two
letters to his father which Escoiquiz drafted for him. I-le never
screwed up his courage to the point of sending them, or personally
delivering them into his father's hands. They were rhetorical
I Thcre is n vcry black uudcrfllot in the story or &ron Colli. Wben lie
was caught the French police sent a spy with his credentials to ValeD~ay, to
see how far the persons about f'erdinaml could be iuduced to compromise
themselves. But the prince's terror, and abject delation of the supposed
baron, stopped further proceediogs.
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compositions, setting forth the moral and political turpitude of
GOOoy, find warning the King that his favourite was guilty of
designs on the throne. If Charles IV had been given them, he
probably could not have mfide ont half the meaning, and would
have handed them over for interpretation to the trusty Manue}
himself. The only other move which the prince was induced to
make was lo dmw out a warrant appointing his friend llnd confidant,
the Duke of Infantado, Captain-General of New Castile. It was to
be used if the old king, who was then labouring under one of his
attAcks of gout, should chance to he carrietl off by it. 'l"he charge
of Madrid, and of the troops in its vicinity, was to be consigned
to one whom Ferdinand could trust, so that GOOoy might be cllcck.
mated.
But the Prince of the Asturias took one other step in the
autumn of 1807 which was destined to bring matters to a head.
It occurred to him that instead of incurring the risks of conspiracy
at home he would do better to apply for aid to his father's all-
powerful ally. If Napoleon took up his causc, and promised him
protection, he would be safe against all the machinations of the
!lrince of the PellCC: for a frank and undisguised terror of the
Emperor was the mainspring of Godoy's foreign and domestic
policy. Fcrdinand thought that he had a sure method of enlisting
Bonaparte's benevolence: he was at this moment the most eligible
parti in Europe: he had lost his first wife, a daughter of hig uncle
of Naples, and being childless was bound to marry again 1. By
offering to accept ll. spouse of the Emperor's choice he would give
such a guarantC€ of future loyalty and obedience that his patron
(who WlIS quite aware of GOOoy's real feelings towards France)
would withdraw all his SUppOlt from the favourite and transfer it
to himself. Acting under the advice of Escoiquiz, with whom he
WllS always in secret I.:ommunica.tion, Ferdinand first SOUllded the
l'rench ambassador at Madrid, the Marquis de Beauharnais,
a brothcr-in~law of the Empress Josephine. Escoiquiz saw the
lllllbn.~sador, who displayed much plensure fit his proposals, nnd
urged him to encourage the prince to proceed with his plan ll.
I Godor hau the impudence to propose to the prince that he shoultl many
Donna Luisa, t11e younger sister of his O\I'D uufortunate wife, and the cousin
of the King. Ferdinand found courage to refuse this aUillllce.
'I The intrigues of Escoiquiz had heguu as early as Marc11, 1907, the month
in which the lott.ers to the King against GOOO)' were drafted. 'l'he negotiation
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The fact was that the diplomatist saw profit to his own family in
the scheme: for in default of eligible damsels of the house of
Bonaparte, it was probable that the lady whom the Emperor might
choose as Queen of Spain would be onc of his own rclatives-some
Beauharllais or Tascher-a niece or cousin of the Empress. A wife
for the hereditary prince of Badcn had been already chosen from
among them in the preceding year.
When therefore Escoiquiz bronched the matter to the am~
sadnl' in June, 1807, the latter only asked that he should be given
full tlSSUffiUCC thnt the Prince of the Asturias would carry out his
design. No private interview could be managed between them
ill the c.xisting state of Spanish court etiquette, and with the spies
of GOOoy lurking in every comer. But by a prearranged code of
signals Fcrdinand certified to Bcuuharnais, at onc of the royal
levees, that he had given all his confidence to Escoiquiz, and that
the latter WtlS really acting in his name. The IUllhassador there-
fore undertook to transmit to his master at Paris any document
which the 'prince might entrust to ·him. Hell{.-e thcre came to
be written -the celebrated letter of October 11, 1807, in which
Fcn:linilnd implored the pity of 'the 'hero sent by providence to
save Europe from anarchy, to strengthen tottering thrones, and to
give to the ·nations peace und felicity.' His futher, he suid, WIl$
surrounded by malignant and astute intriguers who had estranged
him from his son. Dut one word from Paris would suffice to
discomfit such persons, and to open the eyes of his loved parents
to the just grievances of their child. As a token of amity and
protection he ventured to ask Bonapartc for the hund of somc lady
of his aUf,l'llst house. He does not seem to have had any particular
one in his eye, as the demand is mudc in the most general terms.
The choice would really have lain between the eldest daughter of
Lucien Bonapm1e, who was then (as usual) 011 stmined terms with
his brother, And one of the numerous kinswomen of the Empress
.fosephine.
GOOoy was so well served by his numerous spies that the news
of the letter addressed to Donaparte was soon conveyed to him.
He resolved to take advantage to the full of the mistake which
with Dea.uhamais began in June. These dates are strongly against the idCo1
that llonaparto lI'aIl at tha ho.tOOm of the whole allil.ir; his hant! does nllt
appear till July-August. Indeed he was far away in Eastern Germany wheu
Escoiqui~ began his mOOn'iews with the aml.tassatlor.
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the prince had made in opening a correspondence with a foreign
powel' behind the back of his father. He contrived an odious SL"ene.
He induced the old king to make a sudden descent on llis son's
apartments 011 the night of O"tober 27, with an annoo guard at
his back, to accuI;C him publicly of uimillg at dethroning or even
murdering his parents, nnd to throw him into solitary confinement.
Ferdinand's papers were sequestrated, hut there was found among
thcm nothing of importancc except the two documents denollncing
Godoy, which the prince bud composed 01' copied out under the
direction of his adviser Escoiquiz, and a cyphcr codc which was
discovered to have belonged to the prince's late wife, and to Il(l.ve
been used by hel' in her private let1:.eni to her mother, the Qucen of
Naples.
'!'hCI"e was absolutely nothing that pro\'ed any intelltion 011 the
part of Ferdinand to commit himself to overt treason, though
plenty to show his deep discontent, and his hatred for the Prince of
the Pcncc. 'l'he only ad: that an honest critic could colI disloynl
was the attempt to open up a correspondence with Napoleon.
But GOOoy thought that he had found his opportunity of crushing
the heir to the throne, and even of removing him from the succes-
sion. He caused Charles IV to publish an extraordinary manifesto
to his subjects, in which. he was made to speak as follows;-
'God, who watches OVCl' all creation, does not pcnnl.t the success
of atrocious designs against an innocent victim. His omnipotencc
has just. delivered me from Itll incredible catastrophe. My people,
my faithful subjects, know my Christian life, my regular conduct:
they all love me and gi,ve me constant proof of their veneration,
the reward due to 0. parent who loves his children. I was living in
perfect confidence, when an unknown hand delated to me the most
enonnous and incredible plot, hatched in my own palace against
my person. The preservation of my life, which IlHS been already
several times in danger, should have been the special charge of the
heir to my throne, but blindoo,and estranged from all those Christian
principles ill which my paternal care und love have reared him, he
has given his consent to ll. plot to dethrone me. Taking in hand
the invcstigation of the matter, I surprised him in his apal'tlllent~
and found in his hands the cypher which he used to commwlicate
with his evil counsellors. I have thrown several of these criminals
into prison, and have put my son uucler nrrcst in his own ubo<le.
'fhis necessary punishment adds another sorrow to the many which
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already afflict me; but as it is the most painful of all, it is also
the most Ilecessary of all to carry out. Meanwhile I publish the
facts: I do not hide from my subjects the grief that I feel-which
can only be lessened by the proofs of loyalty which I know that
they will display'! [Oct. 30, 1807].
Charles was therefore made to charge his son with a dclibemte
plot to dethrone him, and even to hint that his life had been in
danger. The only possible reason for the Cannulating of this most
unjustifiable accusation must have been that GOOoy thought that
he might now dare to sweep away the Prince of the Allturias from
his path by imprisonment or exile. There can be no other explana.
tion for the washing in public of so much of the dirty lillen of the
palace. }i'erdinand, by his craven conduct, did his best to help his
enemy's designs; in abject fear he delated to the King the names
of Escoiquiz and his other confidants, the dukes of Infantado and
San Carlos. He gave full patticulars of his attempt to communicate
with Napoleon, and of aH·his correspondence with his parlisans-
even acknowledging that he had given Infantado that undated
commission as Captain-General of New Castile, to come into effect
when he himself sh~uld become king, which we have already had
occasion to mention. This act, it must be owned, was a little
unseemly, but if it had really borne the sinister meaning that
GOOoy chose to put upon it, we may guess that Ferdin8.nd would
never hnve divulged it. In addition the prince wrote the disgusting
letter of supplication to his father which has been already quoted,
owning that' he had lied. the other night,' and asking leave to kiss
his majesty's ,royal feet. It is beyond dispute that this epistle,
with another similar one to the Queen, was written after a stormy
interview with GOOoy. The favourite had been aUowed by his
master and mistress to visit Ferdinand in prison, and to bully
him into "Titing these documents, which (as he hoped) would ruin
the prince's reputation for ever with eve!)' man of heart and honour.
GOOoy was wrong here: what struck the public mind far more than
the prince's craven tone was the unseemliness of publishing to the
world his miscrublc letters. Thut a pl"ince royal of Spain should
have been terrified by an upstart charlatan like GOOoy into writing
such words maddened all who read them.
Napoleon was delighted to see the royal family of Spain putting
itself in such an odious light. He only intervened Oil a side issue
I 111e manuscript of this decree was ill the halll.lwritiug of GOOoy himself.
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by sending peremptory orders that in any proceedings taken against
the Prince of the Asturias no mention was to be made of himself
or of his amhassndor, i.e. the matter of the secret appeal to
J:'rauce (the one thing for which E'erdinand could be justly blamed)
was not to be allowed to transpire. It was probably this corn·
mtmieution from Paris which !lIlvcd Ferdinund from expel'icncing
the full consequences of GOOoy's wrath 1. If any public trial took
place, it was certain that either Ferdinand or some of his friends
would speak of the French intrigue, and if the story came out
Napoleon would be aogt'}'. The mere thought of this possibility
so worked upon the fnvuurite that he suddenly resolved to stop the
impeachment of the prince. In return for his humiliating prayers
for mercy he was given a SOlt of Ilngracious pardon. ''l11C voice
of nature,' so fun the turgid proclamation which GOOoy dictated to
the old king, 'disarms the hand of vengeance. I forgive my SOIl,
tmd. will restore him to my good graecs whcn his conduct shall
hu\'e proved him a truly reformed character.' Ferdinand was left
dishonoUlw ILnd humiliated: he had been accused of intended
parricide, made to betray his friends and to confess plots which he
had never formed, and then pardoned. GOOoy hoped that he was
so ruined in thc eyes of the Spanish people, and (what WIl..'i more
important) in the eyes of Napoleon, that there would be no more
trouble with him, a supposition in which he grievously erred.
Aftcr a decent interval the prince's fellow conspirators, Escoiquiz
and Infantado, wcre acquitted of high treason by the court before
which they had been sent, Rnd allowed to go free. Of the dl'eadful
accusations made in the Proclamation of Oct. 30 nothing more
was heard.
111C whole of the ' Affair of the Escurial,' as the arrest, imprison~
ment, and forgiveness of Ferdinand came to be called, took place
between the twenty-seventJl of October and. the fifth of November,
datcs at which it is pretty certain that NapOleon's unscrupulous
designs against the royal house of Spain had long been matured.
The open quarrel of the imbecile father !md the cowardly son only
helped him in his plans, by making more manifest than ever the
dcplomble state of the Spanish court. It served tl8 a u.seful plea to
I Cf. lo'oy and Torefio, who agree on this point. Napoleon insiuuntes tl8
much in his letter to ~'erdinnlld of April 16,1806 : '1 flatter myself that
I contributed by lily representations to thll happy ending of the affair of the
Escurial' (Nap. Oorrup" 13,750).
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justify nets of aggression which must have been planned many
months before. If it had ne,'er taken place, it is still certain
that Napoleon would have found some other plea for sweeping out
the worthless house of Bourbon from the l)eninsula. He had
begWl to collect Ilnnies at the roots of the PyrcllL'eSl without
any obvious military necessity. some weeks before Ferdinand was
arrested. When that simple fud is taken into consideration we
see at ontt the hollowness of his plea, elaborated during his exile
ut St. Helens 1, that it WLL,> the disgraceful explosion of family
hatred in the Spanish royal house that first suggested to him the
idea of removing the whole generation of Bourbons, and giving
Spain a new king and a new dynasty.
NOTE TO CHAPTER 1I
IT may perhaps be wortb while to gil'C, for what it is wort11, a story which
I fiud ill the Vaughall PO}JImJ concerning the causes of the fillal quarrel be-
tween Godoy and the Prince of the Asturias, ending ill the arrest of the latter
allu the whole' Affair of tile Escurial.' Among Vaughan's large collection
of miscellaneous papers is 11 long document addressed to him by olle of his
Spanish friends, purporting to give the secret history of the rupture; the
narrative is said by the author to ba\'e been obtained from the mouth of
the minister Caballero, who would certainly llave had the betit means of
goining court intelligcnce in October, 1807. 111C tale runs as follows: "I11C
Queen llad for many years been accustomed to make secret visits to GOOoy's
palace under cover of the dark, CflCOrted only by 8 lady-in-waiting and JI
single body-servant. TIle sentinels round the palace had been designedly
so placed that nOlle of them coI'ered the postern door by which her majesty
was aceustomed to' pass in and out. One night in the autumn of" 1007 tile
whole s}'stem of tile palace-guanls was suddenly chang(.'(I without the Queen's
k"llOII..ledge, and when she returned from her excursion she ran into the ann!
of a corporal's guard placed in front of the privy entrance, The men, fortu-
nately for l\Iaria Luisa, did not recognize the three muffl.ed figures who feU
into their clutches, amI allowed them to buy Uleir way in for all O7lza 1fQ'/'(),
or gold twenty-dollar piece, But when GOOoy and the Queen talked the
matter over, and found that King Charles had ordered the inconvenient altera-
tions in the sentinels, they came to tile conclusion that Ferdinand harl
deliberately induced his father to change the posts of the guard, with tile
object either of stopping his mother's exits or of making a public scandal by
causing her to be arrested at this strange place 311d hour, The Prince
ellauced to have had a private COI\\'ersation with his father 011 the pre\'ious
day, and this might well have been its result.' In high wrath, the story
1 Las Cllses, ii. 200,
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proceeds, tIle Queen and the favourite resolved to crush Ferdinand at once,
and to get him c:o:cluded from tile ilUcceIlEion. 111Cy chose the very inade-
I]uate excuse of the letter of the Prince to Napoleon, of which they hnt:!
perfect cognizance from the "cry moment of its being 'l\7ittcn. Dut, we arc
assured, they were fluite wrollg ill their SllSlliciollS, the originator of lite
movement of the sentries, which had so discollcerted them, having been
Daron Versagc, the uewly appointed colonel of the Walloou Guards. He
had got the King's leave to rearrange the watclling of the palace, and going
round it had spied the private door, which he had blocked witl} a lIew
picquet, quite unnware of the purpose for wIdell it hoo been used for so many
years. This Versage, it will be remembered, EerH~d under Palafox, and
was killed ill Aragon during the first year of the war. 1 Mould imagine the
whole tale to be an ingenious fiction, in spite of the Ilame of Caballero citt'(l
in its support: of Utat personage Napoleon wrote [Nap. Corr&}). 14,OHi]
'i1 a une tres mauvtl.ise re:puta'tion ; c'est tout dire que de dire qu'iJ etait
I'homme de confiance de la Iteine.· Dut tlle story was curreut i.n Spain very
6OO11 after the alleged advcuturc took place.
SECTION I: CHAPTER IH
THE CONQUEST OF PORTUGAL
Tm:R.E is certainly no example in history of a kingdom con-
quered in so few days and with such small trouble as was Portugal
ill 1807. 'l'hat a nation of three million souls, which in earlier
days had repeatedly defended itself with success against numbers
far greater than those now employed against it, should yield without
tiring a single shot was astonishing. It is a testimony not only
to the timidity of the Portuguese Government, but to the numbing
power of Napoleon's name.
The force destined by the Treaty of FontAinebleau for the inva-
sion ofPOItugal consisted of Junot'g 'Army of the Gironde,' 25,000
strong, and of three auxiliary Spanish corps amounting in all to
about the sullle numbers. Of these one, coming from Galicia I, was
to strike at Oporto and the Lower Douro; another, from Badajoz 2,
was to take the fortress of Elvas, the southern bulwark of POIiugal,
and then to march on Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus.
These were flanking operations: the main blow at the Poliuguese
capital was to be dealt by Junot himself, strengthened by a third
Spanish force 3; they were to COlllXlntrate at Salamllnca llnd Ciudad
Rodrigo, and make fO!' Lisbon by the high-road that passes by
Almeida and Coimbra.
The Army of the Gironde crossed the Bidassoa OD October 18:
by the 12th ofNovember it had arrived at Salamanca, having covered
300 miles in twenty·five days-very leisurely marching at the rate of
twelve miles a day. The Spaniards would not have been pleased
to know that, by Napoleon's orders, engineer officers were secretly
taking sketches of every fortified place and defile that the army
passed, and preparing reports as to the resources of all the towns
of Old Castile and Leon. This was one of the many signs of the
1 Composed of 6,500 men under General Taranco, marcliing from Vigo.
, Composed of 9,500 men under So1a1l0, Calltain-General of Andalusia., and
marchiug from Badajoz.
~ COlllposed of 9,500 men under Caraffa.
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Emperor',..; ultimate designs. On the 12th of November, in COIl~
sequence we cannot doubt of the outbreak of the troubles of
October 27 at the Spanish court, Junot suddenly received new
orders, lelliug him to hm'I'Y' Hc was informed Umt every day
which intervened before his arrival at Lisbon was time granted to
the Portuguese in which to prepare resistonce,-possibly a180 time
ill which England, who had plenty of troops in the Mediterranean,
might make up her mind to send military aid to her old ally.
JUDot was din.>eb..'<l to quicken his puce, und to strike before the
enemy could mature plans of defence.
For this reason he wos told to chmlge his route. The Emperor
had originally intended to invade the country over the usual line
of attack from Spain, by Almeido. and Coimbra, which Mn.ssena
was to take three years later, in 1810. But when the events at
the Escurial showed that a crisis was impending in Spain, Napoleon
changed his mind: there was the fortre'>!> of Alltl~ida in the way,
which might offer resistance and cause delay, and beyond were
11Cllrly 200 miles of difficult monntain rouds. Looking at his
maps, Napoleon saw that there was a much shorter way to Lisbon
by another route, down the 'l'agus. From Alcantara, the Spanish
frontier town on that rh-er, to Lislxm is only 120 miles, and there
is no fortress on the way. The maps could not show the Emperor
that this road was for half of its lellgth tI. series of rocky defiles
through an almost unpeopled wilderness.
, OI'del'S were therefore sent to Junut to transfer his bw;c of
operations from Salamanca to Alcantara, and to march dovm the
'l'agus. The Spaniards (according to their orders) had ooUected
the magazines for feeding Junot's force at Salamanca and Ciudad
Rodrigo. But for that Napoleon cared little. He wrote that the
anny must take the shortest road at all costs, whatever the difficulty
of getting supplies. 'I will not have the march of the army
dcluJt.'l1 for a single day,' he "ddcd; '20,000 men can feed them-
selves anywhere, even in a desert.' It was indeed a desert that
Junot was ordered to cross: the hill.road from Cindad Rodrigo
to Alcllntara, which hugs the Portuguese frontier, has hardly a
village on it; it crosses ridge after ridge, ravi.ne after ravine. In
November the rains had just set in, and every torrent was full.
Over this stony wildemess, by the Pass of Jlerales, the French army
rushed in five daJs, but at the cost of dl'eooful privations. When
it reached Alcantara half the horses had perished of cold, all the
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guns but six had been left behind, stranded at various points Oll
the road, and of the inflUltry IllOrc than a quttrttT WIlS missing_
the famished men having scattered in all directions to find food.
If there hud been a Portuguese fOl"CC watching AlctUlwra, JUllot
must haw.! waited for mallY days to get his army together agabl,
1\11 the more so becnuse every CArtridge that his men were curryillg
had been spoiled by the wet. But there were no enemies near;
JUlIot found at· the great Tugus bridge only a few Spanisll
battalions and guns on the way to join his army. Confiscating their
munitions to flll his men's pouch~ ttnd their food to provide them
with two days' rations, JUllot rushed on again upon the 19th of )Jo-
vember. He found, to his surprise, that there wus no rOlid suitable
for wheeled traffic along the Tagus "alley, but only a poor track
running 1l1ong the foot of the mountains to CMtello Branco, tlle
sole Portuguese town in this part of the frontier. The march from
Alcantara to Abrant.es proved even more trying than that from
L'iudad Rodrigo to AlCaJltara. It was through a treeless wilder-
ness of grey granite, seamed with countless ravines. The rain
continued, the torrents were even fuller than before, the country
even more desolate than the Spanilih side of the border. It was
only after terrible sufferings that the head of the column reached
Abrantes on November 2S; the rear trailed in on the 26th. All
the guns except fOUI Spanish pieces of horse artillery had fallen
behind: the CIlvalry was practically dismounted. Half the infantry
was marauding oft' the road, or resting dead-beat in the few poor
villtlb'CSlhat it had passed. Iftllere had been ~'eIl5,OOO Portuguese
troops at Abrantes the French would have been brought to a
stop. But instead of hostile batt.alions, Junot found there only
an alL'cious diplomatist, named Barreto, sent by the Prince-lwgent
to slop his ad\'llllce by offers of servile submission to the Emperor
and proffers of tribute. Reassured as to the possibility that the
Portuguese might ]lU.ve been intemlillg anJl(x] resistance, .JUllot
now took a most hazardous step. Choosing the least disorganized
compunies of every regiment., he made up four battalions of picked
men, and pushed on again for Lisbon, now only seventy-five miles
distant. This time lIe had neither Il. gun nor II horseman left, but
he struggled forward, and on the 30th of November entered the
Portuguese mpital at the head of 1,500 Wetl.I'J soldiers, all that Imd
been able to endure to the end. They limped in utterly exhausted,
their clothes in rllo<7S, and their cartridb"CS so soaked through that they
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could not have fired a shot had the)' been attacked. If the mob
of Lisbon had fallen on them with sticks and stones, the starving
invaders must have been driven out of the city. But nothing of
the kind happened, and Junot was able to install himself as
1,1'{)\'c.....lOr of POItugal without having to strike a blow. It was
ten days before the last of the stragglers came up from the rear,
and even more before the artillery appeared llnd the cavalry began to
remount itself with confiscated horses. Meanwhile the Portuguese
were digesting the fact that the)' had allowed 1,500 famished, half·
amllxl men to seize thcit capital.
While Junot had been rushing on from Salamanca to Alcanrora,
and fi'OlIl Alcanrnra to Abrantes, Lisbon had been the scene of
much pitiful commotion. '111e Prince-Regent had long refused to
believe that Napoleon really intended to dethrone him, and had
been !>till occupying himself with futile schemes for propitiating
the Emperor. Of his courliers and generals, hardly one counselled
resistance: there was no talk of mobilizing the dilupidat.c<larmy of
some 30,000 men which the country was supposed to possess, or
or calling out the militia which ha.d done SLlch good service in em'lier
wars with Spain and FrallCC. Prince Jolm contented himself with
declaring war 011 England on the twentiet.h of October, and with
garrisoning the coast batteries which protect Lisbon against attacks
from the sea. Of these signs of obedience he sent reports to
Napoleon: on the eighth of November he scizl.'<1 the persons of
the few English merchants who still remained in Portugal; the
majority had wisely absconded in October. At the Sllme time he
let the Britis'l Government know that he was at hearl their friend,
and only driven by brute force -to his present COlli'SC: he even
,~rmittl.-d their ambassador, Lord Strangronl, to linger in Lisbon.
In a few days the Regent began to see that Napoleon was
·inexorable: his ambassador from Pm'is was sent buck to him, and
reported that he had passed on the way the army of Junot marcbing
by Burgos on Salamanca.. PrcscntJy all English fleet under
Sir Sydney Smith, the hero of Acre, appeared at the mouth of
the Tagus, alld dechuw Lisbon in a state of blockade-the natured
reply to the Uegcllt's declaration of war and seizure of English
residellt.~. Other reiLSons e."isted for the blockade: there had
lately arrived in the Tagus a Russian sqnadron on its homeward
way from the Mediterranean. '111e CmI' Alexander was at this
time Napoleon's eager ally, and had just declared war on England;
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it seemed wise to keep an eye on these ships, whose arrival appeared
to synchronize in a most suspicious way with the approach of Juuot.
Moreover there was the Portub"llcse fleet to be considered: if the
Prince-Regent intended to hand it over to the Frellch, it would
have to be dealt with in the same way as the Danish fleet had been
treated a few months before.
Lord Strangford retired on board Sydney Smith's flagship, the
Hibel"llia, and from thence continued to exChRllge notes with the
miserable Portuguese Government. The Regent was still hesitating
between sending still morc abject proposals of submission lo
Bonaparte, and the only other alternative, that of getling on
board llis fleet and crossillg the Atlantic to the great Portuguese
colony in Brazil. The news that Junot had reached Alcantal'u
only confused him still more; he l..'Ould not IIlnkc up his mind
•to leave his comfortable palace at :Mafra, his gardens, and the
countless chapels and shrines in which his soul delighted, in order
to dare the unaccustomed horrors of the deep. On the other
hand, he feared that, if he stayed, he might ere long find himself
a prisoner of state in some obscure French castle. At last his
mind was made up for him from without: Lord Strangford on
the twenty-fifth of November received a copy of the Paris Moniteur
of the thirteenth of October, in which appeared a proclamation
in the true Napoleonesque "ein, announcing that 'the house of
Bl-aganza had ceased to reign in Europe.' The celerity with which
the paper had been passed on from Paris to London and from
London to Lisbon was most fortunate, as it was just not too late
for the prince to fly, though far too late for him' to think of
defending himself. JUDot was already at Abrantes, but during
the four days which he spent between that place and Lisbon
the die was cast. Abandoning his wonted indecision, the Uegent
hurril..>d on shipboard his treasure, his state pllpers, his insane
mother, his young family, and all the hangers-on of his court.
The whole fleet, fifteen men-of-war, was crowded with official
refugees and their belongings. More than twenty merchant
ycssels were hastily manned and freighted with other inhabitants
of Lisbon, who determined to fly with their prince: merchants
and noblc.~ alike prefcnoo thc voyage to Rio de Janeiro to ffLCillg
the dreaded French. On the twenty·ninth of November the
whole convoy passed out of the mouth of the Tagus and set Sllil
for the West. When he toiled in on the thirtieth, Junot
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fawId the birds flown, and took possession of the dismantled
cit.y.
Junot's Spanish auxiliaries were, as might have been expected
from the national character and the deplorable state of the
government, much slower than their French allies. 8010.no nnd
the southern army did not enter Portugal till the second of
Dt.>cember, three days llfte.. Lisbon hud fallell. TarllJl{:O and the
Galician corps only reached Oporto on the thirteenth of December.
To neither of them was any opposition offered: the sole show
of national feeling which they met was that the Governor of
Valen:-'Q clo..<:ed his gates, and would not admit the Spaniards till
llC hcu.rd t.hat Lisbon was in the enemy's hands. wId that the
Prince-Uegent had abandoned the country.
Junot at first made some attempt to render himself popular and
to keep his troops in good discipline. But it was impossible to
concilia.te the Portuguese: when the)' saw the exhausted condition
and comparatively small numbers of the army that had OVeITUn
their reallli, they were filled with rage to think that no attempt
had been mude to strike a blow to save its independenl'C. 'Whell,
on the thirteenth of December, Junot made a great show out of
the l'CI'Clllony of huuling down the Portuguese flag and of hoisting
the tricolour on the public buildings of the metropolis, there bl'Oke
out a fierce riot, whieh hnd to be dispersed with a cavalry chtu·bI'C.
But tbis was the work of the mob: both the civil and the military
authorities showed a servile obedience to Junot's orders, Ilnd no one
of importance stood forward to head the crowd.
The filost precantionary measure of the French geneml was to
dissolve the Portuguese army. He ordered the discharge of all men
with less than one and more than six years' service, dissolved the
old regimental cadre8, and reorganized the 6,000 or 7,000 men left
into nine new corps, which were soon ordered out of the realm.
Ultimately they were sent to the :Bultic, llnd remained garriooned
in Northern Germany for some years. At the timc of the Russian
War of 1812 there were still enough of these unhappy cxik'S left to
constitute three strong regiments. Nearly all of them perished in
the SIlOW during the retreat from Moscow.
Further endeavour to make French rule popular in Portugal was
soon rendered impossible by orders from Paris. The Empel'Or's
mandate not only bade J unot confiscate and realize t~ll the property
of the 15,000 persons, small and great, who had. fled to Brazil with
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the Prince-Regent; it also commanded him to raise a fine of
100,000,000 fmncs, four millions of our money. from the little
kingdom. But the emigrants had carried away nearly half the
coined money in Portugal, and the rest had been hidden, leaving
nothing but coppers and depredated paper money visible in circula.
tion. With the best will in the world JUDot found it difficult to
begin to collect even the nucleus of the required sum. The heavy
Lues and imposts which he levied llUd no slllall efft'Ct in adding
to the discontent of the people, but their total did little more
thun pay fol' the maintclltUlCC of the invaders. Mcunwhile the
troops behaved with the usual licence of a French army in a
couqucrcd country, and repeatedly provoked snuhruinu.ry hruwb
with the peasantry. Military executions of persons who had
!'CSisted requisitions by force began ns cnrly as Jnnuary, 1808.
Nothing was wanting to prepare an insurrection but leaders: of
their appcamnce there was no sign; the most spil'ited members
of the upper classes had gone off with the Uegent. Those who had.
rClllninoo were the miserable burcaucmts which despotic govcm.
ments always breed. They were ready to serve the stranger if they
mllId keep their posts and places. A discreditable proportion of
the old state servants acquiesced in the new government. The
Patriarch of Lisbon issued a fulsome address in praise of Napolcon.
The members of.the provisional government which the ll.egent had
nominated on llis departure mostly submitted to JtlIlOt. Thel'e
was little difficulty found in collecting a deputation, imposing by
its numbers and by the names of some of its personnel, which
travelled to Bayonne, to compliment Bonaparte and request him
to l:,'Ttl.nt some definite f01'1ll of govennf1cnt to Portugtl.1. The
Emperor treated them in a very offhand way, asked them if they
would like to be anne.xed to Spain, and on their indjgnant repudia.
tion of that proposal, sent them off with a few platitudes to the
effect that the lot of a nation depends upon itself, and that his eye
was upon them. But this interview only took place in April, 1808,
when events in Spain were flSSullling a vel)' different aspect from
that which they displa)'ed at the moment of Junot's first seizure of
Lisbon.
SECTION I: CHAPTER IV
THE FRENCH AGGRESSION IN SPAIN: ABDICATION OF
CHARLES IV
THE 'Affair of the Escurial' added some complications to tl:e
situation of affairs in Spain fmm Napoleon's point of view. But
there was nothing in it to make him alter the plans which he was
at this moment carrying out: if the Bourbons were to be evicted
from Spain, it made the task somewhat easier to find that the he.ir
to the throne was now in deep disgrace. It would be possible to
urge that by his parricidal plot.s he had forfeited allY rights to the
kingdom which he had hitherto possessed. In dealillg with the
politics of Spain he might for the future be disregarded, and there
would be no one to take into considemtion save the King and Queen
and GOOoy. All three were, as the Emperor knew) profoundly
unpopular: if anything 11Iu.1 been m.:cdL-'(} to make the nation more
discontented, it was the late scandalous events at the Escurial.
Nothing could be more cdnvellient than that the favourite and
his sovereigns should sink yet further into the abyss of unpopu.
larity.
Napoleon thercrorc went steru:lily on witlI his plulls for pushing
more and more l~rench troops into Spain. with the object of occupy·
iug all the main strategical points in the kingdom, The only
doubtful point in his schemes is whether he ultimately proposed to
seize on the persons of the royal family, Or whether he intended by
11 series of threatening acts to SClU'C them off to Mexico. as he had
already scared the Prince of Portugal oft' to Rio de Janeiro. It is
all the whole probable tlmt he IclUlI..'(} to the latter plall, Every
week the attitude of the }i'rench armies became more aggressive, and
the language of their mu.sLer more haughty and SillistCI' 1. The tone
I It is impossible to doubt that Napoleon'S oohemo wn.s ah-e.-my in pTOgl'CSil
as early llll October. On Nov. 13 he sent orders for the secret arming and
pro\'isioniug of all the frontier fortresses of Yr-"nce (Nap. Correllp., 13,343),
On Nov. 24 he directed his chamherlaln, De Tonrnon, to spy out the condition
of l'ampeluna. and the other Spauish border slronglLolds, and to discover the
OM/LN, I D
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in which he had forbidden the court of Spain to allow any mention
of himself or his ambassador to appenr, during the trial of Prime
Ferdinand and his fellow conspirators, had been menacing in the
highest degree. After the occupation of Portugal no further
allusion had been made to the project for pl"Oclaiming GOOoy
Prince of the Algarves. His name was never mentioned either to
the Portuguese or to the officers of JUIlOt. The favourite soon saw
that he had been duped, h\,1t was too rorrificd to complain.
But it was the constant influx into Spain of French troops
which contributed in the most scrious way to frighten the Spanish
court. JUllot had entered Lisbon on No\'. 30, and the news th8t
he had mastered the place without firing a shot lUld reached the
Emperor early in December. But long before, Oil the twenty-second
of November, the French resenes, hitherto known as the' Second
Corps of Obsenation of the Gironde,' which had been collected at
Ba)'ollue in Nm'embel', crossed the Spullish frontier. The)' COll-
sisted of ~,OOO men-nearly all recently levied conscripts-under
GCllcml Dupont. TIle b-cat)' of Fontaincblcau had cuntuinl'l1
a clause providing that, if the English tried to defend Portugal
by landing troops, Napoleon might send 40,000 mcn to aid JUllot
after giving due 1wtice to the King qj" Spain. Instead of waiting
to hcur how thc first corps had fared, or apprisillg his ally of his
intention to dispatch I>upont's corps across the frontier, the
Emperor merely ordered it to cross the Bidassoa without sending
any information to Madrid. The fact was that whether the pre-
liminary condition stated ill the treaty, an English descent on
Portugal, did or did not take place, Bonaparte was dctermined to
CUlTy out his design. A month later thc Spllnim'ds heard, to tlleir
growing alarm, that yet a third army corps had come across the
border: this WtlS the' Corps of OOOcr\'utioll of the Ocean Coost,'
which llad been hastily organized under Marshall\'loncey at Bor-
dC£LUX, and pushed 011 to Bayonnc when Dllpont's troops morl'£!
forward. It was 30,000 strong. but mainly composed of conscript
battolions of the levy of 1808, which hud been mised by untici·
pation in the previous spring, while the Uussian war was still in
progress. On the eighth of January this army began to pass tIle
Pyrenees, occupying all the chief tOWIlS of' Biscay and NavaTI-e, while
Dupont's divisions pressed on and C311wned themselves in BllI'gos,
oxact distribution of the Spanisllarmy (13,364). Such moves could have but
one meaning. •
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Valladolid, and the other chief cities of Old Castile. They made
no further advunre towards Portugal, where Junot clearly did not
require their aid.
The Spanish government was terror-stricken at the unexpected
appearance of more than 60,000 French troops on the road to
Madrid. If anything more was required to cause suspicion, it
was the news that still more' corps of obse.rvnliolJ' were being
formed at Bordeaux and Poitiers. "Vliat legitimate reason could
there possibly be for the direction of such masses of troops on
Northern Spain? But any thought of resistance was far from the
mind of Godoy and the King. Their first plan was to propitiate
Napoleon by making the same request which hOO brought the
Prince of the Asturias into such trouble in October-that the
hand of a princes.... of the house of Donapll.rtc might be granted to
the heir of the Spanish throne. The Emperor was making an
ostentatious loul' ill Italy while his forces were overruDlling the
provinces of his aUy-as if the occupation of Castile and Biscay
were no affair of his. His most important act in November was
to evict from Florence the ruling sovereign, the King of Etl'Uriu,
and the Regent, his mother, thus annexing the last sun'iving
Bow-ban state save Spain to the French Cl'Own. He wrote polite
but meaningless Icttel'S to Mndrid, making no allusion to the boon
asked by Charles IV. The fact was that Napoleon could now
trcat Fcrdinund us 'dllmagcd goods'; hc was, by his futhcl"s 0\\'11
avowal, no more than a pardoned parricide, and- it suited the
policy of the Emperor to regard him as a comicted criminal who
had played away his rights of succession, If Napoleon visited his
brother Lucien at :Mantua, it was not (as was thought at the time)
with allY renl intention of persuading him to gi\'e his daughter to
the craven suitor offered her 1, but in order to tempt her father to
accept the crown of Portugal-even perhaps that of Spain. Dut
Lucicn, who always refused to fall in with Napoleon's family
policy, showed no gratitude for the offer of a thorny throne in the
lbel'ilU1 Pcninsula, nnd not without I'CUbOll, fol' onc of the details
of the bargain was to be that he should divon.'C a wife to whom he.
was fondly attached.
It was only after returning from Italy in Januar)' that the Emperor
deigned to answer the King of Spain's letter, now two months old,
1 Note on this point Talleyrand's .Ml'IMires, i. 333, aud :Nap. Oorrup.,
13,402 (Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, Dec. 17,1807).
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in precise terms. He did not object to the principle of the alliancc,
but doubted if he could gi\"C any daughter of his house to 'a SOli
dishonoured by his own father's declaration.' This rerg' was not
very reassuring to GOOoy and his master, and worse was to folloll".
fn the end of January the Afoniteur, which the Emperor always used
as a means for ventilating schemes which were before long to take
shape in fac4 began a systematic course of abusing the Prince of
the Pence as a bad minister and a false friend. More troops kept
pouring across the Pyrenees without any ostensible reason, and
now it was not only at the western passes that they began to
appear, but also on the eastern roods which lead from Roussilloll
into Catalonia and Valencia. These prminces are so remote from
Portugnl thnt it wus clear that the army which WM (.'ollectiug
opposite them could not be destined for Lisbon. But on February
10, 1808, .I4,OOO men, half French, half Italiuns, under Gellernl
Duhesme, began to drift into Catalonia and to work their way
down towards its cnpiml-BarcelOlm. A side-light on the mean.
ing of this development was given by Izquierdo, Godoy's agent at
Paris, who now kept sending his muster very disquieting reports.
French ministers had begun to sound him as to the way in which
Spain would take a proposal for the (:ession to Fmnce of Cata.
lonia and part of Biscay, in retU11l for Central Portugal. King
Charles would probably be asked ere long to give up these ancient
and loyal provinces, and to do 80 would mean the outbreak. of
a revolution all over Spain.
In the middle of February Napoleon finally threw off the mask,
and frankly displayed himself as a robber in his ally's abode.
On the sixteenth of the month began that infamous seizure by
surprise of the Spanish frontier fortresses, which would pass for
the most odious -act of the Emperor's ",-hole careel., if the kid·
napping at Bayonne were not to follow. The movement started
at Pampeluna; French troops were quartered in the lower town,
while a Spanish garrison held, as was natural, the citadel. One
cold morning a large party of French soldiers congregated about
the gate of the fortress, without arms, and pretended to be
amusing themselves with snowballing, while waiting for a dist.l'ibu·
tion of rations. At a given signal many of them, as if beaten in
the mock contest, rushed in at the gate, pursued by the rest. The
first men. knocked down the ullsuspecting sentinels, and seized the
muskets of the guard stacked ill t.he arms-rocks of the guard~rooll1,
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Then a company of grenadiers, who hOO been hidden III a neigh·
homing house, suddenly ran ill at the gate, followed by a whole
battal..ion which lllld oc'Cn at drill tl. few hundred )'ards away. The
Spanish garrison, taken utterly by surprise and unarmed, were
hustled out of their quarters and tUl'IlL>d into the town 1,
A high.spiritcd prince would have declared war ut once, what·
ever the odds against him, on receiving such an insulting blow, But
this was not to be expected from persons like Godoy and Charles IV.
Accordingly they exposed themselves to the continuation of thcse
odious tricks. On February ~9 General Lecchi, the officer com-
manding the French troops which were p[lSSing through Barcelona,
ordered a rC\'iew of his division before, as he said, its appronching
departlll'c for the south. After some evolutious he marched it
thl"Ough the city, and past the gate of the citru:l.el; when this point
was renched, he suddenly bade the leading company wheel to the
left nnd enter the fortress. Befol"e the Spaniards understood what
WM happening, several thousalld of their allies were inside the
place, and by the evening the rightful owners, who carried their
opposition no further than noisy protestations, had been cvicted.
A fcw days lItter the two remaining fronticr fortreiscs of Spain,
San Sebastian, at the Atlantic end of the Pyrenees, and l"iguertl.S,
at the great pass along the Mediterranean coast, suffered the same
fute: the former place WllS sun-endcrcd by its govCl:nor when
threntened with an actual assault, which orders from Mndrid
fOl'bude him to resist [l\'1nrch 5). Figueras, 011 the other hand,
was sci?.cd by a. roup de main, similar to that ut Pampeluna;
200 French soldiers, having obtained entrance within the walls on
n futile pretext, suddcnly seized the gates mul ntlmittL.J u whole
regiment, which turned out the Spanish garrison [March 18] t.
H would be hard, if not impossible, to find in the whole of
modem history any incident approaching, in cynical elfrontel'Y and
mean cmming, to these first hostile acts of the I<'reneh on the
1 In Nap" {JOTTUp., 13,588, will be found the orders to General D'Armagnac
to get l~iou of the citadel by menaccs if he can, but if he cannot, hy the
actual use of force. 'S'il arrivait que le commandaut--glfucral de Navarre se
refullit arendre la citadelle, vous cmployeri{l;/; les troupes tlu Marechal MOlleey
pour I'y forcer.'
, It will 1lardly be believed that Napier, in llis blind re'"erence for Napoleon,
omits to give any tletail8 concerning tile seizure of the furlresses, merely
8/lying that they were' taken by various artifices' (i. 13). It is the parti-
culars which are scandalous as well as the mere fact.
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territory of their nllics. The lIet result was to leave the two chief
fortresses, on each of the main entries into Spain from France,
completely in the power of the Emperor.
GOOoyand his employers were driven into wild alann by these
acts of open hostility. The favourite, in his memoirs!, tells us
that he thought, for a moment, of responding by a declaration of
war, but that the old king replied that Napoleon could not be
intending treachery, because he had just sent him twelve flDe
coach-horses and several polite letteN. In face of his master's
reluctance, he tells us that he temporized for some days more.
The story is highly improbable: Charles had no will save GOOoy's,
and would have done whatever he was told. It is much more
likely that the reluctance to take a bold resolve was the favourite's
own. '¥lten the French troops still continued to draw nearer to
Madrid, GOOoy could only bethink himself of a plan for abscond-
ing. He proposed to the King and Queen that they should le/ne
Madrid and take refuge in Seville, in order to place themselves as
far us possible from the French armies. Behind this move WllS
a scheme for a much longer voyage. It seems that he proposed
that the court should follow the example of the Regent of Portugal,
and fly to America. At Mexico or Buenos Ayres they would at
least be safe from DOTIflpttrte. To protect the first stage of the
flight, the troops in Portugal were directed to slip away from
Junot and rna.<;s in Estrcllmdllm. 'l'hc garrison of i\ftuirid Wtl.';
drawn to Aranjuez, the palace where the court lay in February
and March, and was to act us its escort to Seville. It is certain
that nothing would have suited Napoleon's plans better than that
Chm'les IV should abscond and leave his Ulrone derelict: it would
have gi\'en the maximum of' advantage with the minimum of
odium. It is pos,'iible that the Em!lC'Ur wus working precisely with
the object of frightening GOOoy into flight. If so his scheme was
foiled, because he forgot that he had to doot 1I0t only with the
contemptible court, but with the suspicious and revengeful Spanish
nation. In Mnrch thc people intervelled, nlld their outbrcuk put
quite a diAerent face upon affairs.
MeLlnwhile the Empc.mr WIll; launching ll. new fif,rurc upon the
stllorre. On February 26 his brothcr~in-law, Joachim Mural, the
new Grand~Dllkc of Bel'g, appeared at Bn)'ollne with the title of
'Lieutenant of' the Emperor,' and a commission to take command
I MemQir.r of God!)!;, i. 122. Cf. ArtooheJ i. 21)1.
,
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of all the French for(.'eS in Spain. On March 10 he crossed the
Bicll\&;()tl and tlSSumeU possession of his post. Murat's clumu:lcr is
well known: it was not very complicated. He was a headstrong,
unscrupulous soldier, with a g<!nius for headitlg a cayalry charge
011 a In.rge scale, and an unbounded ambition. He was at present
meditating on thrones and kingdoms: Berg seemed a small thing
to this son of Il GIlSC...'OIl innkeeper, and evcr since his brothers-in-
law Joseph, Louis, and Jcrome Bonaparte had become kings, he
was determined to climb up to be their equal. It has frequently
been asserted thnt Murat wos at this moment dreaming of the
Spanish crown: he was certainly aware that the "Emperor was
plotting against the Bourbons, and the military movements which
he hUll been directed to Clll'ry out were sufficicnt in thcmsclvcs
to indicate more or less his brother-in-law's intentions. Yet Oil
the whole it is probable that he had not received more than half-
confidences from his august relativc. His dispatches arc full of
murmurs that he was being kept in the dark, and that he could
1I0t !let with full L'Onfidcllcc fOl' want ofcxplicit dircctiom:l. Napoleon
had certainly promised him promotion, if the Spanish aflair came
to a successful end: but it is probable that Murat understood that
hc WIIS not to lx! rewarded with the crown of Charles IV. Perhaps
Portugal, 01' Holland, or Naples (if one of the Emperor's brothers
should pass on to Madrid) was spoken of as his reward. Certainly
therc was cnOllgh at slakc to make him eager to en!"ry out whatc\'cI'
Bonaparte ordered. In his cheerful self-confidence he imagined
himself quite capable of playing the part of a Machiavclli, and of
edging the old king out of the c:.'Olmtry by threats aud hints. But
if grape-shot was required, he was equally rendy to administer an
unsparing dose. "Vith 8. kingdom in view he could be utterly
unscrupulous I.
On March 13 Murat arrived at Durgos, and issued a strange
proclllnllltion bidding his army' treat the cstimable Spanish Illltioll
as friends, for the Emperor sought only the good llnd happiness of
Spain.' The curious phrase could only suggest that unless he gave
this warning, his troops would have ttcated their allies as e1J,cmies.
, 'I1mt Murat did not dream of the SIJanish crown is, I think, fairly well
demollstrated by his descendant, Connt Murat, in his useful MlIral, J..ieutellll1lt
d~ rBmperell'r ~fl Espa!J1le (1007). Dut that after once reading the dispatclle8,
,Nllp. COTlWp., 13,MlfI and 13,M3!), he failed to sec that his brotbcr-in-Iaw's
intention was to seize Sllain, is impossible.
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The scandalous pillage committed by many regiments during
February and :March quite justified the suspicion.
The approach of Mural scared GOOoy into immediate action, all
the more because u new corps tl'arrnJ:e, more than 30,000 strong,
under Marshal Bessieres, was already commencing to cross the
Pyrenees, bringing up the total of French troops in the Peninsula
to more than 100,000 men. He ordered the departure of the
King and his escort, the Madrid garrisoll, for Seville on March 18.
This brought matters to a head: it was regarded as the commence·
ment of the projected flight to America, of which rumours were
Already floating round the court nnd capital. A despotic govern-
ment, which never takes the people into its confidence, must always
expect tu have its actions interpreted in the most U11flwoumhle
light. Except GOOoy's personal adherents, there was not a soul
in Madrid who did 1I0t belie\·e that the favourite was acting in
collusion with Napoleon, and deliberately betraying his sO\'ereign
und his country. It was by his conscnt., they tllOught, thut tJle
French bad crossed the Pyrenees, had seized Pampeluna and
Barcelona, and were now marching Oil the capital. They were
far from imagining that of all the persons in the game he was the
/:,'Tcatest dupe, and that the recent development<; of Napolcoll'~
policy had reduced him to despair. It was correct enough to
attribute the present Illiserable situation of the realm to GodoJ's
policy, but onl)' because his servility to Donaparte had tempted
the latter to see how far he could go, and because his maladmillis·
tration had brought the army so low that it was no longer capable
of defending the fatherland. Men did well to be angry with the
Prince of the Peace, but they should have cursed him as a timid,
incompetent fool. not as a deliberate traitor. But upstarts whu
guide tilC llolicy of a great realm for their private profit must
naturally expect to be misrepresented, and there can be no doubt
that the Spaniards judged GOOoy to be a willing helper ill the ruin
of his master and his country.
Aranjuez, ordinarily a quiet little place, was now crowded with
the hangers-on of the court, the garrison of Madrid, and a throng
of anxious and distraught inhabitants of the capital; some had
come out to avoid the advancing French, some to learn the latest
news of the King's intentions, others with the deliberate intention
of attacking the favourite. Among the latter were the few friends
of the Prince of the Astnrias, and a much greater number who
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sympathized with his unhappy lot and had not gauged his
miscntble disposition. It is probable that as things stocxl it was.
really the best move to send the King to Seville, or c\"en to
America, and to commence open resistance to the French when
the royal person should be in surety. But the crowd could see
nothing but deliberate treason in the proposal: they waited only
for the confirmation of the news of the departure of the court
before breaking out into violence.
On the night of the sc\"enteenth of March GOOoy was actually
commencing the evacuation of Aranjue7.) by sending off his most
precious possession, the too-celebrated Donna Joscpha 'ludo, under
cover of the dark. The p<-"rty which was escorting her fell into the
midst of a knot of midnight loiterers, who wcm watching the
palace. There was a scuffle, a pistol was fired, and as if by n
prearranged plan crowds powcl out into the &-treets. The cry
went round that GOOoy was cllITying off the King and Queen, and
a general rush was made to his house. '111eI'C were guards before
it, but they refused to fire on the mob, of which no small propor-
tion was composed of soldiers who hlUl broken out of their burrncks
without leave. In a moment the doors weI'C battered down and the
assailants poured into the mansioll, hunting for the favourite.
They could not find him, alld in their disappointment smashed
nU his works of art, and bumt his magnificent furniture. Then they
flocked to the palace, in which the)' suspected that he had taken
refuge, calling for his head. The King und Quccn, in deadly terror,
besought their ill-used son to sa"e them, by propitiating the mob,
who would listen to his voice if to no other. Then came the hour of
Ferdinand's triumph; stepping out on to the balcony, he unllounced
to the crowd that the King was much displeased with the P\;nce
of the Peace, and had determined to dismiss him from office. 'rhe
throng at once dispersed with loud cheers.
Next morning, ill fact, a royal decree was issued, declaring
Godoy relieved of nU his post.<> and duties and banish/..>d from
the court. 'Vithout the favourite at their elbow Charles and his
queen seemed perfectly helpless. The proclamation WIl.'1 received
ut first with satisftlction, but the peoplc still hung about the palace
and kcpt calling for the King, who had to /..'Olne out several times
and salute thcm. It began to look like a scene from the begilllling
of the French Rcvolution. 'l'herc was already much talk in the
crowd of the benefit that would ensue to Spain if the Prince of
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the Asturias, with whose su(ferings everyone had sympathized,
were to be entrusted with some part in the govel1lance of the
realm. His partisans openly spoke of the abdication of the old
king as a desirable possibility.
Ne>.-t day the rioting commenced A.clY'8.in, owing to the reappear-
ance of Godoy. He had. lain concealed for thirty.six hours beneath
a heap of mats, in a hiding·plac.'e contrived under the rafters of his
mansion; but hunger at last drove him out, and, when he thought
that the coast was clear, he slipped down and tried to get awn)'.
In spite of his mantle and slouched hat he was recognized almost
at once, and would have been pulled to pieces by the crowd if he
had not been saved by a detachment of the royal guard, who carrit>d.
him off a prisoner to the palace. The news that he was trapped
brought thousands of rioters under the royal windows, shouting for
his instant trial and execution. The imbecile King could not be
convineed that he was himself safe, and the Queen, who usually
displayed more couraolY'{!, seemed paralysed by her fears for GOOoy
even more than for herself. This was the lucky hour of the l>rinc~
of the Asturias; Ul'ged on by his secret advisers, he suggested
alxlicution to his father, promising that he would disperse the mob
and save the favourite's life. The silly old man accepted. the pro-
posal with alacrity, and drew up a short docwnent of twch'e lines,
to the effect' that his many bodily infirmities made it hard for him
to support OilY longer the hcuvy weight of the oomillistmtion of
the realm, and that he bad decided to remove to some more
tempcmte clime, there to enjoy the peace of private lire. After
serious deliberation he had resolved to abdicate in favour of his,
natural heir, and wished timt Don Fcrdillllnd should at once be
received as king in all the provinces of the Spanish crown. That
this free and spontaneous abdication should be immediately pub-
lished was to be the duty of the Council of Castile.'
SECTION I: CHAPTER V
THE THEACHERY AT HAYONKE
THE news of the alxlication of Charles IV was rcceinx!. with
universal joy. The rioters of Aranjuez dispersed after saluting
the Ilew sovereign, lllld l1110wed Godoy to be taken on~ without
further trouble, to the' castle of ViIlaviciosa. Madrid, though
I\'Iurat was now almost at its gates, gave itself up to feasts and
processions, Uf'lel' ho.\·ing fiT'st sacked the pa]oc'CS of the Prince of
the !}eacc and some of his unpopular relations and partisans.
Completely ignOl-ant of the pel'so,1l1l1 character of Ferdinand VII,
the Spaniards attributed to him nU the virtues and graces, and
blindly expected the commencement of' n golden nge-as if the
liOn of Charles IV Ilnd Maria Luisa was likely to be a genius and
a hero.
Looking at the general situation of affairs, there can be no doubt
that the wisest course for the young king to have taken would haN!
been to concentrate his army, put his person in safety, and ask
Napolcon to speak out and formulate his intentions. Instead of
taking this, the only manly COUl'$C, l'erdinillld resolved to throw
himself on the Emperor's mercy, as if the fall of GOOoy had been
Napoleon's object, and not the conquest of Spain. Although
MUl1lt had actually arri\'(~d at Madrid on Mm'ch 23, with a great
body of cayalry and flO,OOO foot, the King entered the city ne.-.::t day
Ilnd practically put himself in the hands of the invader. He wrote
a fulsome letter to Napoleon ussuring him of hi~ devotion, illld
lxlggillg once more I'Of the hand of CL princess of his house.
His I'lX:eption in Madrid by the French ought to hlwc undcecived
him at once. The ambassador Beauharnais, alone among the foreign
ministers, refrained from acknowledging him as king. Murat was
equu.lly n.'Calcitruut, and moreovcr most rude und disobligillg in his
lUllf,l1.lage and behaviour. The fact was that the Grand-Duke had
supposed that he was entering Madrid in ol'dru: to chase out GOOoy
and rule ill his strnd. The popular c."plosion which had swept
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away the favourite and the old king, and substituted for them
a young and popular monarch, had foiled his desibPJ1. He did
not know how Bonaparte would take the new situation, and mean·
while was surly and discourteous. But he was dctcrmincd that
there should at least be grounds provided for a breach with
Fcrdinand, if the Emperor should resolve to go on with his
original plan.
AccOlX1ingly, he not only refused to acknowledge the new king's
tiUe, but hastelled to put himself ill secret COlllllllllliCll.tioll with tllC
dethroned sovereigns. They were only too eager to meet him half-
way, lLnd Maria Luisa espe<:illlly was half-mad with rage at her
son's success. At first she and her husband thought of nothing
but escaping from Spain: they begged Murat to pass on tu the
Emperor letters in which they asked to be permitted to buy a little
estate in France, where thcy might enjoy his protection during
their cledilling years. But they begged also that' the poor ])rhlCe
of the Peace, who lies in a dungeon covcred with wounds and
contusions alld in danger of death,' might be saved and allowed to
join them, 'so that wc may all live together in some healthy spot
fill' from intrigues and state busincss I.'
Murat saw that the angry old quecn might be utilized to dis-
cl"L'<1it hel' SOlI, IInd promised to send on everything to Napoleon.
At the first word of encouragement given by the Grand-Duke's
agent, Dc Monthion,l\-lnriaLuisa began to cover muny sheets with
abuse of her son. 'He is false to the core: he has no natural
ttfli:clion: he is Imt"d-hc8.l-ted and nowise illclinl'<1 to clemency.
He has been directed by villains and will do anything that ambition
suggests: he makes promises, but does not alwU)':; keep them 2.'
Again she writcs :-' From my son we have nothing to expect but
outrllcl7Cs ulId persccution. He hfl.S eoinmcll{;cd by forb'CI'y, and he
will go on manufacturing evidence to prove that the Prince of
the Peace-that inno(,'cnt and nfft'Ctiono.tc friend of the Emperor,
the Duke of Berg, and every l?renchman [-may appear a criminal
in the eyes of the Spanish people mId of Napoleon himself. Do
not believe a word that he says, for our enemies have the power
and Illeans to make all)' falsehood seem true 3.' In anoUICI' letter
she says that the riots of Aranjuez were no gcnuinc explosion of
I Soo the letters of :'>Iarch 22-7 in Torefio, Appendix, i. 436-45.
~ Letter of March 27, in Torefio, APIlClldix, i. 441.
, Ibid., p. 430.
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popular wmth, but a deliberate plot got up by her son, who spent
countless sums on debauching the soldiery and importing ruffians
from Madrid. He gave the signal for the outburst himself by
putting II lamp ill his window at a fixed hour-tmd so forth 1.
Hnding the Queen in this state of mind, Murat SllW his way to
dealing a deadly blow ut Fcnlinand: with his coultsel and conscnt
Cbal"ies IV was induced to draw up and send to Bonaparte a formal
protest against his abdication. He was made to declare that his
resignation bad not been volulltary, hut imposed on him by force
and threats. And so he 'throws himself into the arms of the great
mOllarch who hllS been his ally, and puts himself at his disposition
wholly amI for ever)' purpose 2.' This document placed in
Napoleon'S hands the precise weapon which he required to crush
King Ferdinand. If the Empet'Ol' chose to take it seriously, he could
declare the new monarch a usurper-almost a pll.nicide-the legality
of whose ac(:ession had been vitiated by force and fraud.
As a ma.Uel· of filet Bonaparte's mind had long been made up.
The revolution of Aranjuez had been t\ surprise and a disappoint.
ment to him: his designs against Spain were made infinitely more
difficult of realiwtion thereby. Wllile he had only the weak und
unpopular government of Godoy and Charles IV to deal with,
he had fancied that the game was in his hands. It had been mOl-C
than probable that the Prince of the Peace would take fright, und
carry oft' the King and Queen to America-in which case he
would, as it were, find Spain left derelict. If, however, the emi-
gration did not take pluce, and it became neccssury to lay hands on
Charles and his favourite, Napoleon calculated that the Spilniards
would be more pleased to be rid of GOOoy than angry to sce force
employed against him. He was so profoundly ignorant of the
character of the nation, that he imagined that a few high-sounding'
proclamations and promises of liberal reforms would induce them
to accept from his hands allY ne\'/' sO"ereign whom he chose to
nominate. It was clear that the acce;.sioll of a young und popular
king would make matters far more difficult. It was no longer
possible to pose as the deliverCl' of Spain from the shameful pre-
dominance of GOOoy. Any move against }'erdinand must bear
the character of an open assault on the national independence of
the kingdom.
1 Letter Or March 26 ill Toreiio, i. 430.
, The I)rotest of Charles IV will be found printed in Append.ix No. 4.
46 THE TREACHERY AT BAYONNE [AP." 7
But Bonaparte hud gone too far 1;0 recede: he hud 1I0t moved
100,000 men across the Pyrenees, and seized 11ampeluna and Barce·
Iona, merely in order that his troops might assist ut the coronution
ceremonies of another Bourbon king. In spite of all difficulties
he was resolved to persevere in his iniquitous plun. He would
not recognize the new monarch, but would sweep him away, and
put in his plac..'C ~OlUC member of his own family. But his chosen
instrument was not to be l\iurat, but one of the Bonapartes.
He knew too well the Duke of Berg's restless spirit und over-
weening ambition to trust him with so great a charge as Spain.
And he was right-with only Naples at his back Joachim was
powerful enough to do his master grave harm ill 1814. The tool
was to be onc of his own brothers. It was on the night of
:March 26 that the news of the abdication of Charles IV reached
him: on the morning of the twenty-seveuth he wrote to Amsterdam
offering Louis BOllapllrle the chance of exchanging the Dutch for
the Spanish crowu. The proposal was made in the most casual form
-' You suy that the climate of Holland does not suit you. Besides
the country is too thorougWy ruined to rise ~rrain. Give me
a categorical answer: if I lIominatc you King of Spain will you
take the offer; can I count Oil you? l' Louis very wisely refused
the proffered crown: but his weaker brother Joseph, tired of
Naples and its brigands, made no scruples when the same proposal
was laid before him.
This letter to Louis of Holland having been written on the
filost news of the events at Aranjuez, and four days before "Mural
began to send in his own plans and the letters of protest from the
King nud Queen of Spain, it is clear that the Empcl:or had never
an}" intention of recognizing Ferdinand, and was only playing
with him during the month that followt..'I1. It wus not in mere
caution that Dcauharnais, the ambassador, and Murat, the military
representativc, of France, were bidden ncver to address the new
sovereign as king but as Prince of the Asturias, and to ad as
if Charles IV were s;till legally reigning wltil they should have
specific din.-ctions from Paris t.
I NI/p. Oorrcap., xvi. 500; see al.'lO in Documents hi8I.Qriq/UN!, pub/it8 fHlT
Louis BOllapaTte (Paris, 1029), ii. 200.
2 It is scarcely lIooessary to say that the letter whieh Nu.IK>!eoll is said w
Imve sent Murat on March 29, and which is printed in the Mbll(}nal de t,'te-
HtI/me, is (as Llllfre)' and Count 1\1 urdt !Jave shown) a forgery composed IJr
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This state of semi-suspended relations lasted for a fortnight,
from lierdinand's arl'ival in Madrid on March 24, down to his
departure fmm it on April 10. They were vel)' uncomfortahle
weeks for the new king, who grew more alarmed as each day
l)assed withuut a letter fmm Paris ratifying his title, while French
troops continued to pour into Madrid till some 35,000 were
assembled in it and its suburbs.
A very few dlLYS after his accession Fcrdinand was informed thal
it was probable that Napoleon was intending a visit to Madrid,
and was at UJ1Y rate coming as far as Dayonne, I-le immediately
sent oft' his eldest bl'Other Don Carlos (the hero of the unhappy
wars of 1833-40) to compliment his patron, and if necessary to
receive him at the frontier [April 5]. Two days Idcr there
appeared in Madrid a new French emissary, General Savary-
afterwards Duke of Rovigo-who purported to come as Bonaparte's
harbinger, charged with the duty of preparing Madrid tor his
arrival. He C8.nicd the farce so far that he asked fol' a palace for
the Emperor's residence, produCl.od trunks of his private luggtlf,"C I,
and began to refurnish the apal·tments grllnted him. That he
bore secret' orders for Mumt we know from the latter's dispatches,
but this was only half his task, Napoleon had confiul..'l1 to him
verbal instructions to lure Fcrdinand to come out to meet him
in the north of Spain) among the French armies massed ill Biscay
and Navarre-if possible even to get him to Bayonne on French
soil. In his St. Helena memoirs Napoleon denies this, and Savary
in his autobiogrllphy ILlso states that he did not act the purt of
tempter or make any pl'Omises to the young king: the journey
to Bllyonne, he SlLYS, was a. silly inspimtioll of Fcrdillnnd's own.
But neither Bonaparte nor Saval'J arc witnesses whom one would
believe on their most solemn oath. The former we know well: the
Jatter had been onc of the persons most implicated in the shocking
murder of the Duc d'Enghien. ''''hen we find the Spanish witnesses,
who cOllversed with Savar)' during his short stay in Madrid,
agreeing that the general promised that Napoleon would recognize
Ferdinand as king, give him an imperial princess as wife, and
take him into favour, wc need not doubt them. It is Ilot disputed
Napoloon himselt long after. It is quite inoonsistent with tlle offer to Louis
Bonaparte, and with other letters to Murat of the Ilame week.
I It is said that they afterwards tU~llcd out to be full uf smuggled goOlls,
a prh'ate speculation of Savary or bis underlings.
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that Snvary. unlike Murat and Bcnuhamais, reg!1larly addressed
his victim by the royal title, and it is rertaill that he started in
his company and acted as his keeper during the jourucy 1. The
move that he at first proposed was not a long one: the general
sai.d that according to his adviccs the Emperor must be due at
Durgos on April 13 : it would be time enough to start to meet
him on the tenth. Burgos lies well inside the frontiers of Castile,
and if it was packed with French troops, so wlls Madrid: onc
place was no more dangerous than the other.
Exactly how far the perjurie.'> of Savary went, or how far he was
apprised of his master's final intentions, we cannot tell, but it is
certain that on April ]0 he set out flum l\fndrid in the Kjng's
company: with them went Escoiquiz, Ferdinand's clerical confidant,
CcVtlUo::; the minister of foreign nffhirs, und half tl. dm',cn dukeg
and marquises chosen from among the King's old partisans. To
administer aff'airs in his absence Ferdinand nominated a 'Junta' or
council of regency, with his unele Don Antonio, a simple and very
silly old mau, at its head 2.
On reaching Burgos, on April I!!, the party found masses of
French troops but no signs of Napoleon. Savary appeared ve."{ed,
said that his calculation must haye been "'Tong, and got the King
to go forward two more stages, as far as Vittoria, at the southenl
foot of the Pyrenees [April 14]. Here Ferdinand received a note
from his brother Don Carlos, whom he had sent ah~ saying
that Bonaparte had been lingering at Bordeaux, and was not ex~
pected at Bayonne till the fifteenth. Ferdinand, always timid and
suspicious, was getting restive; he hud IJOthing on paper to assure
him of Napoleon's intentions, and began to suspect Savary's bland~
ishmcnts. TIle latter doubted for !\ moment whether he should
not have the court seized by the :French garrison of Vittoria, but
1 Savary, in his mendlWioulI autohiography, denieil that he persUAded
Ferdinand to start for nayonne. Dut he is refuted by two contemporary
documents. The young king, in his letter of adieu to his father, stntes that
Savary has convinced him of tlle necessity of going; while Murat in a
dispatch to Bonaparte snys that' Sl\.vo,rr hns in no small degree contribuwd
to induce the new court to quit Madrid' [April 8].
~ for Don Antonio's habits we have on Tal1errand's authority aome very
curious stories. He spent most of his time of captivity at Valenpy sitting
in the library, mutilating illustrated books with bi;; scissors, not to mako
a scrap-book, but to destroy any engravings that sinned against morals
or religion!
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finally re.'lOlved to endeavour to get a letter from his mastel'l which
would suffice to lure l,'erdinand across the frontier. He WilS
entrusted with a petition of the same cast that Napoleon had been
ill the habit of recei\,jng from his would-be client, full of scrvile
loyalty and demands for the much-desired Bonaparte princess. •
The four days dW'ing which Savary wus absent, while the l"Oyal
party remained at Vittoria, were a period of harassing doubt to
Fcrdinllnd. He was visited by all malll;Jer of persons who besought
him not to go on, and especially by Spllniards lately arrived from
l~al"is, who detailed all the disquieting rumours which they had
heard at the French court. Some besought him to disguise himscU'
and escape by night from the 4,000 troops of the Imperial Guard
who garrisoned Vittoria. Others pointed out tllat the Spanish
troops ill Bilbuo, which \I'M still unoccupied by the French, might
be brought down by cross-roads, and assume charge of the king's
person halfway between Vittoria and the frontier, in spire of the
600 French cavalry which escorted the cavalcade. Guarded by his
own men Ferdinand might retire into the hills of Discay. Dut
to adopt either of the COUI'SC8 proposed to him would huvc com-
pelled the King to come to an open breach with Bonaparte, and for
this he had not sufficient courlJ{,'C, as long M there was thc slight.e;t
chalice of gettillg safely through his troubles by mere servility.
On April 18 Savary reappeared with the expected communica-
tion from Bllyonnc. It was ced:ninly onc of the strangest epistles
that one sovereign ever wrote to another, and one of the most
characteristic products of Napoleon's pen. It wns nddressed to the
Prince of the .Asturias, not to the King of Spain, which was an
ominous prefoc-e. But on the other hand the Emperor distinctly
stated that' he wished to cOllcilio.te his friend in every way, and to
find occnsion to give him proofS of his affection and perfect esteem.'
He added that' the marriage of your royal highness to a French
princess seems conformable to the interests of my people, and
likely to forge new links of union between myself and the house of
BOlll·bon.' The core of the whole W/lS the e.xplicit statement that
'if thc abdication of King Charles was spontaneous, and not forced
on him by the riot at Aranjuez, I shall have no difficulty in re-
cognizing your royal highness as King of Spain. On these details
I wish to converse with your royal highness.' This was a double-
edged saying: Napoleon had in his pocket Charles's protest, com-
plaining that the abdication had been for<:cd upon him by fears
011,\",. !
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for his personal safety: but Ferdinand WlIS not aware of the faet:
indeed he so little realized his parent's state of mind that he had
written to him before quitting ,Madrid ill the most friendly terms.
If he had fathomed the meaning of Napoleon's carefully con·
structed sentence, he would have fled for his life to the mountains.
These were the main clauses of Napoleon's letter, but they are
embedded in a quantity of turgid verbiage, in which wc are only
uncertain whether the hypocrisy or the bad taste is the morc
offensive. •How perilous is it for kings to permit their subjects
to seek justice for themselves by deeds of blood! I pray God that
your royal highness may not experience this for yourself some day!
It is not for the interest of Spain that the Prince of the Peace
should be hunted down: he is allied by marriage to the royal house
and has governed the realm for many years. He has no friends
now: but if your royal highness were to fall into similar disgrace
you would have no more friends than he, You cannot touch him
without touching yOW' parents. You have no rights to the crown
SU\'e those which your mother has transmitted to )'ou: if in trying
the Prince )'OU smirch her honour, you are destroying your own
rights. You have no power to bring him to judgement: his evil
deeds are hidden behind the throne, , , , 0 wretched Humanity!
WeakneSSt and En'Or, s~ch is our device! Dut all can be hushed
IIp: tum the Prince out of Spain, and I will give him an asylum in
France,'
In the next paragraph Napoleon tells Ferdinand that he should
never have written ro him in the preceding autumn without his
father's knowlcdge-' in that your royal highness was culpable;
but I flatter myself that I contributed by my remonstrances in
securing a happy end to the affair of the Escurial.' Ji'inally
Feminand might assure himself that he should have from his ally
precisely the same treatment that his father had always experienced
-which again is adouble-edged saying, if we lAke into consideration
the history of the relations of Charles IV and }rauce,
TIle King 81ld his confidant Escoiquiz read and reread this
curious document without coming to any certain conclusion:
probubly they thought (as would anyone else who did not know
the Emperor thoroughly) that the meeting at llayonne would open
with a scolding, Ilnd end with some tiresome concessions, but that
F'erdinand's title would be recogni7.ed, Savary's commentary was
reassuring: SptUlish witnesses say that he excluimcd 'I am l'Cad)" to
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have my head taken off if, within a quarter of all hour of your
majesty's arrival at Bayonne, the Emperor has not saluted you as
King of Spairi and the IlImes. . . . The whole negotiation will
not take three days, and your majesty will be back in Spain in
a moment 1,'
On April 19, therefore, the royal party set out amid the hrrouns
of the populace of Vittoria, who tried to hold back the horses,
und to cut tIle b·Ill.:cs of the King's coach: 011 the twentieth they
reached llayonne. Napoleon cntertuined them at dinner, but would
not tnlk politics: after the meal they were sent home to the not
very spacious or magnificent lodgings prepared for them. An hour
later the shameless Savary presented himself at the door, with the
astounding message that the Emperor had thought matters over,
and had come to the conclusion that the best thing for Spain would
be that the house of Bourbon should cease to reign, and that
a French prince should take their plncc. A prompt acquiescence
in the bargain should ~ rewarded by the gift of the kingdom of
Etruriu, which had just been tnkCIl from Fcrdinnnd's widowed sister
and her young son.
The possibility of such an outrage' had never occurred to the
yOllng king and hill counsellors: whcll something of the kind had
been suggested to them at Vittoria, they had cried out: that it was
insulting to the honour of the greatest hero of the age to dream
that he could be plotting treachcry 2. And now, too late, they learnt
the stuft' of which heroes were made, Even with Savary's worth
ringing ill thcir cars, thcy could not belicve that they bad hennl
aright. It must be some mere threat intended to frighten them
before ncgotiations began: probably .it meant that Spain would
have to cede some American colonies or some Catalonian frontier
districts. Next morning, therefore, FerdinRnd sent his minister
Ccvallos to plead his ClLUse: Napoleon refused to bargain or com-
promise: he wanted nothing, he said, but a prompt resignation
of his rights by the Princc of the Asturias: there· was nothing left
to haggle about. It was gradually borne in upon l<'erdinand that
the Empet·Ol" meant what he had said. But though timid he was
obstinate, and nothing like an alxlicatioll could be got out of him.
He merely continued to send to Napoleon one agent after another
1 Cevallos, p. 36.
t It 11'38 the Duke of Infautarlo W110 made this exclamation. See Urqllijo's.
letter to Cuesla in Lloreute's collection of papers on the BaYOl1ne business.
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-tirst the minister Cevo.llos, then his tutor and confidant Escoiquizt
then Don Pedro Labrador, a cowlCillor of state, all charged with
professions of his great readiness to do anything, short of resigning
the Spanish throne, which might satisfy his captor. Centllo!; and
Escoiquiz have left long narmtives of their fruitless embassies.
That. of the latter is especially interesting: he was admitted to a
long conference with Bonap..'\rle, in which he plied every argument
to induce him to leave Ferdinalld on the throne, after marrying
him to a French princess and e.'{acting from him C\'cry possible
guarantee of fidelity. The Empel'or was ready to listen to every
rcmonstranee, hut would not move frolll his projects. He laughed
at the idea that Spain would rise in arms, and give him trouble.
'Countries full of mQuks, like yours,' he said, 'arc easy to sllbjuf,"Iuc.
There may be some riots, but the Spaniards will quiet down when
they sce that I offer them the integrity of the boundlU'ies of the
monarchy, a liberal constitution, and the preservation of their
religion and their national customs I.'
When such were Napoleon's ideas it was useless to Ilrgue with
him. But Ferdinand refused to understand this, and kept reiterating
all sorts of impracticable offers of concession and subservience.
while refusing to do the one thing which the Emperor required
of him. Napoleon, much irritated Ilt the refusal of such a pOOl'
Cl'Cature 'to ··bow to his will, has left a sketch of him during these
trying days. 'The Prince of the Asturias,' he wrote, 'is very
stupid, ·...ery malicious, a very great bater of lrance. . . . He is
a thoroughly uninteresting person, so dull that I cannot get a
word out of him. Wllatever one says to him he makes no reply.
\Vhether I scold him, or whether I coax him, his fllce !leVer 1ll0\'CS.
After studying him you can sum him up in a single word-he
is a sulky fellow 2,'
As Ferdinand would not budge, Bonaparte had now to bring his
second device to the front. With the old king's Pl'Otcst before
him, the Emperor could say that Charles IV had never abdicated in
any real sense of the word. He had been made to sign ILrcsignation
'with a pistol levelled at his head,' as a leading article in the
AfOlli.teur duly set forth. Such a. document was, of course, worth
nothing: therefore Charles was still lGng of Spain, and might sign
I .Escoiqui~, p. 318. Every student of Napoleoll should read the whole of
the wonderful dialogue between the ~~mperor and the Canon of Toledo.
~ Napoleon to Talleyrand, May 0, 1808.
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that surrender of his rights which Ferdinand denied. Napoleon
promptly scnt for the old king and quccn, who arrived under
a French escort on April 30, ten days after their son's captivity
began. At. Baymme they rejoined t.heir denrly-Ioved GOOoy,
whom :Murat had ext.orted from the Junta of Regency, under
co\'cr of a consent. sent by Ferdinllnd to. Napoleon from Vittoria
two days before he crossed the frontjllr.
Charles IV arrived in a state of lachrymose collapse, sank on
Napoleon's brcruit and culled him his true friend and his only
support. 'I reall)' do not know whether it is his position or the
circulllstances, but. he looks like a good hom~t. old man,' com-
mented the Emperor. 'The Queen has her past written on her
face-that is enough to define her. As to the Prince of the
rcacc. he looked like u prize bull, with a dash of Count Dart! about
him,' GOOoy and the Queen had only one thought., to avenge
themselves on Fen:lino,nd: after what had taken place they could
never go back to rule in Spain, so they cared little wbat happened
to the country. /u, to the King, his wife and his favourite pulled
the lStl'iJlgs, tUld he gesticulated in the fnsl1ion that. Uley desired.
The Emperor treated them with an ostentatious politeness which
he had always refused to the new king: at. the first banquet t}mt
he gave them occurred the (lJ)i;U1U Sl::ene (already mentioned by us),
in which Charles refused to sit down to table till Godoy had been
found and put near him.
'1\1'0 days after their arrivul Napolcon compelled Ferdinalld to
appear before his parents: he himself was also present. The
interview commenced by King Clmrles ordering his SOil to sign
SI. complete and absolute renunciation of' the Spanish throne.
BOllRl)arte then threw in a few tlu'e..'l.tening words: but Ferdilland,
still unmoved, mude 1\ steady refusal. At this the old king rose
from his chair-lIe was half-crippled with rheumatism-and tried
to strike his son with his mne, wllile the Queen burst in with
a stream of abuse worthy of a fishwife. Napoleon, horrified at
the odious scene, according to his own nalTative of it, hurl'ied
Ferdinand, <who looked scared,' out of the room.
The same night [May 1]. Ferdinand's a<h'isers bethought them
of a new and ingenious move-wc need not ascribe it to his own
1 or this interview we lm\'c the vcrsion of Napoleon Ilimself ill a dispatch
to Murat, dated May 1 ; another br Cevallos, Ferdinand's minister; a third
by Dc l'radt (aftcr"'ards Archbishop of Mcchlill), thcn presCllt at llarollnc.
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brains, which were surely incap..'lble of the device. He wrote to King
Charles to the effect that he had always regarded the abdication
at Aranjuez as free and unconstrained, but that if it had not been
:;0, he WIIS ready to lay down his crown again and hand it back to
his father. But the ceremony must be done in an open and
honoumble way at Madrid, before the Cortes. If his parent
personally resumed the reins of' power, he bowed to his authority:
but if his age and infirmities induced him to name a regent, that
regent should be his eldest SOI1.
This proposal did not suit the Emperor at all, so he dictated to
the old king a long letter, ill which the Napoleonesque phraseology
peeps out in a score of places. Charles refuses all tenns, says that
his son's condud ll;ld. 'plm:ed tl bUl'rier of bronze between him and
the Spanish throne,' and concludes that' only the Emperor can
save Spain, und he himself would do nothing that might stir up
the fire of discord among his loved vassals or bring misery on
them [Muy fl]. Fcrdintmd l-cplicd with un C<lually lOllg letter
justifying at large all his conduct of' the past year [May 4].
'¥hen things stoOO. at this point there atrived from Madrid the
news of the bloody events of the second of May, which we have to
relate in the next chapter. This brought Napoleon up to striking
point, and once IllMe he intervened in his own person. He sent
tor Ferdinand, and in the presence of his parents accused him of
having stirred up the riot in the cupital, and informed him that if
he did not sign an abdication and an acknowledgement of his
father as the only true king by twelve that night' he should be
dealt with as a traitor and rebel.' This is Napoleon's own version \
but Spanish witnesses suy that the words used were that' he must
choose between abdication and death 2.'
To anyone who remembered the fate of the Due d'Ellghien such
a phrase was 1ll000e thall an idle threat. It brought the stubbom
.Ferdinand to his knees at last. That e\·ening he wrote out
a sill1ple and straightforward form of abdication-' without any
motive, save that I limited my former proposal for resignation
by l.:ert'lin proper conditions, your majesty ha.'1 thought fit to
insult me in the presence Qf my mother and the Emperor. I have
been abused in the most humiliating terms: I have been told that
unless I make an unconditioual resignation 1 and my companions
1 Dispatch to i\Iurat ofi'lJay 5.
S 'Prillcc, il faut optcr entre la cession et la mort' (CcvalIoo, 11. 60).
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sh».l1 be treated as cl'imillllls guilty of COI1Spil1lCY. Undel' such
circumstances I make the renunciation which your majesty com·
mands, that the government of Spain may return to the con-
dition in which it was OD March 19 last, the day 011 which your
majesty spontaneollsly laid down your crown in my favour t ,
[M"y 6].
Ferdinand having abdicated, Napolcon at once produeed a treaty
which King Cbarles had ratified on the previolls day. twenty~four
hours before his son gave in. By it the old man 'resigned all his
rights to the throne of Spain and the Indies to the Emperor
Nllpolcoll, the 0I11y person who in the plocsent state of affuirs can
re·establish order.' He only annc.xed two conditions: '(1) that
there should be no partition of the Spanish monarchy; (~) that the
noman Catholic religion should be the only one recognized in
Spain: there should, according to the existing practk-c, be no
tuleration for any of the reformed religions, much less for infidels.'
If anything is wanting to make the silly old man odious, it is the
(inal touch of bigotry in his alxlicntion. The rest of the document
consists of a recital of the pensions and estates in France conferred
by the Emperor 011 his dupe in return for the abdication. It took
fivc days mOI'C to cxtort from Don Fcrdino.nd a formal cession of
his ultimate rights, as Prince of the Asturias, to the succession to
the throne. It was signed on May 10, and purported to give him
in return a palace in France and a large unnuaI revcnuc. But he
was really put under close surveillance at Talleyraud's estate of
Vulcns--ay, along with his brother Don CiLrlos, and Ilever uIloWl.. J
to go beyond its bounds, The Emperor's letter of instructions to
Talleyrand is worth quoting for its cynical brutality. He wrotc
to his ex-ministcr, who was much disgusted with the invidious
duty put upon him: 'Let thc princes be receh·ed without any
show, but yet rcspectably, t\lld tl'y to keep them amuscd. If you
chance to have a theatre at Va1en~ay there would be no harm in
importing some actors 1I0W and thell, You may brillg over
Mme de Talleyrand [the notOliollS MmI..' Grand of 1800], and fOUl'
or five ladies in attendance on her, If the prince should fall
in 10\'1..' with some PI'Ctty girl among them, there would be no
harm in it, especially if you are quite sure of her. The princc
must uot be allowed to take lllly false step, but must be amused
and occupied. I ought, for political safety. to put him in Bitche
I 'foreiio, Appeudix, i. 466, 46i.
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01' some other fortress-prison: but AS he placed himself into my
clutches of his own free will, and as everything in Spain is going
on as I desire, I have resolved merely to ]llo.cc him in a country
house where he can amuse himself under strict surveillance....
Your mission is really a very honourable onc---to take in three 1
illustrious guests and keep them amused is a task which should
suit a Frenchman and a personage of your rtlnk 2.' Napoleon
afterwards owned that he was framing what he called' a practical
joke' Oll Tulleyrand, by billeting the Spaniards on him. The
Prince of Benevento had wished to make no appearance in the
matter, and the Emperor revenged himself by implicating him in it
as the jailor of his captives. Talleyrand's anger may be imagined,
and estimated by his aftcr (:ondllct.
At Valenc;ay the unfortunate .Ferdinalld was destined to remain
for nearly six )'CU1'li, not IUllusing himself at nU ficcon:ling to
Napoleon's ideas of amusement, but employed in a great many
church services, a litUe partridge shooting, and (so his ullwilliIlg
jailor tells us) the spoiling of much paper, not with the pen but
with the scissors; for he developed a childish passion for clipping
out paper patterns and bestowing them on everyone that he met.
Onc could pardoll him everything if he had not spoilt his attitude
as victim and martyr by occasionally sending adulatory letters to
the Emperor, and even to his own supplanter, Joseph Bonaparte
the new King of Spain.
1 TIle third prisoner was Ferdinaml's uncle, Don Alltonio.
2 This letter, eliminated by tlle editors of the CorresPQlldance de Napolloo,
may be found ill Lecestre, LeUre:r illedilu de NapoMoII " i. p. 207.
SECTION I: CHAPTER VI
'I'm; SECOND 0.'" l\IA Y: OUTnR~AK OF THE SPANISH
INSUlUtECl'lON
w·HL~ King Fcrdill/llld had taken his depali:urc to Bayonne, the
position of Mural in Madrid became very delicate. He might
expect to hear at allY moment, since the Emperor's plans were
more or less known to him, either that the Spanish king had been
ITllUlc 11 prisoner, or that he hud ulken the alarm, escaped frolll
his escort, and fled into the mountains. In either case trouble at
Madrid was very probable, though there was no serious military
danger to be fcared, fol' of Spanish troops there were only 3,000 in
the city, while some 35,000 French were encamped in or about it.
Dut there might be 11 moment of confusion if the Junta of RCf,rcncy
should take violent measures on hearing of the King's fate, or the
populace of MaW'id (and this was much more likely) bUl"St into
rioting.
From the tenth of April, the day of the King's departure for the
north. down to the twenty-ninth there was no serious muse for
appl'Chension, The people were no doubt restless: they could not
llndel"Stand why the French lingered in Madrid instead of marching
on Portul"rul or Gibraltar, n.cconlillg to thcir expressed intention.
Rumours of all kinds, some at' which hit off fairly well the trne
projects of Bonaparl:e, were currcnl Mumt's conduct was not
calculated to reassure observers; he gave himself the airs of a
military governor. mther than those of an officer engaged in
conducting an allied army through friendly territory. Some of
his acts gave terrible offence, such as that of insisting that "the
SWOl,d of Francis I, taken at Pavia in lM5. the llride for three
centuries of the royal armoury. should be given up to him l , His
I NapolCQll, d.isapprovillg of Murat's action ou this point, committed llim·
self to two astounding lIistoriCl\1 statements. <Why trouble about the sword;
lIe wrete; • li'rancis 1 was a Bourbon [!) and he was takeu by the ltaliaJ\.~.
Jlot the SIJauiaTtls' [!!] (.!.Yup. Cwr~JI., 13,724).
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mU 011 the J llnW, for the sUITClltler of the Prince of the Pcuce,
whom he forwarded under French escort to Bayollne, (:Quld 110t
fail to be unpopular. But the first real signs of dnuf:,'Cf were not
seen till the twenty-second of April, when Murat, in obedience to
his master, intended to publish the protest of Charles IV against
his aWication. It was to be presented to the Junta in the form of
a letter to its president, Don Antonio. Meanwhile 1'rench ~rrellts
were set to print it: their Spanish ullclel-Hugs stole il.1ld circulated
some of the proofs. Their appearance raised a mob, for the name
ofChurles IV t:ould only sugf:,f'Cst the reuppearWlL'C of GOOoy. An
angry crowd broke into the printing office, destroyed the presses,
und hunk>d away the Frenchmen. Mumt at once made a great
matter of the affair, and began to threaten the Junta. •The ann.v
which he communded could not without dishonouring itself allow
disorders to arise: there must be no more anarchy in Spain. He
was not going to allow the corrupt tools of the English government
to stir ·up troubles.' The Junta replied with rather more spirit
than might have been expected, asked why an army of 35,000
French troops had 110W lingered more than a month around the
capital, and expressed an opinion that the riot was but an explosion
of loyalty to FerdinfLlld. But they undertook to deal severely with
factious persons, and to discour~cre even hannless assemblies like
that of the twelltY-Sl..~'Olld.
Meanwhile Murat wrote to the Emperor that it was absurd that
he could not yet establish u police of his own in Mtldrid, that he
could not print what he pleased, and that he had to negotiate with
the Junta when he wished his orders publishe<4 instead of being
able to issue them on his own authority 1. He was answered in
a style which must have surprised him. Napoleon was ashamed, he
said, of a general who, with 50,000 men at his buck, asked for
things instead of taking them. His letters to the Junta were
servile; he should simply assume possession of the reins of power,
and act for himself. H the canaille stirred, let it be shot down :.
Murat could only reply that' if he had not yet scattered riotel"S by
a blast of grape, it was only because there were no mom to shoot:
his imperial majesty's rebuke had stunned him" like a tile falling
on his head" by its unmerited scvcrity 3.'
Within three da}'S of this letter there was to be plenty of
I Murat to Kapoleoll, April 22. I Napolllon to l\huat, April 26.
~ ,Murat to Kapoleon, April 30.
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gl1lpc-shot, enough to satisfy both Emperor und Gnllld-Duh.
They probably bad the revolt of Cairo and the 13th Vendcmiaire
in their mind, and wel"e both under the impression that a good
bllfJlltc piti1c~ly crushed by artillery was the best basis of a new
regime.
On the night of .Ap61 fl9 the first clear and o.ccumte account
of what 'I'M happening at Bayonne arrived at Madrid. Napoleon
had inle"cepled all the letters which Don Ferdinand had tried
t.o smuggle out of his prison. He read them with grave
disappr<n·al. for his guest had not scrupled to use the expres·
sioll 'the CLU'l;(,'d :E'rcllch,' and had hinted ut the ptupricty of
resistance. Hc had not yet been cowed by the threat of a rebel's
death. Dut on the twenty-third OllC of the Spaniards at Dayonne
succeeded in t'SCtlping in dish'Uise. crossed the mountains by a lonely
track, and reached Pampeluna, whene<l he posted to Madrid, This
wtJ,.'l a. cCrtain NaVfll'l'ese ll10gistmtc named Tbnl'l1UVllrro, to whom
l"el'dilland had given a vcrbal message to c."I:plain Napoleon's plans
and conduct to the Junw, lllld to inform them that he would never
give in to tbi~ vile mixture of fort:c and mUlll, He could lIot !SCnd
them any definite instructions, not knowing the exact stale of affairs
at Madrid, and a premature stroke might imperil the life of himself,
his brothel', and his companions: let them bewa.re therefore of
showing their warlike intentions till preparati:ons had been fully
made to shuke off the yoke of the 0p!J!'eSSOt',
This message Ibarnavill'l"O delivered on the night of April ~9-30
to the JWlta \ who llad summoned in to heal' it a number of judges
and other magnates of the city, Next morning, of course, the
informatioll, ill a more or less garbled shape, spread all round
Madrid.. there were foolish rumours that the BisCilJuns had
already taken arms, and that 30,000 of them were marching Oil
Btl)'OtlllC to save the Killg, as also that certain of the COllSt towns
had invited the English to land. On the thirtieth leaflets, both
written and printed, were being secretly circulated round the city,
setting forth the unhappy condition of the King, and bidding his
subjects not to forget Numancia~, It is astonishing that riots did
I llnrnavarro's story, written dO"']J by Ililllself on Se!ltember 27, 1808, can
be (ouIld printed in full 011 PI'- 457-0 of the Appendix to Torefio'g first
volume.
I For a specimen Ilee the llocumellt Oll 11, 462 of CoUllt Mu.rat'g Mural el~
B$pagne (Paris, 1697),
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not break out at QIJt:X\ considering the growing excitement of th<l
people, and the habitual insolence of the :French soleticry. But
lewlcl"S were wllllting, lllld in especial the Junta. of Rch1'Cllcy and its
imbecile old president made no move whatever, on the pretext,
npplU'Cntly, tliat nny (:ommotioll might imperil the lives of
Napoleon's prisoners.
It was Murat himself who brought matters to a head next day,
by ordering the Junta to put into his hands the remaining members
of the royal family, Ferdinand's :youngest brother Don Francisco,
a boy of sixteen, and his sister the widowed and axiled Queen of
Etruria, with her children. Only Don Antonio, the incapable
president of the Junta., and the, Archbishop of Toledo, the King's
second-cousin, were to be left behind: the rest were to be sent
to BaYOllllC. Knowing what had happened to Don Ferdinand and
DOll Carlos, the people wcre honified at the news; but they trusted
that the Regency would refuse its leave. To its eternal disgrl1l'e
that body did nothillg: it did not even try to smuggle away the
young Don Francisco befOl'e A'luret sllOuld arrest him.
On the morning, therefore, of May 2 the streets were filled
with people, and the palace gates in espl'Cial were beset by an
excited mob. It was soon seen that the news was true, for the
Queen of Etruria appeared and started for the north with all her
numerous family. She was unpopular for having sided with her
mother and Godoy against Don Ferdinand, and was allowed to
depart undisturbed. Dut when the can'iage that was to heal' off'
DOll Francisco was brought up, and one of Murat's aides-de-camp
appeared at the door to take charge of the young prince, the rage
of the crowd burst all bounds. The French officer was stoned, and
saved with difficulty by a patrol; tIle !.:oach WitS tOI'l1 to piece;;,
Murat had not been unprepared for something of the kind: the
battalion 011 guard at his palace was at once turned out. and fired
a dozcn volleys into the unarmed mob, which fled devious, leaving
scores of dead and wounded on the ground.
The Grand-Duke thought that the matter was over, but it had
but just begun. At the 110ise of the fiJ'ing the excited citizens
Hocked into the streets armed with whatever came to hand, pistols,
blunderbusses, fowling-pieces, many only with the 100lg Spanish
knife, They fell upon, and slew, a certain number of isolated
French soldiers, armed and unarmed, who wel-e ofT' duty and
wandering round the town, but thcy also made a fierce attack
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on Murat's guard. Of course they could do little against troops
ill'moo and in order: in the first hour of the fight there were anI)'
nbout 1,000 men at the Grand-Dukc's disposal, but this small force
held its own without much loss, though eight or ten thousand
angry insurgents fell llpon them. But within seventy minutes the
French army from the suburban camps came pouring into the city,
brigade after bl·igadc. After this the struggle WI.LS little more than
11 massacre: many of the insurgents took refuge in hOll~ and
maintained a fierce but futile resistance for some time; but the
nU~Ol'ity were liwcpt a\\'11Y in a few minutes by ctlvalq c1uwges.
Only at OIlC point did the fight assume a serious shape. Almost
the entire body of the Spanish garrison of Madrid refrained from
taking any pmt in the risillg: without the orders of the Junta the
chiefs refused to move, and the men waited in vain for the orders
of their officers. But at the A'tiller)' Park two captains, Daoiz
and Velnrde, threw open the gates to the rioters, allowed them
to seize some hundreds of muskets, and when the first French
column appeared ron out three guns and opened upon it with
grape 1. Though aided by no more than forly soldiers, and
perhaps 500 civilians, they beat off two assaults, and only
succumbed to u. third. Daoiz was bayonetted, Velnrde shot dead,
and their men perished with them; but they had poured three
volleys of grape into a street packed with the enemy, and caused
the only serious losses which the French suffered tha.t day.
The whole struggle had occupied not more than four hours:
when it was ovel' Murat issued an 'onler of the day,' scntencing
all prisoners taken with arms in their hands, ill persons discovered
with arms cOllcculcd ill their houses, and all distributors of
seditious leaflets, 'the agents of the English government,' to be
shot. It seems that at least a hundred persons were executed under
this edict, many of them inuoccnt bystanders who had taken no
part in the fighting. Next morning Murat withdrew his Draconian
decree, and 110 further fusiludcs look place. It is impossible, ill the
conflict of authorities, to arrive at any clear estimate of the
numbers slain 011 each side 011 l\'111Y 2~. Probably Torei'lu is not
1 Napier (1. 15) says that DaoiT. and Velarde were' in a state of excitement
from drink,' a disgraceful Preueh calumny. Ho"' could be bear to reproduce
suell a libel on these unfortunate officers?
I The Junta., to soothe the feelings of Madrid, gave out that only 150
Spauiards had fallen. The M01lilett1' said that 2,000 criminals had been cut
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far out when he estimates the whole at sometllillg over a thousund.
Of these fourwfifths must have been Spaniards, for the French only
lost heAvily at the arsenal: the number of isola.ted soldiers
murdered in the streets at the first outbreak of the riot does not
seem to have been "cry larbrc.
Many French authors haYe called the rising a deliberate and
prcconcertcd <..'onspimcy to massacre the French garrison. On the
other hand Spanish writers have asserted that Murat had arranged
e"erything so as to cause a riot, in order that he might have the
chance of administering a' whiff of grape-shot,' after his masb~]"1!
plan. But it is clear that both are making unfounded accusations:
if the insurrection had been premeditated, the Spanish soldiery
would have been implicated in it, for nothing would have been
easier than to stir them up. Yet of the whole 3,000 only forty
ran out to help the imurgents. lHoreover, the mob would have
been found armed at the fir~i; commencement of trouble, which
it certainly was not. On the other hand, if Murat had been
organizing a massacre, he would not have been caught with no
morc than two squadron~ of cavalry and five or six companies of
infnntry under his hand. These might have been ~lt to pieces
before the troops from outside could come to their help. He had
been expecting riots, and WM pl'eparcd to deal with them, but was
surprised by a serious insumx:tion on a larger scale than he had
fOI'CS(.'Cn, I.md at a moment when he was not rendy.
For a few days after May ~, Murat at Madrid and his master
at BaYOlmc .....el"C both living in f\ sort of fools' paradise, imagining
that 'the affairs of Spain were going oft' wonderfully well,' and
that 'the party of FerdillRlId had l.x.'Cn crushed by the prompt
suppression of its conspiracy.' The Grand-Duke had the simplicity
or the effrontery to issue a proclamation in which he said' that
e'·ery good Spaniard had groaned at the sight of such disorders,'
and another ill which the insun"CCtion was attributed to 'the
machinations of our common enemy, i.e. the British government I.'
On :May 4 Don Antonio laid down the presidency of the Junta
without a word of regret, and went 0/1' to Bayonllc, having first
borrowed 25,000 francs from Mumt. The latter, by virtue of
down or executed! Murat reported a 1058 of eighty men ouly, while Napier
AAyS that he has excellent F'roncll authority and cyG-\\·itnes!les to the effect
that 750 fell.
I Proclamations of May 2 and 3: there are originals in the VOUfJful1I Papert.
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a decree issued by Charles IV, then assumed the presidency of
the Junta of Regency. The rest of the members of that ignoble
body CllSily $tl.nk into his servile instruments, though they had at
last received a secret note smuggled out from llayonne, in which
Ferdino.nd (the day before his abdication) told them to regard his
remo\'Ul into the interior of France us a declaration of war, and to
call the nation to arms. To this they paid no attention, while
they pretended to take the document of resigllation, which Dona*
parte had fOrLm him to sign, as un authentic and spontaneous
expression of his will. The fact is that twenty years of GOOoy
had thoroughly demorali7.ed the bureaucracy and the court of
Spain: if the country's will had not found bettel' exponents than
her ministers and officials, Napoleon might have done what he
pleased with the Peninsuln.
At present his sole interest seems to have lain in settling the
details of his hrother Joseph's election to the Spanish throne.
FCl'dinnnd's final rCliignution of ull his rights having been siJ:,rnccl
on May 10, the field was open for his successor. Thc Emperor
thought that some sort of deputation to rcpresent the Spanish
nation ought to he !,"Ot together, in order tllllt his brother might
not seem to reccive the crown from his own hands only. :Murat
was orst set to work to terrorize thc Junta of Regency, and the
'Colweil of Castile,' n body which practically occupied Illuch the
snme position as the English Privy Council. At his dictation
the Junta yielded, but with an ill grace, and sent petitions to
Bo.yonne asking for a new monarch, and suggesting (as desired)
that the person chosen might be Joseph BOllaparte, King of
Nnples [May 13]. MW'nt had just !x.'(!n informed that as nll had
gonc well with the Emperor's plans he should have his reward: he
might make his choice between the thrones of Naples and of
Portugal. He wisely chose the formcr, where the rough work of
subjection had already been done by his predecessor.
Blit rcsolvel:l to get together something like a represcntativc body
which might vote away the liberty of Spain, Napoleon nominated,
in the Madrid Gazette of May ::t4, 150 persons who were to go to
BayolInc and therc ask him to grant thcllllt king. He nnmeda most
miscellaneous crowd-ministers, bisbops,judges, municipal officers of
Madrid, dukes and counts, the heads of the religiolls orders, the Grnnd
Inquisitor and some of his colleagues, and six well-known Americans
who were to speak for the colonies. To the eternal disgrace of
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the Ml1ing classes of Spnin, no less than nillely-onc of the nominees
were base enough to obey the orders given them, to go to Bayonnef
[Uld there to Cl'l).ve us I.l boon that the weuk and incompetent
Joseph Bonaparte might be set to govern their unhappy country,
under the 1l1lSpk-es of his brother the hero und regellcrator. Long
before the degrading farce was complete, the whole country was in
arms behind them, and they knew themselves fo1' traitors. The
election of King Joseph I was only taken in hand on June 15,
while twenty days before the north und south of Spain had risen
in arms in the Dame of the captive Ferdinand VlI.
It took a week fOl" the news of the insurrection of May 2 to
spread round Spain: in the public mouth it of course assumed the
shape of tl. mussucrc dc1iberatcl}' planned by Mumt. It wus not
till some days later that the full details of the events at Bayonne
got abroad. But ever since the smprise of the frontier forl:rt'SSes
in February and March, intelligent men all over the country had
been suspecting lImt some gross act of treachery WllS likclY to be
the outcome of the French invasion, Yet in most of the districts
of Spain there wus a gap of some days between the arrival of the
news of the King's captivity and the first outbreak of popular
indignation. The fact was that the people were waiting for thc
lawful and constituted authorities to take action, and did not
move of themselves till it wus ccrtnin that no initiative wus to
be expected from those in high places, But Spain was a country
which had long been governed on despotic lilies; and its official
chiefs, whether the nominees of Godoy or of the knot of intriguers
who lUll just wall their way to POWCl' undeL' Fcrdino.nd, were
not the men to lead a war of national independence, Many were
mere ad"Cllturers, who had risen to preferment by flattering the
latc favourite, Others were typical bureaucrats, whose only concel1l
wn.'> to lU.,'cept as legitimate whatever orders reached them from
Madrid: provided those orders were couched in the proper form
and written on the right paper, they did not look to see whether
the signature at the bottom was that of GOOoy or of the Infante
Don Antonio, or of Mural. Others again were courtiers who
owed their position to their great names, and not to any personal
ability, It is this fact that Rl,:counts for the fortnight or even
three wL'Cks of torpor that followed the events of the second and
sixth of May, Murat's orders during that space travelled over the
countq, and most of the cuptains-general and othCl' authorities
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seemed inclined to obey them. Yet they were orders which should
have stirred up instant disobedience; the Mediterranean squadron
Wtll! to be sent to Toulon, where (if it did not get taken on the way
by the British) it would fall into the hands of Napoleon. A large
detachment of the depleted regular army was to sail for Buenos
Ayrcs. with the probable prospect of finding itself el'C long Oil the
hulks at Portsmouth, instead of on the shores of the !tio de la
Plata. The Swiss regiments in Spanish pay were directed to be
transferred to the French establishment, and to take the oath to
Napoleon. All this could have no object save that of diminishing
the fighting power of the country.
The first prm':ince where the people plucked up coumge to act
without their officials, and to declare war on France in spite of
the dreadful odds against them, WllS the remote and iuacecssible
principality of the Asturias, pressed in between the Bay of Biscay
and the Cantabrian hills. Uiots began at its eapital, Oviedo, as
early as the first arrival of thl} news from Madt·id on May 9, whell
Murat's edicts were torn down in spite of the feeble resistance of
the commander of the gan'ison and some of the magistrates. The
Asturias was one of the few provinces of Spain which still preserved
vClltih"CS of ih; IlK'<1iacval representative inltiitutions. It had Il
'Junta General,' a kind of local' estates,' which chanced to be in
session at the time of the cl'isis. Being composed of local mag·
nates and citizens, und not of officials and bureaucrats, this body
was sufficiently in touch with public opinion to feel itself home on
to action. After ten days of secret preparation, the city of Oviooo
and the surrounding country-side rose in unison 011 May fl4: the
partisans of the new government were imprisoned, and next day
the estab..'S fUl'Il1fl.lly declared war 011 Napoleon Bonaparte, alld
ordered a levy of 18,000 men from the principality to .resist in-
vasion. A great part of the credit for this daring move mllst be
given to the p'"CSidcnt of the Junta, the :Murquis of Su.nlll Cl'llZ,
who had stirred up his colleagues as early as the thirteenth by
declaring that' when and wherevel' one sblgle Spaniard took arms
against Napoleon, he would shoulder a musket and put himself at
that man's side.' The AsturiRns had no knowledge that other
provinces would follow their example; there was only olle battalion
of regular troops and onc of militia under arms ill the province;
its financial resources were small. Its only sb-englh lay in the
rough mountains that had on<:c sheltered King Pelayo from the
0),[41"'. 1
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Moors. It was therefore an astounding piece of patriotism whcu
the inhabitant<; of the principality threw down the challenge to
the ,·idOl' of Jella and Austel·lit3.. confiding in their stem resolu-
tion and their good cause. All through the war the Asturias
played it very creditable part in the struggle, and nc\'er let the
light of liberty go Qut, though often its capital and its port of
Gijoll fell into :French hands.
One of the first and wisest measures taken by the Asturiall
Junta ""IlS an attempt to interest Great Britain in the insurrection.
On May 80 they sent to London two emissaries (one of whom was
the historian TorcHo) 011 a Jersey plivatccl', whose captain WI\S
persuaded to turn out of' his course for the public profit. On
June 7 they had renched London and had all interview with
Canning. the :Foreign Secretary of the Tory government which had
lately comc into power. Five days Jater' thcy werc USl>urcd that
the Asturias might draw on England for all it required in the
way of arms, munitions, and monc)'. All this wus done before it
was known in England that any other Spanish province was
stirring, for it wus not till June ~ that tile plcllipotentiw:ie:; of
the other juntas began to appear in London.
The revolt of other provinces followed in very quick succession.
Galicia rose on May 30, in spite of its captain-general, Filallghieri,
whose resistancc to thc popular voiee cost him his popularity and,
not long after, his life. Corunna and l?errol, the two northern
arsenals of Spain, led the way. Thili uddition to tllcflsul'gcnt
forces wus very important, for the province was full of.,Ltroops he
garrisons that protected the ports from English descents, There
were eighteen battalions of regulars and fourteen of militia-
EL whole army-concentrated in this remote comer of Spain.
Napoleon's plan of removing the Spanish troops from the neigh-
bourhood of Madrid had produced tlle unintended result of making
the outlying provinces very strong for self-defence.
It is more fitting for a .Spanish than an English historian to
descend into the details of the rising of each province of Spaill.
The general characteristics of the outburst in each region were
much the samc: hardly anywhere did the civil or military offici~ls
in charge of the district take the lead. Almost invariably they
hung back, fearing for their places and profits, and realizing far
better than did the insurgents the enormous militar)' power which
they were challenging. The leaders of thc movement were ci\.per
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local magnates not actually holding office-like the celebrated
Joseph Palafox at Saragossa-or demagogues of the streets, or
(but less frequently than might have been expected) churchmen.
Napo!oon was quite wrong when he called the Spllnish rising' all
insurrection of mOllks.' The church followed the nation, and not
the lmtion tlle church: indl'(..J. many of the spiritual hierarehy
were among the most servile instruments of Murat. Among them
was the primate of Spain, the Archbishop of Toledo, who was
actually a scion of the house of llourbon. '111cre were mnny
ecclesiastics among the dishonoured ninety-one that went to
Ba)'ollne, if there were others who (like the Dishap of Sanwnder)
put thcmscll'l'S at the head of their flocks when the country took
arms.
H was a great misfortullc for Spain that the juntas, which were
everywhere formed when the people rose, had to be composed in
large part of men ullncquainted with govel'nment and organization.
There were many intelligent patriots among their members, a. certain
number of statesmen who had been kept down or disgraced by
Godoy, hut also 11 lllrgc propOltioll of I1mbilious wind~J.gS flud
self-seeking intriguers. It was hard to constitute a capable govern·
ment, 011 the spur of the moment, in 1\ country which had suflered
twcnty YCllrs of Goooy's rule.
An unfortunate feature of the rising was that in most of the
provinces, and especially those of the south, it took from the flrst
a "cry ~nguinary cast. It was natural that the people should
sweep away in their anger every official who tried to keep them
down, or hesitated to commit himself to the struggle with Frunl..'e.
But there was no reason to murder these weaklillgs or traitors, in
the st)')e of the Jacobins. There was a terrible amount of aSS¥Sina·
tion, public fUld private, during thc first days of thc illsurrcction,
Three cuptains-general were slain under circumstance; of brutal
cruelty-Filllnghieri in Galicill, Torre del Fresno in Estl't~madura,
Solano at Cadiz. The fate of Solano may serve us an example: he
tried to keep the troops from joining the people, and vainly
harangued the mob: pointing to the distant sails of the English
blockading squadron he shouted, 'There are )'our real enemies!'
But his words had no effect: he was hunted down in a house where
he took refugc, and was being drugged to be hUllg Oil thc public
gallows,' when the hand of a fanatic (or perhaps of a secret friend
who wished to spare him a dishonourablc death) dealt him a fatal
..
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slab in the side. Gregorio de la Cuesta, the Govcmor-Gcneral of
Old Castile, who was destined to play such a prominent and
unhappy pltrt in the history of the ne."i:t two years, nearly shared
Solano's fate. The populace of Valladolid, where he was res!ding,
rose in insurrection like those of the other cities of Spain. They
called OIl their military chief to put himself at their head; but
Cuesta, au old soldier of the most unintelligent and brainless
sort, hated mob·violcnce almost more than he hated the French.
He held back, not from a desire to sen'c Bonapal'tc, but from
1l. dislike to being bullied by civilians. The indignant populace
erected a gallows outside his house and came to hang him thereon.
It was 110t, it is said, till the rope was actually rOUlld his neek
that the obstinate old mall gave in. The Castilians promptly
released him, and put him at the head of the armed rnbble which
formed their only force. Remembering the awful slaughter at
Cabezoll, llt Medina de Rio Scoo, and at Medellin, which his
incapacity and mulish obstinacy was destined to bring about., it is
impossible not to express the wish that his consent to take arms
had been delayed for a few minutes longer.
All over Spain there took place, during the last days of l\fay
and the first week of June, scores of murders of prominent men,
of old favourites of Godoy, of colonels who would not allow their
regiments to march, of officials who had shown alacrity in obeying
the orders of Mural. In the Asturias and at Saragossa alone do
the new juntas seem to have succeeded in keeping down assassina-
tion. The worst scelles took place at Valencia, where a mad priest,
the Canon llnltasnr Calvo, led out a mob of l'uffillllS who in two
days [June p-7] murdered 338 persons, the whole colony of French
mcrclmnts residing in that wealthy town. It is satisfat:tory to
know that when the Junta of Valencia felt itself firmly seated in
the saddle of power, it seized and ex~uted this abominable person
and his chief lieutenants. In too many parts of Spain the mur-
derers went unpunished: yet remembering the provocutioll which
the nation had received, and comparing the blood shed by mob-
violence with that which flowed ill Remlutiotltll'Y FnUlL'C1 we must
consider the outbul'1;t deplorable rather than surprising.
"'hen the insurrection had rcuchcd its full development, we find
that it centred round five points, in each of which a separate
junta had seized all power and ~'llll to levy an arm)'_ 'l'he
most powerful focus was Seville, from which all Andalusia took its
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directions: indeed the Junta of Se\'ille Illlcl as.<;umed the arrognnt
style of' supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies,' to which it had
no legitimate title. The importance of Andalusia was that it was
full of troops, the regular garrisons having been joiuLoJ by most
of the expeditionary corps which hud returned from southern
POltugol IHorcover it was in possession of II full b'Casury And
n fleet, and had frC':! communication with the English at Gibraltar.
On J Ilnc 15 the Andalusians struck the first military blow that
toM on N'lpok'On, by bombarding and capturing the French fleet
(the relics of Trafalgar) which lay at their merey within the harbour
of Cndiz.
Thc second in impOl·tallcc of the (:enh"CS of I'csistal1(.'C was Galicia,
which was also fairly well provided with troops, and contained
the arsenals of FermI and COl"llllllll. The risings in .A.sturias, and
the feeblcr gatherillb~ of pntriots in Loon and Old Castile, prac-
tically Ix'<:&llle bmnches of the Galician insurrection, though they
wcrc dirccted by their uwn juntl.ls mlt] tried to work for themselves.
It was on the army of Galiein that they relied for support, and
without it they would not have l"lCen formidable, '111e boundaries
of this l~reu of insurrcction WCJ'C S(\'lJh~nde.r·, Vfl.lladolid, unci Sego-
"ia: flllther east the tl'OOpg of l\fonec)' nnd Dessicrcs, in the direction
of BUl'gOS and Aranda., kept the country-side from rising. There
were sporndic gatherings of peasants in the Upper Ebro "alley
nml the mountains of Nol'thel1l Castile, but thcse \\'Cl'C mere un-
organized ill-armed bands that half a battalion could disperse,
IL wus the MOle ill t.he Ba.sque Pl'Ovinccs mu1 NIlHl.l're: here too
the French lay Cflllloned so thickly that it \\'l\8 impossible to meddle
with them: their point.s of (.'oncentl'lltioll were Vittoria and the
t.wo forlresses of ]'nmpcluntl. ll.J1d Sml SeLastiltH.
The other horn of the hnlf·mooll of l-e"Olt, which encircled Madrid,
was composed of the insurr()(...iiol1s in Murein and Valencia to the
~ollth and Arngon to the north. These regions wel'C Illuch less
fa\'omllbly situated fOl' forming centres of resistance, because they
WCI'C "cry wcnk in ol'glllli·/.cd troops. "Vhcll thc Amgoncse elected
Joseph Pnlafox AA their captain-general and declared war on
}~rance, there were only 2,000 regulars and one battery of artillery
in their realm. The le\'ies which they begun to raise were nothing
more than half.armcd peasants, with no adequate body of officers
to train and drill them. Valencia and Murcia wcre n little better
00; bccaul>C tlle arsenal of CaI'Utgellll tllld it... b'1lJTisoll lay within
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their boundaries, but there were only 9,000 men in all under arms
in the two provinces. Clearly they could not hope to deliver such
a blow as Galicia or Andalusia might deal.
The last centre of revolt, Catalonia, did not fall into the same
strategical system as the other four. It looked (Ol' its enemies
not at Madrid, but at Barcelona, where Lecchi and Duhesme were
finnly established ever since their coup de main in February. The
Catnlalls had as their task the cutting off oe this body of invaders
from its communication with .France. and the endeavour to prevent
new forces from joining it by crossing t.he Eastern Pyrenees. The
residence of the insurrectionary Junta wns at Tarragona, but the
most important point ill the provhw(! for the moment. was
Gerona, a fortress commanding the main road from France, which
Napoleon had not had the foresight to seh",e at the sumc momcnt
that he won by treachery Barcelona and Figueras.. While the
Spaniards could hold it, they had some chancc of isolating the
army of Duhesme from its supports. In Catalonia, or in the
Balearic Isles off its ~t, there were in :May 1808, about 16,000
men of regular troops, among whom there were only l,flOO soldiers
of the cavalry arm. 'There was no militia, but by old custom the
levee en lIla9se might always be caned out in moments of national
danger. These irregulars, somatenes as they were called (from
"ornate", the alarm-bell which roused them), turned out ill great
numbers according to ancient eustom: they had been mobilized
thirteen years before in the French War of 1793-5 and their
warlike traditiolls were by no means forgotten. All through the
Peninsular struggle they made a very creditable figure, considering
their wallt of orgl\llization and the difficulty of keeping them
together.
The French annies, putting aside Duhcsme's isolated force at
Darcelona, lay compactly in a great wedge piercing into the heart
of Spain. Its point was at Toledo, just south of Much-id: its base
was a line drawn from San Sebastian to PampeltUla across the
Westem Pyreflt..'CS, Its buck bone lay along the great high road
from Vittoria by Burgos to Madrid. The advantageous point of
this position was that it completely split Ccntrnl Spain in two:
there was no communication possible between the insurgents of
Gnlicia and those of Aragoll. On the other hand the wedge was
IOllg and narrow, and exposed to be pierced by a force striking
at it either from the north-east or the north-west. The Aragonese
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rebcl~ were too few to be dlUlgeroUS; but the strong Spanish, army
of Galicia was well placed for a blow at Durgos, and a successful
atlack in that direction would ClIt off Madrid from Frn.Il~ and
leave the troops in and about the capital, who formed the point
of the intrusive wedge, in a very perilous condition. This is the
l'eason why, in the first ijWgc of the WiU', Napoleon showed great
anxiety as to what the army of Galicia might do, while professing
t:omparative equanimi~y about the proceedings of the other forces
of the insurrection.
Having thw sketched the strategic position of affairs in the
])cninsula. during the first days of June, we must set ourselves
to lenrn the main chl1ntdcristics of the militn.ry geography of
Spain. and to estimate the character, organization, and fighting
value of the two armies which were just about to engage. With.
out some knowledge of thc conoitiolls of wUl'fcu'C in Spain, a mere
catalogue of battles and marches would be absolutely useless.
•SECTION II
THE LAND AND THE COMBATANTS
CHAPTER I
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF THE PENL~SULA: MOU1'I"TAINS,
RIVERS, ROADS
OF all the regions of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula possesses
the best marked frontier. It is separated from France, its only
neighbour, by oue brond range of mountains, which defines its
boundaries even more clearly than the Alps mark those of Italy.
For the Alps are no single chain, but a system of double and triple
chains running parallel to each other, aod leaving between them
debatable lands such as Savoy and the Southern Tyrol. Between
Spain and France there is no possibility of any such claims and
counter-claims. It is true that Roussillon, where the eastern cnd
ofthePyrenean range mns into the sea, was Spanish down to 1659,
but that was a political survival from the Middle Ages, not a
natural union: there can be no doubt that geographically Rous·
~illon is a French and not an Ibcrill.Il land: the main backbone of
the boundary chain lies south and not north of it.
The Pyrenees, though in height the)' cannot vie with the Alps,
and though they are not nearly so jagged or scarped as the greater
chain, arc cxtremely difficult to cross, aU the more so bccn.usc the
hand of man has seldom come to help the hand of nature in
making practicable lines of lWces8 between Frull(~ and Spain. In
the whole length between the Bay of Biscay and the MeditemmC3l1
t.here are 0111)' two short fronts where intelx:ommunication is eaSJl
and these lie at ilie extreme east and west, where the mountains
touch the sell. In the ~o miles which intervene there is lumJly
one good pass practicable for wheeled traffic or for the march of
an army: most are mere mule-paths, rarely used save b)' !imugglers
and shepherds. The only one of these minor routes employed in
the war was that which leads from Jaca in Aragon to Oloron in
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Bearn, and that was not much used: only on one single occasion
in 181S does it appear prominently in history, when Clausel'i'I
French division, fleeing before Wellington and pressed up against
the foot of the mountains, escaped across it with some difficulty.
The only pusses that were s)'stematieully employed during the
war were those which lie close to the water at each end of the
Pyrenean chain. At the eastern end there are three which lead
from Roussilloll into Catulonill. Onc hugs the water's edge, tmtl
crawls along under the cliffs from Pcrpignan to Uasus: this was not
in 1808 the most important of the three, though it is the one by
which the railway ptlSSCS to-day. Inland there !\re two other rouc]s
over difficult crests--one ten, the other forty miles from the shore-
the former from Dellegal'de to Figueras, the other from Mont-
louis to Pu.yccrda and Vich. The first was the pass most used in
the war, being less exposed than the Rosas route to English de-
scents from the sea: the coast road could actually be cannonaded
by warships at somc corners. It was blocked indeed by the
fortress of Fignems, but that stronghold was only in Spanish
hands for a very short period of the 'I'm.. '111e inmost, or :Monl.-
louis-Puycerda road was bad, Icd into nothing more thlln a few
upland ,'alley~ llnd was very littJe employed by the French. It
would have been of importAnce had it led down into the lowlands
of Aragon, but after taking a long turn in the hills it harks back
towards the Catalan coas4 and joins the other two roads near
Geroull.-tl. forb'css whieh is so placed as practically to COlllllltllld
every possible access into EastcMl Spain.
Taking all three of these paths into Catalonia together, they
do but form a sort of back door into the Iberiall Pellinsula. They
only communicate with the narrow eastem coast-strip from Bar-
celona to Valencia. 'l111~re is no direct access frolll them into
Castil~ the hcalt of the country, Md only a roundabout cntrnnt'e
by Lerida into Anlgon. The great lllasS of the Catalan and
Valencian Sierros bars them out from the main bulk of the Spnnish
realm. Catalonia and Valencia, wealthy and in parts fertile as tbey
are, are but its back premises.
TIle lrue front doO!' of the kingdom is formed b)' the passes at
the other, the westem, end of the Pyrenees. Here too we haxe
three Ilvnilnble ronles, but they differ ill chnrneter frolJl the roods.
at the edge of the Mediterranean, in that they open up two com-
pletel)' separate lines of advancc into Spain, and do not (like the
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Catalan defiles) all lead ou to the 8&me goal. All three start from
BaYOllllC, the great southCMl fortress of Gascony. lnc first keeps
for some time close to the seaside, and after crossing the Didassoo.,
the boundary river of France and Spain, at Irun, leaves the fortress
of San Sebastian a few miles to its right and then charges the
main chain of the mountains. It emerges at Vittoria, the most
northerly town of importance in the basin of the Ebro. A few
miles further south it crosses that stream, and then makes for
Burgas and Madrid, over two successive lines of Sierras. It opens
up the heart of both Old and New Castile. The other two roa.WJ
from Bayonne strike inland at once, and do not hug the Discayan
shore like the lrun·Vittoria route. They climb the Pyrenees., onc
by the pass of Maya, the other, twenty miles further east, by the
more famous pass of Ronccsvalles, where Charlemagne suffered
disaster of old, and left the great paladin, Rotund, dead behind
him. The Maya and Ronccsvallcs roads join, after passing the
mountains, at the great fortress of Pampeluna, the capital of
Navarrc. From thence severallincs arc available for the invader,
the two chief of which are the roads into Old Castile by Logrono
and into Arv.goll by Tudcla. PampelunR is quite as valuable as
Vittoria as the base for an attack on Central Spain.
The whole Iberian Peninsula hns lx.'Cn compnred, not inaptly,
to an inverted soup--plate: roughly it consists of a high central
plateau, surrounded by t\ flat rim. But no comparison of that
kind can be pressed too hard, and we must remember that the rim
is variable in width: sometimes, as on the north const, and iu the
extreme south-east of the peninsula, it is "ery narrow, and much
cut up by small spurs running"down to the sea. But as a rule,
and especially in Central Portuga~ Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia,
it is brood and fertile. Indeed if wc set aside the Ilorthem coast-
Biscay, Asturias, and Galicia-we may draw a sharp di\'ision
betwcen the rich and semi-tropicul coast plain, and the high, wind-
swept, and gencrally batten central plateau. All the wealth of the
land lies in thc outer strip: the centre is its most thinly inhabited
and worthless part. Madl"id, lying in the very midst of the plateau,
is therefore not the natural centre of the land in anything save
a mathematical sense. It is a new and artificial tmm of the
sixteenth century, pitched upon as an administrative capital by
the Hapsburg kings; but in spite of the long residence of the
court there, it never grew into a city of the first class. Summing
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up its ineligibilities, an acute obsener said that Madrid combined
'the soil of the Sahara, the sun of Calcutta, the wind of Edinbw-gh,
and the cold of the North Pole.' Though in 110 sense tile natural
capital of the country, it has yet a certain military importance as
the centre from which the roml-systcm of Spain radiale>. There
ig, as a glance at the map will show, no other point from which all
the main avenues of communication with the whole of the province>
enn be controlled. An invader, therefore, who has got possession
of' it can make any combined action against himself Ycry' difficult.
But he must not flatter himself that the capture of Madrid carrie'l
with it the same effect that the capture of Paris or Berlin or
Vienna entails. The provinces have no such feeling of dependence
on the national cnpital as is common in utile!' countries. }rance
with Paris occupied by an enemy is like a body deprived of its
head. But for Anda.lusians 01' Cnto.loninns or Galicinns the occu-
pation of Madrid had no such paralysing effect. No sentimental
aflection for the royal residence-and Madrid was nothing more-
existed. And a government established at Seville or Cadiz, or allY
other point, would be just as well (or as ill) obeyed as one that
issued fts orders from the sandy banks of the Manzanares. ___
The main b"COgraphical, t\S well as the main political, chal'fi(;-
teristics of Spain are determined by its very complicated lllountain-
system. It is a land where the rivers count for little, and the hills
for almost everything, in settling military conditions. In most
countries great rivers are connectblg cords of national life: their
waters carry the internal traffic of the renhn: the main roads lie!
along their banks. But in Spain the streams, in spite of their
length and Si7.e, are useless. They mostly flow in deep-sunk bed...
fur below the level of the surrounding country-side. The!ir rapid
current is always swirling round rocks, or dashing over sandbanks :
often they flow for mile nfter mile between cliffs fl'Om which it
iiJ impossible to reach the water's edge. In the rainy season they
I\re dangerous torrents: in the summer all save the very largest
dwindle down into miserable brooks. A river in Spain is always
a sundering obstacle, never a line of' communication. Only for a
few scores of miles near their mouths call anyone of them be
utilized for navigation: the Doum can be so employed as far a.'i
Freneda on the frontier of POltugal, the Tagus in good seasons
llS far us Abrantcs, the Guudulqui\'ir to Seville. }'or the rest of
their long courses they arc not available even for the lightest ooa.ts.
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Spanish rh'ers, in short, are of importanc.'C not as lines of transi~
but us obstacles. They form mllllY flue positions for defence, bllt
positions generally rendered dangerous by the fact that a very
few days of drought may open mall)' unsuspected fords, where just
before there had been deep and impassable water. Uivers as broad
us the Tngus below Taluvcrlt and the Douro nt Toro were occa~
sionally crossed by whole armies in dry weather. It was always
htlZllrdous to trust to them as permanent lines of defence.
It is the mountains which really require to be studied in detail
from the military point of view. Speaking generally wc may
describe the Iberian system-as distilicl from the !}yrenees-w;
consisting of onc chain running roughly from north to south,
so as to separate the old kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, while
at right anglcs to this ehain run a number of others, whose gencral
courses are parallel to each other and run from east to west.
There is no single name for the 1II0untuins which separate Castile
and Aragon, nor do they form one continuous range. They are
a number of separate systems, often dividl.>rl from eaeh other by
wide gaps, and sometimes broadening out into high tablelands.
The central nucleus, from which the rest ron out, lies between the
provinces of New Castile and Valencia, from Guadalajara in the
former to Morella in the latter. Here there is a great ganglion
of chaotic sierras, pierced by hardly a single practicable ro.'ld.
Northward, in the direction of Aragon, they sink down into the
plain of the Ebl'o: southwal'd they spread out into the lofty
plateau of Mureia, but rise into higher and narrower ranges again
as they get ncar the frontier of Andalusia.
This block of clmins and pLttcaus forms the central watershed of
Spain, which throws westward the sources of the Douro, Tagus,
Guadiana, and Guadalquivir, and eastward those of thc Xucar and
Segura. The basins of these streams and their tributaries form
thrce-fourths of the Iberia.n Pcninsula. The rest consists mainly
of the great ,'alley of the Ebro: this hardly falls into the system,
llnd is somewhat exceptiollal. It hllS been descl·ilx>d us serving
IlS a sort of wet-ditch to the main fortification ot' the peninsula.
Starting in the western extension of the Pyrenccs, quite close
to the Bay of Biscay, it runs diagonally across Spain, more or less
parallel to the Pyrenees, und falls into the Mediterranean between
Catalonia and Valencia. It is more low-lying than the rest of
the muin valleys of Spain, is broader, and is not so mucll cmmped
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and cut up by mountains running down to it at right angles to its
eoul'se.
Behind the Ebro lie, chain after chain, the parallel sicrrw; which
lllark off' the divisions of the great central plateau of Spain.
Arleche comptu-es them to the waves of a great petrified sea.,
running some higher and some lower, but all washing up into
jagged crests, with deep troughs between them.
The first IUld 1lI0~-t Ilortherly of these waves is thut which we
Illay call the range of Old ClLStile, which separates the basin of the
Ebro from that of the Douro. At one end it links itself to
the P)'rcncuu chain in the neighbourhood of Suntundcr: at the
other it curves round to join the more central sierras in the direction
of Saria and Calatayud. It is the lowest of the chains which
bound the l..'Cntral plateau of Spain, und is pierced b), three prac-
limbIe roads, of which the most important is that from Vittoria.
to Burgos.
Between this chain on the east and the Cantabrian mountains
on the north lies the great plain of Old Castile and Leon. the
heart o( the elder Splll1ish monarchy, in the du.ys when ArUncroll
was still independent and Andalusia remained in the hands of thc
Moor. It is a fairly productive eOll1·producing land, studded with
IUlcient cities such as Burgos, Palencia, Valladolid, Toro, Zamol"a,
&tlamanca. The l ticrra de Campo3 (land of the plains), as it was
called, was the granary of NOI"them Spain, the most civilized part of
the kingdom, llIul the on1y one where therc e... isted a fuirl)' complete
system of roads. For want of the isolated mountain chains which
cut up most provinces of the Iberian Peninsula, it was Imr-d to
defend and ensy to overrun. If the mountains that divide it from
the Ebro ,'alley are once passed. there is no way of stopping the
invader till he reaches the border of Asturias, Galicill. or New
Ca.'ltile. The whole plain forms the valley of the Uppcr Dolll'o
and its tributaries, the Adaja, Pisuerga, Esla, Tormcs, and the
rest. It narrows down towards Portugnl, as the mountains of
Galicia on the one side and Estremadura on the other throw out
their spurs to north and south. Hence the Lower Douro valle)"
after the Portuguese frontier has been passed, is a defile rather
than a plain. Before Oporto and the estuary are reached, there
are many pla.~s where the 1ll00mtains 011 either side come right
down to the river's edge.
'Ole second chain is much more important, and more strongly
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marked: it divides Old from New Castile, the valley of the Domo
from that of the Tagus. In its central and western parts it is
really a. double rnnge, with two narrow valleys between its chief
ridges. These valleys are drained by the Zezere and ~U'(In, two
tributaries of the Tugus which flow ptlnlllcl for mall)' scores of
miles to the broad ri\"cr which they feed, If we call this great
system of mountains the chain of New Castile it is only for COIl-
venience' sake: the Spaniards and Portuguese have no common
IltllllC for them. In the east they arc styled the Sierra de Aylloll;
above Madrid they are known as the Guadarrama-a name some·
times extended to the whole chain. When they bet.'OIlU! double,
west of Madrid, the northern chain is the Sierra de Gala, the
southern the Sierra de Gredos. Finally in Portugal the extension
of the Sierra de Gata is called the Sierra da Estrella, the southern
parallel ridge the Sierra do Moradal. The whole system fornli.
a very broad, desolate, and lofty belt of hills between the Tagus
Rnd Douro, through which the practicable passes are few and
difficult. Those requiring notice are (1) the Somosierra Pa.<;:;,
through which runs the great northern road from Burgos to
:Madrid: its name is well remembered owing to the extraordinary
way in which Napoleon succeeded in forcing it (against all the
ordinary rules of war) in the winter of 1808. (~) There is fl.
group of three passes, all within twelve miles of each other, across
the Guadarrama, through which thel"e d~bouch on to Madrid the
main roads from North-western Spain-those from (a) Valladolid
llnd Segovia, (b) from AstOl'gu, Tordcsillas, and AJ."evalo, (c) fmm
Salamanca by Avila. After this group of passes there is a long
space of impracticable hills, till we L"Oll1e to the cllief rand from Ilorth
to south, parallel to the Portuguese frontier; it comes down the
valley of the Alo.gon from Salamanca, by Btuios and Pluscncia, 011
to the great Roman bridge of Alcantara, the main passage m"er
the Middle Tagus. Thi8 is a bud road through a desolate country,
but the exigellcies of war caused it to be used continually by the
French and Ellglish armies, whene\'er they had to transfer them-
selves from the valley of the Douro to that of the Tagus. OccasiolJ-
oIly they employed 11 still worse route, a little further west, fmm
Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales to Alcantara. 'Vhen we get within the
Portuguese {mutier, we find a. mad pamllel to the last, from
Almeida by Guards. to Abrantes, also a difficult route, but like it ill
perpetual use: usually, when the French marched from Salamanca
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to Alcantara, 'Wellington I~oved in a corresponding way from ncur
}\Jmcida to Abrantes. This road runs along the basin of the
Zezere, though not down in the trough of the river, but high up
the hillllidcs above it. Spanil:\h llnd Portuguese roods, llS we shall
see, generally avoid the river banks and run along the slopes far
above them.
The next great chain acrosg the Peninsula is that which separates
the barren and sandy valley of the Upper Tagus from the still
more desolate llnd melancholy plateau of Ll Munchn, the basin of
the Guadiana. Of all the regions of Central Spain, this is the Illost
thinly peopled and uninviting. In the whole valley there are only
two towns of allY Si7.e, Ciud.ad Real, the capital of La. Mancha, and
lladajoz, the frontier fortress against Portugal. The mountains
north of the Guadiana are caned first the Sierra de Toledo, then the
Sierra de Guada.lupe, lustly on the Portuguese frontier the Sierra
de San :Mamed. Their peculiarity, as opposed to the other cross·
ranges of the Peninsula, is that at their eastern end they do not
unite directly with the mountains of Valencia, but lcave a brood
gap of upland, through which the roads from Madrid to Mureia and
Madrid to Valencia take their way. When the Sierra de Toledo
once begins roads are vcry fcw. ThCl'C arc pm.cticlllly only three-
(1) Toledo by San Vincente to Merida, a most break-neck route
winding among summits for forty miles; (2) Almaraz by Truxillo to
Mcrida, the main path from Tagus to Guadiana, and the most used,
though it is difficult and steep; (3) Alcantara by Albuquerque to
Booajoz, a bad military road parallel to the Portuguese frontier,
continuing the similar route from Salamanca to Alcantara.
Leaving the barren basin of the Guadiana to proceed southward,
we find UCI'OSS our }lllth tl. runb"C of first-rate importan<.'C, the
southern boundary of the central plateaux of Spain: dropping
down from its crest we are no longer· among high uplands, but in
the brond low-lying semi-tropical plain of Anda.lusia, the richest
region of Spain. The chain between the fertile valley of the
Guudlllqllivir and the barren plll.teull of La Mnnchll is known for
the greater part of ita course as the Sierra l\1orena, but in ita
western section it takes the name of Sierra de COllstalltino. 'TIle
passes across it require specia.l notice: the moot eastern and the
most important is that of Despefia-PelTos, through which passes the
high road from Madrid to Cordo\'u, Sc\"illc, and Cadiz. At its
southern exit was fought the fight of :&l)'len, in which the armies
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of Napoleon received their first great check by the surrender of
Dupont and his ~O,OOO men on July ~3, 1808. Higher up the
defile lies allother historic spot, on which Christian und Moor fought
the decisive battle for the mastery of Spain in the early years of
the thirteenth centlU'Y. the well-known fight of La.s Navas cl!!
'1'010&1.. The Despeiia-Jlerros has two side-passes close to its left
uncl I'ight: the former is that of San Estcvnn del Puerto: the
latter is known as the' King's Gale' (lluerro del Hey). All these
three defiles present tremendous difficulties to an assailant from the
north, yet all were carried in a single rush by the armies of Soult
and Scbastiani in 1810. The central pass of the Sierra l\Io1'ellll.
lies ninety miles to the left, and is of much less impol'tam:e, lIS
it starts Doom the most arid corner of La Mancha, and does not
l:OIlUect itself with allY of the great roads from the nOlth. It leads
down on to Cordova from Hinojosa. Again sixty miles to the west
;. three more passes L"Ome down on to Seville, the one by Lleren3, the
second by Monasterio, the third by l"regenal: they lead to Bada~
joz and Merida. 'rhese are Cl.I.sicr routes through fl le&; rugged
country: they were habituaUy used by Soult in 1811 and 181~,
when, from his Andalusian base at Seville, he used to go north to
besiege or to relieve the all-important fortress of Badajoz.
Last of all the great Spanish chains is that which lies dose along
the Mediterranean Sea, forming the southern edge of the fertile
Alldalusian plain. It is the Sierra Nevada, which, though neither
the longest nor the broadest of the ranges of the south, contains
the loftiest peaks in Spain, .l\ill1haren and La Veleta. This chain
runs from behind Gibraltar along the shore, till it joins the
mountains of Murcia, leavirig only a "cry narrow coast~strip between
its foot and the southenl sea. 'Three roads cut it in its western
half, which, starting from Granada, Ronda, and Alltequera all come
down to the shore at, or in the neighbourhood of, the great port
of Malaga. The parts of the coast·line that are far from that city
are ollly oc'Cessiblc by following diffh:,'Ult ro8.(L'l that nm clo:.e to the
water's edge.
We have still to deal with two corners of the lOO·inll Peninsula.
which do not fall into any of the great valleys that we have
described.-Gll.licia and Northern Portugal ill the nOl·th-west, and
Catalonia in the north-east. The geographical conditions of the
former region depend on the Callt.nbl·ian MOUlltaillS, the western
continuation of the Pyrenees. This chain, after running for many
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miles as a single ridge, forks in the neighbourhood of the town of
Leon. One branch keeps 011 in its original direction, and runs by
the coaJlt till it reaches the Atlantic at Cape Finisterre. The other
tums south~westand divides Spain from Portugal as far us the sea.
The angle between these fork1ng ranges is drained by a considerable
river, the Minho. The basins of this stream and its tributary the
Sil, fonn the grcn.ter pal't of the provin{:e of Galicin. Their vaUeys
arc loft)" much cut up by cross-spurs, and generally barren. 'l1w
access to them from Central Spain is by two openings. The main
one is the high road from Madrid to Corunna by Astorga; it
does not follow the cOUl'se of either the sa or the Minho, but
charges cross-ridge after cross-ridge of the spurs of the Galician
hills, till at last it CQmes down to the water, and forks into two
routes leading the onc to Corunna, the other to the still more
important arsenal of Ferrol. The other gate of Galicia is a little
to the south of Astorga, where a pass above the town of Puebla de
Sanabda gives access to a steep and winding road parallel to the
Portuguese frontier, which finally gets into the vlllley of the
Minho, and turns down to reach the port of Vigo. It will be
remembered that Sir John Moore, in his famous retreat, hesitated
for some time at Asbwb1tl. betwccn the Vigo nnd COl"unnlll'oods, Ilnd
finally chose the latter. His judgement was undoubtedly correct,
but the best alternative was bad, for in winter even the Madrid-
Corunna rood, the main artery of this part of Spain, is distressing
enough to an anny. It does not follow any well·marked valley, but
cuts across four separate ranges, every one of which in January was
a nursery of torrents in its lower slopes, ond nil abode of sno\\"
in its upper levels. Besides the roads with which we have already
dealt there is a third important line of communication in GaHcill,
that by the narrow coast-plain of the Atlnntic, from Conllllltl by
Santingo to Vigo, and thence into Portugal us far as Oporlo. This
would be a good road but for the innumerable river-mouths, small
and great., which it hllS to cross: the rowJ passes each stream just
where it ceases to be tidal, and at each is fronted at right angles
by a defensible position, which, if held by a competent enemy, is
difficult to force from the front, and still more dinicult to turn by
Il detour up-stream. Nevertheless it was by this route that Soult
successfully invaded Northern Portugal in the spring of 1809. It
must be remembelw that he was only opposed by bands of peasants
1I0t even organized. into the loosest fonn of militia.
OMAN. I I)
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The geography of Catalonia, the last Iberian region with which
we have to deal, is more simple than that of Galicia. The land is
formed by a broad mountain belt running out from the cllStcrn end
of the Pyrenees, pllrl\llel to the Mediterranean. l'i'OITI this chain
the slopes run down and form on die eastern side a coast-plain,
generally rather narrow, on the western a series of pamllcl valle)'s
drained by tributaries of the Segre, the most importAnt affluent
of the Ebro. They all unite near Lerida, an important toWIl and
It great centre of roads. But two considerable rivers, the 'fer and
the Llobregat, have slllall basins of their own in the heart of the
central mountain mass, which open down into the coast-plain by
defiles, the one blocked by the peak of Mo.ntserrat, the other by
the toWll of Gcrollu. DW'iug the greater part of the Peninsular
War the French held the larger share of the shoreland, dominating
it from the great fortress of Barcelona., which U1CY had seized by
treachery ere hostilities begun. In 1811 they captured Tarragona
also, the second capital of the sea coast. But they never succeeded
in holding down all the small upland plains, and the minor passes
that lead from one to the other. Hunted out of one the Spanish
army took refuge in the next, and, though it dwindled down
ultimately to a mass of guerilla bands, was never caught en masS/:
and exterminated. There were too many boIt-holes among the
network of hills, and the invaders never succeeded in stopping them
all, so that down to the end of the war the patriots always main-
tained a precarious existence inland, descending occasionally to the
shore to get ammunition and stores from the English squadrons
which haunted the coast. They were supplied and reinforced from
the Balearic Isles, which Napoleon could never hope to touch, for
his power (like that of the witches of old) vanished when it Cilme
to running water. The survival of the Catalan resistance after the
French htu:l drawn a complete cordon around the hill-country,
holding the whole coast-plain on the one hand, and Lerida and the
Scgrc valley on the other, is onc of the incidents of the! war most
creditable to Spanish constancy.
Havillg deoJ.t with the physical geography of Spain, it is lle<.'C:SSll.ry
for us to point out the way in which the natural difficulties of tile
country had influenced its ma.in lillCS of communication. Road:;:
always take the 'line of least resistance' in early days, and seek for
easy passes, not for short cuts. TIle idea that' time is money,' and
that instead of going round two sides of a triangle it may be worth
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while to cut a new path across its Qase, in spite of all engineering
difficulties, was one very unfamiliar to the Spaniard. Nothing
shows more clearly the state of mediaeval isolation in which the
killgdom still lay in 1808 than the condition of its roads. Wherever
the country presented any serious obstacles, little or no attempt had
been made to grnpple with them since the days of the Romam.
The energetic Charles In, alone among the kings of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, had done something to improve the system
of intercommunication. He had, for example, superseded the old
break-neck road from the plains of Lean into Galiein, by building
the Dne new clUlU~~ee from Astorga to Villafranca by Manzanal;
but among the line of Hapsburg and Bourbon sovereigns Charles
was a rare exception. Under the imbecile rule of his son (or rather
of GocIoy) improvements ceased, and internal communications were
as much negleck>d as any other branch of state management. 'What
roads there were, when the war of 1808 broke out, were in a state
of dreadful neglect. The Spaniard was still too prone to go round
an intolerable distance rather than attempt a serious piece of
engineering work. Let us take, for example, the northern coast
of Spain; the Cantabrinn mnge is no doubt a most serious obstacle
to intercourse bctW(''C1l Castile and Leon, on thc olle side, and the
maritime pro....inces of Asturias and lliscay on the other. But who
would have cOlll.'eivcd it possible thut ill n length of 300 miles of
mountain, there should be no more than five roads practicable for
wheeled traffic and artillery? Yet this was so: to get down from
the central plateau to the coast there are only available these five
routes-one from Leon to Oviedo, one from Burgoo to Santander,
~me from nurgos to Bilbao, one from Vittoria to Dilbao, and one
from Vittol"ia to San Sebastian and Irrnl. There were many other
points at which a division travelling in light order without guns
or baggage could cross the watershed-as was shown in Blake's
flight fi"Om ReyllOsa. lLnd Nc)"'s invasion of thc Astm·ias. But for
an anny travelling with all its impediTnellta such bypaths were
impracticnble.
Let us take another part of the Peninsula-its eastern side.
l11e ancient separation between Arllgon and Castile is fully
reflected by the utter isolation of the two for intercommunication.
To "ret from Madrid to the east COWlt there are only three roads
suitable for wheeled trofIic: one goes by the main gap ill the hills
by Chinchilla to 1\furcia, another by Requeiia to Valencia. The
.2
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'third passes by Calatayud to Saragossa and ultimate1)' to Barcelona.
.Dctween it und the Valencia road there is !.l gap of no IC!18 than
UO miles unpierced by any good practicable line of communica-
-tion 1, This being so, we begin to unuerstand how it was that the
pperations on the eastern side of Spain, during the whole of the
struggle, were a sort of independent episode that never exercised
.any groat influence on the main theatre of the war, or, on the
other hand, was much affected by the progress of the strife in
Cnstile or Portugal. Boult's conquest of Andalusia did not help
Suchet to conquer Valencia. On the other hand, when the latter
.did, in January, 18H~, succeed in his attempt to subdue the eastern
coast-line, it did not much affect him that Wellington was stonn-
ing Ciudad Rodrigo and pressing back the French in the west.
He was able to hold on to Valencia till the allies, in 1813, got pos-
session ·of the upper valley of the Ebro and the great road from
Madrid to Saragossa. and Lcl'ida, after the battle of Viltol'ia. I~
was only then that his Rank Wf\...'I really turned, and that he was
compelled to retreat and to abandOli his wuthern eOllquests.
Summillg tip the general characteristics of the road-system of
Spain, we note first that the main routes are rather at right angles
to the great rivers than parallel to them. The sole exception is to
be found in the valley of the Ebro, where the only good cross-road
of Northern Spain does follow the river·bank from Logroiio and
'l'udela on to Saragossa and Lerida..
Just becalLSC the roads do not ding to the valleys, but strike
across them at right angles, they are always crossing watersheds by
means of difficult passes. And so there is hardly a route in the
whole Peninsula where it is possible to find fifty miles without
a good defensive position drawn across the path. Moreover, the
<.'Olltinual passes make the question of supplies very difficult; in
crossing a plain an army can !i\'e, more or less, on the supplies of
the country-side; but among mountains and defiles there is no
population, and therefore no food to be had. Hence an army
on the move must take with it all that it t:OIlSUIlles, by means of
a heavy wagon train, or an enormous convoy of pack-mules. But
only the best roads are suitable for wheeled traffic, and so the lines
practicable for a large host are very ~tricted in number. The
!:ltudent is often tempted to consider the movements of the rival
generals ver)" slow. The explanation is simply that to transfer an
1 'nU) 00« cross-roads Cuenca-Teruol and Molina-'1'eruel hardly couut.
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army from one river-basin to another was a serious matter. It
was necessary to 6pend weeks in collecting at the base food and
transport sufficient to support the whole fOl'ce till it reached iw
gonl. In 1811 or 1812 the French and English were continually
moving up and down the Portuguese frontier parallel to each
other, the onc from Salamanca to lhdajoz, the other from Almeida
or Guarda to Elvas. But to prepare for one of these flittings was
sllch l\ serious matter that by the time that the arm,Y was able to
move, the enemy had usually got wind of the plan, and was able
to follow the mo\'ement on his own side of the frontier. There
were months of preparntion reqUU"L'<1 before u few weeks of active
operations, and. when the concentration was over and the forces
massed, they could only keep wh'Cthcr us long as the food held out.
and then had to disperse again in order to Ih'e. This was what
was meant by tile uld epigflllll, that' in Spain large armies starve;
and small armies get beaten.'
Hulf the strategy of the campaigns of 1811-12-13 consisted
in one of the combatants secretly collecting stores, concentrating
his whole anny, und then dashing ut sOlIle important purt of his
adversary's line, before the other could mass his forces in a COrte-
"ponding way. If prompt, the assailant might gain a forblight, in
which he might either try to demolish the enemy in detail before
he could concentrate, or else to take from him some important
position or town. In 1811 l\fllrmont and Dorsenne playt.>d this
trick on 'Wellington, during the short campaign of El Bodon and
Aldca do. Ponte. Thc)' relicved Ciudnd Rodrigo, and ncarly caught
some divisions of the English army before the rest could join, Hut
missing the instant blow, and allowing ,"Vcllingtoll time to draw in
his outlying troops, they failed and went home. In 181~, on tlle
other hand, the British gencral su(.'(,'CSSfully played oft' this device
011 the French. He first concentrated in the north, and captured
Ciudad Rodrigo in clC"Cll ili~ys, before Ma.rmont could muss his
scattered divisions; then going hastily south he took Badajoz in
exactly the same way, storming it after only nineteen days of
siege. Soult drew his army together at the news of'VeUington's
nlO~e, but had to bring troops from such distam:es, and to collect
so much food, that he arrived within three marches of Badajoz only
to hcur that the place had just fo.l1en.
In dealing with the main geographical facts of the war it is fair
to recollect that all invasion of Spain from France is one of the
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most difficult of undertAkin~ because the whole river and moull-
tain system of the Peninsula lies Qi..'TQ88 the main line of advance
from Bayonnc to Cadiz, which the invader must adopt. While the
French conquest must be pushed from north to south, both the
streams and the Sierras of Spain all run at right angles to this
direction, i. e. from east to west. In advancing from the Pyrenees
to Madrid, and again from l\[adrid to Se,'ille and Cadiz, the
invader has to Cl"OSS every main rivcr-Ebro, Domo, Tagns,
Guadiana, and Guadalquh-ir-and to force the passes of evel)'
main range. Moreover, as he advances southwalu, he hus to h'ejJ
his flanks safe against disturbance from the two mountainous
regions, Catalonia and Portugal, which lie along the eastem and
western coasts of tbe Peninsula. Unless the whole hl'endth of
Spain, from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, be occupied step
by step as the invtlder U'lOves on towards the Stmits of Gibraltar,
he can always be molested and hllXe his lines of communiCAtion
with France threatened. In the end it lllay be said that Napo-
Icon's whole schcmc ofconquest was shipwrecked upon thc blunder of
attacking Andalusia and Cadiz while Portugal \I'as still unsubdued.
",VcUington's constant stlllies out of tlmt country upou the French
flank, in Loon and Estremadura. detained such large forces to
protect the valleys of the Central Douro and Tagus that enough
men were never found to finish the conqucst of the south and east.
And finally one crushing victory at Salamanca, in the plains of
Leon, so threatened the invader's line of touch with Franec, that he
had to abandon the whole south of Spain in order to concentrate
an army large enough to force ",VelliIlbJton back from Burgas and
the great northern road.
On the other hand, one tremendous advantage possessed by the
French in the eentral years of the war must be rclllcmbcl'(~d. It
is manifest that .Madrid is the only really important road-ccntre in
Spain, and that its undisturbed possession by the French in 1809-11
gave them the advll11tancre of being able to operate from 11. single
point, against enemies who lay in a vast semicircle around, with no
good cross-roads to join them and enable them to work together.
The small 'Army of the Centre,' which was always kept in and
around Madrid, could be used as a reserve for ll.ny other of the
French armies, and transferred to join it in a few marche:-;, while
it was infinitely more difficult to nnite the \'al'ious force>; lying
on an outer circle at Astorga, Almeida, Abrantes, Qnd Cadiz,
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which the Spania.rds and the British kept in the field. In ~hort.
ill l.'Stimating the difficulties of the t""9 parties, the advantage of
tht! centml position must be weighed against the disadvan~<Ye
of long and exposed lines of communication.
One of the cardinal blunders of Nllpoleon's whole scheme for the
l.'onquest of the Peninsula WI:lS that he persisted in treating it 8.S if it
were German or Italian soil, capable of supporting an army on the
march. His troops were accustomed to live on the country~side
while crossing Central Europe, and therefore made no proper pre-
parations for supplying themselves by other meum than plunder.
But in Spain there are only a few districts where this can be done:
it may be possible to get fOl"wllrd without an enormous train of
{:OIlVOYS in Andalusia, the coast plain of Valencia, and certAin parts
of the rather fertile plateau of Leon, the wheat-bearing Ticrra de
Campos. But over fonr-fifths of the Peninsula, an army that tries
t.o feed Oil the country-side will find itselfat the point of starvation
in a few days, and be forced to disperse in order to live.
Till he htul SL'Cn Spain with his own eyes Napoleon might
perhaps have been excused for ignoring the fact that his ordinary
method of' making war support itself' was not in t.his case possible,
Uut even after he had marched from Bayonne to Madrid, and then
fhllll ::\1adrid to Astorga, in 1808, he persisted in refusing to sec
facts as they were. "Vc find him on his wu}· back to Paris from
t.he campaign utt.ering the eXb'aordinary statement that· Spain is
a much better country than he had ever supposed, and that he
had no idea what a magnifi<.:ent present he had made to his brother
;Joseph till he had seen it 1,' Of his utter failure to grasp the
difliculties of th,e country we may get a fail' conception from his
orders, given at the same time, to Marshal Soult, who was at that
l1lomentoccupicd in pushing Sir John Moore towards Corunna. He
told the Duke of Dalmatia that if he reached Lugo on January 9,
Ulld the English got away safely by sea. he WlIS to march on Oporto,
where he ought to arrive on the first of February; after seizing
that city he was to go on to Lisbon. which he might reach on or
about February 10. As a matter of fact Soult saw the English
depart, and ocellpied Corunna on January 19, but his army was so
utterly worn out, and his stor01 so entirely exhausted, that with the
nest will in the world he could not move again till February !'lO,
only took Oporto on March 29, and had not yet started for Lisbon
I He said this to De Pradt (Rtoofuiioru ~&pflgTle, p. 224).
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when Wellesley suddenly fell on him and drove him out of the
country on May l~ 1809. The Emperor, in short, had given Soult
orders cxccutublc perhaps, according to the distance, in L:HUbardy of
Bavaria, but utterly absurd when applied to a country where roads
are few and bad, with a defile or a ri \'er crossing the path at every
few miles, and where food hns to be carefull,:... collected before a mo\"(~,
and taken on with the army by means of enonuoU$ convoys. :l\Iore-
over the month was January, when every brook had beeomea mging
mountain stream, and every highland was covered with snow!
With such conceptions of the task before him, it is not wonderful
that Napoleon was contillually issuing wholly imprncticable orders.
The one that we have just quoted was sent Qut from Valladolid:
how much worse would the case be when the Emperor persisted in
directing affairs from Paris or Vienna., the last llews that had
reached him from the front being now several weeks old! With
ull his genius he never thoroughly sureeeded in grasping the state
of affairs, and to the very last continued to send directions that
would have been wise enough in Central Europe, but happencU to
be inapplicable in the Iberian Peninsula.
It is only fair to Napoleon to add that his Spanish enemies, who
ought at least to have known the limitations of their own road-
system, and the disabilities of their half-starved armies, used
habituaUy to produce plalls of operations far more fantastically
impossible than any that he ever drafted. They would arrange
far-reaching schemes, for the co-operation of forces based on the mOlSt
remote corners of the Peninsula, without attempting to work out
the 'lo!,l'istics' of the movement. The invariable result was that
such enterprises either ended in disaster, or at the best came to
a stop after the first few marches, because some vital point of the
calculation had already been proved to have been made on erroneous
datA.
SECTION II: CHAPTER II
THE SPANISH ARMY L~ 1808
V\THEK the English student begins to investigate the Peninsular
\VUT in demil, he finds that, as regards ilic Spanish armies and their
behaviour, he starts with a strong hostile prejudice. The Duke of
"Vcllingl:on in his dispatches, and still more in his private letters
and his table-talk, was always enlarging on the folly and arrogance
of the Spanish gcllemls with whom he had to CO-OpCl'Il.tc, and on
the ulltnlstworlhiness of their troops. Napier, the OllC military
classic whom most Englishmen have rend, is still more emphatic
and far more impressive, since he writes in It very judicial style,
and with the most elaborate apparatus of references and authorities.
W:hen the reader begins to work through the infinite number of
Peninsular diaries of British officers and men (for there are a very
considerable number of writers frolD alllong the mnk and file) the
impression left upon him is much the same. It must be confessed
that for the most part they had CL very poor opinion of our allies.
llefore allowing ourselves to be carried away by the almost
unanimous verdict of our own countrymen, it is on1)' fair to examinc
the state and character of the Spanish army when the war broke
out. Only WhCll wc know its difficulties can we judge with fuirnc!:>S
of its conduct, or decide upon its merits and shortcomings.
The armed force which served under the banners of Charles IV
in the spring of 1808 consisted of 131,000 men, of whom 101,000
were regulars and 30,000 embodied militia.. The ).atter had been
under anus sinee 1804, and composed the greater part of the
garrisons of the seaports of Spain, all of which had to be protected
tle<rainst possible descents of English e~..peditions 1.
Of the 10],000 men of the regular army, however, not nIl were
available for the defence of the country. 'While the war with Russia
was still in progress, Bonaparte had requested the Spanish go"Cl11-
ment to furnish him with a strong division for use in the North
[March, 1807], and in consequence the Marquis of La Romana
, See Appendix, containing the state of tile Spanish army in 1808.
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had been sent to the Baltic with 15,000 men, the picked regiments
of the anny. There remained therefore only 86,0;00 regulars within
the kingdom. A very cursory glance down the Spanish nrmy·list
of 1808 is sufficient to show that this force was far from being in
a sntisfactory condition for either oflcnsivc or defensive operations.
It is well worth while to look at the details of its composition.
The infantry coll.'listed of three sorts of troops-the Royal Guard,
the line regiments, and the foreign corps in Spanish pay. For
Spain, more than any other European state, had kept up the old
scventeenth-century fashion of hiring foreign mert.'enaries on a lru..~
scale. Even in the Jloyal G:llard half the infantry were composed
of I'Valloon Guards,' a survival from the day when thel'etherlands
had been part of the broad dominious of the Hapsburg kings.
The men of these three battaliOnS were no longer mainly Walloong,
for Belgillm had been it gl'OllP of French departmenbl for the last
thirteen years. There were Germans and other foreigners of all
sorts in the ranks, as well as it large number of native Spaniards.
'111ere were also 8ix regiments of Swiss mercennrics--ovcr 10,000
bayonets-and in these the men in the rank!! did reall.y come from
Switzerland and Germany, though there Wall a sprinkling alllong
them of strangers from all lnnds who had 'left their country for
their country's good.' There were also one Neapolitan and three
Irish regimcnts. These latter were survivals from thc days of thc
'Penal Laws,' when yo'lIng Irishmen left their homes by thousands
eyery ycut' to take service with Fram.'e or Spain, in the hope of
getting some day 0. shot ut thc hated redcoats. Thc regimcnts
bore the names of Hibernill, Irlanda, and mtonia (i. e. Ulster).
They were VCI·y much under their pl"OJXr establishment, for of late
years Irish recruits had begun to run short, even after the '98:
they now took service in Frant'e and not in Spain. The tblX.'C
Irish corps in 1808 had only 1,900 men under arms, instead of the
5,000 which they should have produced; and of those the large
majority were not real Irish, but waifs of allllationalitics. Of late
native Spaniards had been drafted in, to keep the regiments from
dying out. On the other hand we shall find that not only the
foreign regiments but the whole Spanish army was still fnll of
officers of Irish nallle and blood, the sons and grandsons of the
original eriligmnts of two generations buek. An astounding
proportion of the officers who rose to some note during the war
bore· Irish names, and were hereditary soldiers of fortWle, who
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justified their existence by the unwavering courage which they
always showed, in a time when obstinate perseverance Wt\.'l the main
military virtue. ''Ve need only mention Blake, the two O'Donnells,
) ACy, Sarsfield, O'Neill, O'Daly, Mahony, O'Donahue. If none of
them showed much strategical skill, yet their constant readiness to
fight, which no series of defeats could tame, contrasts vcry well with
the spiritless bchnviour of a good many of the Spanish generals.
. No officer of Irish blood wall ever found among the cowards, and
hf\rdly onc among the traitors t.
The ten foreign corps furnished altogether about 15,000 men
to the Spanish regular army. The rest of the infantry was
composed of thirt)'-fivc regiments of troops of the linc, of three
battalions each, and twelve single-battalion regiments of light
infuntry. They were theoretically territorial, like our own infant,·y
uf to-day, and mostly bore local names derived from the pro\;nces-
Asturius, Toledo, Estremadura, and so forth. All the light infantry
<.,orps belonged to the old kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre, which
wcre therefore scantily represented in the nomenclature of the
ordinary line regiments. There were altogether 147 battalions of
~pullish infantry, excluding the foreign troops, and if all of these
had been up to the proper establishment of 840 men, the total
would have amowlted to 98,000 bayonets. But the state of disor-
ganization was such that as a matter of fact there were only 58,CX)()
ullder MillS. The regiments which Napoleon hud requisitioned for
!Service in the North had been more or less brought up to a war-
footing, and each showed 011 an averae,O'C !!,OOO men in the rftnks.
But many of the corps in the interior of Spain displayed the most
lamentable figures: e. g. the three battalions of the regiment of
Estrcmadura had only 770 men behn.'<lll thcm, Cordova 793, alld
Navan'E! 8~~howing !t50 men to the battalion instead of the
proper 840. Theoretically thcre should. ha'"c been no difiiculty
in keeping them up to their Pl"()pel' strength, Q,<; machinery for
n ..'Cruiting them had been duly provided. Volwltary cnlistment
was the first resource: but when that did not suffice to keep the
nUlks fuU, there was ll. kind of limited conscription called the
(illillta 2 to fall back upon. This consisted in balloting for Illen
ill the regimental district, under cerlaln rules which allowed an
ellormous number of exemptions---e. g. all skilled artisans and all
I 'n16 minister O'Farrill and Genernl Kindelan were tl16 chief exceptiOI1ll.
2 Su call..,d UecaU8l,l it was origiuIO.lly 9uwosed to take thefiftllml1U.
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middle-class townsfolk were free from the burden-so that the agri-
cultural labourers had to supply practically the whole contingent.
Substitutes were allowed, if by any mealls the conscript could
afford to pay for them. The conscription therefore should have
kept the regiments up to their proper strength, and if many of
thcm had only a third of their complemcnt undcr arms, it wt\S
merely due to the general demorali7.ation of the times. Under
Godoy's administration money was always wanting, more especially
since Napoleon had begun to levy his monthly tribute of 6,000,000
francs from the Spanish monarchy, and the gaps in the ranks
probably represented enforced ecouomy as well Q.8 corrupt adminis-
tration.
1.11e 30,000 embodit:d militia, which formed the remainder of
the Spanish infantry, had been under anns since 1804, doing
garrison duty; they seem in many respects to have been equal
to the linc batllllions ill efficiency. They bore names derived from
the towns in whose districts they had been raised-Badajoz, Lugo,
Alcazar, and so forth. Their oflk:~rillg was also strictly local,
all ranks being drawn from the lending families of their districts,
and seems to have been quite as efficient as that of the Hnc.
Moreover their ranks were, on the a\'et-agc, much fuller than
those of the regular regiments-only two battalions in the total of
forty-three showed less than 550 bayonets Oil parade.
It is when we turn to the cavalry that we come to the weakest
part of the Spanish army. There were twelve regiments of hea,'y
and twelve of light horse, cn.ch with a nominw. establishment of
700 sabres, which should have given 16,800 men for the whole
fOrl'C. There were only about 15,000 oiTk'Ci"S rold troopers em-
bodied, but this was a small defect. A more real weakness lay ill
the fact that there were 0111y 9,000 horses fqr the 15,000 men.
It is difficult for even a wealthy government, like our own, to keep
its cavalry properly horsed, and that of Charles IV was naturally
unable to cope with this tiresome military problem. The chargers
were not only too few, but generally of bad quality, especia.lly
those of the heavy cuvalry: of those which were to be found ill the
regiment:a1 stables a very large. proportion were not fit for service.
'Vhen the five regiments which Napolcon demanded for the ex-
pedition to Denmark had been provided with 540 horses CIl.Ch and
t>Cnt off, the mounts of the rest of the army were in such adeplorable
state that some corps had not the power to horse one-third of their
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troopers: e. g. in June, 1808, the Queen's Reglment, No. 2 of the
heavy cavalry, had 202 horses for 668 men; the 12th Regiment
)lad ~9 horses for 667 men; the 1st Chasseurs-more extra·
ordinary still-only 185 horses for 577 men. It resulted from
this penury of horses that when Napoleon made a second demand
for Spanish cavalry, asking far a divi~ioll of ~,OOO sabn:'$ to aid
Junot in invading POliuglll, that force had to be made np by
putting together the mounted men of no less than ten regiments,
each contributing two or at the most three squadrons and leaving
the rest of its mell dismounted at the depOt.
Even if the cavalry had all been properly illmmted, they would
have been far too few in proportion to the other arms, only 15,000
out of a total force of 150,000-000 in eight; wbcrcns in the time
of the Napoleonic wars one in six, or even onc in five, was considered
the proper complement. In the Waterloo campaign the French
had the enormous number of 21,000 cavalry to 83,000 infantry-
ol1e to four. "Wbat with original paucity, and with want of re~'
'1lI0tlllts, the Spaniards took the field in 1808, when the insurm::tion
began, with I\. ridiculollsly small number of horsemen. At Medina
de Rio Seco they had only 750 horsemen to !!2,OOO foot-soldiers,
Ilt Daylen only 1,200 to 16,000. Later in the wl\.r they succeeded
ill filling up the ranks of the old cavalry regimcnts, and in raising
many new ones. But the gain in number was not in the least
iu:colllpanied by a glun in efficiency. For the whole six years of
the strnggle the mounted arm was the weakest point of their
hosts. Again and again it disgraced itself by allowing itself to be
beaten by half it<; own numbers, or by absconding early in the
fight and abandoning its infantry. It acquired, and merited, a
detestable reputation, and it is hard to find half a d07.en en~"C­
lllcnts in which it behaved even reasonably wcll l . When \Vcllillgton
was made generalissimo of the Spanish armies in 1813 he would
1I0t bring it up to the front at all, and though he took 40,000
Spaniards over the Pyrenees, there was not a horseman among
them. It is hard to account for the thorough worthlessness of these
squadrons, even when we make allowance for all the difficulties
of the time: Spain was notoriously deficient in decent cavalry
officcrs when the war be&ran. The horses were inferior to the
.French, a.nd the equipment bad. :Prom early disasters the troopers
I The successful and opportune charge of the regimiento del Reyat Talavera.
....a~ about the only ease which ever came under English eyes.
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contracted n demoralization which they could never shake ofl', But
granting all this, it· is still impossible to explain the consistellt
misbehaviour of these evasive squadrons, The ofHcer.;, no doubt,
had a harder task in organizing their new levies than those of the
infantry and artillery, but it is curious that they should never
have succeeded in learning their business even after four or five
years of war.
The artillery of the Spanish army, on thc othcr hand, cnnl(.'(1
oh the whole a good reputation, This was not the result of proper
preparation. 'When the struggle began it consisted of thirty-four
batteries of ficld artillery, six of horse, and twcnty-onc garrison
batteries (compania.r jija.'J), with a total of 6,500 men, Forty
batteries-that is to say 240 gUlls or somewhat less, for in some
cases there seem to have been only four instead of six piece<; in the
battery-was according to the standard of 1808 a mediocre allow-
OOl<.'C to an army of 180,000 mcn, only about two-thirds of what it
should have been 1. But this was not the worst. Deducting four
fully-horsed batteries, which had been taken off by Napolcon to
,Denmark, there remained in Spain four horse and thirty-two field
batteries, These were prad;ically unable to move, for they wcre
almost entirely destitute of horses. For the ~16 guns and thcir
caissons there were only ill hand 4000 draught animals!. 'Vhen
the war began, the artillery had to requisition, and more or less
train, 3,000 horses or mules l>cfore they could move ti"m their
,barracks! I do not kIlOW iUly fact that illustrates better the state
of Spanish administration under the rule of GOOoy. The mising
of the great insurrectionary armies in the summer of 1808 ought
to have led to an cnormous increase to the ~rlillery arm, but
the trained men were so few that the greatest difficulty was found
in orgiUlizing new batteries. Something was done by turning the
marine artillery of the fleet into land troops, and there were a few
hundreds of the militia who had been trained to work guns. But
the officers necessary for the training IUld ofik'Cring of new battericg
were so scarce, that for many months no fresh forces of the artillery
arm could take the field. III the autulUll of 1808, at the time
of the battles of Espinosa and 'I'udela, if we carefully add up the
I Napoloon had an ideal proportion of Jive guns per 1,000 men. But, as .
we shall show in the next chapter, while llcaling willl tllC Frend) annies, 116
!lever succeeded in reaching anything like this standard in the Peninsula,
Yet his opponents were always worse o.lf.
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number of guns brought into action by the five armies of Galicia,
Estremadura, Aragon, the 'Centre' (i. e. Andalusia and Castile),
and Catalonia, we do not find a piece more than the 240 which
existed at the outbreak of the war. 'l'hat is to say. the Spaniards
had raised 100,000 new levies of infantry, without any corresponding
extension of the artillery ann. During the campaign the conduct
of the corps seems on the whole to have been vcry good, compared
with that of the other arms. This wps to be expected, as they
were old soldiers to a much greater extent than either the infunb'y
or the cavalry. They seem to have attained a fair skill with their
w{.'apons, and to have stuck to them vcry well. Wc often hear
of gunners cut down or bayonetted over their pieee8, seldom of a
general bolt to the rear. For this very reason the personnel of
the batteries suffered terribly: eVel)' defeat meant the capture of
some dOlen~ of guns, Ilnd the cutting up of the men who served
them. It was as much as the govemment could do to keep up
a moderate number of batteries, by supplying new guns and
amalgamating the remnants of those which had been at the front.
Each batch of lost battles ill 1808-10 entailed the loss and <:011-
sequent reconstruction of the artillery_ If, in spite of this, we
seldom hcar complaints as to its conduct, it must be taken as
a high compliment to the arm. But as long as Spanish generals
persisted ill fighting pitched battles, (Uld getting their armies
dispersed, a solid proportion of artillery to infantry could never
be established. Its average strength may be guessed from the fnet
that at Albuera the best arlllY that Spain then possessed put in
linc 16,300 mcn with only fourteen gUlls, less than onc gun per
thousand men-while Napoleon (as we have already noted) believed
that five per thousand was the ideal, and often managed in actual
fact to have three. In the latter years of the war the pie<.'CS were
almost always drawn by mules, yoked tandem-fashion, and not
ridden by drivers but goaded by men walking at their side-the
slowest and most unsatisfactory form of traction that can be
imagined. Hence camc, ill great part, their inability to man-
ceuvre.
Of engineers Spain in 1808 had 169 officers dispersed over the
kingdom. The corps had no proper rauk and file. But there was
a regiment of sappers, 1,000 strong, which was officered from the
enbrU1L>ers. There was no army serviL'C corps, no military tnlin,
no organized commissariat of any kind. When moving about
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a Spanish army depended either all contractors who undertook \
to provide horses and wagolls dri"ell by civilians, or more fre-
quentlyon the ct\Sunl sweeping in by requisition of all the mules,
oxen, and carts of the unhappy district in which it was operating.
In this respect, us in SO many others, Spain was still ill the Middle
Ages. The facl that there was no permanent arrangement for
providing for the food of the army is enough ill itself to aceount
for many of its disa,;:;ters, If, like the British, the Spaniards had
possessed money to pay for what they took, things might have
worked somewhat better. Or if, like the French, they had possessed
an organi7.ed military train, and no scruples, they might have con·
trived to get along at the cost of utterly ruining the country-side.
But as things stood, .depending on incapable civil commissaril'Jl
and the lUlwilling contributions of the local authoritiel, they were
generaUy on the edge of starvation. Sometime'! they got over
the edge, and then the army. in spite of the proverbial frugality
of the Spanish soldier, simply dispersed. It is fair to the men
to say that they generally straggled back to the front sooner or
later, when :they had succeeded in filling their stomachs, and got
incorporated in their own or some other regiment. It is said that
by the end of the wur there were soldiers who hud, in theil' fashion,
served in as many as ten different corps during the six years of the
struggle.
Summing up the faults of the Spanish army, its depleted
battalions, its small and incompetent cavalry force, its insufficient
proportion of artillery, its utter wallt of commissariat, we find
that its main source of weakness was that while the wars of the
French Revolution had induced all the other states of Europe
to overhaul their military organi7.ation and learn something from
the methods of the French, Spain was still, so far as its army was
concerned, in the middle of the eighteenth century. The national
temperament, with its eternal relegation of all troublesome refonns
to the morrow, was no doubt largely to blame. But GOOoy, the
all-powerful favourite who had also been commander-in-chief for
the l!\.St seven yetll'$, mw;t take the .main responsibility. If he had
chosen, he possessed the power to change eyerything; and in some
ways he had peddled a good den! with details, changing the
uniforms, and increasing the number of battalions in each regi~
ment. But to make the arm)' efficient he had done very little:
the fact was that the commander-in-ehief was quite ignorant of
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the military needs and tendencies of the day: all his knowledge
of the army was gained while carpet-soldiering in the ranks of the
royal body-guard. It Wlls natural that the kind of officers who
eomlllcndcd themselves to his haughty and ignoTilnt mind should
be those who were most ready to do him homacrre, to wink at his
pcculations, to condone his jobs, and to refrain from worrying him
for the money needed for reforms and repairs. Promotion was
wholly arbitrary, and was entirely in the favourite's hands. Those
who were prepared to bow down to him prospered: those who showed
!Uly backbone or ventured on remonstrances were shelved. After
a few years of this system it was natural that all ranks of the
army became demoralized, since not merit but the talents of
the collrtier and the flatterer were the sure road to prosperity.
Hencc it came to pass that when the insurrection began, the
level of military ability, patriotism, and integrity among the higher
ranks of the army was very low. There were a few worthy men
like Castai'los and La Romana in offices of trust, but a much
greater proportion of Godoy's proteges. Onc cannot condone
the shocking way in which, during the first days of the WIW, the
populace and the mnk and file of the army united to murder so
many offieers in high place, like Filanghieri, the Captain-Geneml
of Galicia., Torre del Fresno, the Captain-General of Estremadum,
and 501al1o, who commanded at Cadiz. But the explanation of
the atrocities is simple: the multitude were resenting the result'i
of the long administration of Goooy's creatures, and fell upon
such of them as refused to throw in their lot immediately with
the inSUl'1'CCtioll. The murdered men were (rightly or wrongly)
suspected either of an intention to submit to Joseph Bonaparte,
or of a design to hang back, wait on the times, and make their
decision only when it should become obvious which paid better,
patriotism or sen>ility. The people had considerable jnstification
ill the fact that a very large proportion of Godoy's protcgC'S,
especially of those at Madrid, did swear homage to the intrnder
in Ol-der to keep their places and pensions. They were the
base of the miserable party of AfralIcesadoa which brought so
much disgrm:e on Spain. The misguided cosmopolitan liberals
who joined them were much the smaller half of the traitor-
faction. ---
GOOo)' and his clique, therefore, must take the main responsibility
foJ' the state of decay and corruption in which the Spanish army
OllA:s". I «
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was found in 1808. What more could be expected when for so
many years an idle, venal, dissolute, ostentatious upstart had
been permitted to control the administration of military affairs,
and to settle all promotions to rank and office? 'Like mMter
like man' is always a true proverb. and the offkers who begged or
bought responsible positions from Godoy naturully followed their
patron's example in spreading jobs and peculation downwards.
The undrilled and half-clothed soldiery. the unhorsed SqUadr<lllS,
the empty arsenals, the idle and ignorant subalteMls, were all,
in the cnd. the result of GOOoy's long domination. But we
do not wish to absolve from its share of blame the purblind
nation which tolerated him for so long. In another country
he would have gone the way of Gaveston or Mortimcr long
before.
'Vhen this was the state of the Spanish armies, it is no wonder
that the British observer, whether oflicer or soldier, could never
get over his prejudice against them. It was not merely because
l~ Spanish army was generally in rags and on the verge of star\'u-
tion that be despised it These were act'ident.~ of war which
everyone had experienced in his own person: a British battalion
was often tattered and hungry. The Spanish gO\'ernment was
notoriously poor, its old regiments had been refined again and
again with raw conscripts, its new levies had never had a fair shut.
Hence came the things which disgusted the average Peninsular
diarist of British origin-the shambling indiscipline, the voluntary
dirt, the unmilitary habits of the Spanish troops. He could not
get oyer his dislike for men who kept their arms in a filthy, rusty
condition, who tmvcllcd not in orderly column of route but like
a flock of sheep straggling along a high road. who obeyed their
offiecl's only when they pleased. And for thc officers themselves
the English observer had an even greater conrernpt: continually
we come across observations to the effect that the faults of the
rank and file might be condoned-after all they were only hnlf-
trained peasants-but that the officers were the source and fount
of evil fmm their laziness, their nrrognnce, their ignorance, and
their refusal to learn from experience. Here is a typical passage
from the Earl of Munster's Remilli8C(;JlCca:-
"'Ve should not have been dis.'>1l.tisfied with our nllics, mfllgrG
their appearance and their r~crs, if we had felt any reason to
confide ill them. The men might be "capable of all that men
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dare," but the appearance of their officers at once bespoke their
not being fit to lead them in the attempt. They not only did
llot look like soldiers, but evcn not like gentlemen, and it was
difficult from their mean and abject appearance, particularly
among thc infantry, to guess what class of society they could have
been taken from. Few troops will behave well if those to whom
they should look up are undeserving respect. Besides their general
inefficiency we found their moral feeling different from what we
expected. Far from evincing devotion or even common courage
in their country's cause, they were very often guilty, individunlly
and collectively, of disgraceful cowardice. ''Ve hourly regretted
that the revolution had not occasioned a more complete oouleverae-
ment of society. so as to bring forward fresh and yigorous talent
from all classes. Very few of the regular military showed them-
selves worthy of command. Indeed, "'ith the exception of a few
self-made soldiers among the Guerillas, who had risen from among
the farmers and peasantry. it would be hard to point out a
Spanish officer whose opinion on the most trivial military sub·
ject was worth being nsked. We saw old besotted generals
whose armies were fonned on obsolete principles of the allden
r~gime of a decrepit government. To this was added blind
pride and ,·anity. No proofs of inferiority could open their
eyes, and they rushed from one eITOr and misfortune to another,
benefiting by no experience, and disdaining to seek aid and
improvement' [pp. 194-5].
A voice from the ranks, Sergeant Sw-tees of thc Rifle Brigade.
gives the same idea in different words.
'Most of the Spanish officers appeared to be utterly unfit
Ilnd unable to command their men. They had aU the pride.
arrogance, and self·sufficiency of the best officers in the world,
with the very least of all pretension to have a high opinion
of UlCmselves. It is true tllCy were not all alike, but the
majority were the most haughty. and at the same time the most
contemptible crentmcs in Ule shape of officers that ever I beheld'
[po 109].
Ai; a matter of fact thc class of officers in Spain was filled up in
three different ways. One·third of them were, by custom, drawn
from the ranks. In an army raised by conscription from all strata
of society excellent officers call be procured in this way. But in
one mainly consisting of the least admirable part of the surplus
••
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population, forced by, want or hatred of work into enlisting, it
WtlS hard to get even good sergeants. And the sergeants made
still worse sub-lieutenants, when the colonel was forced to promote
some of them, No wonder that the English observer thought
that there were 'Spanish officers who did not look like gentlemen.'
This class were seldom or never allowed to rise above the grade
of captain. The remaining two-thirds of the officers received
their commissions from the Will' office: in the cavalry they were
supposed to show proofs of noble descent, but this Wtl!i not required
in the infantry. Thel"C was a large sprinkling, howevcr, of mcn
of family, and for them the best places and the higher ranks were
generally reserved-a thing feasible because all pl"Omotion was
arbitrary, neithcr scniority nor merit being neces81u'ily coniliclered.
The rest were drawn from all classes of society: for the last fifteen
years any toady of GOOoy could beg or buy as many commissions
for his proteges as he pleased, But a large, and not the worst,
part of the body of officers was composed of the descendants of
soldicrs of iortunc--Irishmen WC!"C most numerous, but UICI"C wcre
also French and Italians-who had always been seen in great
numbers in the Spanish army. They held most of the upper-
middle grade<; in the regiments, for the promoted sergeants were
kept down to the rank of captain, while the nobles got rapid
pl'Omotion and soon rose to be colonels and generals. On thc
whole wc <'Annot doubt that there was a mas.<; of bad officers in
the Spanish army: the ignorant fellows who had risen from the
ranks, the too-rapidly promoted scions of the noblesse, and the'
nominees of GOOoy's hangers-on, were none of them very promising
material with which to {.'Onduct a war il autrolU;c for thc c-xistcllce
of the realm.
In 1808 there was but one small military college for the training
of infantry and cavalry officers. Five existed in 1790, but Godoy
cut them down to one at Zamora, and only allowed sixty cadets
there at a time, 80 that five-sixths of the )'oung ll)en who got
commissions went straight to their battalions, there to pick up (if
they chose) the rudiments of their military education. From want of
some common teaching the drill and organization of the regiments
were in a condition of chaos, Every colonel did what he chose ill
the way of manual exercise and manreuvres. A Freneh officer says
that in 1807 he saw a Spanish brigade at a review, in which, when
the brigadier gave the order' Ready, present, fire!' the different
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battalions carried it out in three different times and with wbolly
distinct details of execution.
Not only was the Spanish ilrmy indifferently officered, but eW!n
of such officers as it possessed there were not enough. In the old
line regiments there should have been seventy to each corps,
i. e. ~,450 to the 105 battalions of that arm. But Godoy had
allowed the numbers to sink to 1,520. 'When the insurrection
broke out, the vacant places had to be filled, and many regiments
received at the same moment twent>' or thirty subalterns taken
frolll ci\'il life and completely destitute of military training.
Similarly the militia ought to have had 1,800 officers, and only
possessed 1,200 when the war began. The vacancies were filled,
but with mw and often indifferent material.
Such were the Offil'Cl"S with ~'hom the British army had to
co-ope!rate. There is no disguising the fact that from the first the
allies could not get on together. In the earlier years of the war
there were some incidents that happened while the troops of
the two nations lay together, which our countrymen could never
forgive or forget. We need only mention the midnight panic
in Cuesta's army on the eve of Talaver~ whell 10,000 mell ran
away without having had a shot fired at them, and the cowardly
behaviour ,of La Peiia in 1811, when he refused to aid Graho.m at
the bloody little bo.tt1e of Barossa.
The strictures of 'IVellington, Napier, and the rest were un-
doubtedly ,yell deserved; and yet it is easy to be too hard on the
Spaniards. It chanced that our countrymen did not get a fair
opportullity of observing their allies under favourable conditions;
of the old regular army that fought at Haylen or Zornoza they
never got a glimpse. It had been practically destroyed before we
came upon the field. La Romana's starving hordes, and Cuesta's
eVl\.<;ive and demoralized battalions were the samples from which the
whole Spanish army wllSjudged. In the Talavcra campaign, thc first
in which English and Spanish troops stood side by side, there can
be no doubt that the latter (with few eXlocptions) behaved in their
very worst style. They often did much better; but few Englishmen
had the chance of watching a defence 1i~e that of Sa.mgossn or
GeronfL. Very few observers from our side saw anything of the
heroically obstinate resistance of the Catalonian mi'Jueletes and
S01IwiclU:a. Chanl'C threw in our way Cuesta tllld La Pelia and
]maz as types of Peninsular generals, and from them the rest
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were judged. No one supposes that the Spaniards as a nation
are destitute of all military qualities. They made good soldiers
enough in the pnst, nnd may do so in the future: but when, after
centuries of intellectual and political torpor, they were called upon
to fight for their nationnl existence, thcy were just emerging from
subjection to one of the most worthless adventurers and one of the
most idiotic kinb"S whom history has known. Charles IV and GOOoy
account for an extraordinary amount of the decrepitude of the
monarchy and the demorali7Ation of its anuy.
It is more just to admire the constancy with which a nation so
handicapped persisted in the hopeless struggle, than to condemn
it for the incapacity of its generals, the ignorance of its officers, the
unsteadiness of its row levies. If Spain had been a first-rate mili-
tary power, there would have been comparatively little merit in the
six years' struggle which she waged against Bonaparte. 'Whcn we
consider her weakness and her disorganization, we find ourselves
more inclined to wonder at her persistence than to sneer at her
mishaps.
SECTION II: CHAPTER HI
THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN
~ 1. THE ARMY OF ]808: ITS CHAllACTER A..VD OItGA)JIZATlOll.'.
Ix dealing with the history of the imperial armies in the
Peninsula, it is our first duty to point out the enormous difference
between the troops who entered Spain in 1807 and 1808, under
Dupont, MaDcey. and Murat, and the later arrivals who came
under Bonaparte's personal guidance when the first disastrous stage
of the war was over.
Nothing CRn show more clearly the contempt which the Emperor
entertained, not only for the Spanish government but for the
Spanish nation, than the character of the hosts which he first scnt
forth to occupy the Peninsula. After Tilsit he was the master of
half a million of the best troops ill the world; but he did not
consider the subjugation of Spain and Portugal a sufficiently
formidable task to make it necessary to move southward any
appreciable fraction of the Grand Anuy. The victors of Jella and
l"riedland were left. in their cantonments on the llhine, the Elbe,
and the Odcr, while a new force, mainly composed of elements of
inferior fighting value, was sent across the Pyrenees.
This second host was at Napok'on's disposition mainly owing to
the fact that during the late war he had been anticipating the con~
scription. III the winter of 1806-7 he had called out, a year too
soon, the men who were due to serve in 1808. In the late autumn
of1S07, while his designs in Spain were already in progress, he had
summoned foIth the conscription of 1809. He had thus under
arms two years' contingents of recrnits raised before their proper
time. The depOts were gorged, and, even after the corps which
had been depleted in Prussia and Poland had been made up to full
strenf:,rth, there was an enormous surplus of men in hand.
To utilize this mass of conscripts the Emperor found several ways.
or the mCll raised ill the winter of 1806-7 some thousands had
been thrown into temporary organizations, called 'lef:,tions of resen'c,'
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and used to do garrison duty on the Atlantic coast, in order to
guard against possiblc English descents. There were five of these
'legions' and two 'supplementary legions' in the army sent into
Spl~in: they showed a strcul"rth of 16,000 men. None of them hud
been more than a. year under ann;;, but they were at any rate
organized units completc in themselves. 1ney formed the greater
part of the infantry in the corps of Dupont.
A shade worse in composition were twenty' provisional regiments'
whieh the Emperor put togethcr for Spain. Each regimcntal depot
in the south of l!'rance was told to form fom companies from its
liupembwldant mass of conscripts. These bodies, of about 560 mell
each, were united in fours, and each group was called a.' provisional
-regiment.' The men of each battalion knew nothing of those of
the others, sincc they were all dmwn from separate regiments: there
was not a single veteran soldier in the mnks: the officers were
almost all either half-pay men called back to servi(:e, or young sub-
lieutenants who had just received their commissions. 'lllese bodies,
equally destitute of esprit de carps and of instruction, made up
nearly 30,000 men of the army of Spain. They constituted nearly
the whole of the divisions under Bessieres and Moncey, which lay in
Northem Spain at the moment of the outbreak of the 11'81'.
But there were military units even less trustworthy than the
rprovisional regiments' which Napoleon transferred to Spain in
the spring of 1808. These were the five or six regiment.1 (le
marcllt, which were to be found in some of the brigades which
crossed the Pyrenees when the state of aflD.irs wus already growing
dangerous. They were formed of companies, or even smaller bodies,
hastily drown together from such southern depOts, as were fOlmd
to be still in possession of superfluous conscripts even after COl1~
tributing to the' provisiollal regiments.' They were to be absorlx'll
into the old corps when the pressing need for instant reinforcements
for the Peninsula lihould eome to an end. In addition to all these
temporary units, Bonaparte was at the same moment making a vast
addition to his permanent regular army. Down to the war of
]806-7 the French regiments of infantry had consisted of three
battalions for the field and a fourth at the depot, which. kept
drnfting its men to the front in order to fill up the gaps in the
other three. Napoleon had now resoh·ed to raise the establishment
to fivc battalions per regiment, four for field service, while the ncwly
created fifth became the depOt battalion. When the Peninsula.r
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\Var broke out, a good many rcgimen'bl had alrcady completed
their fourth field·ba.tt'1lion, and several of these new corps are to be
found in the rolls of the armies which hud entered Spain. The
multiplication of battalions had been accompanied by a reduction
of theil· individuuJ strength: down to February, 1808, there were
nine companies to each unit, and Junot's corps had battalions of
u strength of 1,100 or 1,200 bayonets. But those which camc latcr
were six-company battalions, with a strength of 840 bayonets when
at their full establishment.
All the troops of which we have hitherto spoken were native
:Frenchmen. llnt they did not compose by any means thc whole
of the infantry which the Emperor dispatched into Spain between
October, 1807, and May, 1808. According to his lISUal cuslom he
cmployt..u great numbers of auxiliaries from his vassal kingdoms:
we note intercalated among the .French units seven battalions of
Swiss, four of Italians, two each of Neapolitans and Portuguese l ,
and one each of Prussinns, '\Vestphalinns, Hanoverians, and Irish.
Altobrether there were no less than 14,000 men of foreign infantry
dispersed among the troops of Junot, Dupont, llessieres, Moncey,
and Duhcslllc. They were not mns.scd, but scattered brondCilSt in
single battalions, save the Italians and Neapolitans, who formed
a complete division under Lccchi ill the army of Calulonia.
The CAvalry of the army of Spain was quite as heterogeneous
and ill compaded us the infantry. Just as •pro\'isional regimcnts'
of foot were patched up from the southern depOts of France, so
were' provisional regiment<;' of cavalry. The best of them were
composed. of two, three, or four squadrons, each contributed by the
depot of a different cavalry regiment. The worst were cscadm-1l8
de marche, drawn together in a haphazard fashion from such of
the depOts as had a surplus of conscripts even after they had given
a full squadron to the 'provisional regiments.' 'l1lCre were also a
number of foreign cavalry regiments, Italians, Neapolitans, lancel"S
of Berg, Ilnd Poles. Of vetcran regimcnts of French cavull'y there
were actually no more than three, about 1,250 men, among the
12,000 horsemen of the army of Spain.
'Vhen we sum up the eomposition of the 116,000 men who lay
south of the Pyrenees on the last day of May, 1808, we find that
1 'l1lese last were the rear bnttalions of the uuforlullate l>ortuguese legion
which was ill march for the Jlaltic; t11ey were still 01\ tbis side of the Pyrenees
when the war J.ocg-.>.n, IIlld were hastily utilized against Sarag08l!a.
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3,000
9,500
1,000
1,250
(Javalrg.
1,750
1,800
31,000
3,200
14,000
16,000
81,200
!l5,8oo
flot a. third parl of them belonged to the old units of the regular
French army, It may be worth while to gi\'e the figures:-
Of veterans we have--
(1) A detachment of the Imperial Guard,
which W(lS intended to serve llS the Empcror'~
special escort during his imlption into Spain .
(2) Twenty-six lmttalions of infantry of the
line and light infantry, being all first, second, or
third battalions, and not newly raised fourth
battnlions
(3) Three old regiments of cavalry of the line
(4) Three newly raised fourth battalions of
infAntry regiments of the line.
This gives a total of regularly organized
French troops of the standing army of
(5) J?ive legions of resen'e, and two 'supple-
mentary legions of reserve'
(6) Fifteen' provisional regiments' from the
depots of Southern France [the remaining five
had lIot crossed the frontier on May 31] .
(7) Six regiments de f1UlrCM of conscripts
(8) Eighteen battalions of Italian, Swiss,
Gel'luuu, and other auxiliaries .
(9) Sixteen 'provisional regiments' of cavalry,
and a few detached' provisional squadrons,' and
escadroll9 de marche
(10) Three regiments of foreign cavalry
This makes a total of troops in temporary
organization, or of foreign origin, of 64,200 10,500
Napoleon, then, intended to conquer Spain with 11 force of about
110,000 men, of which no more than 34,000 sabres and bayonets
belonged to his regular tll'my; the rest were conscripts or foreign
auxiliaries, Dut we must also note that the smaU body of veteran
troops was not distributed equally in each of the corps, so as to
stiftlm the preponderating mass of conscripts. If we put aside the
division of Imperial Guards, we find that of the remaining ~5,OOO
infantry of old organization no less than 17,500 belonged to
Junot's army of Portugal, which was the only one of the corps that
had a solid organization, Junot had indeed a \'ery fine force,
seventeen old line battalions to two battalions ot' conscripts and
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three of foreigners. The rest of the veteran troops were mainly
with Duhcsme in Catalonia, who had a good division of 5,000
vcterans. In the three corps of Dupont, Moncey, and Bessieres on
the other hand old troops were conspicuous by their absence:
among the 19,000 infantry of Dupont's corps, on which (as it
chanced) the first stress of the Spanish WAr was destined to fall,
there was actually only two battalions (1,700 men) of old troops.
In MOllccy's there was not a single vetemn unit; ill Bcssietw', only
four battalions. This simple fact goes far to explain why Dupont's
c;'{pcdition to Andalusia led to the capitulation of Baylcll, and
why Maurey's march on Valencia ended in an ignominious retreat.
Countries cannot be conquered with hordes of undrillcd conscripts
-not even countries in an advanced sUlo"'C of political decom-
position, such as the Spain of 1808.
§ 2. THE AR~n.' OF 1808-14: ITS CHARACTER AND
OllGA."lZATlON.
R'l)"len, as we sholl see, tnught Napoleon his lesson, and the
second anny which he brought into the Peninsula in the autumn
of' 1808, to repair his initial disasters, was very dim~rently con~
stituted from the heterogeneous masses which he had at first judbred
to be sufficient for his task. It was composed of his finest old
regiments from the Rhine and Elbe, the flower of the victors of
Jen/\ and Friedland. Even when the despot had half a million good
troops at his disposition, he <:ould not be in force everywhere, and
the transference of QOO,OOO veterans to Spain left him almost too
wcak ill Central Europe. In thc Essling~WlloOTam campaign of
1809 he found that he was barely strong enough to conquer the
Austriruls, precisely because he had left so many men behind him
in the Peninsula. In the Russian campaign of 1812, vast as were
the forces that he displayed, they were yet not over numerous for
the enterprise, because such an immense propOltion of them was
composed of unwilling allies and disaAected subjects. If the masses
of Austria.ns, P.russians, Neapolitans, Portuguese, ';Vestphalians,
Bavarians, and so forth hail been replnced by half their actual
number of old French troops from Spain, the army would have
been far more powerful. Still more was this the case in 1813:
if the whole of the Peninsular army had been available for 8Cr\'jcc
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on the Elbe and Oder at the time of Llitzen and Bautzen, the effet.1
on the general history of Europe might have been inculculable.
'liuly, therefore, did the Emperor call the Spanish 'Var 'the
rWlIling sore' which had sapped his strength ever since its
commencement.
.A word as to the tactical organization of the French arm)' ill
1808 is required. The il)fantry regiments of normal fonnation
consisted, as we have seen, of four field battalions and one depot
battalion; the last nllmed never, of course, appeared. at the front.
Each field battalion was composed of six companies of 140 men;
its two flank companie:l, the grenadiers and voltigcurs, weI'C fOl"llwd
of the pick of the corps I; into the grenadiers only tall, into the
voltigeurs only short men were drafted. Thus a battalion should
nOI'mally lw.ve shown 840 and a regiment :3,:360 men in the field.
But it was by no means the universal mle to find the whole foUl'
battalions of a regiment serving together. In the modern armies
of' France, Germany, or llllssia, a regiment in time of peace linlS
concentrated in its recruiting district, and can take the field in a
compact body. This was not the case in Napoleon's ever-wandering
hosts; the chances of war were always isolating single battaliom,
which, once dropped in a garrison or sent on an expedition, did lIot
easily rejoin their fellows. Many, tOOl of the new fourth battalions
l'Ilised in 1807 had never gone forward to Germany to seek the
main body of their regiments. Of the corps which were brought
down to Spain in the late autumn of 1808 there were more with
three battalions than with four coneentrated under the regimental
eagle. Some had only two present, a few no more than one!, But
the Empcl'or disliked to have single isolated battalions, and pre-
ferred to work them in pairs, if he could not get three or fO\l1'
together. The object of this was that, if one or two battalions got
IlIUcll weakened in It. campaign, the men could Ix fused into R.
single unit, and the supernumerary OffiCCN and sergeants sent back
I .'reneh generals were mueh addicted to the pernicious practice of massing
the gJ'enadier companies of all the regiments of a division, or an army corps,
in order t.o make" picked battalion or brigade, to be used as a reserve.
Junot had four such battalions (grenadier, rtlmu) at Vimiero, and Victor
three at Barossa.
! To take 11. later example, of the three CQrp8 t/urmk (11, VI, VUl) with
which .M~na invaded Portugal ill 1810, there were only thru regiments
with four battalions present; wllile liel"tllltceu had Uln~, eight boo two, and
ten a single battalion only,
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to the depOt, where they would form a new battalion out of tlle
slock of conscripts. But the fresh organi7Ation might very likely
he hurried, by some sudden chance of wae, to Flushing, 01' Italy, ot;<'
the Danube, while the eagle and the main body remained in Spain
-or vice versa.
There was therefore, in consequence of the varying strength of
the regimen~ no regularity or system in the brigading of the
French troops in Spain: in one brignde there might be five or six
isolated battalions, each belonging to a separate regiment; in
'tlllother three from one regiment and two from n. 8eCO!ld; in n thin:!
four from one regiment and onc from another. Nor was there any
fixed number of battalions in a brigade: it might vary from three
(n very unusual minimum) up to nill(.."-nn cqu!llly rare maximum.
Six was perhaps the most frequent number. A division was com-
posed of two, or less fl'~quelltl)' of three, brigades, and might ha\'e
any number from ten up to sixteen or eighteen battalions-i,e. it
varied, allowing for casunllosscs. from 6,000 to 10,000 men. This
irregularity was part of Napoleon's system: he laid it down as an
axiom that all military units, from a brigade to an army 'corps,
ought to diffcr in strength among themselvcs: otherwise the enemy,
if he had once di!>COvered how many brigades or divisiom were in
front of him. could calculo.tc with accul't\cy the number of troops
with which he had to do.
Much confusion is caused, when we deal with Napoleon's
army, by the strange g)'stem of numeration whkh he adopted.
The infantry, whether called' line regimcnts' or 'light infantry
regiments,' were dl·ilIOO and organized in the same way. But the
Emperor had some odd vagaries: he often refused to raise again a
regiment which had been exterminated, or taken prisoners enma88e,
Hencc after t\ few years of his rei!:."!l there were some vacant
numbers in the list of infantry corps. The regiment~ for example,
which were garrisoning the colonies at Ule time of Ule rupture of
the Peace of Amiens, fell one after another into the bands of the
English as the wal" went on. They were l1e,'er replaced, and left
gaps in the army list. On the other hand the Emperor sometimes
raised regiments with duplicate numbeTS, a most tiresome thing for
the military historian of the next age. It i~ impossible to fathom
his purpose, unless he was set on confusing his enemies by showing
more battalions than the list of existing corps seemed to make
possible. Or perhaps he was thinking of the old legioll!! of the.
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Roman Empire, of which there were always se\'eral in c-xistcm;e
bearing the same number, but distinguished by their honorary titlCll.
Those who' wish to read the story of onc of these duplicate
regiments may follow in the history of Nodicr the tale of the
raising and extermination of Colonel Oudct's celebrated '9th Big'
of the line I,
There is another difficulty caused by a second freak of the
Emperor: all regiments ought, as we hare said, to havc shown four
field battalions. But Bonaparte sometimes added one or even two
more, to corps which stood high in his favour, or whose depOtS'
produced all some OCCi\Siolls a vcry large surplus of conscripts.
'Thus we find now and then, in the morning state of a French army
corps, a fifth or even a sixth 2 battalion of some rebo1ment. But as
a rule these units had not a very long existence: their usual fate
was to be sent home, when their numbers ran low from the wear
and tear of war, ill order to be incorporated in the nonnal cadres
of their corps. On the authority of that good soldier fmd
admirable historian, Foy, we are able to state that on the first
of June, 1808, Napoleon hnd 417 field battnlions, over and abo,'c
the depots, on his anny rolls. If the 113 regiments of the line,
Ilnd the thirty-two light infantry regiments had all been in exis-
tence and complete, there should have been 580 field battalions.
Clearly then some corps had disappeared and many others had no~
more than three battalions ready. But the units were always
being created, amalgamated, or dissolved, from week to week,
so that it is almost impossible to state the exact force of the
whole French army at any given moment. The most importallt
change that was mude during the year 1808 was the conversion of
those of the provisional regiments which escaped Dupont's disaster
into new permanent corps. By combining them in pairs the
114th-UOth of the line and the 83rd Mger were created 8. In
the succeeding five years more and more corps were raised: the
I Nodier, &«venir8 de la Rl!;o/ution, ii. 233-6.
¥ In the campaign of 1810 the 26th, 66th, and 02nd regiments in Massena's
army hatl liUl and 6th batta.liolls in tile field •
• Thill was done on July 7 (soo Nap. Oo,.,esp., 14,1(4). Nos. 1 and .2
became tlle 114th of the line, 3 and 4 tllC 1I;ith, 5 and 6 tile 116th, 7 and 8
the 33rd IE!ger, !) and 10 the 117th, 11 the 118th, la and 14 the llmh,
17 and 18 the 12mh. l\fllen the 6th, 7th, and 8th were captured at Daylen,
new conllcriptli had to be hrought from Fmncc to complete the 116th am]
replace the 33rd Ieger.
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annexation of' Holland and Northern Germany iil 1810-11 ulti-
matelyenabled the Emperor to carry the total of' his line regiments
up to 156 [18131 and of' his light infa.ntry regiments up to thirty.
. ,
SIX •
Of the French cavalry we need not speak at such length. '¥hen
the Spanish war broke out, Bonaparte was possessed of about
eighty rcgimcnts of horsemen, each taking thc field with four
squadrons of some 150 to 200 men. There were tweh'e regiments
of' cllimssiers, two of carabineers, thirty of dragoons, twent)·-six
of cltasseurs a cheval, ten of hussars, i. e. fourteen regiments of
heavy, thirty of' medium, and thirty-six. of light horse. The
cuil'assiers were hardly ever seen in Spain-not more than two
or three regiments ever served south of the Pyrenees 2. On the
other hand the b"l'eater part of the dragoons wel'e employed
in the Peninsula-there were in 1809 twenty.five of the thirty
regiments of them in the field against the Euglish and Spaniards.
:More than half of the hussars also served in Spain. To the
veteran corps of regulars therc were added, at the outset of the
war, as will be remembered, a great number of 'provisional
regiments,' but these gradually disappeared, by being incorporated
in the older cadres, or in a few (.'t\Scs by being formed into new
permanent units. There was also a mass of Polish, German, and
Italian cu.valry; but these auxiliaries did not bear such a high
proportion to the native French as did the fOl'eign part of the
infantry al·m. By far the most distinguished of these corps were
the Polish laneers, whom the English came to know only too well
at Albuera. 'l'he Italians were almost exclUSively employed 011 the
ca.!lt coast of Spain, in the army of Catalonia. The Germans-
mostly from Westphalia, Bcrg, and Nassau-were scattered about
in single regimcnts alllong thc cavalry corps of the various armies.
They were always mixed with the French horse, and never appeared
in brigades (much less in divisions) of their own.
'Thc average 8trength of a French cavalry regiment dw'ing the
years 1809-14 was four sqlladrons of about 150 men each. It
was vcry seldom that a corps showed over 600 men in thc ranks:
I Soo RoUllSCt's excellent La Gronde AnllCe de 1813.
t TIle mest Oistillgllislloo of these "'IIS the 13th Cuirnssiel'9, 0. regiment of
new formation, ....hich scrl'OO throughout the war in Arngon lI11d Catalonill,
and was by far the best of SucJlet's mounted carpi!. I;or i'b> adlievemeut!t the
reader may be referred to the interesting M€IIIQiru of Colonel de Gonneville.
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not unfrequentlr it sank to 450 1• When it grew!>till further
attenuated, it was usual to scnd back the cadre$ of one or two
squadrons, and to complete to full numbers the two or three which
kept the field. These figures do not hold good for the raw
'provisional regiments' which Bonaparte med during the first year
of the war: they sometimes rose to 700 or eyen 800 strong, when
the depots from which they had been drawn chanced to be
exceptionally full of recruits~. But such large corps are not to
be found ill the later years of the war. By 18HZ, when Napoleon,
busied in Central EllI'Ope, ceased to reinforce his Spanish armies,
the aver~<re of a cav~ry regiment had shrunk to 500 men. In
1813 it wus seldom that 400 effective sabres could be mustered by
any mounted corps.
As to the scientific arm!> of the French service, the artillery and
engineers, there is no doubt that throughout the war they deserved
very well 'of their master. Artillery canDot be improvised in the
manner that is possible with infantry, and the batteries which
accompanied Dupont's and Moncey's conscripts into Spain in ]808
were yderalls. 'Vithout them tile row infuntry would have fared
even worse than it did, during the first rear of the struggle. 'fhe
proportion of guns which the French employed during the wars of
the Empire was generally very large in comparison with the size
of their armies-one of the many results of the fact that Bonaparte
had orih>1nally been an artillery officer. He raiseJ, as wus remarhxl,
the number of gnnners in the French service to ll. figure as large as
that of the whole regular anny of Louis XVI nt the moment when
the Revolution broke out. But in Spain the difficulties of tra.ns-
port and the badness of the roads seem to have combined to keep
down the proportion of guns to something very much less than
was customary in th,e more favourable terraill of Italy or Germany.
A large part, too, of the pict.'L'S were of very light metal-four- and
eyen three-pounders, which were found easier to transport across the
mountaim than six- or eight-pounders, though much less effective
in the field. III many of the campnigns, therefore, of the Peninsular
"Var the French artillery stood in a proportion to the total number
I In Ma~na's army of 1010 the largest cavalry regiment (25th Dragoons)
Imd (lOO men. In Sucllet's army in the same year there was one eXColltiollally
strong regiment (4th HU8Sl\N) with 759 sabres.
I The 2nd Provisional Drag<>olls of Moncer's corps bad no less than 872
men in June, 1&>8.
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of men present, which was so low that it barely e..."i:ccct.l.cd that
customary among the British, who were notoriously more' under-
gunned' than any other European army sa\'C that of Spain. Junot
at Vimiero had twenty-three guns to 13,500 men: Victor at Taluvera
had eighty guns to about 50,000 men: Mt\.SSCna in 1810 invaded
Portugal with some 70,000 men and H!6 guns; at Pucntes «'Qnaro
he only showed forty-two guns to 40,000 bayonets and sabres '.
Soult at Albuera had (apparently) forty guns to 24,000 men:
in the autumn campaign of 1818 the same marslw.l had 125 guns
to 107,000 men. It will be notL.J. that the proportion never rises
to two gullS per thousund men, and occasionally does not much
ex.eL'Cd onc gun per thousund~. This contrnsts remarkably with
the 350 guns to 120,000 men which Bonaparte took out for the
campaign of Waterloo, or even with the 1,372 guns to 600,000
men of the Russian expedition and 1,056 guns to 450,000 men
of the ill-compacted army of 1813.
I In this case the low proportion was due to want of lJOTSCS, not to bad
roads. EI'en the forty-two guns were only produced when Bessieres had lent
l\rasseoa many teml18,
I I take thei:lC figures l'CSpCcUI'c1y from ThiCbault, Fririou, LnpCllC, Le Clcn::,
and Uousset.
031&1'1'. I
SECTION 11:· CHAPTER IV
THE TACTICS OF THE FRENCH A1\'U THEIR ADVERSARIES
DURING THE l'ENINSUL..I\.R WAR
AN account of the numbers and the organi7.ation of an army is
of comparatively little interest, unless we understand the principles
on which its leadel's nrc accustomed to handle it on tile do)' of
battle, and its vdue as a fighting machine.
Speaking"l:,renerally, the tactics of the French infantry during tllC
PeninsullU' War were those which httd been developed fifteen years
before, during the first struggles of the Revolution. They nearly
always attacked with a thick cloud of tiraillcur~covering onc or two
lines of battalions in column. The idea was that the very numerous
and powerful skirmishing line would engage the enemy sufficiently
to attract all his attention, so that the massed buttalions behind
arrived at the front of battle almost without sustaining loss. The
momentum of the columns ought then to suffice to carry thcm
right through the enemy's lines, which would already have suffeml
appreciabl.y from the fire of the tirailleurs. This form of attack
had won countless victories oyer Prus~ian, Austrian. and llussian:
and many cases had been knmyn where a hostile position had been
curried by the mere impetus of the French columns, without n shot
having been 6red save by their skirmisheNi. But this method, which
'Vellinb>1:on eu.lled 'thc old French style,' never suc<:eeded against
the English. It had the fatal defect that when the column came
up through the tirailleurs and endeavoured. to charge, it presented
It small front, and only the nNit two ranks could fire. ]'or the
normal French battalion advanced in column of companies, or
less frequently of double companies, i. c. with a front of forty
or at most of eighty men, and a depth of nine or of eighteell,
since the company WM always three deep, and there were si>:
<:ompanies to a battalion. Thc rear ranks only served to give
the front ranks moral support, and to impress the enemy with
a sense of tile solidity and inexorable strength of the approaching
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mllS.'i. Sometimes n whole regiment 01' brigade formed one dense
column. Now if the enemy, as was always thc case with the
llritish, refused to be impressed, but stood firm in line, held their
ground, and blazed into the head of the mass, the attack' was
certain to fail. For 800 men in the two-deep lhle, which Wellington
loved, could all use their muskets, and thus poured 800 bullets per
"olley into a l'rench battalion of the sallle strength, which only
could return 160. The nine-deep, 01' eighteen-deep, column was a
target wh.ich it was impossible to miss. Hence the front ranks
went down in rows and the whole came to a standstill If, as was
often t.he case, the French battalion tried to deploy in front of the
English line, so as to bring more muskets to bear, it seldom 01'
• never succeeded in accomplishing the manoouvte, for each company,
as it,straggled out from the mass, got shot down so quickly t.hat
the formation could ncver be completed. No wonder that Foy in
his private journal felt himself constrabled to confess that, for a set
battle with L'<}unl numbers on a limited front, the English infantry
was superior. '[ keep this opinion to myself,' he adds, 'and have
never divulged it; for it is necessary that the soldiel' in the ranks
should not only hate the enemy,. but also despise him 1.' Foy kept
his opinion so closely to himself t.hat he did not put it in his
formal history of the Peninsular 'War: it has only become public
property since his journals were published in 1900.
Dut the fact tha.t with anyt.hing like equal llumbers the line
must beat the column was demonstrated over and over again
during the wnr. It had first been seen at Maida in 1806, but
that obscure Calabrian battle wns hardly known, evcn by name,
save to those who had been present. It was at '1'alavem, and !dill
mOl'e at BuStlco and Albuera, that it became patcnt to everybody
that the attack in battalion column, even if preceded by a vigorous
swarm of skirmishcrs. could never succeed against the English, At
the two former fights the French attacked ~phill, and laid the
blame of their defeat upon the unfavourable ground. But when
at Albucru. Um_'C English briJ:,1'8des drove double their own numbel'S
from the commanding ridge on which Soult had ranged them,
simply by the superiority of their musketry fire, theI'C wns no
101lh'Cr any possibility of disgui::;ing the moral. Yet to the end
of the war, down to \Vaterloo itself, the French ~tuck to their
old formation: at the great battle in 1815,.as 'VcllingtDll tersely
• Diary of Foy, ill Girod de l'Ain', Vie MUitaire du Gili&al Puy. p. 08.
,2
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said, 'The French came on once more in the old style, and we bent
them in the old style.'
But when Napoleon's armies WCI"C opposed to troops who could
not "stnnd firm to meet them in a line fOl"mntion, they generally
succeeded. 'l1lC Spaniards, in their earlier battles, often tried to
resist in a line of deployed battalions, but their 1IWrole was not
good enough when the attacking WlUillll d.rew close to them, awl
they gem,rally gave way at the critical moment and let their
Elssailants break through 1. ~11e same had often been the case with
the Austrians and Prussinns, who in their earlier wars with Napoleon
used the line formation which }"rederick the Great had popularized
fifty YCIll"S before. The great kiug had accustomed his troops to
fight in a three- or four-deep line, ....;th a comparatively small
provision of skirmishers to cover their front, for it wus by the fire
of the whole baU:nlion that his troops were intended to win. The
masses of tirailleurs which the French sent forward in front of their
(:olulllns generally succeeded in engllging the Prussian or Austriall
line so closely, that the columns behind them came up without much
loss, :md then broke the line by their mcre momcntulll and moral
effed. Hence in their later WlU"S the German powers copied their
encmies, und took to using ll. very thick skirmishing linc backed by
bllttalion columns in the l'rench style.
WellilllJum never found any reason to do so. His method was
to conceal his main line a<; long ns possible by a dip in the grOlllld,
a hedge, or a wall, or to keep it behind the crest of the position
which it was holding. To face the tirailleurs each baH.nlioll sent
out its light company, and each brigade had assigned to it several
detHched companies of riflemen: from 1809 OIlWard some of the
60th UiAes and one or two foreign light corps 2 were broken up and
disb:ibuted round the various divisions for this special purpose.
This gave a line of skirmishers strong enough to hold back the
tirailleurs for a 10llg time, probably till the supporting columus
I The reader \\'110 wisheil to see a logical explanation of tile phenomenon
may find it in the remarks of the Spallish Colonel Moscoso (1812) ill
Arteche, H, 394, He explains that the skinnishing line of his compatriOts
was always too tllin to kcep back tIle timilleuril, 11lC latter illmrialll)'
pU8ht,....I their way c100c up to the Spanish main body, and while presenting in
their scattered fonnation no definite mark for volleys, were yet numeroUll
ellough to shoot (]o"'n so many of their optJoncnLs as to shake the Sll[\nish
fonnation before the colulllm in the rear came up,
2 e. g. nrull~wick-Oeu and the 01l/meurI Britanllique~.
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came up to help them. It was only then that the Bl'itish skirmish-
ing line gave way and retired behind its main body, leaving the
deployt.-d battalions in f!UX! of the French column, of which they
never failed to give a satisfactory account. The covering screen of
light troops often suffered terribly; e.g., at Barossa, Brown's' light
battalion' lost fourteen out of twcnty"'One officers and more than
half it~ rank and file 1, while holding off the French advance from
the line which WM forming in its rear. But the combat always
went well if the enemy's skirmishers could be kept back, and his
supporting columns forced to come to the fmnt, to engage with the
regiments in two-deep formution which were waiting for them.
Charges with the bayonet are often heard of ill narrati\'cs-
cspeciuJly French llllrmtivcs-of the Peni.nsular; \Var. But it was
very seldom that the opposing troops actually came into collision
with the wllite weapon. There were (x:co.sions, almost invariably
in fighting in villages or enclosed groundr on which considerable
llUmbers of men were killed or wowldcd with the OO)'onet, but they
were but few. It is certain, however, that the 43rd at Vimiero, the
7lst and 88th at Fuentes d'Ofioro, llnd the 20th at Honccsvallcs,
engaged in this fashion 2; and other Cill;(.'S could be quoted. But ItS
a rule a 'bayonet charge' in a l"rench historian merely lllCUllS the
Itdv/Hlcc of 0. colullln up to the enemy's position without firing: it
does not imply actual contact or the crossing of weapons. An
English charge 011 the other hand wns practically all &1\'tuH:e in
line with frequent volleys, or independent file-firing. At Albuera,
or Barossa, or SalamanCiL it wns the ball not the bayonet which
did the work; the ellemy was shot down, or gaxe way without any
hand-to-lltUld conflict.
French cavalry tactics had by 1808 developed into as definite
n system us those of the infantry. Napoleon was fond of ma;;;sing
his horsemen in very large bodies and launching them at tlle Rank,
or evcn nt thc centre, of the army opposed to him. He would
occasionally use ns mlllly as 6,000 or 8,000, or (ns at "raterloo) even
12,000 men for one of these great strokes. Two or three uf his
I See Blakeney, A Boy ill tile l'elli1l6«[ar War, edited by Sturges (1009),
pp. H19,lOO, for an account of this bloody episode.
~ 111e ~eader wllo is curious as to details of actual bayonet-fighting m'ly COll-
suit Grnttall for tJle l:IDtb, ulld the Imou)'lllollS 'T. 8.' of the 7lst for "'ucutes
d'Olioro, and 8toovellS of the 20tll for HOllces\'alles. TIle charge of Tovoy's
company of tllO latter corps, on the last-mentioned occasion, much resemblctl
(Jne of·the incidents of Jnkerman.
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famous battles were won by tremendous cavalry charges-notably
Marengo and Dresden, while Eylau was just saved from faUing into
a disaster by a blow of the same kind. But cavalry must be used
ut prcci~ly the right moment, Illust be skilfully led and pushed
home without remor.';c, and even then it may be beaten off by
thoroughly cool and ulIshukcll troops. It is only ~crnillst tired, dis-
tracted, or undisciplined oott8.1ions that it can count on It reASOll-
able certainty of !:Iut"(;ess. All through the war the Spanish annies
supplioo the French horsemen with exactly the opportunities that
they required: they were always being surprised, or caught ill
confusion while executing some! coruplirotcd man(r:uvrc; fmd ll.S if
this was not enough, they were often weak eUOllgh in morr.k to
dluw themselves to be broken even when they Imd been ullowed
time to take their ground and form their sqna~. The battles of
Galllonal (1808), Medellin, Allm de Tonnes, and Ocafia (1809), the
Geborn, and Saguntnm (18}}) were good examples of the power
of masses of horse skilfully handled over a numerous but ill-
disciplined infaJitry.
On the other hand, agninst the English the fi-ench cavalry
hardly ever accomplished anything worthy of note. It is only
pos::sible to name two oecilsion8 on whieh they made their mark:
the first was at Albuera, where, profiting by an opportune cloud-
burst which darkened the flli-'C of day, two regiments of Itmcers
came in lIpoll the flank of a British brigade (Colborne's of the
second division), and I\lmost entirely cut it to pieces_ The second
incident of the kind was at Fuelltes d'Ofioro, in the AAme summer,
when Montbrull's cavalry charged with somc cffect 011 Houston's
division and hustled it back for some two miles, though they llevcr
liu(,'(:ccdcd in breaking its squares.
On the other hand the ca.'leiI where the French horsemen fOllnd
themsel\'~ utterly wmble to deul with the British infalltry were
\-ery numerous-we need onl)' mention Cacabellos (during Maore's,
retreat), El Rodon, Salamall~l, and several skil1'uisht-'S during the
retreat from Burgos in 1812. After such experiences it was no
wonder thut Foy, and other old officers of the army of Spain,looked
with dismay upon Napoleon's great attempt at ·Waterloo to break
down the long line of British squw.-e:l between La Ha)'c Suillte anti
Hougonmont, by the charges of ten or tweh-e thousand heavy
ctnalry Illl\SSOO on a short front of less than a mile 1. The Emperor
I &-e Foy's diary iu Girud dtl rAin, p_ 277.
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had never seen the British infantry fight, and was entirely ignorant
of their resisting power.
Of fights between cavalry and cavalry, where the two sides were
prerent in such equal numbers as to make the struggle a fai .. test
of their reJative efficiency" there were but few in the llenimmlar
War. In the early yean; of the struggle 'Vellin/:,>1:on was very
scantily provided with hOrliemen, and never could aftord to engage
in t\ ca.vulry battle on El IUI'b'C scale. Later 011, when he was morc
happily situated in this respect, he showed such El marked reluctance
to risk great cavalry l-"Ombabl that the old saying that he was
'pre-eminently an infantry general' seems justified. That he could
use his horsemen vigorously enough, when he saw his opportunity,
he showed at Assaye, long before he had made his name knowll
in Europe. Yet the only one of hi!j great hatt*5 in Spain where
his dragoons took a prominent part in the victory was Salamanca,
where Le Marchant's brigade struck such a smashing blow on the
flank of the H'ench army. 'Ve have his own authority 1for the fRet
that he hesitated to mass great bodies of horse, because he doubted
the tactical skill of his officers, and the power of the regiments to
manrenvre. 'I considered OUI cavah)',' he wrote ten years after the
war was over, •so inferior to the French from want of order, that
although I considered one squadron 1\ mateh for two rrench, [ did
not like to sec four British opposed to four French: and as the
llumbers increased and order, of course, became mOlOC necessary,
[ was the more unwilling to risk our men without having a
superiorit), in nwnbers. 'l'hey could gallop, but could not preserve
thei.r order.'
Foy, in his excellent history of the Spanish 'Var, emits an opinion
in words cm'iously similar to those of V\'cllingtoll) stating tht\t fOl'
)ll1lLiical purposes the English troopers wcre inferior to the F10CllCh
on acoowlt of their headlong impetuosity and want of power to
manreuvre 2• ''Vben two such authorities 6o"Tec, there must clearly
have been some solid foundation for their verdict. Yet it is hat-d to
quote many combats in their support: there were cases, 110 doubt,
where English regiments thrcw their chances away by their blind
fury ill charging, as did the fl3rd Light Dragoons at Talavera.,
the 13th Light Dmgoons near Campo Mayor on March 25, 1811,
llnd Slade's brigade at l\Iaguilla on June 11, 1812. Yet with the
memory before us of Paget's admirable operntions at Sahagull and
1 Letter to Lord Willtam RUMell, July 31, 1626. t "'oy, i. 286-00,
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llene\'ente in December, 1808, of Lumley's skilfiJl containing of
Latour l\faubourg's superior numben> at AlbUCl"a, and llis brilliant
success at Usagre oyer that same general in 1811, as well as
Cotton's considerable cavalry fight at Villa Garcia in 18]2, it
sccms strallgc to find 'Wellington disparaging his own troopers. No
doubt we must concede that the British horsemen did not show
that marked superiority O\'C1' their rivals of the same arm which
Wellington's infantry always asserted. But fairly balancing their
faults and their merits, it would seem that there was something
wLUltillg ill their gcIlCl'tllIlO less than in thcmschcs. A lover of the
('-AvaIl'y arm would have got more profit out of the British horse
than 'Wellington ever obtained. It is noticeable that not one of the
successful lights cited above took place under the eye or the direc-
tion of the Duke.
\ As to the Spanish eamlry, it was (as we have already had occasion
to remark) the weakest point in the national arm)'. In the first
uctions of the war it appeared on tl.le field ill such small numbers .
that it had no ehance against the French. But later on, when the
juntas succeeded in raising large masses of horsemen, their scan-
dalous conduct on a score of fields was the despair of Spanish
generals. WOe need only mention l\-fede1lin and Ocaiia as examples
of their misbehaviour. No French cavalry-general ever hesitated
to engage with double of his own llUmber of Spanish horse. ·When
"ihtOrously charged they never failed to give way, und when ont'e
on the move it was impossible to rally them. It was often found
011 the night of It battle that the mass of tile caval!")' was in flight
twenty miles ahead of the infantry, which it had bnsely deserted.
Napoleon, as every student of the art of war knows, had started
his Clll'ecr as an officer of artillery, and never forgot the fact. He
himself has left on record the statement that of all his tactical
SL'crds the cQm:enll'atioll of' an overwhelming ltrtillery fire on a given
point was the most important. • 'Vhen once the combat has grown
hot,' he wrok, 'the general who has the skill to unite an imposing
mass of artillery, suddenly and without his adversary's knowledge,
in front of some point of the hostile position, may be sure OfSUCCCliS.'
His leading idea was to secure an overwhelming artillery pl'eparatioll
for his infulltr)' iltlacks: for this I"CNion his typical battle begun
with the massing of a great number of gUlls 011 the POillts of the
<:llemy':; linc which he intended ultimately to break down. In fllis
respect he nbandoned entirely the vicious tactics that prevailed
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in the earlier J'ears of the revolutionary war, when the cannon,
instead of being com;entratt..(f, were distributt.>d about in twos llnd
threes among the infantry bo.ttnlions. 'We shall find that his
method had been perfectly assimilated by his subordinates; when
the ground allowed of it, they were much gh'Cll to collecting many
guns at some salient point of the line, and bringing a concentrated
lire to bear on the weak spot in the enemy's position. At Ocafm
a battery of this kind had a great share in the credit of the victory;
at Albucra it suved Saulfs routed tl'OOPS from complctedestmdiou.
The names of artillery generals like Senarmont and Ruty need
honourable mention for sueh achievements. If the French artillery
had less effect against the English than against most of Napoleon's
foes, it was bcenuse of ",rellinglon's admirable custom of hiding his
hoops till the actual moment of battle. Austrian, Russian, or
l'russian generals oct;upiLxl a hilliiue by long lilies drawn up Oll
the hither slope, of which every man could be counted. Hence
. they could be thoroughly searched out and ooltert.xl by the French
guns, long before the infantry was let loose. 'Vellington, on the
other hand, loved to show a position apparently but ho.lf-defended,
with his reser\'es, or e\'en his main line, carefully hidden behind the
crest, or CO\"ered by walls and hedges, or conceo.led ill hollows o.nd
ravines, Hence the l"rench artillery-preparation wus much em-
barrassed; there were no masses to fire at., and it was impossible
to tcll how UIlY part of the line was held. By the cnd of thc WUI'
the French marshals grew very chary of atb.cking any position
where 'Vdlillbr1:on ~howctl iight, for they neller could tell whcthcI'
they were opposed by It mere rearguard, or by a whole army
skilfully concealed.
The English annies, unlike the :French, always took with them
it comparatively small PI'Op0l'tioll of artillery, seldom so much as
two guns to the thousand men, as Foy remarks. But what there
was was excellent, fmlll its high discipline and the accuracy of its
fire. The Duke preferred to work \\'ith small and movable units,
placed in well-chosen spots, and kept dark till the criticalmolDcnt,
rather than with the enormous lines of guns that Bonaparte
belicved in. His horse artillcry was oftcn pushed to the frout
in the most daring way, in reliance 011 its admirable power of
manccuvring and its complete steadiness. At Fuentes d'Oiioro,
for example, it was maue to cover the retreat of the right wing
before the masses of French Co'1.\'alry, in a way that would have
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seemed impossible to any onc who was not personally acquainted
with Norman Ramsay and his gunners. Hcm.'e came the astounding
fo.ct that during ,the whole war the Duke llever in the open field
lost an English gun. Several times cannon were taken and re-
takcll; OllL"C or twk.-c gUlls 1I0t bclOllgillg to the horse or field
batteries were left behind in A. retreat, when transport failed. Dut
in the whole six years of his command 'Velliugtori lost no gUlls
in battle. Foy gives an unmistakable testimony to the English
artillery in his history, by remarking that in its material it was
undoubtedly superior to the French 1: the same fact may be verified
from the evidence of our own officers, several of whom have left
their opinion 011 record, that after huving inspected captured
French cannon, limbers, and caissons they much preferred their
own.
'l'his statClllCllt, it must be remcmbered, only applies to the fiel~1
and horse artillery. The English siege artillery, all through the
11'0.1', was notably inferiol' to the French. 'Vcllington ncver
possessed a satisfactory battering train, and the awful cost at
which his sieges were hUilro into sucCCS$(..":l is a testimony to the
inadel)uacy of his resources. The infantry were sent in to wit;, hy
sheer courage amI at tcrrible expense of life, the places that could
not be reduced by the ill-equipped siege artillery. There C'Ul
be no doubt that in poliorcetics the enemy was our superior:
but with 0. vcry small number of artillery ofliccl"s trained to siege
work, an insignificant body of Royal Engineers 2, and practically no
provision of trained sappers 3, what Wll.$ to be expected? It Wll.$
llot stl'ange that the Freneh showed themselves our masters in this
rc.<;ped. But the fault lay with tile organization at hc.ud quarlcN,
not with the artillery and engineer officers of the Peninsulai' army,
who had to learn their trade by experience without having rccci"ed
!lily proper training at home.
1 Foy, i. 200.
I It was usual to supplemCllt tllC nlcugrc supply of eugiuCXlrs by officers
who volunteered fronl the line.
3 11lere were only the C Royal i\fi1itllry Artificers' ill very small uUIlIUcrs.
111e rank and filc of the engineer corps did not yet exist.
SECTION III
SARAGOSSA AND BAYLEN
CHAPTER I
OPENING OF J-10STIWTIES: THE FRENCH fi','VASIONS OF
ANDALUSIA AND VALENCIA
WHII.E the proviuces of Spain were bursting Qut, onc aftcl'
another, into open insnrrectiOll, Murat at Madrid and Bonaparte
at Bayonne were still enjoying the fools' paradise in which they
had dwelt since the formal abdication of Ferdinnnd VII. The
forlller was busy in forcing the Junta of Regency tu perform the
action which he elegantl)' 8t)'le£1 •swallowing the pill,' i. e. in
compelling it to do hOlllugc to Napoleon and humbly crave for the
appointment of .Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spaill. He imagined
that his only serious trouble lily in the lumentable emptiness of
the treasury at l\'1adrirl, and kept announcing smooth things to his
llUl:;tcr-'Thc coulltry was tranqui~ the st/lie of public opiniun in
the capital was far happier than could have been hoped: the
IlIltive soldicry were showing an excellent disposilion, the cuptuins~
general kept sending in good reports: the new dynasty WllS likely
to be popular, and the only desire expl'el:lseU by the people was to
sce their newly designated king arrive promptly in their midst 1.'
Letters of this kind continued to How from the pen of the Duke of
Herg till almost the end of the month, Even after details of the
insllrrection of Aragon and the Asturi!\$ began to reach himJ he
{,'ould write on :May 31 that a ~trong flying column would suffice
to put evcrything ]·ight. About this time he was seized by n violent
fcver and took to his bed, just as things were commencing to grow
Sel'lOIlS, Oil his conva,lesl.:cnce he left for France, af'tcr putling
c\·erythillg in churge of Savw:y, the llIall who of all Frenchmen
most deserved the hatred of Spain. About the middle of June
he recrossed the French frontiel'J and after a few weeks went oft' to
I Murat to Napoleon, May lB.
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Naples to take up his new kingship there. Spain was never to sce
him ngnin: the ml:.astrophc which he hnd, by his master's orders,
brought about, was to i.>e L'Oncluded to its end by other hands.
Vi'hile Mural lay sick at the suburban palace of Chamartin,
and while Napoleon was drafting acts and constitutions which
the assembly of notables at BaYOIlIlC were to fiClXpt and publish,
the first acts of war between the insurgents and the French an)IY
of m'Cl! pation took place.
We have alrcndy had occasion to point out that the main
military strength of the insurrection lay in Galieiu. and Andalusia.,
the two districts in which large bodies of regular troops had placed
themselves at the disposition of the newly organized juntas. In
Valencia, Catalonia, llnd Murcia the movement was much weake!':
in Old Castile, Aragoll, and the Asturias it had hardly any other
forces at its dispof¥tl than hordes of hill·armed pcusuuts. Clcurly
then Galicia and Andalusia were the dangerous points for the
French, and the former more than the latter, sim.'C an army de-
scending from its hills, and fnlling on the long line ofcommunications
between France and Madrid, might cause the gravc",'t inconvenience.
If there had been any organized Spanish forces iu Aragon, there
would have been an equal danger of an attack directed from
Sarfll:,'Ossa against the eastenl flank of the French communications.
But while GaHcia was posse!iSCd of a numerous amlY of regular
troops, AraJ:,'01l had lIothing to show but a mass of hastily
assembled peasants, who were not yet fllIly provided with arms
{lud were only just beginning to be told off into battalions.
Napoleon, at the moment when he began to order his troop;;
to move, was under the impression that he had to dl..'8,l with a
number of isolated riots mther than with a geneml insurrection
of the Spanish nation. His first orders show that he imagined
that a few flying 1..'OlUlllllS would be able to scour the disuflbcLcd
districts and scatter the bands of insurgents without much trouble.
Instead of Il strategical plan fol' the conquest of Spnin, wc fiud
in his directions nothing lIlore than provisions for the launching of
a small colullln against each point where he had been informeU
that a. rising had broken out. He presupposes that the kingdom
as It whole is quiet., und that bodies of 3,000 or 4,000 men ma.y
march anywhere, without havillg to provide for the maintenilllCC of
their communications with Madrid, or wiUl each other. Only ill a
friendly country would it have been possible to carry out such orderl$,
lBOO] NAPOLEON'S PLAJ.'1 OF CAMPAIGN 125
There were at the Emperor's disposition, at the eud of May, some
116,000 men be)'olld the PJrenees: but the 26,000 troops under
Juuot in Portugal were so completely cut oft' from the rest, by the
insurrection in Castile and Estrcmudura, that they had to be left
out of consideration. Of the remainder the corps of Dupont and
Moncey. 53,000 strong. lay in and about Ml1dl'id: Bessieres, lo
whom the preservation of the main line of communications with
l?I'lUlce fell, had some 25,000 between Burgos and SUIl Sebastian:
Duhesme, isolated at Barcelona, and cOlTIllmnicating with France
by Pcrpignan and not by Bayollllc, hud onI)" some 13,000 at his
disposal in Catalonia. Up to the first week in June the Empel'Or
thought that the 91,000 men of these four corps would be enough
to pllcify Spain.
His first design was somewhat as follows: Bessieru; Wall to keep
a /inn hand on the linc of communications, but also to detach
a division of 4,000 men under Lefebvre-Desnouettes ~ffB.inst
Saragossa, and fI. brigade undcr Merle to pacify Santalldcr and the
northern littoral. TIle Emperor does not at first seem to have
rcali7.ed that, with the army of Galicia hanging on his western
flank, Bessieres might not be able to spare Illen for such distant
enterprises. He dealt with the corps as if it had nothing to face
save the local insmgents of Aragon and Old Castile. From the
large body oftroops which lay about Madrid, Toledo, and Aranjuez,
two strong columns were to be dispatched to strike at the two main
centres of the insurrection in Southem Spain. Dupont wus to take
the first division of his army wrps, with two brigades of cavalry
and a few other troops, and mnrch on Cordova and Seville. This
gave him no more than about 13,.000 men for the subjugation of
the large and populous province of Andalusia. The other two
infantry divisions of his corps remained for the present near
Madrid 1.
On the other side of the capital, Marshal Moncey with a SOlIJe~
what smaller forcc-one division of infantry from his own army
l:orps und one brigade of cavalry, 9,000 men in all-was to move
on Valencia, and to take possession of that city and of' the great
naval arsenal of Cadag'Cua. His expedition was to be supported
by a diversion from the side of Catalonia, for Duhesme (in spite
of the small number of his army) wns told to send a colunm along
the sea-coast route, by Tarragonn and Torlosa, to threaten Valencia
1 For details of his force see llll) note 011 pp. 102-3.
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from the north. Moncey's remaining infantry divisions, which were
not dctailed for the expedition Omt he was to lead, remaiuoo near
Madrid, availahle (like Dupont's second and third divisions) for the
reinforcement of Bessicrcs or the strcngthelliug of the two expedi-
tionary columns, as cireumstallces might decide.
Clearly Dupont und MOllccy were both sent forth to undertake
impossible L.'\Sks. Napoleon had not comprehended that it was not
provincial emClItC8 that he had to crush, but the regular resistance
of a nation. To send a column of 12,000 men on a march through
300 miles of hostile territory to CadiT., or a column 'of 9,000 men
on a march of 180 miles to Valencia, presupposes the idea that the
e."\:peditions are affairs of police and not stmtegical operations.
Our astonishment grows greater when we consider the character of
the troops which Dupont and l\Ioncey commanded. In the army
of the former there was one vetemn French battalion-that of the
Mru.;nes of the Guard, six of raw recruits of the Legions of ltcservc,
two of Paris Municipal Guards (strangely distracted from their usual
duties), one of the l..'Olltinb'Cllt of the Helvetic Coufederntioll, and
four of Swiss mercenaries in the Spanish service, who had just been
l..'Ompellt.'<l to transfer their allegiun<:c to Napoleun. The Cilvah)'
consist~ of four 'provisional regiments' of conscripts. It was Il
military crime of the first order to send 13,000 troops of this
quality 011 an important expedition. Moncey's force was of exactly
the same sOlt-eight battalions of conscripts fonned in 'provisiollal
regimcnts' Md two 'provisional regiments' of dragoons, plus 1\
\Vestphalian battalion, and two Spanish corps, who deserted en
fTU.ursc when they wcre informed that they were to march t\b"ltlIlSt
Valencia in company with the marshal's French troops. He had
not one sillgle company or squadron of men belonging to the old
imperial army.
Bessieres was much more fortunate, as, amOng the ~5,OOOmen of
""hom he could dispose, there were four vetemn battalions of the
line and two old regiments of cavalry; moreo\'er there were sent
ere long to his aid three of the battalions of the Impcriul Guard
which 'lay at Madrid, and foul' hundred sabres of the dragoons,
chasseurs, and gendarmes of the same famous corps.
The march of the two expeditionary columns began on May ~4,
a date at whida Murat and his master had but the faintest Ilotion
of' the wide-spreading revolt which was on foot. 1\Ioncey and
Dupont were both o8icers of distinction: the marshal was one of
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the oldest and the most rcspaied officers of the imperial army: he
had won the grade of general of division in the da)'s of the Republic,
and did not owe his first start in life to Napoleon. Of all the
marshals he WM by severnl years the senior: He passed as 0. stendy,
capable, and prudent officer of vast experience. Dupont on the
olhCl' hand wns a young man, who had Jlrst won tl. llalDe by his
brilliant {.'OUTage at the combat of Dirnstein in the Austrian war
of 1805. Since then he hud distinguishl..>d himself at Friedland;
he was on the way to rapid promotion, and, if his expedition to
Andalusia had succLoeded, might hUlle counted on a duch:y and
a mtuoshal's bn.ton as his reward. Napoleon knew him as a brave
and loyal subordinate, but had never before given him an indepen-
dent command. He could hardly guess that, when left to his own'
inspirations, such a brilliant officer would turn out to be dilatory,
wanting in in.itiath'e, ruId wholly destitute of moml courage. It is
impossible to judl:,"C with infallible a{.'(:uracy how a good lieutenant
will behave, when llrst the load of responsibility is laid upon his
shoulders. On May fH, Dupont quitted 1'ok'<l.o with his 18,000
men: in the bl'Oad plains of La Mancha he met with 110 opposition.
Ever)'whel'C the people were sullen, but no open hostility was shown.
Even in the tremendous defiles of the Sierrll. Morena he fowId no
enemy, and crossed the great pass of Despefia-Perros without having
to llre 11. shot. Coming out at its southern end he occupied Andujar,
the town at the main junction of road!> in Eastern Andlllusia, all
June 5. Here he got clear intelligence that the whole country-
side was up in arms: Seville hud risell all May 26, and the rest of
the province had followed its c-'{ample. There was a large assembly
of arnl{.'d peasants mustering at Cordova, but the regular troops
had not yet been brought up to the front. General Castaiios,
whom the JUllta had placed in chief command, was still busily
engaged in concentrating his scattered battalions, forming them
into brigades UJid divisions, and hastily filling up with recruits the
enormous gaps which existed in the greater part of the corps. The
regulars were being got together at a camp at Cannonu, !;Qutlt of
the Guadalquivir, and not far from Seville. The organil':ation of
new battalions, fi'(lITI the large number of volunh'Cl'S who remained
when the old regiments were completed, took place elsewhere. It
would be weeks, rather than days, before the ullorgani1.ed mass took
shape as an army, and Dupont might count on a considerable respite
before being attacked. But it was not only with the forces of
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Castafios that he had to reckon: at Cordova., Se\-iUe, Granada, and
all the other towns of Andalusitl, the PC!!.Sil.lIts were flocking in to
be armed and told off into new regiments. There was every proba-
bility that in a few days the movement would spread northward
over the Sierra Morena into La Manchn. An insurrection in this
district would sever Dupont's communication!\ with Madrid, for he
hud not left behind him any sufficient detachments to guard the
defiles which he had just passed, or to keep open the great post·
road to the capital across the plains of New Castile. 'When he
started he had been under the impl'ession that it was only local
troubles in Andalusia that he had to suppress.
Dupont was already beginning to find that the insurgents were
in much greater nnmbers than he had expected when he crossed
the Sierra l\Iorena, but till he had nmdc trial of theil' strength he
considered. that it would be "TOllg to halt. He had close before
him the great city of Cordova, a most tempting prh:e, and he
l"Csolvcd to push on at least so far before taking it upon himself to
halt and ask for reinforcements. His continued movement soon
brought about the fi~t engagement of the war, as at the bridge of
Alcolea he found his advance disputed by a considerable hostile
fon:e [JUIle 7].
The military commandant of the district of Cordova. was a certain
Don Proi'O de Ech6..varri, a retired colonel whom the local Junta
had just placed in command of it.s levies. His fon:e consisted of
10,000 or 12,000 peasants and citizens, who had only received their
arms three days before, and had not yet been completcly told off'
into regiments and companies, On the 4th of June he had been
sent a small body of old b:oop~lle battalion of light infantry
(Campo Mayor), and one of militia(the 3m. }lrovincial Grenadiers of
Andalusia}--l,400 men in all, amI with them eight b"Ulls. To have
abandoned Cordova without a. fight would have discour~ued the flew
levies, and probably have led to Echa\'arri's own death; fOI' the
armed mob whieh be commanded would have tom him to pieces llS
a traitor if he had refused to give battle. Accordingly he resolved
to defend the passage of the Guudalquivir at the point where the
high-road from Andujar erossed it, six miles outside Cordova, He
ban·jcadcd. the bl"idgc a.nd plaCLu his gwlS and the two old huttalions
on the hither side of the river, in a position commanding the defile.
On eaeh flan k of them some thousands of the Cordovan insurgents
were drawn up, while the rema.inder of the levy, including all the
lBOB] COMBAT OF ALCOLEA 1~9
mounted men, were sent across the bridge, and hidden in some hills
which overhung the rand by which the French were coming. They
were ordered to show themselves, and to threaten to fallllpon the
enemy from the f1allk, when he should have developed his attack
upon the bridge. If Ech6.varri llad been guided by military con-
siderations he would not have dtu'cd to offer battle with ~uch a l"/lW
and motley force to lfl,()(X) French troops---even if the latter were
hut the conscripts of Dupont. But political Il~.:essity compelled
him to make the attempt.
When Dupont found the position of Alcolea occupied, he can-
nonaded the Spaniards for a time, and then launched his vnngllttrd
agaiJlst the bridge. The leading battalion (it was one of those
formed of the Paris Mnnicipal Guards) stormed the barricades
with some loss, and began to cross the river. After it the rest of
Pannetier's brigade followed, and began to deploy for the attack on
the Spanish position. At this moment the ConlovlUl levies beyond
the rivcr showed themselves, and began to threaten 11 flank attack
on Dupont. The latter sellt his cavahy against thcm, and a few
charges soon turned back the demonstration, and scattered the raw
troops who had made it. :Meanwhile Dnpont's infantry oowUlced
and overpowered the two regular battalions opposed to them; see-
ing the line bmken, the mnsscs of insurgents on the flanks left the
field without any serious fighting. The whole horde gave way and
poured lmck into Cordova and right thl"Ough the cif,y, whose
ruined walls they made no attempt to defend. They had lost very
few men, probably no more than 200 in all, while the French had
suffered evcnless, their only casualties being thirty killed and eighty
wounded, wellnigh all in the battalion which had forced the bnI-
ricades at the bridge.
There would be no reason to linger even for a moment ovel' thilS
insignificant skinnish, if it bud. not been fOl" the dcplol'tlblc c\'cnts
which followed-events which did more to give 11 ferocious charlU:ter
to the war thmJ. any others, save (>Crhaps the massacre by Culvo
at Valencia, which was taking place (as it chanced) on that very
sume day, June 7.
Dupont, after giving his annya short rest, led it, still ranged
in buttle m'ray, across the six miles of plain which sepm-ated him
from Cordova, He e.xpL'Ctcd to find the defeated army ofEchuvurri
rallying itself within the city. Bnt on arriving in front of its
gates, he found the walls unoL'CupiL'<1 und the suburbs deserted.
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The Cordovans hud closed· their gates, but it was rathet· fOl" the
purpose of gaining time for a formal surrender than with any
intention of resisting. Dllpont had already opened negotiations
for the unbarring of the gates, when a. few sc:attered shoh were
fired at the French columns from a tower ill the wllll, or a house
abutting on it. Treating this as It good excuse for avoiding
the granting of a capitulation, Dupont blew open one of the
gates with mnnon, and his troops rushed into the empty streets
without finding any enemy to defeat. lne impudent fiction of
'l'hiers to the effect that the entry of the French WM &:riously
resisted, and that desperate street-fighting took place, is sufficiently
disproved by the fact that in the so-called storming of CordOVIl.
the l~rench lost altogether two killed and seven wounded,
Nevertheless the city was sacked from cellar to garret. Du-
pont's undisciplined conscripts broke their ranks and ran amuck
through the streets, firing into windows and battering down doon>.
"Whercver thCl"C was the lcast show of resiswncc they slcw ofI' whole
households: but they were rather intent 011 pillage and rape
than 011 Illlll-dcr. Cordova was a wealthy pluce, iLl shops were
well WOlih plundering, its churches and mona.<:teries full of silver
plate and jewelltrl reliquaries, its vaults of the strong wines of
Andalusia. All the scenes of horror that afterwards occurred at
Badajoz or San Sebastian were rehearsed for the fhost time at
CordOVR.; and the army of Dupont had far less excuse than the
English marauders and murderers of 1812 and 1813. Thc Frcnch
had taken the city ·practically without loss und without opposition,
and could not plead that they had been maddened by the fall
of thousands of their eomrades, or that thc)" were drunk with the
flify of battle after many hours of desperate fighting at the
breaches. Neverthcless, without any excuse of this sort, Dupont's
army behaved in a way that would have suited better the hordes
of Tilly and lVallenstein. Their commandcrs could not draw
them away fl'Olll their orgies and outrages till the n~--t day:
indeed, it seems that many of the French officers disgm.ced thelll4
selves by joining in the plunder. While the mell wel'e filling
theil" htl\"crsacks with private properly, there were found coloncls
and even generals who were not ashamed to load carts and coaches
with pictures, tapestries, and meW-work from chUl'Chcs and public
buildings, and bag'fi of dollars from the treasury, where no less
than 10,000,000 reals of ~pecie had been fowld. Laplanne, whom
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Dupont appointed commandant of the place, took 9l,OOO ducats of
blackmail from the Count of VillIlIlUe\"a, on whom he had billeted
himselt~ in return fo!' preserving his mansion from pillG.e,uc. When
the French left Cordova, nine days later, they had with them more
than 500 wheeled vehicles seized in the place which were loaded
with all sorts of plunder I.
Dupont had hardly settled down in Cordova, and begun to sub-
stitute crushing militAry contributions for ul1systemlltic pillage,
when he found himself cut oA' from his base. l11c valley of the
Upper Glladnlquivir, and the slopes of the Sierra Morcna, on both
the southern and the northern sides of the passes, rose in arms
in the second week of' June. The French had left. no detachments
behind to preserve their communications: between Cordova and
Toledo there WCl'e only a fe\\' posts where stragglers and sick had
been l'ollccteJ, some isolated officers busy on surveying or on raising
contributions, and some bodies of ten or twenty men escorting
coul'iers or belated trains of wllofr()ns bearing food or ammunition
to the front, Most of these unfortunate people were cut up by
the insurgents, who displayed fWIll the fil'lit a most ferocious
spirit. The news of the sack of Cordova drovc them to the com-
mission of inhuman Cl·uclties; some pl'iSOncl'S were blinded, others
tortured to death: Foy says that the brigadicr-general RCnc,
surprised while crossing the l\{orcllu, was throwll into a vat of
boiling water and scalded to death 2. The parties which escaped
IlUI.$sacrc hastily drew back towards Madrid and Toledo, and soon
there was not a French soldier within 150 miles of DUPOllt's isolated
di vision,
That general did not at first reali1.e the unpleasantness of his
1 It is astonishing to find that Napier (i. 114) expressly denies that Cordova
WIIS f:;u;kcd. fo'ny (iii. 231), t110 best of tllo f.'rem:ll historians, acknowledges
that' unarmed civilians wore shot, churches and hOUlles 8ackoo, alld IJCOllCS
of horror enacted sudl as had not been seen since the Christian drove
out the ilIoor in 12.'36.' Calltllill Basto, the best narrator amollg French
eye-witnesses, speaks of IISSlIssinatioll, genernl pillage, llud systematic rape.
Cabany, Dupont's laudatory biographer, confesses (p. W) to drunkcnness
and deplorable excesses, and allows that Dupont distribnted 300,000 francs as
a t gratification' among his gene",,1 officers. M:my of the details givell
3hol'Il are derived from the oAid:,1 IHlrmtive of the Cordovan municillal
authorities printed ill the Mlldrid GllzeUe.
t 1;'oy, Hi. 233. CaballY (p. 00), OD the ot11er hand, says that he was sawn
in two ootwecn planks. Gillc, in his JlHmf)il'(;lI d'Ull GOllsent de 1006 (p. 85),
gil'es other t1istressillg details.
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position. He had been sufficiently surprised by t.he opposition,
offered ut AlcoIea, und the rumours of thc concentrution of the urmy
of Castanos, to make him unwilling to advance ;beyond Cordova.
He wrote to Mumt asking for l'cinforcclllcnts, and cspcciully for
troops to keep open his lines of communication. There were,
he said, at least 25,000 regulur troops Illul'chillg uguinst him: the
English might disembark reinforcements at Cadiz: the whole
province was in a flame: it was impossible to carr)' out the Grand-
Duke of Derg's original orders to pnsh straight 011 to Seville.
But matters were c\'cn worse than he thought: in a few days he
realized, from the non-arrival of couriers from Mndrid, that he
was cut off: moreover, his foraging parties, even when they wel'e
only a few miles outside Cordova, began to he molestc<I und somc-
times destroyed.
After waiting llillC days, Dupont very wisely resohcd to fnll
back, and to endeRxonr to reopen communications with his base.
On Junc 16 he evucllutt..d Conlova, much to the ref,rrct of his
soldiers, who resented the order to ubandon snch comfortable
quarters. On the nineteenth, drRgbring with him an enormous
convoy of plunder, he reached Andujal', the gl'eat junction of roads
where the routes from the passes of the MOl'ena come dO',',"1} to
the valley of the Guaclalquivir. It would have been £.'U' wiser to
go still further back, and to occupy the debauches of the defiles,
instead of lingering in the plain of Andalusia. Hc should have
retired to BaylcD, the town at the foot of the mountains, or to
La. Carolina, the fortress in the upland which commands the
southern exit of the Dcspef'ia Perms. But be was vainly dreaming
of resuming the attempt to conquer the whole south of Spain
when reinforcements should arrive, and Andujar tempted him,
since it was the hest point from which he could t1u"Caten at once
COlUOVa, Jaell, and Granada, the three chief towns of Eastem
Andulusia. Here, thcrcfOl"C, he abodc from June 19 to July 18,
a wasted month during which the whole situation of affilirs in
Spain was changed:.
Here we must leave Dupont, while we treat of the doings of
the othcr French gcnerals during the month of June. While the
invasion of Andalusia was running its course, both Moncey and
Bessieres had been seriously engaged.
The first named of the two marshals was placed in charge of
one-half of the offensive part of Napoleon's plan for the subju-
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gation of Spain, while Bessieres was mainly responsible for the
defensive part, i. c. for the maintaining ,of the communicntions
between :Madrid and ))..').)'onne. It is with Moncey's expedition
against Yu.lcllcill, therefore, that we must first deal. Although
he started a few days latcr than Dupont, that marshal was (like
his colleague) still dominated by the idea that possessed both
Napoleon Ilnd Murat-that the insurrections were purely local,
and that their suppression WM 1\ mere tlICU8ure of police. This
notion accounts for his choice of route: there are two roads from
Madrid to Valencia, a long and fairly easy one which passes
through the gnp between the mOllntains of Mureia and those of
Cuencll, by MU ClemcnLe, Chinchilla, and the plain of Ahnanza,
and a shorter one, full of dangerous defiles and gorges, which cuts
through the heart of the hills by Tarancon, Valverde, and Requena.
The former crosses the watershed between the valley of the Tagus
and those of the rivers flowing into the Mediterranean Sea at
the easiest POhlt, the latter at one of the most difficult ones. Hut
Monecy, thinking only of the need. to deal promptly with the
Valencian illSnrgents, chose the shorter and more difficult route.
I-le left Madrid on June 4: a week later he WWl near Cuenca,
in the midst of the mountains. Not a shot had yet been fired
at him, but as he pressed eastward he found the villages more
and more deserted, till at last he had reached a region that sccmed
to have become suddenly depopulated. He turned a little out
of his way on the eleventh to occupy the city of Cuenoo 1, the
capital of this wild and rugged country, but resumed his advance
on thc eightccnth, after receiving from Mach'id peremptory orders
to press forward 2, There lay before him two tremendous defiles,
which must be passed if he was to rellCh Valencia. The first was
the deep-sunk gorge of the river Cabricl, where the highway
plunges do\\'ll a c1ift~ crosses a ravine, and climbs ncr1't\in up a steep
opposing bank. 'l'he sccoud, thirty miles further on, was the
Pass of the Cabrillas, the point where the road, on reaching the
I Cuencalies twenty-five miles off the main Madrid-Valencia road, well to
the llurH, of it.
1 i\Ioncey's delay of 11 week lit CueuC3 provoked Savary (now acting for the
i'lI'alided ]\Jurat) to such an extent, that he sent forward the cal'alry-general
Excclmallll, nominally to ta.ke cltarge of i\loncey's \'<lnguard, really to !lpur
the cautiuus marshal ou to Ilulion. But Excclmau!l wus capturcU UIL ti,e way
by peasants, and seut a prisoner to Valencia.
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edge of the central plateau of Spain, suddenly sinks dowll into
the low-lying fertile plain of Valencia.
If the Conde de C.ervcllon, the b"Cllcral' whom the Vulencian
Junta had put in charge of its army, had concentrated on these
defiles the 7,000 or 8,000 regular troops who were to be found
in the province and in the neighoouring district of :Murein, it
is probable that l\Ioncey would never have forced his way through
thc mountains; for each of the positions, if held in sufficient
force, is practically impregnable. But the Spaniards had formed
a dl'eply rooted notion that the imader would come by the easy
road ovcr the plains, by San Clcmente and Almanza, and not
through the mountains of Cuenea. 'l'he whole of the troops of
Mw'cia aud the greater part of those of Valencia had been directed
on Almanl'.a, where there was a good position for opposing an
w:my descending from Castile. Only u small detachment had been
6ent to watch the northern rond, and its commander, Don J}edro
Adorno, had statiOlll'd at thc bridge of the Cabricl no more than
one battalion of Swiss mcrcenaries (No. 1 of Traxler's regiment)
and 500 armed peasants with foul' guns. The position was too
extensive to be held by 1,500 men: Monccy faillld that the river
was fordable in several places, and detached a small column to
cross at each, while two battulions dashed at the bridge.. In spite
of the steepness of the ravine the French got over at more than
onc point, Rnd climbed the opposite slope, whereupon the peasants
fled, and half the Swiss battalion was surrounded and captured
while it was trying to COVCI' the retreat of the guns 1. Adomo,
who was lying some miles to the rear, at UequefuJ., when he should
have bt..-en present in full fort,'C at the bric4.~, ought now to have
fallen back to cover Valencia, but in a moment of panic he fled
across country to join the army at Almanza [Jillle ~l].
'111is disgrUl'Cful flight left the Valcncian Junta almost destitote
of troops for the defence of the still stronger defile of the Cabrillas,
which ~:lonl'C)' had yet to force before he could desccnd into the
plain. The Junta hurried up to it two regiments of recruits-one
of which is ~id to have been fmt prnetisl>d in the mallual exercise
the day before it went into action~. These, with 300 old soldiers,
the wrecks of the l'Omlmt ut the Cabriel, and three guns, lril't!
l i\Jollcey induced a good many of these Il1crcell:l.I-ies to take service witll
him; but t1ley deserted him when tho time of trouble bcgnu.
1 Arteche, Guerrll de la Independencia, ii. 100.
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to hold the pass. Moncey turned both fla.nks of this very in-
adequate defending force, and then broke through its centre.
Many of the Spaniards dispersed, 500 were slain or captured, and
the rest fled dO....Tl the pass to Valencia. After riding round the
position, Moncey remarked that it was so strong that with 6,000
steady troops he would undertake to hold it against Napoleon
himself And the. Grand Army [June 24].
Two days later, after a rapid march down the dc.file and lLCl'OSS
the fertile Valencil\.ll plain, l\Ioncey presented himself before the
gates of its capital, and demanded its surrender. But he found
that there was still much fighting to be done: a small column
of l'e/:,'1I1ars had arrived ill the city. though the main army from
Almama was still far distant. With three battalions of old troops
and 7,000 Vulcncinn levies, DOll Jose Cam, n naval offiecr und
brother of the celebrated Marquis of La Homann, had taken up
a position fOUf miles outside the city at San Onofre. He had
covered hill front with some irrigation canals, and barricaded the
road. Moncey had to spend tJle twenty·seventh in beating back
this force into Valencia, not without some sharp fighting.
On the next day he made a gellCrul assault upon the city.
Valencia was not a modern fortress: it had merely n. wet ditch and
an enceinte of mediaeval walls. There WCfe several points where it
seemed possible to eSClLlade the defences, and the marshal resolved
to storlll the place. But he had forgotten tJmt he had to rt.'Ckon
wjth the auxiliary fortifications which the popula.ce hud oonstnlcted
during the last three days. They had built up the gates witJl
beams and earth, b..'\ITicaded the streets, mounted cannon on the
walls where it was po!lSible, and established several batteries of
heavy guns to sweep the main approaches from the open country.
. The city bei.ng situated in a pcrfccUy level plain, and in ground
much cut up by irrigation canals, it had been found possible to
il1umlatc much of tile low ground. As the dvel' GlIooalaviar washed
the whole northern side of thc walls, MOllcey's practicable points
of attack were rcstrided to l:ertaill short SPlt~S on their southern
front.
The marshal first sent a Spanish renegade, a Colonel Solano, to
summon the place. But the Valcnciuns were exasperated rather
than cowed by their late defeats; their Icnders-especially l~adre
Hico, a fighting priest of t1udoubtL>d L'Our8hte and capacity-hud
worked them up to a high pitch of enthusiasm, and they must
•
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have remembered that, if they submitted, they would have to
render an aecount for Cah'o's abominable massacre of the French
residents. Accordingly the Junta returned the stirring answer
that 'the people of Valencia preferred to die defending itself rather
than to open auy sort of negotiations.' A mixed multitude
of 920,000 men, of whom some 8,000 were troops of onc sort
and another \ manned the walls and banicades and waited for the
assault.
After riding round the exposed front of the city, Moncey re-
sohl.'(/. to attack only the south-eastern section. He formed two
columns, each of a brigade, of which onc assailed the gate of
San Jose near the river, while another marched on the gate of
Quartc, furthet· to thc south. Considcring the wCilk l'csistnncc
that he had met at the Cabriel and at the Pass of the Cabrillas,
he had formed a sanguine e.xpcctation that the Va.lencians would
not make a. firm stand, even behind wall;; and barricades. In this
he was wofu1ly deceived: the French had yet to learn that the
encmy, though helpless in the open, was Cllpablc of tile most
obstinate resistance when once he had put himself under coyer
of bricks and earth. The fu'St assault was beaten ofI' wiU. hcavy
los.", though Moncey's conscripts showed great dll.8h, reached the
foot of the defences, and tried to tear down the palisades with their
hands. The marshal should have seen at once that he had too
large a business in hand for the 8,000 men of whom he could
dispose. Dut he persevcred, bringing forward his field artillery
to batter the gates and earthworks before a sel.'ond assault should
be made. It WWI to no purpose, as thc)' wcre soon silenced by the
gUllS of position which thc besieged had prepared for this "ery
purpuse, Lp.lc ill the af'l:cmoon MOlll.'CY risked u sccond gencral
attack, embracing the gate of s.'l.nta Lllcia as well as the other
points which he had before assailed.. But the slonncrs were beaten
ofI' with even hea.yiel' loss than on the first Assault, and bodies
of the defcndel'S, slipping out by posterns and sidc-gates, harassed
the rcheating colunUls by t~ tel'l'iblc flanking lire.
Clearly the game was IIp: Monccy had lost at least 1,~00 men,
l.l. sixth of his available illftUltry fOIX:e 2. He was much to bltulle
1 But only 1,500 were regulars j the rest were uewly ineorporated levies.
~ For, generaUy a very fair calculator of French casualties, gives the
marshal's losses at 2,000 men in all, wllich seems rather a high figure.
Nllllier (L {).5) says that he bad 800 wOUlllk...t to clmy, which SU1Il10S('.S 11, totul
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for pressing the ntl:ack when his first movement failed, for as
Napoleon (wi!le after the event) said in his commentary on the
marshal's operations: 'On ne prend pas par le collet une "ille de
quatre-vingt millc times.' If the ftrst charge did not carry the
walls, and the garrison stood firm, the French could only bret in
by the use of siege artillery, of which they did not possess a single
pIece.
l\fCIlCCy'S position was now vcry dangerous: he knew that the
country WtlS up in arms behind him, and that his communimtions
with Madrid were completely cut. Hc was 1\180 aware that
Cervellon's army from Almaui".a must be marching towards him,
unless it had taken the altcmativc course of pressing in on his rear,
to occupy the difiicult passes by which he had come down into the
Valcnciull coust-plain. His conscripls were dreadfully diseourngt.'<1
by their unexpected revel'SC!: he was hampered by a great convoy
of wounded men, whose transport would cause serious delays.
Nothing had been heard of the diversion which General Chabran,
with troops detached from DulwslIlc's ann)' ill Catalonia, had
been ordered to execute towards the northem side of Valencia. As
0. matter of fuct that general hud not even crossed the Ebro.
Retreat was nece<JSllry: of' the three possible lines 011 which it
could be exccuk.'<1, that along the (:oast road, in the direction where
Chabran was to be expcclcd, was thought of for a moment, hut
soon abandoned: it was too long, and the real base of' the
marshal's corps was evidently :Madrid, and not Barcelona. The
route by Tarancon and the Cabrillas, by which the army had
reached Valencia, was terribly difficult: clearly it would be nece!>·
sary to fort'C a!,JUin the defilC8 which had lx.'Cn cleared on the Wlty
down to the coast. And it was possible that 9,000 or 10,000
regular troops might now be occupying them.
Accordingly, Monccy resolved to retire by the third road, tha.t
through the plains by Allllilnza and San Clemente. If, as was
possible, O:rvellon's whole army was llOW blocking it, they must
be fought and driven off': a battle in the plain would be less
dangerous than a battle at the Cabrillas or the bridge of the
Cabl"icl. Dcfol"e daylight on June 29, thel"Cforc, the nlill"Shal moved
off on thi~ roat!.
loss of 1,100 or 1,200" 111ien;' estimate of 300 is as olwioHs.ly alJsurd as most
of the other figures gil"C11 U)' Umt llistorian. No such loss \\"ould hal'C stopped
a french army-even an anny of conscripts.
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Luck now camc to his aid: the inCilpablc Spanish commander
had made up his mind that the French would retreat by the way
that they had come, and had sent forward General Llamas with nil
the troops of Murcia to seize the defile of the Cabrillas. He
himsclf followoo. with the rest of the regulars, but haltt.'il ut
Alcira, behind the Xucar. Thus while Moneey was marching to
the south, the main bod)" of his enemies WM moving northward.
Cervellon refused to fight in the absence of llamas, so nothing
was left in the marshal's way Ilave hands of peasants who occupied
the fords of the Xucur and the road betwL'ClI Jativa and Almunza:
these he easiJy bl"llshed away in a couple of skirmishes. Nor did
a small column detached in pursuit from Valencia dare to meddle
seriously with his rearguard. So without even exchanging a shot
with the Spanish field-army, which Cel"Yellon had so unwisely
scattered and sent oH' on a false track, Monccy was able to nmkc
his way by Jativa, Almallza, and Chinchilla back towards La
Mandltl [July 2-6].
At Sail Clemente he met with reinforcements under Gencrul
Frcre, consisting of the third division of Dupont's original corps,
some 5,000 strong. This division had been sent to search for him
by Savary, who had been filled with fears for his safety when he
found that the communications were cut, and that Cuenca anu all
the hill-country had risen behind the expeditionary force. After
vainly searching for Moncey on the northern road, in the direction
of Uequentt, l"rcre at last got news that he had takcn the sOllthem
line of retreat, and successfully joined him on July 8. At San
Clemcnte the marshal intended to halt and to wait for Cerve1lon's
tl.l'l'ival, in the hope of beating him in th~ open. But a. few days
Inter he received news from Madrid, to the effect that Savary
wished to draw back the French forces nearer to the capital, and
. that Frcrc, at least, must move in to Ocm1a or Toledo. Much dis-
pleased at finding a junior officer acting as the lieutenant of the
Emperor-for Savary was but a lieutenant*gclleral, while he himself
was a marshal-Moncey threw up the whole scheme of waiting to
fight the Vulencian army. Rnd marclK'd back to the immediate
neighbourhood of Madrid [July 15].
There can be no doubt that the marshal had extraordinary luck
in this short campaign. If he had been opposed by a gcncmllcss
timid and incapable than the Conde de Cervellon, he might have
fowld arrayed against him, at the blidgc of the Cabricl, or at the
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Cabrillas. a considerable body of r'ebJ'Ular8-Cight or nine tholl88nd
men-with 1\ numerous arliUery, inst.end of the insignificnnt forces
which he actually defeated. Again, while he was lrying to st.onn
Valencia, Ccn'cl1on might haxe attacked him in the rear with great
chance of su<x:ess; OT the Sp.'\nilml might ba\"c kept his forteS
united, and opposed Mallcey as he ret:rco.ted Crom before Valencia.
Instead of doing so he split. up his arm)' into detachme:nts, and the
greater part. of it was sent oft' flU' from the central point of his
operations, and did not fire 1\ shot. Truly such a general WIL..'l, as
Thucydidcs remarks concerning the Spartans of old, 'very COIl-
venient for his adversaries.' A less collsiderate enemy would have
had a fair chance of bringing Mancey's campaign to the same
disastrous cnd that IRfell tJml oC Dupout.
SECTION Ill: CHAPTER Il
OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH: THE SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA
HAVL'\'G watched the failure of the expeditions by which Napoleon
hud hoped to complete the <..'onqucst of Southcnl Spain, wc must
turn our eyes northward, to Madrid and the long line of com-
munications which joined the capital to the French base of
operations at Vittoria, l'ampehlllR, and San Sebastian. At the
moment when the Valcncian and Andalusian expeditions were sent
out from Madrid and Toledo) Murat had still under his hand a
large body of troops, the second and third division of l\fonceY'i1
corps, the second and third of DUPOllt'S, and the 5,000 horse and
foot of the Imperial Guard-in all more than 30,000 men.
Bcssieres, jf the garrison of the northern forh'CSSCS and some newly
arrived reinforcements are added to his original fOl-ce, had more
than 25,000. ·With these the grand-duke and the marshal had
to contain the insurrection in Northern Spain, and to beat back
the advam.-c of the army of Galicia.
The furthest points to the north nnd east to which the wase of
insurrection hOO washed lip wcre Logl.'0I10 and Tudcla ill the Ebl'O
valley, SantRnder on the coast of the B..'l.Y of Biscay, and Palencia
and Valltulolid in Old Custile. All these places lay in Bessicres'
sphere of actioll, and he promptly took measures to suppress the
rising at each point. On June ~ a column sent out from Vittoria
reoccupied Logrofio, slaying some hundreds of half-armed peasants,
and executing some of their leaders who had been taken prisoners.
all the same day a stronger force, six battalions and two squadrons
unclel· General Merle, marched from Bnrgos on SUlltander. Driving
before him the insurgents of the Upper Ebro valley, Merle advanced
as far as Reynosa, and was about to force the defiles of the Canta~
b.·inn MOllntains and to descend on to Santander, when he received
orders to return and to take part in suppressing the more dangerous
rising in the plains of Old Castile. News had arrived that the
captain-general, Cuesta, was collecting a force at Valladolid, which
thrcatcned to cut the road between llurgos and Madrid. To deal
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with him Bessicres told off Merle, and another small column of
fOllr b.'lttalions and two regiments of CIUU8C'/I,TS under his brilliant
cavalry-brigadier, Lasalle, one of the best of Napoleon's younger
f,'CIlCluls. After sacking TOloquemadt\ (where somc pensllnts
attempted an ineffectual resistnnce) and ransoming the rich
cathedral town of Plllencin, Lnsalle got ill touch with the forces
of Cuesta at the bridge of Cabc7,on, where the main road from
Dw-gos to Vlllladolid crosses the river Pilmcrguo On the eleventh
of June Merle joined him: on the twelfth their united forces, 9,000
strong, fell upon the levies of the Captnin-gcncral.
Throughout the two years during which he held high command
in the field, Grcgorio de la Cucsta consistently displayed an
arrogance and an incapacity far exceeding that of any other
Spanish general. Considering the state of his embryo' arm}' of
Castile,' it was insane for him to think of offering battle. He
hOO but four cannon; his only veteran troops were SOO cavalry,
mainly c."Onsisting of the squadrons which had accompanied Fer*
dinnnd VII as escOlt on his unhappy journey to Bayonne. His
infantry was composed of 4,000 or 5,000 volunteers of the Valla-
dolid district, who had not been more thfm a fortnight under arms,
and had seen little drill and still less musketry practice. It was
absolutely wicked to take them into action. Uut tlle men, in their
ignorance, clamoured for a battle, and Cuesta did not refuse it
to them. His dispositions were simply astounding; instead of
barricading or destroying tlle bridge Imd occupying the further
bank, he led his unhappy horde across the river and drew them up
in a single line, with the brid&"C at their backs.
On June Hl L'lSalle came nlshing down upon the' anny of
Castile,' and dashed it into atoms at the first shock. The Spanish
ClLvalry fled (as they genel1l.lly did t1u"Oughout the war), the
infantry broke, the bridh"e and the guns were captured. Some
lmndreds of the unfortunate recmits were sabred, others were
drowned in the river. Cuesta fled westwards with the survivors to
Medina de Ilio Seeo, abandoning to its fate Valladolid, which
Lusullc occupied without opposition on the same evening. The
combat by which this important city was won had cost the French
only twelve killed and thhty wounded.
This stroke had completely clean.xl Bessicrcs' right flank: there
could be no more danger from the north-west till the army of
Gnlicia should think proper to descend from its mountains to
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contest with the French the dominion of the plains of Leon and
Old Castile. The marshal could now turn his attention to other
fronts of his extensive sphere of command. After the fight of
Cabezon Merle's division was sent northward, to conq\ICr the rugged
coast-land of the provinee of Santander. There were frightful
defiles between Reynosa and the shore of the Day of Biscay: the
peasants had blocked the road and COycred the hiU'iides with
Klwgahs. But the defciI{.'C was feeble-M might be CXpl..'CteU from
the fact that the district could only put into the field onc battalion
of militia I and a crowd of recent levies. who had been about three
weeks under arms. On June 23 Merle finished cleat·jug the defiles
and entered Santander, whose bishop and Junta fled, with the
wreck of their armed force, into the Asturias.
Meanwhile the troops under llessieres had been equally active,
but with very different results, OIl the Middle Ebro and in the direc-
tion of Al.'flgon. It was known at DUl.'gos and at BaYOIlIlC that
Saragossa had risen like the rest of the Spanish cities. But it was
also known that there was lll.l.rdlY a man of regular troops in the
whole kingdom of Aragon; here,l\.'\ in Old Castile or in Santandel",
the invaders would have to deal only with raw le,'ies, who would
probably disperse after their first defeat. SarngosSlL itself, thc
central focus of the rising, was 110 modern fortress, but a town of
60,000 souls, sW·IXlunded by a mediaeval wall more fitted to assist
in the levy of octroi duties, than in a defence nguinst a regular
army. Accordingly the column under Lefebvre Desnouettes, which
was dinx:ted to start from Pampclunll. against the AI'B.gonesc
insurgents, was one of very moderate size-S,500 infantry, 1,000
horse, and ll. singlc battery of field artillery 2. Dut it was to be
joined a few days later by another brigade 3 and battery, which
would bring its total (ol.'(:e up to lSomcthing more than 6,000 men.
The resources of the kingdom of Aragon were large, but the
patriots were, when the war broke out, in a condition most unfavour-
able for strenUOllS action. The province was one of those which had
been denuded of its llsual garrison: there only remained part of
I 'J'roviucial of Laredo: ,sil bayonets.
11 'nley were a battalion e.-Wll of tlle 1,')th, 47111, II.l1d 70th of tlle Hlle, 11.11 oM
troops, and the 2nd <SUlll'lemelltary Regiment of the legions of lteserve,' two
battalions strong, with a regiment of Polish laocel'l! and the 6th eacadrr.m de
fflllrche.
I 'Ille 1st regimeot of the Vistula (two hatts.) aud the 6th ootaillon de
'I1Iarcht.
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a canLlry regiment, the' King's Dragoons,' whose squuJrons had
been so depleted that it had only SOO men and ninety horses, with
Il. weak battalion of Volunteers ofAragon-some 450 men-and 200
gunners and sappers. [n addition there had straggled into Saragossa
about 500 men tl'Om various Spanish corps at l\Itulrid, Burgos, and
elsewhere, who had deserted their colours when the news of the
ill'surl'cction reached them. This was a small cadre on which to
create a whole army, but the feat was accomplished by the energetic
young man who put himself at the head of the rising in the middle
valley of the Ebro. .Joseph Palafox, the second SOil of a noble
family of Aragoll, had been onc of the suite which accompanied
l"crdinand vn to llayonne, find was an indignant spectator of the
abomiuable tl'eachel'Y which there took plaL-e. "\\r"Jlen the b'agedy
Wail oyer he was fortunate enough to esCApe to Spain: he retired to
his native district, took a promillent part in musing the Aragonese,
and wa.~ cho~en by them as Captain-general when the weak or in-
capable Guillelmi was deposed. He was only twenty-eight yea.t'S of
age. and had no military experience, for he had only served in the
peaeeful rnllks of the king's bodyguard '. He had been a courtier
rather than a soldier, yet at the eritical moment of his life it can-
I IJalafox bas been so often abused tbat I take the opportunity of quoting
the llescrilltion of him given hy SirCharle!l Vaugllan, one of the three or four
Englishmen who saw him at SarB.gOBsa in the day of bis power, and the only
oue who llas left his impressions on record. He lived with Palafox for some
five wcekll in Ocwber-No\"emher, 1808. 'TIlis distinguis11ed nol.leman is
about thirty-four rears of age [an overstatement by six years] j his person is
of middling stature, his eyes lirely and exprossil·e, and bis whole deportment
that of a perfectl)" well-bred lIlau. III private life, so far as ill)" daily intcr4
course gave me an opportunity of judging, Ms mauners were kind, unaffected,
Ilnd ingrati"ling. "From t11e gre.'l.t r01uliness Witll Wllich lIe dispatcl1Cd
business, and from the letters and public papel'll which were written by him
\\ith apparent great ease in my presence, I was led to form a very favourable
opinion of llis talentl!. There w.as a quickness in his manner of sei·l.ing
objeetl!, lIIJ impatience until they were accomplished. He was fond of talking
of the cI·ents of the siege, and auxious to introduce to us men of every class
wllO 11;\11 distingllisJu.Jd themselvcs. 111ere w:lS a vivacity in 11is 111111111er aud
eonver:a.ation, all activity in his exertions as an officer, that is rarely met in Il
Spaniard. It was always 3 most cheering and interesting" tbing to ride with
him tllrough the streets of Saragossa. TIle joy and exultatioll of the peopln
ag he piL..'lSCd evidently Sllrllllg from the 11011rt. To hnl'e acqnitted hilllSl!lf to
their satisfaction was IiO mean reward, and forms a sufficient answer to all the
unworthy attempts (W11ich I h::we been diEgusted to witness) to depreci.'l.te his
clw.racter' (V/u,t/'um Pr/per" froUl nil UllllUulishcd journal of 1B(8).
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not be denied that he displayed a COUl1l,ge and energy which justified
the high opinions which the Aragonese entert.'tinoo of him, He
kept Saragossa dean from tIle plugue of political assassination,
which was so rife in every other corner of Spain. He wisely got
his appointmcnt as Captain-gencral confirmed by the Cortes of
Aragon, which he summoned to meet in its ancient form. He
found out the most capable leaders of the populw.:e, and always
asked their advice before takillg any important step. Hut his
main virtue was his untiring activity: considering the procra~
stinntion and want of organizing power displayed by most
of the Spanish generals, his talent for rapid work seems remark",
able. He was only placed in power 011 May fl6, and by June 8
he was already en~fJ'Cd with the French. In this short time
he had rnisl..>d and organized seven regiments of new levies--
7,400 men in all. They were stiffened with the deserters from
Madrid, and commanded by such retin.'<1 and half-pay officCN M
could be got together. There were some scores of cannon in the
arsenal of Sarat,rossa, but hardly any gunners, and a very small
store of ammunitiOIJ. Palat'ox started a powder factory and a
manufactory of small arms, turned the workmen of the Canal of
.Aragon into a corps of SlIppers, and made a general levy of horses
to remount his single regiment of drogoons, and to provide hi!i
artillery with draugbt animals. TillS was but the commencement
of Plllafox's activity: ere Saragossa was saved he had raised the
whole kingt1om, tmd got more than 30,000 men under anns 1.
Already by the eighth of June he had hurried out a small force
to meet Lefebvre Desllouettes at Tude1a, the frontier town OI~
the Ebl'O, which in the Middle Ages had been known as 'the key
of Aragoll.' This force, which consisted of 2,000 of his new levies,
was pltll..W wldel' the command of his own elder brother the
Marquis of L.lZlLlJ, who had escaped from Madrid under the pretext
that he would bring pressure to bear upon the Captain-gencrnl and
induce him to submit to l\furat. The marquis, though joined by
I Nnpic~ is always hanJ. Oll Sl)lIuislJ offiecriJ Rnu administrators, but I think
that of the whole class Palafox receives the DlOSt undesen't!d contumely from.
his pen. He 1101t1ll him to have lH:!eu a mere l)~Pl'Ct, whose st~illb"$ WC~6
pulled by obscu~e Saragossan demagogues like the celeb~atedTio Jo~ge. He
even doubts bis personal cou~age. Doth Spanisll and French llistorians
unite ill t.1lking the Captaill-gcnernl quite seriously, anu 1 lhillk thcy "re
right. His best testimonial is the harsh aud vindicth'c treatmeut that he
rBCeivcd at Napoleon's hands.
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3,000 or 4,000 peasants and citi:--.ens of Tudela, was easily routed
by the French column, and forced back to Mo.llen sixteen miles
11ettrer to Sanlf,"OSSa. Lefebvrc followed him, after baving exe<:uted
u ccrtuin number of the notables of '£udcla and sacked the toWIl.
Reinforced by more of his brothel"s new levies, L'\zan offered battle
again at Mallen, in a bad position, where his men hud little protec-
tion against the enemy's artillery and the charges of his Polish
lall(:ers. He was naturally routed with SCVCl"C losses. But even
then the Aragonese were not broken in spirit: ralafox himself
marched out with tile l'Cmuinder of hi!> IICW levies, some of whom
had not been -five days under arms. At Alagon, only seventeen
miles fwm the gales of SarRf,"OSAA, he drew up 6,000 infantry (of
whom 500 were regulars) 150 dr~<1()()ns and fOllr gUllS, trying to
cover himsclf by tile line of the Cunul of Arugon and some olive
groves. It is hardly lla'Cssary to say that his artillery was over-
powcred by the fourtecn pk'CCtl of the Frcnch, and that his infantry
gave back when furiously assailed by the Poles. Palafox cllarged
at the head of his two squadrons of drngoons, but was wounded in
the arm and had his horse killed under him. His routed followers
ctm·icd him bnek into the city, where the majority took refuge,
while the more faint-henrted fled beyond it to AIcaniz and other
points in Upper ~<70n.
Elated by three ensy victories, Lefebvre thought that there was
nothing more to do but to enter Saragossa in triumph. He was
much da'Cived: the citiYA,:ns were standing at bl.ly behind their
flimsy defences, having recovered in a single night from the dismay
caused by the arrival of the broken bands who had fought at
AJ!la<70Il. The military conditions were not unlike those which
Moncey had to ftu:e in another region, a fortnight Itltcr: SuragoSStl
like Valencia. lies in an extensive plain, with its northern side
wasllt'<} by the waters of the Ebro, I.lnd ib; casteru by those of the
shallow and fordable Huerha: but it.s southem and western fronts
are expo:«l to attack from the open. It. was ljul'J'Uundcd by !l brick
wall of ten to twelve feet high, intel'l'Upt.ed in scveral places by
convents and barrueks whose blank ba.ek-ftK'CS continued the line
of the cnuinte I. Inside the wall WCI'C the crowded lanes in which
dwelt the 60,000 citi1,cns, 0. tangle of lltllTOW streets 8ave tbe olle
broad Coso which intersects the plo.ce from east to west. The
I '11C ehief of these Imilllings inserted in the wall were the eonVCllU> of
Santa Engracia and the Miserkordia, and tlte cavalry barracks.
Oll:lA~. J L
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houses were mostly solid and lofty structures of brick and stone,
with the heavy bn.rred 'windows and doors usual in Spain. The
strength, such as it was, of Saragossa consisted not in its outer
shell, but in the closely packed houses, convents, and churches, each
of which might serve at need as a small fortress. Many of them
were solid enough to resist any form of at?u=k Sll\'e that of being
battered by artillery. ViThen barricades had been thrown across
the lanes from side to sidCt each square of buildings would need to
be assaulted and captured piecemeal. But nOlle of the French
officers who arriVl..'<i in fmut of Saragossa Oil June 15, 1808, Imd
allY conception that the problem aoout to be presented to them
was that of street~fightingcarried on from house to house. There
had been many sieges since the war of the French ll.evolutioll
beo<ran, hut none carried on in this manner. In Italy or Germany
no onc had c\'cr hcard of a city which tried, for want of bustiolls
and curtains, to defend itself by barricades: such places always
Sll:~·etl themselw...g by un obvious and blamcless surrcndCI"
Dut if lL sie",ae wus coming, there was one position just outqide
the town which was clearly destined to play a chief part in it.
Just across the Hneroo lay a broad f1at.. topped hill, the Monte
Torrero, which rose to the height of 180 feet, and overlooked all
the south side of the place. It was such a splendid vantage-ground
for siege-batteries, that the defenders were bound to hold it, lest it
should fall into the power of the French. It should have beell
crowned by EL strong detached fort, or even by an entrenched
camp. But Pulafox in the short time at his disposal had only
been able to throw lip a couple of open b....tteries upon it.., and
to loophole the extensive magazines and workshops of the Canal
of Aragon, which were scattered over the summit of the hill,
while the canal itself flowed, as a sort of outer defence, around its
furthel· foot.
Saragossa had two other outlying defences: the one was the
AJjaffcria, an old square castle with four towers at its corners,
which had been the abode of Moorish emirs, llnd of Aragone>ie
kiub'S, but now served as the prison of thc Llquisition. It lay
a couple of hundred yards outside the western gate (Puerto del
Portillo) of the city. It was a solid brick structure, but quite
unsuited to resist a serious artillery attack. The second outwork
was the suburb of San Lazaro beyond the Ebro: it was connected
with Sarngossa by a new Ilnd handsome bridge, known as the
1800] LEFEBVRE BEFORE SARAGOSSA 147
'Puelltc de Piedra,' or •Stone Bl·idge.' Cunnon were mounted at
its southern end so as to sweep its whole length.
On June 15, Lefebvl'e-Desnouettes appeared before the city,
driving before him some Spanish outposts which he had met upon
the way. He resolved at once to carry the place by storm, a t:\$k
which, considering the weakness of its walls, did not seem impossible,
and all thc more so because the gates 1:Itood open, each defended
only by an earthwork containing two 01: three gnns. The }'rellch
general, neglecting the Monte Torrero and its commanding slope;,
attacked anI)' the western front between the gate of Portillo, near
the Ebro, and the gate of Santa Engracia, close to the banks of the
HucrlJo.. His French brigude assailed the northern and his Polish
regiment the southern half of this long line of walls and buildings.
His bm field-batteries were nm up into the fighting line, to batter
the earthworks and to reply to the Spanish guns. The only rCSCl.'ve
which he kept in hand consisted of his brigade of cavalry.
The resistance offered to Lefebvre was of the most irregular
sort; Palafox pimself was not prescnt, nnd his second-in-command,
Bustamulltc, seems to have done little in the way of issuing orders.
The 6,000 half-trained levies which had fOllght Rt Alagon had not
recovered their orb"tlnization, and were hopelessly mixed in the linc
of defence \\·ith 4,000 or 5,000 armed citi1.ens of all ages and
classes who had gone to the walls, each parish under the charge of
two or tlm~e local leaders, who paid little obedience to the com~
mands of the regular officers.
The Captain-General himf$C.]f had started out that moming at the
head of 150 dragoons, and 200 infantry, all regulars, by the road
beyond the Ebro. He had told his subordinates that he. \,\'ns
intending to raise in Upper Artl.c,"'On a force with which he would
fall OIl Lcfcbvrc's line of L'Olllmlllliclltions, and so compel him to
abandon his attack on the city. But there is no doubt that he
had l'C1lUy conceived grave doubts ns to the possibility of Saragossa
dcfending itself, and intended to avoid being captured within its
walls. He wi~hed to have the power of continuing the struggle
outside, in case the Freudl should pcnetrate into the cit.y. On t.h~
morning after the fight at Alagon, bruised and wounded, he WitS
in a pessimistic frame of mind, as his resolvc shows. But tllcre
is no oLocasioll to brand him, Ii1:I does Napier, with timidity: his
previous and his subsequent conduct preclude such a charge. It
was merely un error of judgement; t.he Captain-General should hln:e
1.2
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stayed behind to defend his capital., and have sent his brother
LaWIl, or some other olIiccr whom he could trust, to raise! the
country-side in the rear of the French 1, His retirement might
well have discouraged the Saragossans and led to deplorable results;
but ll8 a matter of fact, Lefebvre's attack began so soon after he
had ridden out over the bridge, that the Ilews of his departure had
not yet got abroad, and the populace were still under the impression
that he Wa.\l among them. It was not till the fighting was over
that he wns missed.
Lefebvre-Desnouettes before Saragossa was in exactly the same
position as l\!ouecy before Valencia, tUld acted ill the same Wlly.
pllFlhing forward a rather reckless attack on the city in full con-
flden<:e that the Spanianls would not stand before an assault
pressed home. He had, moreover, the advantages of being able
to attack a wider front, of having no ditches and inundations
to cramp his operations, and of dealing with wulls even wcaker
than those of Valencia, and defended by artillery of which very few
were pieces of heavy cl\librc.
The first attack was delivcred in the most dashing, not to say
foollllJ.l'dy, lStyle. At the gate of Santa Engracia Il. squadron of
Polish lanceMl, who led the van, charged into and O\'er the small
battery which covered the ingress into the city. Their wild rush
carried them right into the place, in spite of a dropping fire of
musketry directed upon them from every house that they passed.
Turning into a broad lalle to the left, thcse headstrong horsemen
rode forward, losing men at every step, till they were brought to
a stand in the Plaza del Portillo, where the majority were shot
down; a very few succeeded in escaping by the way along which
they had come. The Polish infantry, which should have followed
closely on the heels of the lancers, penetrated no further than the
earthwork at the gate, where it got closely engaged with the
Spaniards who held the neighbouring conveut of Santa Engracia.
Exposed in the open street to n. heavy fire from behind walls and
windows, tlte lcading battalion gave way, and rctilm into the
oli ....e gro....es and buildings outside the gate.
, 'I1Jat Palafox and those about him llespaired of tl,e defence is honestly
cOllfesscd ill tlLe i\lnrquis de w..an's Campuila cM l:era71Q de 181)l;l. He alld llia
brother' hu.d Dot believed that an open town defeuded by untrained peasants
could defend itself,' and tlll} nell"9 of r.efebvrc's first repulse astonished as.
much lI<I it plell<led them.
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Meanwhile the French brigade of Lcfcbvrc's division attacked
the gates of Portillo and the Cannen and the adjoining cavalry
barracks. At the Inst-named post they scaled the walls, which
were pntticulnr1y low and weak at this point, and got into the
city. But at the gates the batteries in the narrow ingress held
them back. After v. sharp skirmish, v. general rush of pellSil.:nts,
roldiers, and citizens, swept out the invaders from the cavalry
lmrracks, IUld. the front of defence wus restored. Lcfebvre would
have done well to pause before renewing his assault: but (like
Moneey at Valencia) he wus loth to believe llUll the enemy would
face a persistent attempt to break ill, He accordingly ordered
wth the columns to renew their attacks: for some time it !:Ieemoo
likely that he might succeed, for the French forced both the
CUfmcn and the Portillo gates and l'CoceupiL-d the cuyoJry barracks,
while the Poles burst in for a second time at Santa E:ngracia..
But it proved impossible to make any further ndvanee into the
dty, where every house was full of musketcc!rs and the narrow
hmes were blocked with artillery, which swept them from end tu
end. 'Vhcn it bccnme clear that the enemy were making )10
further progress, the Spaniards rallied behind the Bull-Ring on
tile Portillo front, and in the convent of Santa Engracia on the
~uthern front, !mu swept out the dceimak.J.. battalions of LcfcbvTC
by a determined ch81'ge t.
It is not surprising to find that the assailants had suflered very
hoovily in such a desperate attack on walls and barricnde.~ teeming
with dcfcnder~ worked up to a high pitdl of patriotic frenzy.
Lefeb'Te lost rOD men, and left behind him at the Portillo gate
several guns which had been brought up too close to the place,
and could not be dragged oft' under the dreadful musketry fire
from the walls, uud the flanking dischar!,I'L'l! frolll the neighbouring
castle of Aljafferia. The Spaniard~, fighting under cover except
at the moment of their final charges, had suflercd comparatively
little: their loss is estimated at IlOt much over 300 men. They
might well be proud of thcir success: they had certainly showed
a heroic spirit in fighting so obstinately after three crushing
dcfcats in the open field. That a practically unfOltificd tOWll
should defend itself b), street-fighting was a. new idea: and that
I The Spaniards 11&\'e called this first attack Oil Sa.r~ the action of the
Eras del Hey, the na.me of the meadows ontside tlle })ortillo and Carmen
gates, ill whicb the fo'hme11 columns massed themseh'cs for the attack.
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peasants and citizens (there were not 900 regulars in the plo.ce)
:lhould not only hold out behind walls, but execute desperate
charges en mM8e, would till that day have been regarded as im-
possible by any soldier of Napoleon. E"ery thinking man in the
French army must have looked with some dismay on the results
of the fight, not because of the loss suffered, for that was a mere
triBe, but because of' the prospect of the desperate national re-
sistance which had evidently to be faced.
McrulWhilc, Lcfcbvrt>Desnouettes retired for some thousands of
Yill-dS from the city, and pitched his camp facing its westCl1l front.
He SCllt pressing letters n.sking for rcinfon:cmcnts both to Mudrid
and to Bayonnc, and attempted no offensive action for ten days.
If he sent a formal summons of surrender to the Saragossans, it
was to Wil.Stc time and allow fresh troops to w'rh'c, rather than
with an)' hope that he could intimidate the citizens. He was
himself morc likely to be attacked during the next few days than
too make any forward mO\'cmcllt. But he wa.<; already beginning
to receive reinfon:ements: on June 21 there arrivLoJ two batta·
lions of the 2nd llegimcnt ot' the Vistula, mul more troops were
behind.
PaIafox, 011 the othe!' hmld, recei "00 much unc..xpeetcd encourage·
ment from the combat of the sixteenth. On receiving the news
of it at Iklchitc on the following llloming, he scut back his
bl-otber, the Marquis de Lar.an, gi"ing him the command of the
city, unu bidding him tell the SaragosStlns that he would endcuvour
to raise the siege in a w~ry few dill'S. There was already a con·
sidemblc body of imlllrgcnts in arms in South-we;tern AI'llorron, under
the Baron de Versage, who had raised at Calatayud two battalions
of new levies t, and gathered in somc fugitives from the Spanish
garrison of Madrid. Palafox ordered the baron to join him with
c\'ery man that he could bring, and their two detachments met at
Almunia on June 21, and from thence marched towards Saragossa
by the road which leads down the valley of the Xalon by Epila..
At the last-named plat.'C they were only fifteen miles fmlll Lcfebvrc-
Desnouettcs' camp, and were nh-cady threatening the French com-
munications with Llgroilo and Vittoria. But their army was
still very small-no lllore tlmll 650 fef,tUrnr infantry, 1,000 men
of Versage's new regiment.~, 350 cavalry, and a couple of thousand
1 He culled them the f Regiment of Fenlilland VII,' autl the' Secoud Regi-
ment of the kingdom of Aragoll.·
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le\'i~ of all kinds, among whom were noted a company of eighty
armed Capuchin friars and a body of mounted smugglers.
The French general hOO now to make up his mind whether he
would raise the siege and fall upon PaJafox with his whole army,
or whether he would dare to divide his scanty resources, and
maintain the attack on the city with one part, while he sent a
containing force against the Cupl:uin-Gcncml\ hands. He resolved
to take the latter course-a most ha:r.ardotls onc com;idcring the
fact that he had, cven with his In.st reinforcements, not much more
than 6,000 sound men in his camp. He dispatched the Polish
Colonel Chlopiski with the first regiment of the Vistula, one
.French battnl..ioll, a squadron of laneers and fOil I' guns to hold
back Palafox, while with the 3,000 men that remained he executed
several demonstrations against outlyillg parts of the defences of
Saragossa, in order to distract the attention of the citizens.
This very risky plan was carried out with complete success.
·While the Saragossans were warding off imugillary attacks, Chlupiski
made a forced march and fell upon llalafox at Epila on the night
of June ~3-24. The Aragonese army was completely surprised
and routed in 0. confused engagement fought in the dark. Several
hundred were cut up. and the town of Epila was sacked: Palafox
fell back in disorder towards Calatayud and the mountains, while
Chlopiski returned to the siege.
The Caproin-General, much disconcerted by"this diStl.ilter, resolved
that he would fight no morc battles in the open, but merely
reinforce the city with the best of his soldiers and resist behind
its walls. So sending back Versage and his levies to the hills,
he made an enormous detour with llis handful of' veteran troops
and a few hundred irregulars, and re-entered Saragossa by the
northern side, which still rcmaillOO open, He had great difficulty
ill holding his followers together, for many (und espE..'ciully his
untrustworthy CIlvall'Y) wished to retire on Valencia and to abandon
the .!Itrugglc in Aragon. But by uppealing to their patriotism-
'he would give every man who insisted on it a passport for
Valcncia, but those who loved him would follow him '-he finally
carl'ied off' the whole force, and took somewhat o\'er 1,000 men
buck to the besieged city [July 1].
During hi~ absence the condition of affairs in Sar~rrossa had
~n (''Ollsidernblyaltcred. On tile ouc IlIllld the defcnces had been
much improved: the gates had been strongly stockaded, and the
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walls had been thickened with earth and sandbags, and furnished
with Il continuom; banquettt:, which had hitherto been wantillg. On
the other hand the !''rench were beginning to receive reinforcements:
on the twenty-sixth Gencral Verdicr arrived with three battalions of
his divisiOll (the second of Bessieres' corps) I and two batll'ilkma de
1I1arc/le, in all some 3,000 or 3,500 men. From this time forward
sllIltll bodies of troops began to rcuch the besiegers at short illtcrvuls,
including two more Polish battalions 2, one battalion of French
l'Ch',.I1llrs, two Portuguese battalions (the last of the unfortunate
divisioll which was all its way across Spain towards the Baltic),
1,000 National Guards of the I-Iautes Pyrenees and Basses Pyrent.:es,
IlIlstily sent acl"Oss the frontier fwm Bayollne, and three squadrons
of cavalry 8. What was more important than the mere numbers
WNS that they brought with them siege-guns, in whicll Lcfehvrc
had hitherto been entirely deficient. These pieces ctune from the
citadel of Pampcluna, and were part of those rcSOUI'(:es of which
the E'rench had so treacherously taken po;;session in the prec.oeding
February.
Verdicr all his anival superseded r..efebvre-Desnouettes, who WilS
considerably his junior, and took charge of the siege. His first
act ww; to develop an attack 011 the Monte Torrero, the hill
in the suburbs, beyond the Huerba, which dominates, at a distance
of 1,800 yards, the southem front of the city. The Spanianlll
had neither ell(·ircled it with contullIous lines, nor crowned it with
any closed wOl·k. It was protected only by two small batteries
and some trenches covering the most obvious points of attack.
The garrison· was composed of no more than 500 men, half
peasants, half regulars of the Uegiment of Estremadurt4 of which
three weak battalions had arrived from Tarrega on the previous day
(June ~7)·. Vcrdier sellt three colullllls, each of one battaliOIl,
against the more accessible parts of the position, and drove out
the small defending force with casc. His task was made lighter
by a pie<.-e of casual luck: on the night before the assault the
main powdcr.magazine of the Saragossans, s~tuated in the Seminary,
1 They belonged to the 14th }'rmisional Reginwllt, and tIle acoornpanyillg
corps were UlC 4th and 7th !xlfoill<n14 de m(lTC~.
, 3rd Uegimcnt of the Vistula.
s 3rd, GUI, :lIld 9th fMOOdron$ de IIIllrche•
• The Uegirnent of &tremadura. was so weak at the outbreak of hostilities
that its three battalions had only 770 men. It Ilad been hastily brought up to
900 ooyollc15 before entering Ule city.
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was ignited by the ClLrele~snes.<; of a workman, and blew up; killing
mnny persons Ilnd wrecking the Seminary itself and mallY houses
in its vicinity. A few hours after this disaster had taken place, and
while the whole city was busy in c-'{tinguishing the conflagmtion,
the French attack was delivered; hence the original garrison got no
help from within the wal1l. But its own eOllducl wo:s deplombly
weak: the colonel in command I headed the rush to the rear,
a pk'Cc of cowardit..'c for which he was ill1prisom..--d and (after
the siege had been raised) was sent before a court-martial and
l>hot.
On the e\"euillg of the twenty-cighth Verdier began to construc:t
heavy breaching battel·iel> on the :dopes of the l\;[onte Torrel"O,
commanding all the southern side of the city. Others were thrown
up Oil the south-western frout, opposite the points which had beeu
ullsnccessthlly a.~ulted twelve days before. On the thirtieth of
June the works were annoo with thirty siehre-guns, four mortun;,
and twelve howitzers, which opened simultaneously on Saragossa at
midnight, and continued to play upon the placc for twenty-four
hours, setting many houses on fire, alld breaching the flimsy ram-
purls in half n dozen places. The old castle of the Alj!lficriu. wus
badly injured, and the gates of Portillo and the Carmen knocked
out of shupe: there werc lllso large gups in thc convent of tl,c
Augustinians, and in the l\.lisericordia, whose back wall formed part
of the ellceinte. All the unarmed population was forced to take
refuge in the cellars, or the more solidly built parts of the
churches, while the fighting-men wcre trying to construct barri-
cades behind the worst breaches, and to block up with sandbags,
beallls, and barrels all the lanes that opened upon them.
l)alafox entered Sarllf,"OSSR OD the morning of July 9l, just in
time to sce Verdier launch his whole available infantry force upon
the shatten-d IVt..-stern and southem fronts of the eity. The as8ault
was made under mueh more favourable conditions than that of
June 16, sim:e the strength of the storming columns was more
than doubled, and the defenCe<! had been terribly mishandled by
the bomoordment. On the other hand the gU.lTison was in no
degree shaken in spirit: the fire of the last twenty.four hours had
been much more dangerous to buildings than to men, and the
n.'Sults of the {host assault had given the defenders a confiden<..'C
which they had not felt on the previolls occasion. Hence it came
I Ilig name was Villcenw I"a}eo; he belonged to the artillery.
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to pass that of the six columns of nSStlult not one su{.'(.'«xk'l1 in
making 1\ permanent lodgement within the walls. Even the
isolated castle of Aljafferia and the convent of San Jose, just
outside the Porta Quemadn, were finally left in the hands of the
besieged, though the latter was for some hours held by the French.
The hardest. fighting was at the Portillo gul:c, where the assaulting
battalions more than once reached the dilapidated earthwork that
COVCrL--d the ingress to the lIorth-werl.ern part of the city. It was
here that there occurred the well~known incident of the' Maid of
Sarugos.sa.' The gunners at the small battery in the gate had
been shot down onc after another b)' the musketry of the assailants,
the final survivors falling even before they could discharge the last
gun that they hud loaded. The infantry supports were flinchillg
and the French were closing in, when a young woman named
Agostilll\ Zaragoza, whose lover (an artillery serJ:,tetlnt) had just
fallen, rushed forward, snatched the lighted match from his dying
hand, and fired the undischarged twcnty.four-pounder into the
head of the storming column 1. The enemy was shaken by a charge
of grape delivered. at ten paces, the citi7.ens, shamed by Agostina's
example, nJshed back to reoccupy the battery, and the assault
was beaten off. Palafox states that the incident occurred before
his own c)'cs: he gave the girl a commis~ioll as sub-lieutenant of
artillery, and a warrant for a life-pension: she was seen t\ yeSit'
later by several English witnesses, senillg with her battery in
Andalusia ll.
I Sir Charles Vaugllan was introduced to the lleroino by I'alafox while he
WII8 st....ying ill S.... rago.<;8l1 ill October. He describes her as '11 handsome
young woman of the lower class,' and says that when he met her she was
wearing on her sleeve a small sllield of honour with ~ t11e nalllO 'Zu.rag<Yl.3.·
iuscribed on it. 'Jbe fact that the dead sergeant was her lover is given by
PalafoJl ill his short narrative of tllli siege, which ought to be a good authority
enough.
II Napier, witll all his prejudice against the Spaniards, does not venture to
ahsolutely rcject tho story. 'Homantie talefi of women rallying the troops
and leading them forward at the most dangerous period of the siege were
current; their trutlL may be doubted. Yet when suddenly environed with
11Orrors, the sensitiveness of' women, drivillg them to a kind of frenzy, might
have produced actiolls abo\'e the heroism ofmeu' (i. 45). 'V. Jacob, M.I'., ill
his T1'IlVClN 1/1 lit#: Soul/> r.!f Sp<lin ilj 18O'J-IO (p. 123), SIl)'S thnt he met AgO\ltUUl
at Se"ille, wearing a blue artillery tunic, with one epaulette, o,'er a short
skirt j she was present wlleu Lort! 'Vellel:lley entered Seville, and was wel·
corned by the JUllta.
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The fl1litless attack of July 9l cost the French 200 killed and
SOO wounded. The Sarilgo~ngurrison lost somewhat less, in spite
of the bomb:trdment, since they had been fighting under covet
against enemies who had to expose themselves whenever they got
near the wall. Verdicr resolved for the future to shun attempts
at escalade, and to begin a regular siege. He commenced on the
third of July to construct parallels, for a main attack on the
southern side of the place, and a secondary attack on the north~
wcstCl'll. He also threw a detachment across the Ebro [July 11].
to close the hitherto undisturbed access to the city through the
suburb of Sun Lazaro and the stone brid~. The force which
could be spared for this object from an army of no more than
l~,OOO or 13,000 men was not really suflicicnt to bold the left
bank of the Ebro, and mcnlly made ingress and egress difficult
without entirely preventing it. 011 two or thrcc occasiolIs when
considerable bodies of Spaniards presented themselves, the French
(.·(mld do 110 more than skirmish with them amI try to cut ofI' the
convo)'s which they were bringing to the city. They could 110t
exclude them, and for the whole remainder of thc siege the com-
munications of the Saragossans with the open country were never
entirely closed I.
By July ]5, Vel'dier'g trenches were commencing to work up
close to the walls, and the ncxt ten days of the montll were oc-
cupied in desperate struggles for the convents of San Jose, of
the Capuchins and TriniwriallS, which lie outside the cit)' IIcar the
Carmen and Porta Quemada gates. By the twenty-fourth the
French had o<:cupicd them, cOlllleetcil them with their approaches,
and begun to establish in them breaching batteries. Another, but
less powerful, littack wus directed against the POl-tillo gate. The
mortars and howib:ers bomban:led the city continuously from the
first to the third. But it WM not till the dawn of Angust 4 that
the heavy guns were ready to begin thcirtask of battering down thc
gatcs and walls of Saragossa. After five hours of steady firing
the Spanish batteries were silenced, and sc\'cral breaches had been
made, mostly in or about thc Convent of Santa Engracia, at the
southernmost point of the city, The streets behind it had been
terribly shattered by the prcvious bombardment, and many building.'>
I 1"0)" exaggerates considerably when he says that from July 12 onward
'the b1o<:kade of Saragossa was complete' (iii. 300). Reinforcements entered
on severnl subsequent occasions.
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dt.'Stroyed, lIombly the I.:cntral hospital, from which the SPllllilll'<1s
had to remove, under a terrible hail of shells, more than 500 sick
and wounded, as well us a number of lunatics and idiots: the
institution had been used as an asylum before the outbreak of
the war. l\fl.tny of these unfortunate creatures were destroyed by
the besiegers' fire l , as were also no small number of the wounded
and of their doctors and IlUl1ieS.
Palafox and his bl-othcl' the lIIaJ.Xluis remained Ileal' Santa
Engrllcia, trying to encourage their followers to repair the bar-
ricades behind the breaches, and to loophole and strengthen those
of the houses which still stood firm. Dut amid the dreadful and
unceasing storm of projociilcs it was hard to keep the men together,
lllld most of the projected l'clrcnchmenls were bnltcrL>d down before
they could be finished. At b'o o'clock in the afternoon of the
fourth, Vel"dier let loose his storming columns, composed of four
Polish nnd nine Freneh battalions 2. They wcre directed in three
bodies against three separate breaches, the eastenlmost in the
1 Cavallero alld 'l'oreiio put t11e l1istr<lSSing !;CellCl'S at the I,ospiml and the
eseape of the IUllatics during the assault on the 4th, hut Arteche seems more
correct ill lll:\cing them during tlle bom!xlrdment of tlle preceding day.
I I find in the Vauglum l'lIper8 the following note: 'General Lefebvre-Des-
nouettes was residing at Cheltenham on parole, having been taken prisoner
at Uenavcnte hy Lord Paget. T WOllt to C1lclteullllm ou l\f'ly 27, 1800, for
the express purpose of seeing tho genem!. He tolU me that he had advanced
at first with no more than 3,000 men,lmt that after General Verdier joined
him, the French force employed against SaragQ8Sa was ]6,000 men. J nndcr-
stood that in the attack of Ju1r 2 and the previou.s figliting they lost 2,000
mOll, ami tll<lot tlloir total loss in the wllolc siCo"U was 4,000, iucluiling three
Il'Cnerals wounded.' Nap. Oonup. (xvii. 389, 426) calls the whole force
before s,-.ragossa on August 2, 17,300 men. liut there seems to llave been
present in all on!y-
(]) Lefcbvre-Desnollettes' column:
j211d of tile Vistula (1st am! 2nd b.'ltts.)Brigade 70th of the line (3rd batt.). . .Grandjean 4th b(drdtkm de. maTC"~ . . .
6th ditto . . .
{
1st of the Vistola (1st and 2nd batts.) . .
. 1st 8uPIllomclltary regiment of Ule LegiOll8 of
BrIgade Hescrve (1st and 2nd balte.) . . .
Habert 47t.11 of tIle line (3rd !xItt.). . . . .
HiUI ditto (4th batt.) . . . . . .
IRegiment of Polish Ul.llccrsCavnlry 5Ul c8Cadro" de marc~ •
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Com·ent of Santa Engracin, the second at the gate of the AAme
name, the third more to the left, in the wall near the gate of thc
Carmen. All three were successful in forcing their way into
the city: the defences had bcCll completely shattered, and at one
point 500 continuous yards of the outer wall had fallen. The
Spaniards clung fOt" some time to the cloistCl1> and church of Santa
Engracia, but were at last expelled or exterminated, and 1,000
yards of the elll"£inte with the adjoining buildings were in the
hands of tht:! French.
It WWJ at this moment, appnrentl)', that Ver<lier :!Cnt in a
pfJrlemerlfaire with the laconic note-' Head Quarters, Sanw. En-
gracia. Ctlpitulatioll?' To which Palafox returned the well·
known reply-' Head Quarters, Sar~""OSSll.. 'Var to the knife I.'
All through the afternoon of the fourth of AUf.,'1Ist, the French
slowly pushed their way up the streets which lead 1l00thward
towards UIC Cosu, the main thoroughfare of Sal'ao"'Ossa. Thcy
could only get forward by storming each house, and turning each
barricade that offered resistance, so that their progress was very
slow. ''Vhile inflictillg terrible losses Oll the Spaniards, they were
ulso suflcring vcry heavily themselves. But they drove a urond
(2) Dil'igioll of GOIIICZ Freire:
14th Pro\·isionalllegimeut(lst, 2nd, aIlrl3rd lmtts.) 1113
7th batap/m de marche 334
6th Portuguese infuntr)' 2M
Portuguese Cazadores 288 = 2060
(3) CohmllL of Colonel Pin! (arrivOll JUllll 29) :
3rd of the Vistul" (1st and 2nd batts.)
National Guards f£elite (two b....tts.)
3rd, 8th, "TIll !Ill, ef(;Ud1'f)1l8 de lIw'rf}hc
(4) Bazancourt's Brigade (an-h·ed August 1) :
14th of the line (1st and 2nd hatts.)
44th ditto (ht IInd 2nd hatts.)
l1tb e~drrJJl de lIlorr;he
(5) Artillery and train .
Total 15,535
111cse "re mainly Delmas's figures. He mentions a battalion of tIle 16th of
tllllline as llrescnt ;.t the great ussnult. l1ICTe must be some error here, as
that regiment was not in Spain. It is probably a misprint for the 70th of
the line, Wlliuh ill not mOlltionoo by l,im till llrOlient, tllOugll it cert.... iulY
was so.
I The story sounds theatrical, hut is vouched for by good authorities,
Vaughan and l'alafox himself, who chose the wonls for the tY1Joll of the reverse
l)f the medal that was issued to the rlefellllers of Sm·agossa. (sell Artool,e, ii. 3!).l).
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wedge into the city, till finally they reached and crossed the Coso,
halfway between the southern wall and the river. In the streets be·
yond the Caso their impetus seemed to have exhausted itself: many
of the men were too tired to press forward any longer; others
turned aside to plunder the churches and the better sort of houses 1•
Verdicr tried to cut his way to the great b"idge, 80 WI to divide
the defenders into two separate bodies, and was so far successful
that many of the Spaniards began to troop off acros~ the river into
the submb of San Lnzaro. But he himself wns wouuded, his maill
column lost its way in the narrow side-streets, and the attack diel"I
down.
In the late afternoon there was almost a suspension of hostilities,
and the firing slackened for a space. But At last the Aragonese,
encouraged by the exhaustion of their enemies, began to resume
the offensive. The fugitives who had erossed to the northern side
of the Ebro were hustled togetheI' und (h-ivell back by their leaders,
while a loaded gun was placed on the bridge to prevent their
return. The garrison of the eastern front, which had not Ix.>cn
seriously attacked, sent all the reinforcements that it could spare
into the {;entre of the town. At dusk masses of Spaniards de-
bouched from the neighbourhood of the two cathedrals, and began
to assail the positions held by the French beyond the line of the
Coso. The first charge into the open street is recorded to have
been led by a monk 2 and sixteen peasant~ everyone of whom were
killed or wounded; but endless reinforcements poured out of c\"cry
lane, and the exhausted French began to lose ground. The
fighting was of that deadly sort in which the question has to be
settled, whether tl~e defenders of the houses in a sheet can shoot
down their assailants, exposed in the roadway, before the latter can
burst into each separate dwelling and exterminate its garrison ill
detail. Often the French held the upper stories long after the
Spaniards had seized the ground floor, and the stuireascs had
to be stormed one after the other. It was natuml that in sueh
struggles the defenders shoulU re(:eive no qua.rter. Though the
fight raged with many variations of fortune in all the cenhal
, Napier mailltains (i. 45) that the city was saved only because the French
fell to pillaging, a contention wJlich seems very unjust to tbe &ra.,"Ossans.
s l'erhaps his nmne, Fray Ignatio de SantarQmana, deserves as mucll
remembrance as that of Agostina. His conduct ill a critical moment was
just as inspiring and told 118 muvh lIS hers (sce ArleciJc, ii. 406).
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parts of the city, there was after a time no doubt that the Ara·
gonese were gaining ground. The French detachments which
had penetrated furthest into the place were gradually cut 00" und
exterminated; the main bodies of the columns drew back and
strengthened themsclves in two large stone buildings, the convents
of San Francisco and San Diego. At nightf.'\lI they retained only
a wedge-like section of the city, whose apex near SUIl Francisco just
touched the southern side of the Cow, while its base was fonned by
the line of wall between the gates of Santa Engrucia and the
Carmen.
The French lmd lost nearly 2,000 men in the struggle: the
engineer Bclmas gives the total as 462 killed and 1,505 wounded 1,
morc than a fifth of the troops which had tu:tua11y been engaged
in the assault. Among the Saragossans, who before the street-
fighting begun had been subjected to a severe bombardment for
many honrs, the casualties must have been nearly as great. But
they could SPll.l"C combatants mOl"C easily than their enemies; indeed
they had more men than muskets, and as each defender fell there
WllS tL nlsh of the unnnncd to get possession of his weapon.
During the night of August 4-5 both sides, fatigued though
they were, set to work to cover themselves with bnlTicades and
works eonstrut.'ted with the debris of ruined houses. In the
moming both French and Spaniards had rough bnt continuous
lines of defcllloc, those of tIle latter ci.rcling round those of the
former, with nothing but the width of a narrow street between
them. 'Vhcre\'cr there was anything npprondling nn open space
cannon had been brought up to sweep it. Whcloc the houses still
stood firm, (,'OllIlllunicatiOIlS Imd. lx.'C1I made between them by
breaking holes through the party walls. In the streets the corpses
of both sides lay thick, for under the deadly cross-fire 110 one dared
venture out to remove thcm: in a day or two the sanitary COIl,
ditiolls would be horrible.
Meallwhile both besiegers and besieged were too cxhausted to
undertake any more serious operations, llnd the fighting sank
to little more than a desultory fusillade !>etweell cnemies equally
l ArteChll nccuS<!!! BclmllS of gidug ouly SW wounded, remarking that
Verdicr stated the higher uumber of 000. But my edition of llelmas (Paris,
1830) distinctly s.'1Ys 'quinze ccut cin'l blesses' (H. (4). Napicr gil'elJ 110
figurelJ lLt all: 111ierll, understatillg FrCllch 109!ielJ ill Ilia usual style, speaks of
300 dead and !)()() wounded.
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well protected by their defences. Such interest (IS there was in the
operations of August 5-6 lay outside the walls of S~fl'()ssa.
On the afternoon of the dny of the great nssault a column of
Spanish troops from Catalonia-two line battalions and ~.OOO or
3,000 new levies and unIted peu.stlllLs-arril'cd at Villamayor ou the
nodh of the Ebro, only seven miles from the city. It escorted a
much·desircd convoy of ammunition, for the supplies in the city
were nmning very low. 'While the fighting was still raging in the
streets Palafox rode out of the suburb of San Lazuro with 100
dragoons and joined this force. On the next morning (August 5)
he skirmished with the l?rench troops which lay beyond the Ebro,
nlld ~d into the city olle vetCI"ll1l battalion and a few Wl'1b"OIlS
of munitions. He then proposed to att..nck the detached J"rench
brigade (that of Pir~) with his whole remaining force on the next
dv.y, in order to deal' the lIorthcl'll front, !lUll to selld the rest of his
convoy-no less than 200 wagonf;-into Saragossa. But on thc
same night he re<.-eived news of the battle of Baylcn and the
surrender of Dupont's army. MOreovCl', he was informed that a
division of the army of Valencia, under Saint-March, was on the
way to reinforce him. This induced him to halt for two days, to
see whether the French would not raise the siege without further
fighting.
Verdier had got the same intelligence at the same hom, with
olxlers to be ready to retreat at a moment's notice, and to avoid
entangling himself in fm·thcr engagements. He was preparing to
withdraw, when on the se\"enth he received supplementary dispatches
from Madrid, with dircctions to hold 011 for the present, and to
keep the Samgossans occupied, without, however, compromising
himself too much. A<..'Cordillgly llc resumed the bombardment,
and began to throw into the city an immense number of shells: for
he saw that when his retreat wus definitely ordered, he would not
be able to carry oil' with him the vnst stores of munitions that be
had accumulated in his camp.
Seeing that the French ..lid not move, Palafox attacked the
covering force on the left bank of the Ebro on August 8. His
enemies were very inferior in numbers and had been told not to
risk anything, considering the delicate state of affail'S. Accord-
ingly the relieving force erossed the river Gallego, pushed back
Pirc"s 2,000 mcn in a long skirmishing fight, und ultimately
established themselves on ground just outside the suburb of San
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La7Aro: Hie l'Onvoy, under cover of the fighting, slIccessfully entered
the city over the great bridge. That night Verdicr withdrew
Pin~'Is brigade across the cher, thus leaving the whole northern
front of the place free from blockade. Clearly this could only mean
that he was about to raise the siege, but for five days morc he
continued to ravage the central parts of the city with his bombs,
and to bickcl' at the barricades with the Saragosslllls. But 011 the
thirteenth the Spaniards noted that his camps seemed to be growing
empty, and on the fourteenth a scrie:o of explosions told them that
he was abandoning his siege works. Mllta Engrncia and the other
points held inside the city were all destroyed on that day, and the
mnmunitioll which could 110t be carried off was blown up. The
guns which had been pressed forward into the ruined stn.-ctli were
spiked and left behind, as it would have been impossible to extricate
them under the Spanish fire. Of those in the outer butteries some
were thl'own into the c..'lnal, otheNl disabled by having their
trunnions knocked off, others merely spih-'t1. Altogether no les.'>
than fifty·four pieces, all more or less iJljUred, but ma.ny sus-
ceptible of repair, were left bchiJld to serve us LrophiL~ for the
SaragOssallS. "...-
F'inally Verdier withdrew by slow mal'ches up the Ebro to Tudela,
where he took post on August 17. He had lost in all over 3,500
men in his 10ng-eontilluL·d struggle wiUl the heroic city. The
Aragonese must have suffered at least as much, but the figures are
of COUl'se impossible to verify. They said that their casualties
amounted to no more than 2,000, but this must surely be an
unden.-tatcment, for Palafox Sll.ys that by August 1 there were of
his original 7,000 levies only 3,500 left under arms. Even allowing
for heavy diminution by desertion and dispersion, this 'implies
very serious losses in action, nnd these !;even AmgollC::;C battalions
formed only a part of the garrison, which counted 13,000 men on
August 13, Probtttbly thc lUlcmbodied citii'.cns and peasants suf·
fered in ll. still heavier proportion than troops which had received
even a small measure of organization. If the whole losses came to
4,500 it would not be surprising-but nothing can be stated with
certainty. Yet whatever were their suflcrings, the Snrngossans
had fumed OVCI' a new page in the history of the art of war. They
had defended for two months an unfortified phu:e, by means of
extemporized barricades, retrenchments, and ctlrthworks, mId had
pro\'ed their ability to resist even a formidable train of siege
(llIAN, I •
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artillery. If the news of DlIpont's disaster had not arrived ill time
to Sllve them, they would DO doubt have succumbed in the end, lIS
must an)' besieged place which is not sooner or later relien.'<1 from
the outside. Dut meanwhile the)' hOO accomplished 8. rare feal;
almost unaided by regular troops, almost destitute of trained
artillerymen and cnginee.rs, they had held at 00)' a force which
Napoleon at the (:Ollllllcnocment of the siege would M\"e supposed
to be equal to the task of conquering not only Arugoll, but tlw.
whole eastcm side of the Iberian Peninsula.
•
SECTION lIT: CHAPTER lIT
OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH: BAT1'LE OF MEDINA
DE RIO sEeD
'Vmu; Lcfclwl'c-Dcsnouettcs und VCllliel' were making their
long series of attacks on Sarllo"Ossa, matters were coming to a head
in UUJ north-west of Spain. 'l11C army of Galicia had at Il\St
descended into the plains, and commenceID to threaten the right
/lank of llessiercs and the communications betweell llurgo5 and
Madrid. This forward movement was due neither to the Galieian
Junta, 1101' to the of1iccr whom they had placed in command of
their army, but to the obstinate persistence of Cuesta, who had
110t in the least learnt the lesson of caution from his defeat at
Cabczon, and was eager to fight a pitched battle ....,jth all the
forces that could be collected in Northern Spain.
The resources at hand were not jm.'onsidcmble: in Galicia, or
011 the way thither from Portugal, wcre 110 less than tllirly-nine
battnlions of regular infanlry-thongh most of them were very
weak: there were also thirteen battalions of embodied militia,
somc thirty guns, and a handful of cavalry (not more than 150
sabres). The Junta had placed in t:ommnnd, aftcr the murder of
the cupl:ain-gcneral Filanghieri, a comparatively young gcneroJ-
Joachim make, one of those many soldiers of fortullc of Irish
blood who formed such n notable element ill the Spanish army.
'VlICIl the insurrection broke out hc had been merely colonel of
the regiment named 'the Volunteers of the Crown': he had nevCT
had more than three battalions to manage before he found himself
placed at the head of the whole Galician army. Though a most
unlucky general-half a dozen times he seems to have been tile
victim of ill fortune, for which he was hardly responsible-Blake was
in real merit far above the a"CTllc.<re of the Spanish commanders.
He lUll neither the slackness Ilor the arrogance which were thc
besetting sins of so lTlany of the l'eninsular generals: and his
dauntless courage was not combined with recklessness or careless
over-confidence. Hc showed from the first very considerable
.2
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orgamzlI1g power: all his efforts were dit;ected to the task of in-
ducing the Junta and the IX'Oplc of Galicia to ullow him to draft
the crowds of recnlits who flocked to his banner into the old
regiments of the line and the militia, instead of forming them
into new corps. ''''jth somc trouble he carried his point, and
was able to bring up to their full complement most of the old
bllHnlions: of new units ,,'cry few I wcre created. ''Vhen he took
the field it was only the old cadres thus brought up to strength
that accompanied him, not raw and unsteady troops of new
orgnni7.ation.
After hastily concentrating and brigading his army at Lugo,
Blakc led them to the edge of the Illounluills which di,·ide Galicill
ftom the plains of Leon, It was his original intention to stand
at bay 011 the hills, and force the French to ll.ttnck him. With
this object he occupied the passes of Manzanal. Fuencebadon. ami
Pucbla de Sanabria, thc only plat."<."S wherc l"Oad~ of impol'lalH:c
penetrate into the Galician uplands [June ~g]. His whole field
force, distributed into fOUl" divisions and a 'vanguard brigade' of
light troops, amounted to some 25,000 men fit for the field: in
addition, 8,000 or 10,000 new levies were being organized behind
him, but he refused-with gl·cat wisdom-to bring them tu the
front during his first movements.
On Blake's left flank were other Spanish troops: the Junta of
the Asturias had mised some 15,000 men: but thcse-1Ullikc the
Galician army-were utterly raw and lllltrained. Of old troops
there was but one single militia battalion amOllg them. The
Junta had dispersed them in small bodies all along the eastern
and southern side of the provi1ll..'e, armying them to eover not
only the high road from Madrid and Loon to Oviedo, but every
impracticable mule-path that crosses the CUlltabrian Mountains-
lly this unwise arrangement the Asturian army was weak a.t every
point: it was impossible to concentrate more than 5,000 men for
the defence of any part of the long and narrow province. The
fact was that the Junta looked solely to the defence of its own
land, and had no conception that the protection of the Asturins
should be treated as only a section of the gr-eat problem of the
pmtoction of the whole of Northern Spain.
While the Galicians and the Asturians were taking up this
I 11U3 bc.~t known was tlle btualbm lileroriQ, eomposo.'" or tIll! students of the
Unil'cnity of Santiago.
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purely defensive attitude, they hOO fm-gotten to reckon with one
faclor in their neighbourhood. Right in front of them lay the
old Captain-General of Castile, with the wrecks of the army that
had been so signally routed at O1bczon. He had retired to
Bcnavente on the Esla, and there had halted, finding that he
was not pursued by Lasalle. Here he reorgnnir.ed his scattered
Castilian levies into three battalions, and raised three more in·
the province of LeOIl. He had still 300 or 400 regular cavalry,
but not a single gun. Quite lUldismayed by his late defeat, he
persisted in wishing to fight in the plain, and began to send
urgent messages both to lllake and lo the Juntas of Asturias and
Galicia, begging them to send down their armies fmm the hills,
and aid him iu making a dash at Vlllladolid, with tlle object of
cutting off :Bessieres' communications with Madrid, and so dis-
ilrrnnging the whole S)'t:ltCIll of N!lpolcoll's pIrm for the <:onquest
of Spain.
'lne Asturians, partly from It well-justified disbelief in Cucst.u's
ability, partly from a selfish desire to retain all their troops for
the defence of their own province, refused to stir. They sent the
Captain·General a modest reinforcement, two battalions of the
newly raised regiment of Covadollga, but refused. any more aid.
111stead, they suggcst<..>d that Cuesta should fall ooek on I.eon
and the southern slope of the Asturian hills, so as to threaten
from thence any advance of thc French into the plains of Leon.
But the Galician Junta. showed themselves less unyielding.
Despite of the rcmOllslratll'es of Blakc, who was set on maintaining
the defensive, and holding the passes above Astorga, they con-
sented to allow their army to move down into the pla.in of Old
Castile and to join Cuesta. After some fruitless remonstrances
Blakc moved forward with the bulk of his host, leaving behind
him his second division to hold tlle pusses, while with the other
three and his nlllguard brigade he marched on Benavente [July 5J.
On July 10 the armies of Galieia and Castile met. at. Villalptllldo,
and a brisk quarrel at once broke out between their commanders.
Cucsta was for attacking the French at once: Dlake pointed out
that for an army with 110 more than thirty gUlls and 500 or 600
eamlry to oftcr bnttle in the plains was sheer madness. The Irish
b"Cncral had the larger !md Illore effe<..'tive army, but Cucsta was
thirteen years his senior AS lieutenant-general, and insisted 011
llSslImil1g eommalld of the cOlllbillcd host in aecordancc with the
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nOnDal rules of military pl'eCedence. After some fruitless resistance
llIake yielded, and the whole Spanish army moved forward Oil
Valladolid: all that Cuesta would grant on the side of caution
was that the third Galician division, 5,000 strong, should be left
as a reserve at Benaxente. Even this was a mistake: if the two
generals were to fight ut all, tiley should have put e"'ery available
man in line, and have endeavoured at all costs to induce the
Asturians also to co-operate with them. They might have had
in all for the oncoming battle 40,000 men, instead of' 2fl,OOO, if the
Olltlying troops had been collected.
A blow from the north-west was precisely what Napoleon at
llttyonne and Savary at Mtulrid had been expecting for some
weeks. :Both of them were pcrfedJy conscious that any check
inlliLicd on Bes.sieres in Old CAAtile would wreck the whole plan
of invasion. So much of the marshal's corps d'armee had been
distrnck.'<1 towards Saragossa, that it was clearly necessary to I'C-
inforce him. From Madrid Savary sent up half of the troops of
the Imperial Guard which had hitherto been in the capitul-
three battalions of fusiliers (first regiment) and three squadrons
of cavalry 1. Napoleon afterwards blamed him sevcrely for not
having sent more, SIl)'ing that from the mass of troops in and
about Madrid he might have spared another complete division-
that of Gobcrt, the second division of MouL-ey's corps. '\Vithout
its aid the Emperor half-expected that Dessieres might be checked,
if the Galieiuns Cllllle down in full force 2. He himself seut up
from Ba)'onne nearly all the troops which were at that moment
uuder his hand, ten vetel'lln battalions just arrived from Germany,
fOI'ming the division of General Mouton.
'flle reinforcements being hurried on to Bessicl'cs by forced
marchcs, that general found himself on July 9 at the hend of
1\ force with which he thought that he might venture to attack
Blake and Cucsta. If they had brought with them nil Ulcir
troops, and had called in the Asturians, it is probable that the
marshal would ha'-e found himself too weak to face them:
fortunately for him he had onl), fivc-ninths of the army of Galicia.
I Oddly enough, in the Duke of Rovigo's own if/moOT/Ni tl,e Iitatement is
madc that these troops arril"(~tl too late to fight at Rio Sct'O, a curious error
(ii_ 248).
t See tlll,l disp.'l.tclt of July 13, to s.wary, and that of the same day to King
Joseph (Nllp. CQ1"Tefp., 14,Hll).
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and Cuesta's miserable levies in front of him. His own fighting
force was formed of odd fragments of all the divisions which
tarmed his corps rI'arm-ee: large wctions of each of them were left
behind to guard his communications with France, and others
were before s.'l.ragossa. Dessieres m(l,loched from lllllogos with the
brigade of the Imperial Guard: at Palencia he picked up Llsallc's
cAvalry with half Monton's newly arrived division of veterans (the
S(.'Cond brigade was left at Vittoria) and a small part of Mcrlc's
division, which had been hastily brought over the mountain!!
from Santandcr to join him. There was also present the lur!,"Cf
half of Verdier's division, of which the rest was now in Arngon
with its COlllnUludcr t.
On the evening of July 15, LRsalle's light cavalry got in touch
,with the outposts of the Spauio.rds near :Medina de Ilio Set:o.
I Bcssicres' ann)" seems to have consisted of the following elements :-
Ilifrmtr!l. CUL'airy.
(I) One regiment of the FWliliers of the Imperial
Guard (three hatts.)
111ree squadrons of C3\'a1ry of the Imperial Guard
(2) From Verdicr's Division:
l)ueOll' I13th IJrovisional Regiment (four hatts.)
Urigade 14th Provisional Uegiment (0110. hatt.) a
Sab....thier's I J7l11 Provisional Regiment (four bntls.) I
Brigade 18th l'rovisiollll.l Hcgimcnt(four IJll.tts.)b
(3) From Merle's Division:
D'Armagnac's I47th of the Line (one batt.)~ I
Hri,;",le 3n:1 Swiss Uegimellt (one hatt.)
(4) From l\louton's Dil·isioll :
lleYllaud's 14th Uger (three batts.) '1
Urigmle l;ith ofthe Line (two batts.)d
(5) lollSlllle's Cavalry Brigade:
10th Chasseurs I
22ud Cbasseurs f
11,000 1,1,50
We may add 750 men for the live batteries of artiUerr and the train, and so
get a tol..'l.lstl'ellgth of 13,700. N"poleon (Cor~6P., 14,213) called the force
16,000.
• The other three batts. of the l·~th were with Verdier at Saragossa. This
odd battalion was in the battlc attached to O'ArmagllIlC'S brigade. Merlc was
briven Oucos' and O'Annagnac's brigades to make up a division.
- These battalions were much weakened by detachments.
• A very strong battalion, it was 1,000 strong on June 1, and must stm Illwe
had 1,000 bayonets.
<I. Both regiments were incomplete, having dropped men at ViUoria and Burgos.
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and reported that Bluke and Cuestn were present in force. 011
the ne:rl morning Bessicres marched before daybreak from IJalencia,
and just as the day was growing hot, dis<.'Ovcn.od the enemy drawn
up on rising ground a little to the cast of the small town which
has given its name to the battle. Blake had 15,000 infantry and
150 cavalry with twenty guns 1; Cucsta 6,000 infantry and 550
CAvalry, but not a single cannon. Toe)' outnumbered Bessieres
by nearly two to onc in fout soldiery, but had little more than
half his number of horse, and only two-thirds as many guns.
A more prudent general than Cuesta. would have refused to fight
at all with an army containing in its ranks no less than 9,000
recruit", and almost destitute of cavalry. But if fighting was to
be done, a wise lllan would at any rate have chosen a good po.sition,
where his Ranks would be covered from turning movements and
inaccessible to the enemy's very superior force of horsemen. The
old Captain-General <:ared nothing for such caution: he had merely
drawn up his army on a gentle hillside, somewhat cut lip by low
stOllt~ walls, but prllCticable for <:8.valry at nearly every point. His
flanks had no protection of any kind from the lie of the ground:
behind his back was the town of Medina de Rio Seco, and the dry
bed of the Scquillo river, obstacles which would tend to make
It retreat difficult to conduct in orderly fashion. But a retreat
was the IWlt thing in Cuesta's thoughts.
Had as was the position seJected, the way in which it was
occupied was still more strange. The Captain-General had divi~cd
his host into two halves, the one consisting of the first division of
I In t]le VuaghulI Pupcr~ T find a <Journal of the operntions of General
Blake,' by some officer of his staff, wlIlamed. It giVCfl the force of the
Galician army at Rio Seeo as follows:-
Ser-
gealltf.
Drum_ Veteran
merf, mnk and
,\c. jik. Recruitff. Talld.
Vanguard:
Gen. Count Maceda 7' 31 76 ],678 277 = 2,187
1st Division:
Gen. Cagigal 166 19< 166 4,i!J5 1315 ~ 6,470
4t]1 Division:
Marquis I'ortago . 1116 165 144 3,208 2281 5,SHI
IIead-quarters Guard:
Volunteers of Navarrc.
'"
66 4.'J 661
''''--
478 466 429 10,362 3,873 =15,22!J
This total onl}' diffcn by 26 from that given by Arteche (ii. 654).
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Battle of Medina de Rio Seco.
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the army of Galicia and of the vanguard brigade, the other of the
Cow·tll Guliciull division and the ruw 'Arm)' of Castile.' Blake
with the first-named force was drawn up in a short, compact
COI'mation, three lines deep, at the south-eastel7l front of the hill,
the • Plateau of Valdecucvas,' as it is called. His right looked
dO\I'n into the plain, his le~ in the centre of the plateau, stood
quite 'in the air.' Dut nearly a mile to his left rear, and quite
out of sight, Ja)' the other half of the army. just too far oft' to
protect lllakc's e....posed flank if it should be att.n.eked, find in a vcry
bad position for defending itself. Why Cuesta ranged his left
wing (or second line, if it may so be called) low down on the
reverse slope of the plateau, and in a plac.:e where it could not even
see Blake's corps, it is impossible to conceive. Torefio ha:-.aros the
guess that, in his urrobTt1nt cOllfidcnee, he placed Blake where he
would have to bear the stress of the bnttle, and might probably
lose ground, intending to <.:ome up himself with the left wing and
restore the tight when his colleague should be sufficiently humbled.
Such a plan would not have been oul:.sidc the scope of the old man's
selfish pride.
llcssicl'es, mru-ching tip from the east, rome in sight of the
Spaniards in the early morning. He at Ollce deployed his whole
army, and advanced in battle army over the plain. In front WM
a slight cavalry screen of L.asu.lle's clllISSCUI'S; next came Mouwn'g
division, deployed to the right, and Mel"ie's division, with Sabathier's
brigade, to the left of tlle eOllult"y-l'oa.d which leads, over the
plateau, towards Medina de Rio Seco. The Imperial Guard,
horse and foot, und thc bulk of Lasulle's cavalry bribTt1de were in
reserve behind the centre, On gettillg nCft.' the enemy's position,
Bcssiel'cs soon dis<.'O\"cred the two Imlvcs of the Splulish army and
the broad gap which lay between thmn. His mind was at once
made lip: he proposed to contnin Cuests. with a small force, and
to fall lIpon and envelop Blake with the rest of his arm)' before
the Captain-Geneml of Castile could come to his aid. This cx~
I.:ellent plan wt\s cill"l'it.:u out to the lctter, thanks to the incapacity
of (,'uestn..
Not far east of the ph\teuu of Valdccuc\'o.s lay tm isolated
eminencc, the lIlound of Monclin: on it the marshal drew up the
greater part of his artillery (twellty guns) which began to batter
Blake's front line: the Galician batteries replied, and held their
own though outnumbered by two to one. Then Snbathier's eight
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weak battalions deployed and commenced a cautious attack upon
Blake's front: this was not to be pressed home for a time. Mean·
while Merlc's seven battalions pushed into the fight, continuing
Sabathier's line to the south-west and trying to envelop Bla.ke's
southern flank. They fOlX:<.-tl the Galicians to throw back their
right wing, and to keep continually e.'Xtending it, in order to avoid
being turned. The Spaniards fought not amiss, and for some hour
or more the battle was almost stationary.
Meanwhile, far to the French right, Mouton's five battalions
were executing a eautious delllonstrntioll against Cucsta's forces,
acro!l.'i the 'northern folds of the plateau. The old general allowed
himself to he completely occupied by this trifling show of attack,
and made no movement to aid lllake's wing. The gltp between
him and his colleague was not filled up, Then came the sudden
dc\'elopment of BcssiCrcs' plan: Subathier and :Mede were told to
attack in eanlcst, and while Blake was deeply engaged with their
fiflccn battalions, Lasullc rode into tile open space Oil the left
of the Galicians, formed up the 22nd c!u/.MCltrs cl cheval at right
angles to the Spanish linc, and churf:,1't.u i'll furiously upon Bluke's
flank, The unfortunate troops on whom the blow fell were
deployed in line, and utterly unprepared for a cavalry shock from
the side. The first battalion which rcceived the attack broke
at once and ran in upon the second I: in a few minutes Blake's
whole left wing fell down like a pack of cards, each corps as it fled
sweeping away that next to it. The French infantry, advancing at
the same moment, ran in with the bayonet, seized the Spanish guns,
and hustled the GaJicinns westward along the plateau in a mob.
Blake's troops were only saved from complete destruction by the
steadiness of a Navarrese battalion, which formed square to cover
the retreat, and at the cmlt of one-third of its strength allowed
the other corps to get a. long start in their flight. They retired
due west, and crossed the Sequillo to the south of the town of Rio
Seeo before they eould be rallied,
It was now the turn of Cuests. to suffer. The moment that
Blake was disposed of, BCSSll'r01 marched over the hill towards the
1 TIle flank battalion whicll started the rout was the' Regiment of Bucnllil
A)"res; a provisional corps which had beeu formed out of the prisoners lately
returned from England, who had been captured during our wllucky South
American expedition, before \Vhitelock's final fiasco (see the' Jonrnal of
Blake's Operations; in the VUlIglum Paperil),
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other half of the Spanish army: leaving some of Lasalle's cavalry
and So.bathiCl"·S brigade to pursue the routed corps, be fOfmed the
whole of his remaining troops in a line, bringing up the reserve of
the Imperial Guard to muke its centre, while Mouton formed the
right wing and the bm brigades of Merle the left. Cuesta, out-
numbered and attacked down hill, would have done wisely to retreat
and to seck for shelter in mid behiml the town of Rio Scco in his
immediate rear. But he had prepared a new surprise for the
enemy; as they dcS<."Cndcd upon him they WCI"C nstonished to sec
his front line, the eight battalions which formed the fourth Galieinn
division, form itself into columns of attack and slowly commcm:c
to climb the hill with the object of attacking their right and
eentre. Meanwhile Cm..'Sta's hundful of cuvalry rode out on the
northern end of the line and fell upon the skirmishers of Mouton's
division, whom it chased back till it was met amI driven oft· by the
three squadrons of the Imptrial Guard.
~nc up-hill charbre of the fourth Galician division was a fll).c but
all ntterly useless display of coumge. They were attacking nearly
double their own numbers of victorious troops, who outflanked
them on both wings and tore them to pieces with l\ concentric fire
of artillery to which they could not respond. The regiments at each
end of the line were soon brokell up, but in the centre two battalions
of picked grenadiers 1 actually closed with the French, captured
four guns of thc Imperial Guard, and forccd back the supporting
infantry of the same corps for a short space, till Bessieres hurlcd
upon them the three squadrons of the Guard-Cavalry, which broke
them and swept them down hill again.
Seeing his attack fail, Cucsta badc his last reserve, the raw
CfI,stilian and Leonese levies, retreAt behind the river and the town
of Mt-dilla de Rio Seeo, which thcy did without much loss, covered
to a certain extent by the two Asturian battalions, the only part
of Cuesta's own force which was seriously cngaged.
The 'Army ofCastile,' therefore, had no more than 155 casualties,
but the two Galician divisions had suffered heavily. '11lCy left
behind them on the field nearly 400 dead, and over 500 wounded,
with some I,m prisoners. The ten gUlls of Blllke's wing had all
been captured, and with them several pairs of colours. In addition
I In accordance with the unwise practice prevailing in mOllt Contincntlal
armies, Dlake had massed the grenadier eompanies of all his line regimeut!!
into two bnttuliOllS, to aet as a sclect rcserl"O.
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more than a thou$Ctnd of the Gnlician recruits had dispersed, and
could not be rallied. Altogether Blake's army had lost ove~
3,000 men. The French, as might have been expected. had suflCrcd
L'Omp.'lratively little: they had 105 killed and 300 wounded,
according to Foy; other historians give cven smallcr figures.
A vigorous pursuit might have done much further harm to the
defeated Spaniards; but Bessicrcs' mcn had been marching since
two in the morning, and fighting all through the midday. They
were much fatigued, and their L'Ommallder did llot press the chase
far beyond the river. But the town of Rio Seeo was sacked from
cellar to garret, with much slaying of non-combatants and outr~cres
of all kinds 1, a fact very discreditable to the marshal, who could
have stopped the plunder had he chosen.
The defeated generals met, a little to the west of the battle-field,
ttlld after a bitter altercation, in which Blake used the plainest
words about Cuesta's gelleralship, parted in wrath. 111e Galicians
retired by the way they had come, and joinoo the divi1;ion which
had been left behind three days before; they then went back to the
pusses above Astorgu, abandoning a considerable amount of stores
at Bcnavente. Cuesta took the army of Castile to Lean, retiring
on the Asturias rather than on Galicia.
Bcssicl'es' well-earned victory WIlS creditable to himself and his
troops, but the way had been made easy for him by the astounding
tactical errors of the Captain-~neralof Castile. The mnk nnd
file of the Spanish army had no reason to be ashamed of their
t:onduct: it was their collllllander who should have blushed at the
reckless way in which he had sacrificed his willing troops. Handled
by Cucsta the best arm)' in the world might have been defeated by
inferior numbers,
The strategical results of the battle of Rio Seeo were great and
far-reaching. AJI danger of the cutting of the communications
between Madrid and Bayollllc was avcrh.-d, and Napolcon, his mind
set at rcst on this point, could now a.<;,<;crt that ])upont's position
in Andalusia was henceforth the only hw.u.rdol1s point in his great
scheme of invSlsion 2. It would clearly be a very long time before
the army of Galicia would again dare to take the offensive. and
mCllnwhile Madrid WAA safe, and the attempt to conquer South~rn
I When Stuart and Vaughan passed through Medina in September, they
were given many harrowing details by the local authorities.
2 &:e hi!; remarks in the document of July 21, NI/p. Corrc8p., 14J 223.
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Spain could be resumed without any fear of interruption. Bes-
sieres, after such a victory, was strong enough not to require any
further reinforcements from the central reserve in and about the
capital.
The most obvious result of Rio Seeo was that King Joscph WM
now able to proceed on his way to Madrid, and to enter the city
in triumph. After rc(,'ci"ing the hom~"e of the Spanish notables
at Dnyollne, and nominating a ministry, he had crossed the frontier
011 July I). But he had been obliged to stop short at Burgos, till
lJcssieres should hllVC beaten off' the attack of Dlake and Cuest.'\:
his presence there had been most inconvenient to the marshal, who
had been fon.oo to lctwC behind for his protection Hey's veteran
brigade of Moutoll'S division, which he would gladly have tnkC!ll
out to the approaching battle.
When the llews of Medina de Ilio Seco arrived at Durgos, the
usurper resumed his nUlI'ch 011 Madrid, still escortt,'d by Rey'~
troops. He travelled by short sluo<:res, stopping at every town to
he complimellted by reluctant magistrates and corporations, who
dared not refuse their homage, The populace everywhere shut
itself up in its houses in silent prote~t. Joseph's state entry into
Madrid on July 20 WM the culminabng point of the melul1choly
farce. He passed through the streets with a brilliant staff, between
long lines of 'French bayonet,;;, and amid the blare of military music,
But not a Spaniard was to be seen except the handful of courtiers
and oflicials who had accepted the new govCJll.mellt. The attempts
of the French to produce a demonstration, or even to. get the town
decorated, had met with passive disobediencc. Like Chllrk-s of
Austria when he entered Madrid in 1710, Joseph Bonaparte might
have exclaimed that he could sec 'a comt, but no people' about
him. But he affected not to llotice the dismal side of the situa-
tion, assumed all exaggerated U1'Lunity, and heaped complimcnts
11Ild prefenuent on the small section of Afranceaado$ who il.dher~
to him.
The usurper had resolved to give himself as much ns possible
the air of u Spanish natiollul king. Of all hit! Neapolitan com·t
he had brought with him only one pel'SOnage, his favourite Saligtl)',
whom he had made Duke of Sun Gerlll!\Ilo. The rest of his hOllse-
hold Wl\S composed of nobles and officials chosen from among the
herd which had bowed before him at Bllyonne. ThCl-c were among
them several of the late partisans of King ,Ferdinand, of whom
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some had frankly sold themselves to his supplanter, while others
(like the Duke of Infllntado) were only looking for an opportllnity
to abscond when it might present itself. The first list of ministers
was nbo full of names that were lllrendy well known in the Spanish
bureaucracy. Of the cabinet of Ferrlinand VII, Cevallos the
minister of Foreign All'airs, O'Fun'ill at the War OfIiec, Pilluela at
the ministr)' of Justice, were base enough to accept the continuation
of their powers by the usurper. Unluijo, who took the Secretary-
ship of State, was an old victim of GOOoy's, who had once before
held office under Charles IV. MIl7..arredo, who was placed at the
ministry of Marine, was perllaps the most distinguished officer in
the Spanish navy. Dnt .roseph imagined that his greatest stroke
of policy was the appointment Il.!I minislcr of the Interior of Gaspur
de Jovellanos, the most prominent among the Spanish liberals,
whose reputation for wisdom and patriotism had cost him a long
imprisonment during the days of the Prince of the Peace. The
idea was ingenious, but the plan for strengthening the ministry
failed. for JO\,cllUIIOS utterly refused to tnke offit'C along with tl
clique of traitors and in the cabinet of a usurper. Yet even with·
out him, the body of courtieril and officials whom Joseph colledcd
was far more respectAble, from their high station and old experience,
than might have been expected-a fact very disgraceful to the
Spanish bureaucmts.
In less troublous times, and with 11 more legitimate title to the
crown. Joseph Donaparte might have made 11 vcry tolerable king.
He was certainly a far more worthy occupant of the throne than
any of the miserable Spanish BourlxlIls: but he was lIot of the
stuff of which successful usurpers are made. He was a weak, we.ll·
intentioncd man, not destitute of a heart or a conscience: and
as be gradually realized all the evils that he had brought on Spain
by his ill-n;,,"ll.Iated ambition, he grew less and less satisfied with
his position as his brother's tool. . He made long and untiring
efforts to conciliate the Spaniards, by an unwavering affability and
mildness, combined with a strict attention to public business.
Unfortunately all his efforts were counteracted by his brother's
harshnC:SS, and by the greed and violence of the French generals,
over whom he could never gain any control. It is a great testimony
in his fuvour that the Spanish people despised rather than haled
him: their more violent animosity was reserved for Napoleon. His
nominal subjects agreed to regard him as a humorous character:
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they laughed at his long harangues, in which Neapolitan phrases
were too often mixed with the sonorous Castilian; they insisted
that he was blind of onc eye-which did not happen to be the
case. They spoke of him as always occupied with the plCil.'lU1'CS
of the table and with miscellallCOus nmours-accusations for which
there was a vcry slight foundation of fact. They insisted that he
was U l:OWWU and a sluggard-titles which lie was ftU' from mcrit~
iug. He was, they said, perpetually hoodwinked, baffled, and
bullied. alike by his gcncnus, his ministcn, and his mistresse.
Dut they never really hated him-a fact which, considering the
manner of his accession, must be held to Le very much to his
credit.
But the first stay of the 'lntrusiye King,' as the Spaniards
,called him, in his CApital, was to be very short. He had only
arrived there on July ~: his forma.l proclamation took place
on the twenty-fourth. He had harilly settled down ill the roY1l1
palace, and commenced a dispute with the effete 'Council of
Castile '-which with unexpected obstinacy refused to swear the oath
to him and to the constitution of llayonne--when he was obliged
to take to Bight. On the twellty~fourth rumoUl'S began to be
current in Madrid that a great disaster had taken place in
Andalusia, and that Dupont's army had been annihilated. On
the twenty-eighth the news was confirmed in eyery particular. On
August 1, the King, the court, and the 20,000 French troops
which still remained in and about the capital, marched out by
the northern mad, and took their way towarilii the Ebro. This
retreat was the result of a great council of war, in which the
eneJl,'Ctic Ildvi(:c of Savary, who wished to tight onc more battle
in front of the capital, "dth all the forces that could be COIl-
centrated, was overruled by the King and the majority of the
generals. 'A council of war never fights,' as has been most truly
observed.
SECTION III: CHAPTER IV
DUPONT IN ANDALUSIA: THE CAPITULATION 0.1" BAYLEN
'WE left General Dupont at Amlujar, on the upper collrse of the
Guadalquivir, wbithcl' he had retired 011 June 19 after evacuating
Cordova. Deep!)' troubled by the interruption of his communica-
tiolls with Madrid, and by the growing strength displayed by the
Spanish army in his fm11t, he had resolved that it WIL'! ne<:es.<;ary to
draw back to the foot of the Sierra Morena, and to recover at all
costs his touch with the main French army in the cnpitiLl. He
kept sending to Mural (or rather to Savary, who had now super-
&..J.ed the Grand-Duke) pel"8i~tcnt demands for lIew orders and for
large reinforcement.<;, Most of his messengers were cut off on the'
way by the insufb'"Cuts, but his situution had ~ome known at
head quo..rters, and was engrossing much of Savary's altention-
more of it indeed than Napoleon approved. The Emperor wrote
on July 13 that the decisive point wus for the moment ill Castile,
and not in Andalusia, and that the best way to strengthen Dupont
\I'M to reinforce Bessicrcs I.
Such had not been Savar)"'s opinion: fi'ightened at the isolation
in which Dupont now lay, he sent to his assistance the ~'COnJ
division of his corps, 6,000 men under General Vedel, all recnJit.s
of the •legions of rescnc,' save one single battalion of Swiss troops.
The division was accompanied by Boussard's cavalry, the 6th Pro-
visional Dragoons, some 600 strong. Vedel made his way through
La Mancha without difficulty, but on entering the Dcspclia Penos
defiles found his passage disputed by a body of insurgents--~,OOO
pel\S[l,n~ with four anti<luc cannon-who had stockaded thcmsclves
in the midst of the pass. A resolute attack scattered them in a
few minutes, lUld on reili:hing La Carolina on the southern slope of
I Soo Foy (iv. 45), and Nap. Correlp., 14,192, where the Emperor goes so far
lIS to S1Ly : 'Si le Gen<5rnJ DUllOnt ellrouvait uu ('(lIme, ccla ait lie pen lie COII-
8iquence. lln'auraitli'autre reBultat que de lui faire repnsscr les montagncs'
(i. e. the Sierra Morella).
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the mountains Vcdcl got in touch with Dupont, who had hithertQ
no notice of his approach [June 27].
Instead of leaving the newly arrived division to guard the passes,
Dupont called it dowll to join him in the \'allcy of the Guadal-
quivir. 'With the assistance ofVedel's troops he considered himself
strong enough to make hend against the Spanish army under
Castufios, which was commencing to dmw near to Andujnr. Keeping
his original force at that town-a great centre of roads, but a
lllulo.l-ious spot whose hospitals were already crowded with 600 sick,
-he placed Vedel at Buylcn, a place sixteen miles further east,
but still in the plain, though the foot-hills of the Sierra Morena
begin to rise just behind it. To assert himself and strike terror
into the insurgents, Dupont ordered onc of Vcdcl's brigades to
make a forced march to Jaen, the capital of a province and a
considerable focus of rcbcllioll. This cxfNXlition sealtered the
local levies, took and sacked Jaen, and then returned in safety to
Daylcn [July 2-8].
Meanwhile Castafios was drawing near: he had now had a month
·in which to orb"Uuize his tU'my. Like Dlake in Galicia, he had
used the recruit<; of Andalusia to fill up the gaps in the depleted
battalions of the regular army. Dut less fortunate than his
colleague in the north, he had not been able to prevent the Juntas
of Seville and Granada from creating a number of new volunteer
corps, and had been obliged to incorporate them in his field army,
where they were a source of weakness rather than of strength.
His total force was some 83,000 or 34,000 men, of whom 2,600
were cavalry, for ill this arm he was ftU' better provided than was
t.he anny of the North. The whole was organized in four divisions,
under Generals Reding, Coupigny, Felix JODes (an Irish officer,
in spite of his Welsh name), and La Pena. In addition there was
!\ lIying brigade of new levies under Colonel Cruz-Murgcon, which
was pushed forward along the roots of the mountains, at a con·
siderable distance in front of the main body; it was ordered to
harass Dupont's northern flank and to cut lJis eomUlunications
with Baylen and La Carolilln.
With 16,000 or 17,000 men, including nearly 3,500 cavalry,
Dupont ought to have been able to contain Castai'lol;, if not to
beat him. The proportion of bis forcC!J to those of the enemy
was not much less than that which Bessicres had possessed at
IHcdilla de Rio Seeo. But, unfortunately for himself and his
O)lAN. I •
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master, Dupont was far from possessing the boldness and thc skill
of thc marshal. By assuming lIot f\. ....igorous oflcnsivc but it timid
defensive along a protracted frollt, he threw away his chances.
'l11C linc which he lmd resohed to hold was that of the Upper
Guadaklllivir, from Andujar to the next passa.:,o-e up the river, the
ferry of MCllbtilmr, eight miles frum Buylen. Tills gave a front
of some fifteen miles to hold: but unfortunately even when drawn
out to this length the two divisions of Barbou and Vooel did not
cover all the possible lines of attll.ck which Castafios might adopt.
He might still march past them and cut them off' from the defile;
of the l\!orenll., by going a little higher up the river and crossing
it near Bae1.1l and Ubeda. Dupont was wrong to take this line
of defCllce at all: unless he was prepared to attack the (u'my of
Andalusia in the open, he should have retired to Baylen or to La
Carolina, where he would have been uble to cover the passes for
as long as he might choose, since he could not have had either
of his flanks turned.
MetLIlwhile he was gratified to hear that further reinforcements
were being scnt to him. Unreasonably disquicted about Andalusia,
as Napoleon thought, S8\'ary proceeded to send a third division
to aid DuVOnt. This was Gobcrt's, the second of l\Ionccy's cor~:
it started ft'om Madrid not quite complete, and left strong dei:llch-
ments at the more important towns along the road through La
Mancha. Though originully seventccn battalions strong, it reached
the northern slope of the Sierra 1\lorena with only ten. Savary
had not intended it to go any furthCl': he had told Dupont that
it was to be used to cover his retreat, if a retreat became necessary,
but not for active operations in Andalusia. Dut disregarding these
directions Dupont commanded Gobert to cross the l\forena and
come down to join Yooel: this he did, brinbting with him nine
'provisional battalions l' and the second provisional l'Cbtiment of
cuirassicrs, perhaps 5,000 men in all. '!ilere were now over 20,006
French on the south side of the mountain, a force amply sufficient
to deal with Casta.i'ios and his 53,000 Andalllsians [July 7]. But
1 QfGobcrt's llivisiou the 5th pro"isioual regiment aud the Irish battalioll
never marched south. The 6th, 7th, and Otli provisional regimenu--tweh'e
battalions-formed the column; ther len one battalion at MadridejOl;,
another at ilJanz811arell, Que more remained in the pass at the Puerto del
Hey; nioe 'md the cuirassiers (700 strong) descended into the plains. See
for deL1.;I!> Cabany's Jluylell, p. 115.
ll.lOO] CASTANOS' PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 179
they were still widely scattered. Dupont lay at Andujar with
9,000 01' 10,000 SllbrCll and bayonets: Vedcl was sixteen mik'!:l
awny at llaylen, with 6,000 men, of whom 2,000 under General
Liger-Bduir were pUl:Ihcd forward to the ferry of Mengibar.
Gobert wa.~ at La C'lrolill.'l, at the foot of the pass~ with five
battalions about him, and a sixth ellcamped on the summit of
the defile. He had sent forward the l"cmnindcr of his division
(the four battalions of the sixth pwvisional regiment, and half the
s{.'Cond provisional cuirassiers) to join Dnpont at Andujar, so that
he had not more than ~,8oo bayonets and 350 cavalry with him.
Cnstm1os, mel.U1while, had brought up his whole army, with the
exception of the tlying eorps of Cruz-Murgeon, to a line close in
front of Andnjar: the heads of his columns were at Arjonn and
Arjonilla, only five miles from Dupont. On July 11 the Spanish
generals held n council of war at llol'cuiia, and drew out their phUl
of operntiolls. Sinee the enemy seemed to be still quiescent, they
resolved to attack him in his chosen position behind the river.
CastaJios, in person-with the divisions of Jones and La Pefia,
12,000 strong-undertook to keep Dupont employed, by delivering
an attack 011 Andujar, whieh he did not intend to press home
unless he got good news from his second and third columm.
Meanwhile, six miles up the river, Coupigny with the second
division, noorl)' 8,000 strong, was to attempt to cross the Gna-
dalquivir by the ford of Villa Nue\'a. Lastly, Rt.'<ling with the
first division, the best and most numerous of the whole army,
10,000 strong, was to sei~e the ferry of l\fengibat· and march on
Baykll. Here he was to be joined b~' Collpigny, and the two
corps were then to fall upon the rear of Dupont's position at
Andlljal', while Castaiios was besetting it in front. It was their
aim to surround and capture the whole of the French division,
if its general did not move away before the encircling movement
wus complete. Meanwhile the tlying <:olullln of Cl'uz-Murgeon,
about 3,000 strong, was to cross the Guadalquiyir below Andujar,
throw itself into the mountains in the north, und join hands with
lleding and Coupigny behind the back of Dnpont.
'l1lis vlan, though ultimately crowned with suc{."css, was perilous
in the highest degree. But Castafios had seriously underestimated
the toml force of DUPOlll, as well Wi miscoDt:eived his eXtu...t position.
He was unde.r the impression that the. main body of the French,
which he. did not calculate at more than 12,000 or ]4,000 meJJ,
N2
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was concentrated at Andujar, and that there were nothing more
than weak detachments at Mcngibar, DnyIcn, or Let. Carolina.
TIlese, he imagined, could not stand before ROOing, and when the
latter had once got to the northem bank of the river, he would
"easily clear the way for Coupigny to cross. But as a matter of
fact Vedel had 6,000 men at Mcngibur and Baylcll, with 5,000
lllorc under Gobert within a short march of him. If the Spanish
plan had been punctually can-ied ou4 Ueding should have suffered
a severe check at the hands of these two divisions, while Dnpollt
could easily have dealt with Castafios at Andujar. Coupigny, if he
got llcr'OSS at Villa Nucva, while the divisions 011 each side of him
were beaten off, would have been in a very oompmmiscd position,
lUld could not have dared to push forward. But ill tills curious
NLmpaign the probable neyer happened, and everything went in
the most unforcSI.."en fashion.
On July 13 the Spanish plan began to be carried out, Rcdillg
marching for Mengibar and Coupiglly for Villa Nueva. Castafios
kept quiet at Arjonil~ till his lieutenants should have renchoo
the points which they were to attack. On the same day Dupont
rel..ocived the news of Moncey's repulse before Valencia, and made up
his mind that he mllst persevere in his defensive attitude, without
lTIaking any attempt to mass his troops and fall upon the enemy
in his front I. Just at the moment when his enemies were plltting
the game into his hands, by dividing thcmscl\'{."8 into three columns
separated from each other by considerable gap~, he relinquished
every intcntion of taking advauW{,"C of their fault.
On July 14 Reding appeared in front of the ferry of Mellgibar,
and pushed back beyond the river the outlying pickets of Ligcr-
llelair's detachment. He made no further attempt to press the
French, but Dupont, disquieted about an attack on this point,
ordered Gobcrt to bring down the remains of his division to
Baylcn, to join Vcdel. Next morning the Spaniards began to
develop their whole plan: Castufios appeared on a long frollt
opposite Andujar, and made a great demonstration against the
position of Dupont, using all his artillery and showing heads of
eolumns at several points. Coupigny came down to tbe river
I Dupont considered that Savary's intention was to stop all offensive
movements whatever: 'Le gcneral~n-chefme fait entrevoir que nous aUfOns
]lcut-Ctre il gardcr Ilotre position jusqu';l cc quc Valcnce et Saragooso soicnt
SQumises' (l)upout to Vedel, July 13).
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at Villa Nucva, and got engaged with a detachment which was
sent out from Andujar to hold the ford. lleding, maki.ng n serious
attempt to push forward, crossed the Guadalquivir at :Mengibal'
ulld attnckl..'<i Ligcr-Bclnil'. Blit Vcdcl et.unc up to the support of'
his lieutenant, and when the Swiss general found, quite contrary to
his expectation, a whole divisiun deployed against him, he Cetl.SCU
to press his advance, and retired once more be,rond the river.
Nothing dL'Cisivc had yet hnppcIlL'<1: but the next day WtU! to be
far more important. The operations opened 'with two gross faults
made by the French: Dupont had been so much impressed with
the demonstration made 8gaillst him by Castanos, that he judged
himself hOpclCSilly outnumbered at A1ulujar, and sent to Vcdcl fol'
reinforcements. He bade him send a battalion or two, or ewm
n. whole brigade, if the force that he had fought at Mellgibul'
seemed weak and unenterprising I. This was an en-or, for CasttlllOlS
onlyoutnumbcred the French ntAndujur by two or t1U1_"C t1lOUStl.llll
men, and was not really to be feared. But Vedel madl2 n worse
slip; despising Rcding ovel'1IIuch, he marched on BttylclI, not with
one hrigade, but with his whole division, save the original detach~
IlICllt of two bnttalions under Ligcr-Bclltir which remained to watch
l\fengibar. Starting at midnight, he reached Andujar at two 011
the afternoon of the sixteenth, to find that CRstaiios had dOlle no
more than repeat his demonstration of the previous day, and had
been cusily held back. Cruz-Murgeon's levies, which the Spanish
general had pushed over the river below Andujar, had rccch'ed a
sharp repulse when they tried to molest Dupont's flank. Conpigny
had made an even feebler show than his chief at the ford of Villa
Nucva, and had not passoo the Guadalquivir.
But lleding, on the morning of the sixteenth, had woken up to
llIlcxpedcd vigom'. He hud forded the river noor Mellgibar nd
fallen on Liger-Belair's detachment for the second time. Hard
pressed, the l"rcnch brigadier had sent for succour to BuylCJ1,
whither Gobert had mm'cd down when Vcdel marched for Andujar.
The newly arrived general cume quickly to thc aid of the eOlll~
promised detachment, but he was Yery weak, for he had left
0. bo.ttaliOll at La CarolinA And sent another with a squtl.(h-oll
of cuirassiers to Li11tU'CS, to guard against a rumoured movement
of the Spaniards along the Upper Guadalqui\'ir. He only brought
with him three battalions and 200 cuvall'y, and this was not
1 Dupont to rcdeJ J evening of Jul)' 15,
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enough to contain Reding. The 4,000 men ,?f the two French
detachments were outnumbered by marc than two to one; they
suffered a thorough defeat, and Gobert was mortally wounded.
His brigadier, Durour, who took over the commund, fell back 011
Baylen, eight miles to the rear. Next morning, though not pressed
by Ih.."t1ing, he retired towards La Carolina, to prevent himself
being cut off from the pIVlSCS, for he credited a false rumour that
the Spaniards were detaching troops by way of Lil1urcll to seize the
Despena PeITos.
Dupont heard of Gobert's defeat on the evcning of the sixteenth.
It deranged all his plans, for it showed him that the enemy were
not massed in front of Andujar, as he supposed, but had a lar6"e
force far up the river. Two courses were open to him-cither to
march on Baylen with his whole army in order to attack Reding,
and to reopen the communications with Ln. Carolina and the passes,
or to faU upon Castai'los and the troops in his immediate front.
An enterprising offk-cr would probably have taken the latter
altemntive, and could not have failed of SllCcess, for the whole
French army in Andalusia save the troop!> of Belair and Dufour was
IIOW concentrated at Andlljar, and not less than 15,000 bayoncts
Md 3,000 sabrei:l were available for an attack 011 Castafios' 12,000
men I. Even if Collpigny joined his chief, the Frcnch would havc
almost nn equality in numbers and a great superiority in cavalry
and guns. Thcrc cannot be the slightest doubt that the Spaniards
1,361
2,000
2,6!J5
1,114
3,004
709
532
2,0.';7
1,454
1 DUl)()JIt's a"lIilable forcc at this moment consisted of the following troops,
Tho uumbers given are 'their original strength, from wllicll deductions must
of course be made :-
[nf,mtry-llarbou's Division:
Cbe' !4th Legion of Rl'Servc (three Latts.)
ha, rts 4th Swiss Hegimeut (ono batt.) ,
Hngado Marillel:l of the Guard (ono ba.tt.)
l'nlllletier'~ Iard Legion uf Hcscno (two batm.)
Brigade Gardo de I'a.ris (two batts.) .
&hramm's I
'"
.. , Swiss regiments of lleding and Preu.~ (four butts,)
Tlb"'''''u
Veders Divisioll :
l'oinsot's !5th Legion of Heserve (three batts.) .
Hrig:ulu 3rd SwilSS Regiment. . , .
t:a8SagIle8' !1st Legion of Reserve (ono balt.) [two batts. detached
!Jrig-ade uuller Liger.!Jelah·J. . .. 1,003
From Gooort's Divisioll :
6th Provisional Regiment (four halts.)
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620
341
!lOO
773
381
,..
623
would have suffered a defeat, and then it would ha\'c been pof'>.~ible
to expel Ueding from Baylcn without nny danger of intcrfcfClll:e
from other quarters.
But, ill a moment of evil inspiration, Dupont chose to deprive
himself of the ad\'antagc of having practically his whole army
concentrated on one spot, and determined to (:opy the error of tlle
Spaniards by splitting his force into two equal halves. He resolved
to retain his defensive position in front of Andujar, and to keep
there his original force-Barbou's infantry and Io'resia's horse.
But Vcdel with his own men, the four battalions from Gobert's
divisioll which were at Alldujar, and 600 cavalry, was sent oft' to
Barlcn, where he was directed to rally the bentcll troops of Dufour
and Liger-Belair, and then to fall upon Hcding and chusc him
back Ix!yond thc Guadalquivir t.
On the morning, therefore, of July 17 Vedel set out with
some 6,000 men and marched to Baylen. Arriving tJlere he found
that Dnfolll' had evacuated the place, awl had hurried 011 to
Lt CllrolillU, on the false hypothesis that fu-ding had pilllhcd past
him to sei1.e the passes. As n matter of fact the Spaniard hoo
done nothing of the kind: after his success at Mengibar, hc had
simply retired to his camp by the river, and given his men twenty-
four hours' rest. It wus a litmnge way to employ the day aftcr
a victory-but his quiescence chanced to have the most fortunate
Cavalry-Frcgia's Division:
Prlvc's 118t Provil;iOllul Dragoons .
Urigade 2nd ditto. . . .
D~pn;'a I1st Pr.ovlsional Ohas.$turt a Oheval
BrIgade 2nd thtto. . . . .
Bou9S.'U'd's I ..
B · d 6th ProvIsIonal Dragoons .rlga 6
1~'ro1l\ Rigrmd's Brigade:
Half the 2nd I'rol'isiunal Cuirassic1'll
Artillery, &e. (36 gung)
2'I,oon
Allowing a deduction of 3,000 men for sick and previous 10Mes, there rcmain
1:;,000 bayonets aud 3,000 Ilabres.
I <Je vous Ilrie, mOll cher gCl1Okal, .le vous porter le plus TaI!idelllcnt
possible, sur Bar1ell, pour y f!lire votre jouctioll nvec le corps qui a combattu
IIlljourd'hui it Menglbar, et qui s'est replle sur cett6 ville.... J'espere que
demain I'ennemi sera rejctC sur Mengibar, all dela du fteuI'c, et que lcs postc!!
de GIl<lrrom"ll ct de la C,'\folille resteront CI1 slhcl,,; ils SOllt d'Ul16 grande
importance' (Dupont to Ve<lel, night of July Hi). III thL'l;C orders lies the
foundation of the disaster.
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effect. Vedel, on hearing that Dufour had hastened away to defend
La Carolina and the passes, l'csolwd to follow him. He was so:
inexcusably negligent that he did not eyeD send a cavalry recoll~
naissance towards Mengibar, to find out whether any Spanish force
remained there. Had he done so, he would have found lledillg's
whole division enjoying their well-earned siesta! In the direction
of La Carolina and the passes there was no enemy save a small
flanking column of 1,800 raw levies under the Count of Valdeca11as,
which lay somewhere near Lil1ares.
On the night of the se\'enteenth, Vedel and his men, tired out
by a long march of over twenty miles, slept at GuarromulI, half-
'way between Baylen and La Carolina. Dllfonr and Liger-Belair
had reached the last-named place and Santa Elena, and had found
no Spmlinrds near them. On the morning of the eighteenth Vedel
followed them, and united his troops to theirs. He had then
some 10,000 or 11,000 men conccntrated in and about La Carolina,
with one single battalion left at Guarroman to keep up his touch
·\\;th Dupont. The lattCl' had been entirely dc<:civoo by the false
news which Vedel had sent him from Baylen-to the elfect that
llediug and his corps had marched for the passes, ill order to cut
the li'rcllch communications with Madrid. Believing the story, he
forwarded to his subordinate an appro\'al of his disastrous move-
ment 1, and bndc him' instnntly attack and crush the Spanish force
before him, and after disposing of it return as quickly as possible
to Alldujnr, to deu.l with the troops of the enemy in that direction.'
Unfortunately, as we have .;;~n, there was no Spanish corps at all
in front of Vcdel; but by the time that he discovered the [ael
it was too late for him to rejoin Dupont without a battle 2. His
1 f J'ai re'Iu \'otre lettre de &ylen. D'allrCs le mouvcment 4e I'ennemi,
le general Dufour a tres.bien fait de regagner de vitesse !rur La Caroline et sur
Ste-Hclcno, pour occulJer la tHe des gorget>. ,1e \'oi>; :wcc plll.isir (IUO VOllS
vous hiltez de VOllil N!unir R lui, alill de comb'Jttre ll.VCC lwantagll. , , . Si
vous troUVl!'lO renuemi it La. Caroliue ou sur tout autre point, tachez de le
Laure, pour venir me rejoindre et repousser ce qui est devant Audujar'
(Dupont to Vedel, night of July 17).
, Vedel had now with him the following troops :-
(1) flis OWII w1101e division [he Ill"! rallied the two detached b:lt-
taliolls of Liger-Helair]. 6,800
(2) Nine battalions of Goben's division (four from Haylen, t1ltee
which ll;u:l fouglit at MeugiLar lIuder DlIfour, two from
l..iium..~ and La Carolina) 4,350
Ba.ttle of BAYLEN July 19.1808. at llie woment of DUPONT'S thin:! attack.
,
,
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troops were tired out with two night marches; there were no
supplies of food to be got anywhere but at La Carolina, and he
decided that he must halt for at least twelve hours before returning
to join Dupont.
Metmwhile, on the morning of the eightcc.nth, Jleding's 9,500
men, of whom 750 were cavalry, had been joined by Coupigny and
the second Andnlusinn division, which nlllounte<l to 7,900 foot
and 500 horse. Advancing from l\1ellJ:,tibar to attack Baylell, they
fOlmd to their surprise that the place was unoccupied; Yedel's
rearguurd had left it on the previous altel'lloon. Ucdillg intended
to march 011 Andujar from the rear 011 the next day, being under
the full belief that V<.-dcl was still with Dupont, amI that the
tl'00PS which had retired on La Carolina were only the fragments
of Gobert's force. For Castufios iUld his colleagues boo drawn up
their plan of operations on the hypothesis that the enemy were
still concentmtcd at Alldujal".
Redillg therefore, with some 17,000 men, encamped in and about
BuyleD, intending to stilrt at daybreak on July 19, and to fall
on Dupont from behind, while his chief assailed him in front...
Dut airetLdy before the sun was up, 1l1l1skcl-shots from his
pickets to the west announced that the French were appl'oaching
from that direction. It WIlS with the head and not with the rear
of Dupont'l; colulUll that Castufios' first. I1nd second divisions wcrc
to be engaged, for the enemy had evacuated Andujar, and was in
fullmurdl for Baylen.
On the night of the seventeenth Dupont had recei\·oo the news
that Vcdcl luul evucuatL-d llaylcn aud gUile off to the north-cast,
so that a gap of thilty miles or more now separated him from his
lieutenant.. He hud ut first 1x.'C1l plcru;ed with the move, us wc
have seen: but presently he gathered, from the fact that Casttn10s
did not press him, but only ussttiled him with a distant lmd
ineffective cannonade, that the main su-css of the campaign was
not at Andujar but elsewhere. The Spanish flrmy was shifting
3 Ca 1 IGth Provisional Dragoons .
() va rr Half 2nd Provisional CuiraSlliers
Artillery, &c. (18 gUllS) .
Deduct 2,iiOO for losses in aClion al i\fcugibar and !lick, Bud
rcmaill.
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itself eastward, and he therefore resolved that he must do the
same, though he would have to abandon his cherished offensive 1..-
position, his entrenchments, and such paIt of his suppli~e
could not carry with him. Having made up his mind to depart,
Dupont would have done wisely to shirt at once: if he had gone
off early on the morning of the eighteenth, he would have found
RL'<!illg and Coupigny not established in position ut Buylen, but
only just approaching from the south. Probably he might have
brusht..'<! by their front, or even have given them a serious check,
if he had fallen 011 them without hesitAtion.
But two considerations induced the French gencral to wait for
the darkness, and to waste fourtecn invaluable hours at A.ndujar.
The first was that he hoped by moving at night to eSCil.pe the
notice of Castanos, who might have attacked him if his retreat
Will! open !md undisguised. '11le second WllS that he wished to
carry ofi' his heavy baggage train: not only had he between 600
and 800 sick to load 011 his wagons, but there was an enormous
mass of other impedimenta, mainly consisting of the plunder of
Cordova. French and Spanish witnesses unite in stating that the
intcrminable file of 500 vchicles which cloggt.'<i Dupont's lllurch
was to n vel')' gl-eat extent laden with stolen goods 1. Ami it
was the OffioeN rather than the men who were rcspom;iLlc for
this mass of slow-moving transport.
It was not therefore till nine in the evening of the eighteenth
that the French general thought fit to movc. Aftcr barricading
and blocking up the bridge of Andujar-hc dared not use gun-
powder to destroy it for fear of rousing Castai'los-he started all
his night march. He had with him thirteen battalions of infantry
and four ~nd a half regiments of cavah)', with twenty·four guns,
ill all about 8,600 foot soldicrs aud 2,500 horse, allowing for the
losses which he had sustained in sick and wounded during the
earlier phases of the campaign 2. His Ularch WllS lllTUUl,.'Cd as
1 Against ClOballY's defence of Dupont on this point Ulcre mun be set the
impression of almost evory l~el1ch witness from Napoloon dowlJwards.
~ Of the troops which we h\·e recapitulated on page 162 there still
remained with Dupont the wl\ole of lJ.1.rbou's infantry, four of the five rcgi-
nllmts of "'resia's cavalry (the fiftll had marcll{l{! with Vlldcl), 1131f of the 2nd
Provisionu} Cnirussins, llud tJlC two Swiss regiments of RCl.1iug uIIII l)reux.
·l1le original total of these corps 11ad been 13,274. There remained about
11,000, for thut llumber call be lIccoullu,...l for "ftet tIlC 1I<ltllc. '1111~ official
:;panish dispatch gave 8,242 unwounded pri30uers aud 2,000 casualties.
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follows :-Chabert's infantry brigade led the van: then came the
grcat convoy: behind it were the four Swiss battalions under
Colonel SChrtllllln, which had lately been incorporated with the
.l"rench army. These lignin were followed by Pannetier's infantry
brigade and Duprc"s two regiments of c!W8SCIITS a, clu.:val. Thc
rearguard followed at some distance: it was composed of two
and a half regiments of heavy cavalry'. placed under the command
of Gcncral Prive, with the onc vetcran infunta·y battalion which
the army possessed, the 500 Marines of the Guard, as also six
compo/;,"nic8 d'elile picked from the 'legions of reseI've.' FrolH
the fact that Dupont placed his best troops in this quarter, it
if! evident that he e."{pcetcd to be fightillg a rearguard adion,
with Castafios in pursuit, rather than to come into contact with
Spanish troops drawn up across his line of march. He was ignomnt
that Rcding and Coupiguy had occupied Baylen 011 the previous
day-a fact which speaks bndly for his cavalry: with 2,500
horsemen about him, hc ought to have known all that was going
on in his neighbourhood. Probably the provisional regiment."
which formed his whole mounted fon:e, were incapable of good
work in the way of sc:outing and rcconnnissalll..'CS.
The little town of Baylell is situated ill a slight depression of
a sntldlc-oockL-J nmgc of hills which I'lIllS southward out from the
Sierra Morcna. The road which leads through it pusses over
the 10ll'est point in the watershed, as is but Iluturnl; to the
north and south of the town the heights are better marked: they
project somewhat on each flank, so that the place is situated
in a sort of amphitheatre. The hill to thc south of Daylcn is
called the Ccrrajon: those to the north the Cerro del Zumacar
Cltico, and the Cerro del Zumacar Grande. All three arc bare
and bald, withmlt 0. shrub or tree: none of them arc steep, their
lower slopes arc quite snitable for cavnl}"y work, llnd even their
rounded summits tWC not inac(:cssible to a hot'SClllan. The gl'Ollnd
to the west of them, over which the French had to adv:mce, is
open llnd level for a mile und n half; Ulell it grows more incgullU',
and is thickly covel-ed. with olive groves and other vegetation,
so that a force advancing oyer it is hidden from the view of a
spectator on the hiUs above Bnylcn till it comes out into the open.
The wooded ground is about two and a half miles broad: its
western limit is the ravine of a mountain tonent, the Uumblnr
(or Herrumblar, as the RSpirate.lodng Andalusialls sometimes roll
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it). The rOM (Will Andujat to llaylen eroSlle'l this scream by
a bridge; the only place where artillery can pass the rocky but
not "ery deep depression.
It is nc<:e$SiU'Y to say a few words about the ground eastward
fwm Bu.ylcn, as this too was not unimportant in thc later phases
of thc battlc. Here the road passcs through a bl'Oad defile mther
than ll. pltlin. It is entirely cOlllmand{.'d by the heights Oil its
northern side, whcre lies the highest ground of the neighbourhood,
the Ccrro de San Cristobal, clXlwned by a ruined IICl'lllilaf,re. Thc
difference between the approach to Baylcn from the wcst and from
the east, is that on the former side the tra\'eller reaches the town
thmugh a semicn:culal" amphiUlcatre of uplund, while by the latter
he comes up a V-shaped valley cut through the hills.
Reding and Coupiguy wel"C somewhat surprised bi" the bicker
of musketry which told them that the French had fallen upon
their outposts. But fortullately for them their troops were already
getting unde)' arms, and were bivoullcking over the lower slopes
of the hills in a position which made it possible to extemporize
without much diRiculty a line of battle, covering the main road
and the approaches to Daylen. They hastily occupied the low
amphitheatre of hills lIotth and south of the tOWIl. Reding
deployed to the right of the rond, on the heights of the Ceno del
Zumacar Chico, Coupigny to its left all the Cen-ajon. Their
fon:e was of n "ery composite sort~se\"cl1tcen battalions of regulars,
six of embodied militia, fivc'of new Andalusian levies. The units
varied bopelessly in siy.c, some hu\"illg as few as 350 me;}, others
as many as 1,000. They could also dispose of 1,QOO cavalry
and sixtccn guns. The greater part of the latter were pltU..'<:d in
battery on the central and lowest part of the position, north and
south of the high road and not far ~n front of Baylen. The
infantry formed a semicircular doublc line: in front were deploYl:(1
battalions near the foot of the amphitllCutre of hills; in rear,
higher up the slope or concealed behind the crest, was a sec:.'onrl
lille in columns of battalions. Tbe can'lry were drawll up still
further to the roor. }i'jnall>', as a necessary precaution against the
po:;.-;iblc tmin,l of Vedel on the scene from La Carolina, Reding
placed seven battalions far away to the east, on the other side
of Daylen, with cavalry pickets out in front to ,6rive timely notit'C
of any signs of the enemy in this quarter. These 8,500 men were
quite out of the battle as long as Dupont was the only enemy in sight.
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BefOl'e it was fully daylight General Chl1bert and his brigade
had thrust back the Spanish outposts. But the strength of the
insurgent army WM quite unknown to him: the morning dusk still
lay in the folds of the hins, and he thought that he might pOS1iibly
have in front of' him nothing but some flying column of insignificant
strength. Accordingly, after allowing the whole of his brigade
to come! up. Clmbert formed a small line of attack, hrought up
his bllttcry along the high road to the middle of the llmphithcab-c,
between the horns of the Spanish position, and made a vigorous
push forw/llu. He operated almost entirely to the south of the
mad, where, opposite Coupigny's division, the hill was lower and
the slope gentler than further north.
To dislodge 14,000 Illen and twenty gUlls iu position with 3,000
men and six guns was of course a military impossibility. nut
Chabert bad the excusc tlmt he did not, and could not, know what
he was doing. His attempt was of course doomed to failure: his
battery was blown to pieCes by the Spanish guns, acting fmlll
a conccntric position, the momcnt that it opened. His four
battalions, after pushing oo.ck Coupigny'!I skirmishing line for
a few hundred yards, were presently checked by the rcserW$ which
the Spaniard sent forward. Having come to a stand they soon had
to retire, and with heavy los..". The brigade drew ooek to the cover
of the olive groves behind it, lelwing two dismounted guns out in
the open.
Behind Chabert the enormous convoy was blocking thc way as far
back as the bridge of the Rumblar. Fi"e hWldrcd WagollS with
their two 01' four oxen apiece, took lip, when strung along the road,
more than two and a hnlf miles. Dupont, who rode up at the
sound of the cannon, and now clearly saw the Spanish line drawn
up on n front of two miles north and south of the road, reali7.ed
that this was no skirmish but a pitched battle. His action was'
govemoo by the fact t1w.t he every moment expected to hear the
gUlls of Castaiio:; thundering behind him, und to find that he wus
attacked in rear as well tI.S in frOllt. He accordingly resolved to
delivel' a SC(.'Ond n.c;sault Wl (juickly as possiblc, before this evil
chance might come upon him, 'Vith some difficulty the Swiss
battalions, Dllpre's brignde of light ca.vnlry, lLnd Pri\'e's dragoons
pushed their WilY past the cOllvoy and got into the open. They
were terribly tired, having marched all night and covered fifteen
miles of bad road, hut their general threw them at once into the
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fight: PtUlnetiel"s brigade and the Marines of the Guard were still
far to the rear, ut or Ileal' the bridge of the llumblar.
Dupont's second attack was a fearful mistake: he should at all
costs have concentrated his whole ann)' for one de:;pel'llte'stroke,
for there was no more chance that 6,000 men could break the
Spanish line than thcre had been that Clmbert's 3,000 could do so.
l}ut without waiting for Pannetier to come up, he delivered his
second attack. The four Swiss battalions advanced to the north
of the road, Chabert's rallied brigade to the SQuth of it: to the
right of the latter were Pri\'C's heavy cavalry, two and a half
regiments strong, with whom Dupont intell(k>d. to deliver his main
blow. The)' charged with admirable vigour and precision, cut up
two Spanish battalions which failed to form square in time, and
cleared the summit of the Cerrajon. But when, disordered with
their first success, the)' rode up against Coupigny's reserves, they
failed to break through, Their own infantry was too far to the
rear to help them, and after a l,l'tl1lant struggle to hold their
ground, the dragoons IUld cuirassiers fell OOck to their old position.,
';Vhen they were already checked, ChaUert and Schramm pushed
forward to try their fortune; beaten off by the central battery of
the Spanish line and its infantry supports, they recoiled to the oo/:."C
of the oli\'e wood, and there reformed.
The }"rcnch were now growing disheartened, and Dllpont saw
disaster impending over him so closely that he seems to have lost
his head, and to have retained no other idea save that of hurling
every man that he could bring up in .fr:uitlcss tl.ttacks Oil the
Spanish centre. He hurried up from the rear Panlletier's brigade
of infantry, leaving at the bridge of the Rumblar only the single
battalion of the Marines of the Guard. At eight o'clock the
rcinforccmenbl had l..'Oille up, and the nttack was I'Cncwl..-d.. This
time the main stress was at the northern end of the line, where
Pannetier Wal; thrown forwnrd, with orders to drive Ueding's right
wing off' the Cerro del Zl1mn.car Grallde, while the other battalions
rencwed their assault IlbtUinst the Spanish centre and left. But thl'
exhausted trooP!! on the l'ight of the line, who had been fighting
since daybreak, madc little imprl..'SSion 011 Coupigny's front, und
Reding's last reserves were brought forward to check and hold off
the onc fl'CSh brignde of which Dupont could dispose.
The fourth attack had failed. The French general had now
but onc intact battalion, that of the Marines of the Guard, which
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had been left with the bae,crgage at the bridge over the Rumblar,
to protect the rear against the possible ud\'cnt of Casltulos. As
there were still no signs ofan attack from that side, Dupollt brought
up this corp~, ranged it across the road in the CClltrc of the lillc,
,md drew up behind it all that could be rallied of Chabeli's and
l\mneticl"s men. The whole forlllL'd a sort of wedge, with which
he hoped to break thl'Ough the Spanish centre by one IfLSt effort.
The cuyalry uunlllccd 011 the flanks, Prin"!'s brigade to the south,
DnprC's to the north of the road. Dupollt himself, with all his
staff' around him, placed himself at the head of the marines, and
rode in front of the line, waving his sword llnd rolling to the men
that tlllS time they must cut their way through [1~.30 1',.11.].
All was in vain: the attack was pressed home, the marines
pushed up to the very muzzles of the Spani:;h cunnon plm..'cd aeross
the high TOad, and Dupnfs chassenrs drove in two b.'l.ttalions in
llcdiug's right centre. But the column could get no further for-
ward: the marines were almost exterminated: Dupre was shot
dcru1: Dllpont rccci\'ed lI. painful (but Hot dIUlf,rcroUS) wound in
the hip, and rode to the rear. 111en the whole attack collapsed,
and the l"rc.nch rolled buck in utter disorocl· to the olive gnwes
wllich sheltered their real'. 'l1le majority of the rank and file of
the two Swiss regiments in the centre threw up the butts of thcil'
muskets in the air and surrendcred-or rather desertLu-to the
enemy'.
At this moment, just us the firing diL.'!} dowlI ut the &·ont, 11
lively fusillade was heard from another quarter. Cruz':i\iurgeon's
light column, fwm the side of the mountains, had come down upon
the Rumblar bridge, and had begun to attack the small ~rre­
guunl 2 which rcmailled with the COllVOy. All was up. Cruz-
Murgeoll was the forerunner of La l}efia, Ilnd Dupont had not a
man left. to scmI to protect his rear. 'l11C battalions were ull broken
up, the wearied infantry had cast themselycs down in the shade of
the olive groves, und could not be induced even to rise to their feet.
Most of them were gasping for water, which could llot be got, for
] That the desertion was pretty general is shown by the (act that o( 2,000
men or thC~1l corps only 308 were recorded as prisonol'!! in tile Spanish official
returlIS. If 300 more had ocen killL'tl and wounded, 1,400 must have deserted.
Hardly aDyofficerswereamong those who went over to the enem)' j Schramm,
their COlllm,mder. was "'oumled.
I Three companies of l'anuetie/s brigade.
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the stream-beds which cross the field were all dried up. and only at
the Uumblll.r could 0. drink be obt..n.ined. Not 2,000 men out of the
original 11,000 who had started from Andujar could be got
together to oppose n feeble front to Rcding and Coupigny. It was
onI)· by keeping up a slow artillery fire, from the few pieces that
had not been silenced or dismounted, that uny show of resi!ltance
could be made. \Vhen the attack from the rear, which Wlls
obviously impending, should be delivered, the whole fOJ;"L'C mw.t
clearly be destroyed.
Wishing at least to get some sort of terms for the men whom he
hOO led into such it desperate position, Dupont at two o'clock sent
his aide-dc-camp, Captain Villoutreys, one of the Emperor's equerries,
to ask for a suspension of hostilities from lteding. He offered to
c\'acuate Andalusia, not only with hi':! own troops but with those
of VL>dcl und Dufour, in return for a free passage to Madrid. This
WM nsking too much, and if the Spanish general had been aware
of thc dcsperntc stutc of his ooversuq, he would not have listened
to the proposal for a minute. But he did not know that La Peiia
was now close in Dupont's rear, while he was fully aware that
Vedel, returning too late from the passes, wns now drawing near
to the field from the north. His men were almost as exhausted as
those of Dupont, many had died from sunstroke in the ranks, and
he did not refuse to nebtOtiate. He merely replied that he had no
power to treat, and that all communications should be made to his
chief, who must be somcwhere in the direction of Andujar. He
would grant a suspension of arms for a few hours, while a French
and a Spanish officer should ride off'together to seek for Castafi08.
Dupont accepted these terms gladly, all the more so because
La Pena's di\'ision had at last reached the Rumblar bridge, and
had announced its approach by four cannon-shots, fired at regular
intervals, as a signal to catch ReWng's ear. It was with the
greatest difficulty that the commander of the fourth Andalusian
division could be got to rceoglli~..e thc lll'lllistice granted by his
colleague; he saw the l"rench at his mercy, and wanted to fall
Upoll thcm while they were still in disorder. :But after some
argument he consented to halt. Captain VilIoutreys, accompanied
by the Spanish Colonel Copons, rode through his linL"S to look for
Cnstafios.
The Spanish commander-ill-chief had displa)'oo most blame-
worthy torpidity on this day. He had let Dupont slip away from
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Andujar, and did not discover that he was gone till dawn had
"arrived. Then, instead of pursuing at full speed with all his forces,
he had sent on La Pef'ia's division, while he lingered behind with
that of Feux Jone:;;, surveying the cnemy's empty lines, The fourth
division must hll,ve marched late and moved slowly, as it only reached
the Rumblar bridge-twelve miles f!'Om Andujar-ut about ~ p.m.
It could easily have been there by 8 or 9 a.m., and might have
fallen upon Dupont while he was delivering one of his earlier
attacks on the &ylen position.
At much the same moment that Villoutrep and Capons
reached Castaiios at Andujar, at about five o'clock in the after-
noon, the second half of the French army at last appeared upon
the scene. General Vedel had discovered on the eighteenth that
he had nothing to fear from the side of the pass~. He therefore
called down all Dufour's troops, save two battalions left at Sa.nta
E1cnll, united the two divisions .at La. Carolina, and brave orders
for their return to Baylen on the follov{ing morning. Leaving
the bivouac at five o'dock V...'<1el, with somc 9,000 or 9,500 men,
marched down the defilc for ten miles as far as the villa",ae of
Gunrroman, which he reached about 9.80 or 10 a.m. l The day
was hot, the men were tired, and though the noise of a distant
cannonade could be distinctly heard in the direction of llaylen, the
general told his officers to allow their battalions two hours to cook,
and to rest themselves. By some inexplicable careles..'mess the two
hours swelled tu four, and it was not till 2 p.m. thnt the column
started out again, to drop do,:n to Baylen. An hour before the
French marched, the cannonade, which had been gl'Owling in the
distance all through the mid-day rest, suddenly died down. Vede1
was in nowise disturbed, and is Sll.id to have remarked that his
chief had probably made an end of the Spanish corps which had
been blocking the road between them.
After this astonishing display of sloth and slackncss, Vedel pro-
cerooo along the road for ten miles, till he came in sight of the
rear of thc Spnnish position at Btlylcll. His cavalry soon brought
him the news that the troops visible upon the hillsides were
enemies: they cOllsist.cd of the brigade which Rcding had told off
1 There is some dispute as to the exact hours ofVctlcl'!1 st.art and halt:
I bal'C adoptcd, morc or less, thooc givcn by Cabally. Vcdel himself, wben
examined by the court-martial, said' qu·it ne pouvait pas preciser l'heure;
whid is (luite in keeping with the rest of his doings.
ox",", l ()
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at the lxlginning of the day to :tto1d the height of San Cristobal
and the Cen'O del Ahorcado against a possible attack from the
rear. It was at last clear to VOOd that things hnd not gone well
at Baylen, and that it was his duty to press in upon the Spaniards,
and endeavour to cut his way through to his chief. He htu! begun
to deploy his troops across the defile, with the ohjecl of attacking
both the flunking hills, when two offkers with I:l. white flug rude out
towards him. They announced to him that Dupont had been
beaten, and had asked for a suspension of hostilities, which had
been granted, La. Pelia's troops had stayed their advance, and he
was asked to do the same.
Either because he doubted. the tmUl of these statements, or
because he thought that his appearance would improve Dupont's
position, Vedel refused to halt, and sent back the Spanish officers
to tell Rcdi.ng that he should attack him. This he did with small
delay, falling on the brigade opposed to him with great fury.
Boussard's dragoons charged the troops on the lower slopes of the
Cerro del Ahorcado, and rode into two battalions who were so
much relying on the armistk'C that they were surprised with their
arms still piled, cooking their (!\'ening meal. A thousand men
were taken prisoners almost without firing a shot I. Cmlsagncs'
infantry attacked the steep height of San Cristobal witb less goorl
fortune: his first assault was beaten off, and Vedel was preparing
to succonr him, when 0. second white flag' came ont of Baylen. It
was carried by a Spanish officer, who brought with him De Barbarin,
one of Dupont's aides-de-romp. The gencral had scnt a written
communication ordering Vedel to cease firing and remain quiet, as
an annistice hud been concluded, and it was hoped that Castuiios
would consent to a convention. 'The moment that his answer was
received it should lxl passed on; meanwhile the attack must be
stopped and the troops withdrawn.
Vedel obeyed: clearly he eould do nothing else, for Dupont was
his hierarchicnl Stlperior, and, 8..<; far as he could see, was still a free
agent. Moreover, De Barbarin told him of the very easy terms
which the commander-in-chief hoped to get from Castalios. If
they eould be seeured it would be unIlL'(."Cssary. as well U!l risky, to
continue the attack. For La Pelia might very possibly have anni-
I Apparently they were the 1st batlalioll of the Irlanda regiment, and the
militia of Joou. lLC(:onliug to the Ilurrntive of Maapoey and Goicooehea
(Arteclle, ii. 612).
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huated the beuten divisi~1l before Vedcl could force his way to its aid,
since hOffie and foot were both 'fought out,' and there was neither
strength nor spirit for resistance left among them. Veclcl therefore
was justified in his obedience to his superior, and in his withdrawal
to a point two miles up the La Carolina road.
Meanwhile Villoutreys, the emiSSllry of Dupont, hlld reached the
camp of Castafios at Andujar 1 late in the afternoon, and laid his
chief's proposn.ls before the Spania.rd. Ai> might have been expected,
they were declined-Dupont was in the trap, and it would have
been absUlu to let him off so ea.siJ)'. No great objection was made
to the retreat of Vedcl, but Castui'ios said that the corps caught
between La. Pei'ia and Ueding must lay down itll ann&. Early next
morning (July 9l0) VilloutreYi:! returned with this reply to the
French camp.
Dupont meanwhile had spent a restless night. He had gone
round the miserable bivouac of his men, to see if they would be in
tl eondition to fight next morning, in the event of the negotiations
failing. 'I11e result was most discouraging; the soldiers were in
dire straits for want of water, they had little to eat, and WCl'C so
worn out that they could not be roused e\"en to gather in the
wowlded. The brigadiers and colonels 'reported that they could
hold out no prosped of a rally on the morrow 2. Only Prive, the
(,'Ommander of the heavy-cavalry brigade, spoke in favour of
flgbting; the others doubted whether even 2,000 men could be got
together for a rush at tpc Spanish lines. When an aide-de-camp,
whom Vcdel had been allowed to send to his chief, asked wllether
it would not be possible to make a concerted attack on lleding
next morning, with the object of disengaging the surrowlded
division, Dupont told him that it was no use to dream of any such
thing. Vl.-del must prepare for a prompt retreat, in order to sa....e
himself; no more could be done.
At dawn, nothing huving been yet settled, La Pefia wrote to
Dupont threutening that if the 1,000 men who had been captured
] Or, according to some autIlOrities, met Castai'iOll at the first post-house
out of Allduj"r, 011 tILe HuylelJ root!.
2 No oue confesses the demoralization of the French troops more than J.<'oy .
• Dupont voulait combattre encore. " .. Mais pour executer des resolutions
vigoureuS(!s i1 fallait des soIdats ii. conduire. Or, ces infortum!s "'ewent plus
des soldats; c'etait UII troupe&u dominI;! par 11)8 besoins physiques, sur h..~lIel
les influences morales n'avaiellt plus de prise. La souifrance Iwait ache\'1;!
d'cllcrver tell oourages.'
,2
196 THE CAPITULATION OF BAYLlli'l
,
[JuLv20
by Vcdcl on the previous day were not ut onec released, he should
consider the armistice at an end, and order his division to advance.
The request was reasonable, as they had been 'surprised and taken
while relying on the suspension of arms. Dupont ordered his
s!!oordinatc to send them oock to ReJillg's camp. Castaiios mean·
while was pressing fOl" a reply to his demand for surrender; he had
brought up Felix Junes's division to join La Pel1a's in the early
morning, so thnt he had over 14,000 men massed on the right bank
of the Rumblar and ready to attack 1, Dupont was well aware of
this, and hud made up his mind to sU1'loclldcr whell he realized the
hopeless demorali:oo..ation of his troops. Early in the morning he
called a council of war; ilie ofJiI..-efS present, after a short discussion,
drew up and signed a document in which they declared that' the
honour of the French arms had been sufficiently vindicated by the
battle of thc previous day: that in a.ccepting the enemy's tenus
the commander-in-chief was yielding to evident military necessity:
that, surrounded by 40,000 enemies, he WI18 justified in averting by
an honourable treaty the destnlction of his corps.' Only the
cavalry brigadier Prive, refUSL>d to put his nalIle to the paper, on
which appear the signatures of three generals of division, of the
officers commanding the artillery and engineers, of two brigadiers,
alid of three {:ommanders of regiments.
After this formality was ended Generals Chabelt and l\Iarescot
rode out from the F~ncL calllp nud mct Custmios. Thcy had
orders to make the best tcrm~ they could: in a general way it WllS
recognized that the compromiscd division could not escape sur-
render, and that Vedel and Dufourwould probably have to CWl-cuate
Aitdulusia and stipulate for !\ free passaf,re to Madrid. The
Spaniards were not, as it seems, intending to ask for llluch more.
But while they wel"C haggling 011 such petty points as the forms of
surrender, and the exemption of officers' baggllcIJ'C from SClI.rc.h,
a·new factor was introduced into the discussion. Some irregulars
from the Sierra Morcna came to CllStaiios, bringing with thcm as
a prisoner an aide-de--camp of Savary 2. They had secured his
dispatch, which was a peremptory order to Dupont to .evacuate
Andalusia with all his three divisions, and fall back towards
Madrid. This put a new fnee on Il.fl-airs, for Cnstaiios BnW that
I Namely, 6,600 of La Peiia's men, 5,400 of Jones's, and 2,500 or 3,000 of
Cr'uu-Murgeon's flying column.
~ HiB name Wll8 Captain de Fcne10n (Cnball)'J p. 178).
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if he conceded a free retreat to Vedel and nu/our, he would be
enabling them to carry out exactly the movement which Savary
intended. To do so would clearly be undesirable: he therefore
interposed in the negotiations, and declared that the troops of
theS(! two generals should lIot be allowed to quit Andalusia by
the road which had lx-en hitherto proposed. 'Dley must be sent
round by sea to some port of Fmnce not immediately contiguoll!'
with the Spanish frontier.
Chabc.rt and l\farcscol, as was natural, declaimed vehemently
against this projeded change in the capitulation, and declared that
it was inudmissible. But the)' wcre answered in even more violent
terms by the turbulent Condc de 'Itll)', who attended as repre-
sentative of the Junta of Seville. Hc taunted them with their
atrocities at the sack of CoruOVIl, and threatencd that if the
negotiations fell UU'()ugh no quartel' should be given to the French
army. At last Castailos suggested a compromise: he offered to
let Dupont's troops, no less than those of Vedel, return to France
by sea, if the claim that the latter should be allowed to retreat on
Madrid were withdrawn. This W3$ conceding much, and the French
gcncrnls accepted the pl'Oposul.
Accordingly Castafios and Till)', representing the Spaniards.
and Chabel't and Marcscot, on behalf of Dupont, signed pre-
liminaries, by whicll it was agreed that the sun'ounded divisions
should formally lay down their anns and become prisoners of
war, while Vedel's mcn should nut be t."U~sidered to have capitu-
lated, nor make any act of surrender. Both bodies of lIlell should
leave Andalusia by sea, and be taken to Rochefort on Spanish
"essels. <The Spanish anny,' 50 ran the curiously worded se"enth
article of the capitulation, <guarantees them against all hostile
aggression during their pasSIl'bae.' The other clauses contain
nothing striking, suvc some mthcl'liberal permissions to the French
officers to take B.\\'ay their bng~"'C--eachgen<rral was to be allowed
two wheeled "ehicles, each field offiC(lr or stnfl' officer onc-without
its being cxamined, This article caught the eye of Napoleon, and
has been noted by mUllY subsequent critics, who havc maintaint."<1
that Dupont and his colleagues, gorged with the plunder of
Cordova, surrcndered before they needed, in order to preserve their
booty intact, That they yielded before it was inevitable we do
not believe: but far more anxiety than was becoming seems
to have been shown regarding the bagg~, This anxiety finds
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easy explanation if the Spanish official statement, that more than
£40,000 in hard cash, and a great quantity of jewellery and silver
plate was afterwards found in the fourgo'l.3 of the staff and the
superior officers, be accepted as correct 1,
The fifteenth clause of the capitulation had COntents of still
more doubtful propriety: it was to the effect that as many pieces
of church plate had been stolclJ at the sack of (Ardova, Dupont
undertook to make a search for them and restore them to the
sanctuaries to which they belonged, if they could be found in
existence, The confession was so scandalous, that we share
Napoleon's wonder that such a claillle could ever have been passed
by the two French negotiators; if they were aware that the charge
of thcft was true (as it no doubt was), shame should have prevented
them from putting it on paper: if they thought it false, they were
permitting a gratuitous insult to the French '&rmy to be inserted
in the capitulation.
"While the negotiations were going OD, Dupont sellt secret orders
to Vedel to abscond during the night, llnd to .retreat 011 Madrid
as fast as he was able. Chabert and l\farescot had ,of course no
knowledge of this, 01' they would ho.rdly !:Ja.Yc consented to include
that general's troops in the convention. In accordance with his
!luperior's orders, and with the obvious necessities of the <:ase,
Vcdel made off' on the night of July 20-~n, leaving only a screen
of pickets in frout of his position, to conceal his departure from
the Spaniards as long as was possible. On the return of his
plellipotentillrics to his camp 011 thc monung of the twenty-first,
Dupont learnt, to his surprise and discontent, that they had in-
dud<.>d Vooel's division ill thci1' bargain with Castm1os. But as
that officer was now far away-he had reached La Carolina at
daybreak and Snnta EIena by noon-the <:ommnndcr-ill-chicf hop<.'<i
that his troops were sal·cd.
'11lc anger of the Spaniards at disco\'ering the evasion of the
second French division lllay easily be imngined. Reeling, who was
thc first to become aware of it, sent down un offiCe!' into Dupont's
camp, with the message that if Vedel did not instantly return, he
should regard the t.'o!lvcntioll Il.S broken, and fall upon the sur-
rounded troops: he should give no quarter, as he considered that
I It will 00 fOllnel ill u,,~ (~,~etfl de Madrid of October 9, 1808. It is sbIted
that 00,000 dollars ill silver and 136,000 dollars in gold, I.Jesiues 11luch lllattl
alld jewellery> were found in thej(llItgQ1U' of Dllpout and his staff.
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treachery had been shown, and that the armistice had been abused.
Dupant could not hope to make a stand, and was at the enemy's
mercy. He dire<:ted his chief of the staff to write an order bidding
Vcdcl to halt, and sent it to him by one of his aides-de-camp,
accompanied by a Spanish officer. This did not satisfy RL'<1ing,
who insisted that Dupont should write all autograph letter of hi.~
own in stronger terms. His demand could not be refused, and
the two dispatches reached Vedel almost at the Mme hour, AA
he was resting hlli troops at Santa EJeua before plunging into the-
passes.
Vedc1, as all his previous oonduct had shown, was weak and
wanting in initiative. Some of his officers tried to persuade him
to push Oil, amI tu leave Dupont to make the best h::rms for
himself that he could. Much was to be said in favour of this
rellOlvc: he might- have argul..x! that silK'C he hud never been
without the power of retreating, it wu.~ wrong of his superior to
include him ill the capitulatiun. His duty to the Emperor would
be to save his men, whatever might be the consequences to Dupont.
The latter, surl"Oundeel as he was, could hardly be considered II free
IIhtCnt, and his orders might be disregarded. But such views were
far from Veelel's mind: he automatically obeyed his chief's dispatch
and halted. Ne.'...t day he marched his troops back to Buylen, in
consequence of a third communication from Dupont.
On July ::zg Dupont's troops laid down thCil· arms with full
fOTmll.1ities, defiling to the sound of military music before the divi·
sions of La Peiio. and Jones, who were drawn up by the Humblar
bridge. On the twenty·fourth Vedel's and Dufour's troops, without
any such humiliating ceremony, stacked their muskets and cannon
on the hillsides cast of Baylen and marched for the coast. When
the two corps were numbered it was fonnd that 8,242 unwounded
men had surrClldelocd with Dupont: nearly 2,000 morc, dead or
wounded. were left. on the battle-field; seven or eight hundred of
the Swiss battalions hud descrtl..'<l and diSiLppenred. 'Vith V(.'<lei
9,300 men laid down their arms 1. Not only did he deliver up his
I This total of 17,636, given in the Spanish returns, seems absolutely
certain. It tallies very \Vell witll the original figures of the r'rCllc1L divisions,
"'helL losses in thc campaign llre allowcd for. 1 find in the Vrwglum Pupe'T¥
It rolltempoxary Spanish scrap of unknown provellanCe, giving somewhat
different figures,;u; follows :-Dupont'i corps: ullwoundcd prisoners, 6,000 ;
killed awl wouoded 011 tllc field, 3,000; Swiss deserters, 1,200; sick captured
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own column, but he called down' the battalion guarding the
Despeila Perms pass. Even the troops left beyond the defiles in
La Mancha. were summoned to surrender by the Spaniards, and
some of them did so, though they were not really included in the
capitulntion, which was by its wording confined to French troops
in Andalusia. But the commanders of three battalions allowed
themselves to be intimidated by Colonel CnIZ.·Murgeon, who wellt
to seck them at the head of a few cavalry, and tamely laid down
their arms 1.
'lile Spaniards had won their success at very small cost. Reding'!;
division returned a casualty list of 117 dead and 403 wounded, ill
which were included the losses of the skirmish of July ]6 as well as
those of the battle of the nineteenth. Coupigny lost 100 dead and
294 wounded. La PClla's and Cruz-Murgeon's columns, which hud
barely got into touch with the French when the armistice was
granted, ClLnnot have lost more than £L score or two of men. 'l'hc
total is no more than 954. There were in addition 998 prisoners
captured by Vcdel when he attAcked from the rear, but these were,
of course, restored on the twentieth, in consequence of the orders sent
by Dupont, along with two guns ami two regimental standards.
Castaii.os, a man of untarnished honour, had every intention of
carrying out the capitulation. The French troops, divided into
small columns, were sent dO\m to the coust, or to the small towns
of the Lower Guadalquivir under Spanish escorts, which had some
difficulty in preserving them from the fnry of the peasantry. It WilS
necessary to avoid the large towns like Cordovaand Seville, wherethe
passage of the unarmed prisoners would certainly have led to riois
J and massacres. At~iia the mob actually succeeded in murdering
sixty unfortunate Frenchmen. But when the troops had been con-
ducted to their temporary destinations, it was found that difficultie'l
hnd arisen. The amount of Spanish shipping an1.ilable would not
IDwe carried 20,000 men. This was a comparatively small hindrance,
ns the troops could hR\'e been sent off in detachments. But it was
iD the hospitals, 400 ; making a total of 10,600. Whittingham, tbe EJlglish
at:t:lche in Castafios' camp, gives another set :-uDwouuded prisoners, 0,500;
killed and wounded, 2,000; Swiss dcsert.erfl, 1,100; making 9,200. Rut both
of these ,1nl confessedly rougll estimates, tllougb made on the. spot. As to
the otber French prisoners, the Vaugban document says tbat 9,100 sur-
rendered witl! Vedel, 800 in the p8S!leEl, and 700 more in La Maucha.
I Battalions surrendcred at Santa CrUir" nwl ut M'llIzu/J<U'cs. Bul tbe officer
in command at Madridcjos refused to be cajoled, and retreated on Madrid.
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more serious that LorJ. Collingwood, the commander of the Briti:oh
squadron off Cadi7" refused his permission for the embarkation of
the French. He observl..-o. that Castanos hud promised to send
])upont's arm)' home by water, without considering whether he had
the power to do SQ. The British fleet commanded the SCll, and
was blockading Rochefort, the port which the capitulation assigned
for the landing of the captive army. No represcnl:uti\'c of Great
Britain had signed the convention \ and she was not bound by it.
He must flnd ont, by consulting his government, whether the
transference of the troops of Dupont to France was to be allowed.
all hClll'illg of the difficulties raised by Collingwood, Caslafios
got into communication with Dupont, and drew up six supple-
mentary articles to the convention, in which it was stipulated that
if the Britiflll Government objected to Rochefort as the port at
which the French troops were to be l.anded, some other place should
be selected. If all passage by sea was denied, a way by land. should
be granted by the Spaniards. This agreement was signed at Seville
on August 6, but meanwhile the Junta was being incited to break
the convention. Several of its more reckless and fanatical members
openly broached the idea that no faith need be kcpt with those
who had invaded Spain undcr such treachcrous pretences. The
ncwspapers were full of talcs of l~rcllch outrages, and. protests
O-ofl'tlinst the liberation of the spoilers of Cordova. and J aen.
Matters came to a head when Dllpont wrote to l\Iorltlt the
Captain-General of ~<\.lldalusia, to protest against further delays,
and to require that the first division of his army should be allowed
to sail at once [August 8]. He received in reply a most shame·
less and. cynicnlletter 2. The Captnin-Gcncral began by declaring
that there werc no ships available. But hc then wcnt on to state
that no more bad. been promised than that the Junta would request
the British to allow the French troops to sail. He supposed that
it was probable that a blank refusal would be sent to this demand..
Why should Britain allow the passage by sea of troops who were
destined to be llSoo against her on somc other point of the theatre of
I 11lere hud been a British att.1chC, Captnin Whittingham, :It Castafios'
head quartcrs. '111e Freudl llegotiators had tried to induce ]1;111 to approve
the tenns of capitulation. But he vcry wisely refusctl, hllving no authority
to do so.
, 111;8 will be found printed at length in the Appendix of Papers relating
to BaylCll.
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war? MorIa next insinuated that Dupont himself must hayc been
well aware that the capitulation could not be carried out. 'Your
Excellency's object in inserting these conditions was merely to
obtain terms· which, impossible as they were to execute, might
yet give a show of honour to the inevitable surrender.... ""\i\7bat
right have you to require the performance of tlll.."SC impossible COil"
ditiolls on behalf of an army which entered Spain under a pretence
of alliull(.'C, and then imprisoned our King and print'es, sacked his
palaces) slcw and roblx.xl. his subjects, wusted his provinces, and
tore away his crown?'
After a delay of some weeks Lord Collillgwood sent in to the
Junta the reply of his gm-cl·nment. It was far from heing of the
kind that Moria alld his fxicnds had hoped. Canning had answered
that no stipulations made at Baylen could bind Great llritain, but
that to oblige her allic.s, and to avoid compromising their honour,
she conscnted to allow the French army to be scnt oock to Francc,
and to be landed in su<:<:essive detachments of 4,000 men at som"e
port between Brest and Rochefort (i.e. at NUlltcs or L'Oricnt).
It is painful to have to add that neither the Junta of Seville nor
the Supreme Ccutral JWIUt, which superseded thut body, took any
.c;teps to carry out tins project. Dupont himself, his generals, and
his staff, were sent home to }rance, but their unfortunate troops
were kept for a time in cantonments in Andalusia, then sent on
board pontoons in the Bay of Cadiz, where they were subjected to
all manner of ill lIAAgc and half-starved, and finally dispatched
to the desolate rock of Cabrera, in the Balearic Islands, where more
than half of them perished of cold, disease, and insufficient nourish-
ment i. Vedel'.s men were imprisoned no less than Dupont's, and
the survivors were only released at the conclll.c;ion of the general
peace of 1814.
So ended tile strange and ill-fought campaign of llaylen. It is
clear that Dupont's misfortun~ were of his own creation. He
ought nevcr to havc lingered at Andujar till July WM far spent,
!Jut should either have massed his three divisions and fallen upon
Castafios, 01' have retired to a safe defensive position at Da)'len 01'
La Carolina and have waited to be attacked. He might have
united something m'er 20,000 mcn, and could have defied eYcry
, For the lLorrors of Cabrcra, the works of three of the prisoners, Ducor of
the Marines of the Guanl, and GiIle and Wagre of Vedel's division, may be
consulted. TILcir story is uecl'ly Uistressing.
18O!l] ClUTlCISM OF THE CAMPAIGN 208
effort of the S5,000 Spaniards to drive him buck over the Sierra
Morena. By dividing his army into fractions and persisting in
holding Andujnr, he brought ruin upon himself. But the precise
fonn in which the ruin came about was due less to Dupont than to
Vcdcl. That officer's blind and irmtional. march on La Carolina
and abandonment of Daylen on .Jnly 17-18 gave the Spaniards the
dltlll(:e of illterp<lsing bctWL'Cll the two halves of the French army.
If Vedcl had made a proper reconnaissance on the seventeenth,
he would have found that Rcding had not marchl..>U for the passes,
but was still lingering at l\1engibar. Instead, however, of' sweeping
the countl")'·sidc for tra<.'Cs of the enemy. he cr<xlitcd a wild rumour,
and hurried off to .La Carolina, leaving the fatal gap behind him.
All that followed was his fault .. not only did he compromise the
campaign by his march back to the passes, but when he hnd d.is-
covered his mistake he returned with a slowness that was inexcus~
able. If he had used ordinury diligence he might yet haye sa.voo.
Dupont on the nineteenth: it was his halt at Guarroman, while the
cannon of llllylen were thundering in his ears, that gave the last
finishing touch to the disru.ter. If he hud. l:ome upon the battle~
field at ten in the morning, instead of at five in the afternoon, he
l;ould haye aided his chief to cut his way through, and eyen have
inflicted a heavy blow Oil lleding and Coupigny. A careful study
of Vcdcl's actions, from his liNt PIlSSao<Y'C of Ule Sierra Morena to his
surrender, shows that on every possible occasion he took the wrong
course.
But e\'en if we grant that Vedel made m-cry poosible mistake, it
is nevertheless true that Dupont fought his battle most unskilfully.
If he had marehed on the morning instead of the night of July 18,
he probably might have brushed past the n-ont of lloo.ing and
Coupigny without suffering any greater disaster than the loss of his
OOggllf,TC. Even as things actually fell out, it is not certain that
he need havc been forced to surrender. He had 10,000 men, the
two Spanish generals had 17,000, but had been forced to detach
somc 3,500 bayonets to b7Uard against the possible rcappcaram:c of
Vedel. If Dupont htl(l refused to waste his men in partial and
SUCL'<:ssi~·c alLacks, and had lllasSed them for a vib"Orous RS!Illult
011 the left wing of the SPaniards, where Coupigny's position on
the slopes of the Ccrrujon was neither very strong nor very well
'defined, he might yet hD.\'c cut his way through, tllough probably
his immense baggage-train would have been lost. It is fair,
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however, to remember that this chancc was only granted him
beca.usc CasbulO6, in front of Andujar, was slow to .discover his
retreat alld still slower to pursuc him. If that officer had shown
rool cnergy, ten thousand men might have been pressing Dupont
from the rear before eight o'clock in the morning.
Ai; it was Dupont mismanaged nU Ule dctails of his atl:m:k. He
made four assaults with fractions of his anny, a~d on a long front.
The leading brigades were completely worn out and demorali ... ed
before the reserves were sent into action. The fifth il.'lSault, "in
which every man was at last brought forward, failed because the
majority of the troops were nlready convinro:l that the day wns
lost., and were no longer capable of any great exertions. It is
absurd to accuse DUPOllt of cowardiee---he exposed his persOn
freely and was wounded-and still more absurd to charge him (as
did the Emperor) with treason. He did not surrcnder till he saw
that thcrc was no possible hope of salvation remaining. But there
can be no doubt that he showed great incapacity to grasp the
situation, lost his hcad, and threw away all his chances.
Ai; to the Spaniards, it can truly be said that they were
extremely fortunate, and that c\'en their mistakes helped them.
Castai'ios framed his plan for surrounding Dupont on the h)'pothc~is
that the main French army Wll:l cOIl(:entrated at Alldujar. If this
had indeed been the case, and Dupont had retained at that plac.:e
somc 15,000 or 17,000 men, the turning movement of Booing and
Coupigny would have been hazardons in the extreme. But the
French general was obliging enough to divide llis force into two
eqnal parbl, and his snbordinate led away onc of the halves 011 a
wild march back to the passes. Again Booing acted in the most
strange und Wlskilful way on July 17; after dcfeating Liger-Dclair
and Dufour he ought to have seized Baylen. Instead, he remained
torpid in his eamp for a day and a half: this mistakc led to thc
far more inc.'Xcusable error of Vedel, who failed to see his advcrsary,
and mtlrchOO off to La Carolina. But Vcdcl's blindness does 110t
excuse Booing's sloth. On the actual day of battle, on the other
hund, Beding behaved very well: he showed considemule tcnacity,
And his troops deserve great credit. It was no mean achievement
for 13,000 or 14,000 I Spaniards, their ranks full of raw recruits
I "re mu~t deduct the seven battalions (3,500 or 4/lOO men) wllich llad
been tlcw.ehcd to t]IC rear to watch for Vcdcl'g ap!lroach, autI were uever
engaged with !>UpoUt'B troops.
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and interspersed with battalions levied only five weeks before, to
withstand the attack of 10,000 French, even if the latter were
badly handled by their general. 'l'he Andalusians had good reason
la be pmud of their ,·idor)'. though they might have refmincd
from calling DUPOllt's Legions of Reserve and provisional regiments
the 'invincible troops of Austcrlitz and Fricdlund,' us they were
too prone to do. 'They had at least succeeded in beating in the
open field and capturing (l. whole French army, a thillg which no
continental nation had accomplished since the wars of the Revolu-
tion began.
NOTE
Sir Charlel! Vnughan, alwll.)'s in sC.'lrch of first-l"lIu] i1tformntioo, called 011
Castaiios and had a long eonversation with him concerning the Convention.
, finu among his papers the follo"';ng notes :-
, Among other particulars of the surrender, General Castafios stated that
the french General Marescot had tIle greatest illtluence in bringing it about.
TIUl gre...t llifficulty was 1.0 persuade tItem [l\fart)SCot am! CIJabert] to capitul'lte
for Vedel's army as well all Dupout'8. A letter had been intercepted ordering
Vedel back to Madrid, and another ordering Dupont to retire. 'l1lis letter
had consillerable effect with the French: but the offer of carrying away their
baggage and the plunder of the country was no sooner made, than the two
generals desired to be permitt.et.l to retire and deliberate :lloue. After a few
minutes they acceph--d the proposal. But General Cnstauoo, to nlllke tha
article of as little value 3!1 possible, got them to insert the clause that the
"'rench officer8 should he allowed to emt..-.rk all their baggage, &c., fllX:ordillg
to IM laMl of Spain. He well knew that those laws forbid the exportatiou
of gold and silver. The consequence Wall that the FrCllcb loot all their more
valmlblo plulldcr wheu embarking at Puerto &mta iUaria.'
SECTION IV
THE ENGLISH IN PORTUGAL
CHAPTER I
THE OUTDREAK OF THE PORTIJGUES,E INSURRECTION
Do....'N to the moment of the general outbreak of the Spanish
insurrection Junot's task in Portugal had not been a diffiClilt one.
As long as Spain and France were still O!>'tensibly allies, he had at
his disposition a ycry large army. He had entered Portugal in
1807 with 25,000 Frellch troops, and during the spring of 1808 he
had received 4,000 men in drafts from Ba)'onne, which more than
filled up the gaps mooc in his battalions by the dreary march from
Ciudad Rodrigo to Abrante:;'. Of the three Spanish divisions
which had been lent to him, 501ano'5 had gone home lo Andulusiu,
but he had still the two others, Caralfa's (7,000 strong) in tIle
valley of the Tagus, and Taranco's at Oporto. The last-named
general died during the ,,;nrer, but his successor, Belesta, still
cOlllmll.ndl..'<! 6,000 men CRlltOIU.'d on the banks of the Douro. Thc
discontent of the Portuguese during the early months of 1808
showed itself by nothing save a few isolated deeds of violence,
provoked by particular acts of oppression on the part of Junot's
subordinates. How promptly and severely they were chastised has
been told in an earlier chapter. There were no signs whatever
of a general rising: the mcans indeed were almost cntirely wanting.
The regulur army had been disbanded or sent off to Francc. The
organization of the militia had been dissolved. The greater part
of the leading men of the country had fled to Brazil with the
Prince-Regent: the bureaucracy and many of the clergy had shown
lL discreditable willingness to conciliate Junot by a tllmc subser-
vience to his orders.
The Duke of Ahrnlltes himself thoroughly enjoyed his Vice-
1 Sce Thit~bau1t, BxpbJitifm de PQrtugal, and For, iv. 003.
lllOO] JUNOTS RULE IN PORTUGAL Q07
royalty, and still deluded himself into believing that he might
yet prove a popular ruler ill Portugal: perhaps he even dreamed of
becoming some day one of Bonaparte's "ns.'>A1-kings. He persisted
in the farce of issuing benevolent proclamations, and expressing his
affection for the noble Portuguese people, till his mastel' at last
grew anh'Ty. • \Vby,' he wrote by the hand of his minister Clarke,
'do you go on making promisCl; which you have no authority to
carry out? Of course, there is no end more laudable than that of
winning the aftectioll and confidence of the inhabitants of Portugal.
But do not forget that the safety of the French army is the first
thing. Disru'm the Portuguese: koop all eye on the disbanded
soldiers, lest reckless leaders should get hold of them and make
them into the Ilucleus of rebel bands . . . Lisbon is an incoll-
veniently large place: it is too populous, and its people cannot
help being hostile to you. Keep your troops outside it, in eunton-
ments along the sea-front': and so forth 1. Meanwhile nnancial
exn.ctious were hcaped on the unfortunate kingdom to contribute
to the huge fine which thc Emperor llad laid upon it: but
there was evidently no chance that such a lu.rge sum conld be
raised, however tightly thc screw of ta.-..:ation might be twisted.
JlIl\ot accepted, as contributions towards thc £2,000,000 that he
was told to raise, much confiscated English merchandise, church
plate, find pl'ivate pl'Operty of the royal house, but his extortions
did little more than pay for his army and the expenses of govem-
ment. Jlortllgal indeed was in a dismal state: her ports were
blockL'd and hcr wines could 1I0t be sold to her old cU!:Iwmers in
England, nor her manufactures to her Brazilian colonists. The
working classes in Lisbon were thrown out of employmen4 und
starved, or migratefl in bands into the interior. }~oy and other
good witncsses from the French side speak of the capital as
'looking like a desert, with no vehicles, and hardly a foot-passenger
ill the streets, save 20,000 persons reduced to heggnryand trying
vainly to live on alms~.' The only activity visible was in the
arsenal and dockynlus, where J unot hud 10,000 men at work
restoring the neglected material of the artillery, and fitting out
that portion of the fleet which had been in too bad order to sail
for Brazil in the previous November.
'I1lC sudden outbreak of the Spanish illsnrrection in the last days
of May, 1808, made an enormous change in the situntioll of the
I Compare Nap. Corrup., 13,600 and 13,620. I For, iv. 273-4..
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French army in Portugal. Before JWlOt had well realized what
was happening in the neighbouring kingdom, his communications
with Madrid were suddenly cut, and for the future informatiou
only reached him with the greatest difficulty, and order!> not at all.
The last dispatch that came through to him was onc from the
Emperor which spoke of the beginnings of the rising, and bade
him scud 4,000 men to Ciudad Rodrigo to hold out a hand to
Bessicl'eS, and 8,000 to the Guadianll to co-operate in Dnpont's
projected invMion of Andalusia I. '1'hei\e orders were dispatched
in lhc lust days of :May; before they could be carried out the
situation had been profoundly modified.
On June 6 there arrived at Oporto the news of the inSUlTeCtion of
Galicia and the establishment of the Provincial J unl:a at Corullua.
The first thought of the new governmellt in Galicia had been to
call home for its own defence the division in northern Portugal.
When it~ ~\lmmon~ reached General Belesw., he obeyed without a
moment's hesitation. The only French 11001' him were General
Quesnc1, the Governor of Oporto, his staff, and a troop of thirty
dragoons which scn'ed as his personal e8<:ort. Belesta seized and
dissl1ned both the general llnd his guard, and forthwith marched
for Spain, by Braga and Valel1?a, with his prisoners. Before leaving
he called together the notables of Oporto, bade them· hoist the
national flag, and incited them to nominate a junta to organize
resistance against Junot. Dut he left not a mall behind to aid
them, and took off his whole force to join General Blake.
On receiving, on June g, the news of this untoward event, Junot
determined to prevent Caraffa.'s troops on the'l'agus fmlll following
the example of their eountrymen. Before they had fully realized the
situation, or had time to concert mrosures for a geneml evasion, he
succeeded in disarming them. Caraffa himself was summoned to
the quarters of the commander-in-chief, alld placed under arrest
before he knew that he was suspected. Of his regiments some
were ordered to attend a review, others to change garrisons; while
unsuspectingly on their way, they found themselves surrounded by
French troops and WCI"C told to lay down their arms. All were suc-
cessfully trapped except the second cnvalry regiment, the' Queen's
Own,' whose colonel rode off- to Oporlo with his two squadrons
instead of obeying the orders sellt him, and Fmclions of the
infantry regiments of Murcia and Valencia who escaped to Badajoz
I Nap. Corregp.} 14,023 (from Bayonne, May 29).
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nfL...er an ineffectual pursuit by the French dragoons. Dut 6,000
out of Carl.Jlo.'s 7J~OO men were caught, disurmcd, and placed on
pontoons moored under the guns of the Lisbon forts, whose com-
manders hOO orders to sink them jf the)' gaye !-Ill)' trouble. Here
they were destined to remain prisoners for the next ten weeks, till
the English arrivoo to release them aftm' the battle of Vimicro.
The imminent danger that CaraHa's force might openly revolt,
and sen'c as the nucleus for a general rising of the POIiubTUC5C, was
thus disposed of. But Junofs position was still unplea.<;ant: he
had only some 26,500 men with whom to hold dowlI the killgOOlll :
if once the inhabitants took arms, such a force could not supply
garrisons for c\'cry corner of a country 300 miles long and a hun·
dred broad. Moreover, there WIlS considerable probability that the
situation might be complicated by the appcarancc of an English
expeditionary army: Napoleon had warned his lieutenant to keep
a careful watch 011 thc side of the $Ca, evcn beforc the Spanish
illsUITeetion broke out. All through the spring a British force
drawn from Sicily was already ho\'cring about thc southern (lOast of
the Peninsula, though hitherto it had only been heard of in the
direction of Gibraltar and Cadi7.. AnothCI· rouse of disquietude
was the presence in the Tugus of the Russian fleet of Admiral
Sinia"in: the strange attitude adopted by that officer much
perplexed Junot. He acknol1'kJged that his master the Czar was
at war with Great Britain, and stated that he was prepared to
fight if the British Jk-et tried to fOlx:e the entrance of the Tagus.
But on the other hand he all~<J'Cd that Russia had not declared
war on Portugal 01' IU:knowk'tif:,t(..J. ibl annexation by the Emperor,
and he therefore refused to land his marines and seamen to help itl
the garrisoning of Lisbon, or to allow them to be uSL'<1 ill any wily
on shore. Meanwhile his crews consumed an inordinate amount of
the provisions which wcrc nonc too plentiful in the Portuguese
capital.
Junot's main advantage lay in the extreme military impotence
of Portugal, That realm found its one sole centre in j ..isbon,
where a tenth of the population of the whole kingdom and half of
its wealth were concentrated, At Lisbon alone was there an arsenal
ofany'si7-e, or n. considerable storc of mnskets and powder. VI'ithont
the resources of the capital the IlI1tion was absolutely mmblc to
equip anything fit to be called an army. Oporio was a small place
in comparison, and no other towll in the kingdom had over 20,000
OllAri'. I 1:>
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souls. Almcida and Elvas, the two ch.ief fol'tresses of the realm,
were safe in the hands of French garrisons. The provinces might
rise, but without luvi.sh help f("Om Spnin or England they could
llot put in the field an anny of even 10,000 men, for BS..'lemblies of
peasants armed with pikes and fowling·pict.'Cs w"c not armies, and
of field-artillery there was hardly a piece outside Lisbon, Elvas. and
Almeida. Nor was there left any nucleus of trained soldiers around
which the natiOll might rall)'; the old arm)' was dissolved und its
small rellUlallt was on the wo.)' to the Baltic. The case of Spain
and of Portugul was cntirel), different when the)' rose agilillst
Napoleon. The fOl·mer collntr), was in possession of the greater
part of its own fortresses, had not been systematically disanned,
and could dispose--in Galicin and Andalusia-of large bodies of
veteran troops. Portugal was without an army, 8.n arsenal, a
defensible fortrc&!. or a legal orgnnization-civil or militur)'--of
any kind.
It is neCl'SSlll'Y to remember this in ordcr to excuse the utter
feebleness of the Portuguese rising in June, 1808. Otherwise it
would have seemed strange that a nation of over 2,000,000 souls
(."OuId not anywhere produce forces sufficient to resist for a single
day a column of 3,000 or 4,000 French soldiers.
The insurrection-such as it was-started in the north, where
the departure of Belesta. and his division had left. the two pro-
vinces of Tras-os-Montes and Entre-Duero-e·Minho free from
any garrison, French or Spanish. Oporto had been bidden to work
out its own sal\'utioll by Belesta, and 011 the day of his departure
(June 6), a junta. of insurrection had been acclaimed. Bnt there
followed a cw·ious interval of apathy. lasting for ten days; the
natural leaders of the people refhsed to come forward: here, just
as in Spain, the bureaucracy showed itself very timid and unpa-
triotic. The magistrates sent secret offers of'submission to Junot:
the military commandant, Oliveim dll. Costa, hauled down the
national flag from the eitadel of San Joiio do. Foz. 'l11c members
of the insllrrectionary junta absconded from the city or kept
quieti. It W/Ul only on the news that the neighbouring districts
and towns had risen, that the people of Oporto threw themselves
frankly into the rebellion. The rough mountain diBtrids which
I For these incidents, so discreditable to the leading men of Oporto,!!Co
Io'oy, iv. 200, alld Torelio, i. 162. Most Peninsular historians collsign them to
oblivion.
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lay to the east of them showed a much more whole-hearted
patriotism: between the ninth and the twelfth of JWIC the whole
of the Tras-os-Monles took arms: onc junta. at Bragan~ nomin-
ated as commander the aged General Sepulveda, who had been
governor of the district in the days of the Prince-Regent: another,
at Villa Real on the Douro, also put in its claim and chose as its
leader Colonel Silveira, an officer who was destined to see much
service during the war of independence. Though the French WCl"C
no further off than Almeida, the rival governors nearly came to
blows, but the final insurrection of Oporto creatt.-d a new power to
which both consented to bow.
On June 18 the f!\lsc report that a French column was drawing
near Oporto so roused the multitude in that city that they broke
loose from the control of the authorities, rcllOisted the Portuguese
flag, threw into prison Da Costa and many other persons suspected,
rightly or wrongly, of a wish to submit to thc cncmy, and called
for the establishment of a provisional government. Accordingly
iL 'Supremc .TWlta of thc Kingdom' was hastily elccted witll thc
Bishop of Oporto at its head. '111is was a strange choi~, for
the aged prelate, Dom Antonio de Custro, though popular and
patriotic, was neither a statesman nor an administrator, and had
no notion whate\'l~l' as to the militAry necessities of the situation.
However, the other local juntas of Northern Pol'tuga! united in
recognizing his authority. His colleagues started on the organiZll-
tion of an army with more zeal than discretion; they called out
the militia which Junot had disbanded, and tried to reconstruct
some of the old regular battalions, by getting together the half-pay
ofliccrs, und the men who had been dismissed from the colours
in December, 1807. But they also encouraged the assembly of
thousands of peasants urmed with pikes and scythes, who consumed
provisions, but were of no military use whatever. In the seven
weeks which elapsed before the coming of the English, the Supreme
Junta had only got together 5,000 men properly equipped and
told off' into regular corps I. The fact WM that they could pro-
vide arms for no more, Northern Portugal having always looked to
Lisbon for its supplies. l"ield artillery was almost wholly wanting
-perhaps a d07,.cn guns in all had been found: of cavalry three
I They re-embodied the old 2nd, 12th, 21st, RDd 24th battalions of infantry
of the ,line, the 6t11 Cazad<lres, and the 6th, 11th, and 12th light cavalry, as
well as one or two otller old CQfpll whose numbers 1 cannot identify,
,2
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skeleton regiments were beginning to be organized. But of half-
armed peasantry, disguised under the name of militia, they had
from 12,000 to 15,000 in the field.
The Supreme Junta also concluded a treaty of offensive and
defensive alliance with the Galiciull Spanilln]s, from whom they
hoped to get arms, and perhaps a loan of troops. Moreover Ult;,Y
sent two envoys to England to ask for aid, and eagerly welcomed
ut Oporto Colonel Brown, a British agent with a roving commill-
sion, who did his best to assist in organizing the new levies. The
command of the whole armed force was given to General Be~nnr­
dino }'reirc, n. pretentions and incapable person, who turned his
vcry moderate resources to no profitable account whatever.
A few days later than the outbrcllk of the insurr<.-'Ctioll in the
regions north of the Doum, there was a corresponding movement,
but of a weaker kind, in the extreme south. On June 16 the
small fishing-town of Olhiio in AJgan'e gave the signal for revolt:
on the eighteenth Faro. the capital of the province, followed the
example. <knerall\Iaurin, the Governor of Algarve, Will! lying ill
in his bed; he was made prisoner along with seventy other French
officers and men, and handed over to the captain of an English ship
which was hovering oH' the const. The whole shore between the
Sierra de Caldeiril.O and the sea took arms, whereupon Colonel
Maransin, .l\faurin's secolld-ill-eollllllund, resolved to evacuale the
province. He had only 1,200 men, a battalion each of the 26th
of the line and Ule Legion dll, .Midi. and had lost his coillmuni-
cations with Lisbon, wherefore he drew together his small force
and fell back fir;;t on Mcrtola and thcn on Deja, in the Alcmtcjo.
The insurgents whom he left behind him could do little till they
had obtained muskets from Seville and Gibraltar. and made 110
attempt to follow the retreating column northwards.
Meanwhile Junot, even after he had succecdt.>d in disarming
Caraffa's Spanish division, was pllSsing through a most anxious
time. In obedience to the Emperor's order;; he had sent a brigade
under General Avril towurds Andalusia, to help Dupont, and
another under Loison to Almeida to open communications with
Be&iictc$. But these dctnchmcnls had been made under two false
idea.", the one that the troubles in Spain were purely local, the
other that Portugal would keep quiet. Avril marched southward
with 5,000 men, but, when his vanguard reached San Lucar on the
Spanish border, he found Andalusiun militia. provided. with artillery
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watching him across the Guadinna. He also learnt that El. large
fort.~ WI1S assembling at Badajoi"-, and that Dupont had got no
further than Corclova-more than 150 miles away. After some
hesitation he retraced his steps till he halted at Estrcmoz, facing
Uadajo7.. Loison had much the same experience: starting from
Almeida he crossed the border and scared away the small Spanish
garrison of Fort Concepeion: but when he drew near Ciudad
Rodrigo and learnt that the plu(:e was strongly held, that all the
kingdom of Leon was in revolt, and that llessieres was still far
distant in Old Castile, he drew back to Almeida [June U-15]'
Returning thither he heard of the troubles in Northern Portugal,
and resolved to march 011 Oporto, which was still holding back
from open insurrection when the news reached him. He deter·
mined to hasten to that important city and to garrison it. Taking
two battalions and a few guns, while he left the rest of his brigade
at Almeida, he marched OD Oporto, crossed the Douro at the ferry
of Pczo-de-Ragon, and begun to move on Amarante [June 21].
Hut the moment that he was over the river, he found himself in
the middle of the insurrection: among the mountains the peasantry
hegan to (ire from above on his long column, to roll rocks down the
slopes at him, alld to haruss his baggage and rearguard. Seeing
that he had only ~OOO men in hand, and that the whole country-
:side was up, LoOOn wisely retllrnoo to Almeida, which he regnined
b)' a circular march through Lamego and Ce:lorieo, dispersing
sc\'crnl bands of insurgents on the way, for the rebellion had
already begun to spread across the Douro into the hills of Northern
Ueira [July 1].
Lisbon in the meanwhile was 011 tllC verge of revolt, but was
still contained by the fact that Junot held concentrated in and
about it the main body of his arm)', some 15,000 men. On Hie
Feast of Corpus Christi (JrnlC 16) thc annual xeligious proecssioll
through the Strc<!U3 ncarly led to bloodshed. This was the grt'Atest
festival of Lisoon, and had always led to the assembly of cnormous
crowds: Junot allowed it to be once more celebrated, but lined
the streets with soldiers, and pla<.ro artillery ready for action in the
main squares and avenues. \Vhile thc function was in progress
a senseless panic broke out among the crowd, some shouting that
they fclt a shock of earthquake (always a terror in Lisbon since the
catastrophc of 1755), othcrs that the English were landing, others
that the soldicrs were about to fire on the people. 'l11e frantic
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mob burst through the military cordon, the procession was broken
up, the prelate who bore the Sacrament took refuge in a church,
and the tumult grew so wild that the artillery were about to open
with grape, thinking tbat they had to deal with a carefully pre-
pared insurrection. A great and miscellaneous slaughter was only
prevented by the coolness of JUDOt, who threw himself into the
throng, prevented the troops from firing, cleared the street, pre-
vailed on the clergy to finish the pro(:ession, and dispersed the
multitudes with no loss of life save that of lL few persons crushed
or trampled to death in the panic.
But though this tumult passed oR' without a disastel', Junot's
position was uncomfortable. He had just begun to realiy.e the
real proportions of the insurrection ill Spain, which had now
completely cut him off from communication with his colleagues.
He had only the Vllbrucst knowledge of how Dupont and Bessieres
were faring: and the fact that large Spanish forces were gathering
both at Ciudad Rodrigo and at Badajoz inclined him to think that
affairs must be going ill in Castile and Andalusia. The long-
feared English invasion seemed at last to be growing imminent:
General Spencer's division from Sicily and Gibraltar was at sea,
and had showed itself first off Ayamonte and the coast of Algarve,
then oft· the Tagus-mouth. Ignorant that Spencer had only 5,000
men. and that he had been brought near Lisbon merely by a false
report that the garrison had been cut down to a hUlldful, d unot
expected a disembarkation. But Spellcer went back to Cadiz when
. he learnt that there were 15,000 instead of 4,000 men ready to
defend the capital.
Meanwhile the populace of Lisbon was stirred up by all manner
of wild rumours: it was said that Loison had been surrounded and
forced to surrender by the IlortheMl insur!,tellts, that the Spanish
army of Galicia was marching south, that an English corps had
landed at Oporto. All sorts of portents and signs were reported
for the benefit of the superstitious. The most preposterous was
one which we should refuse to cn.-'dit if it were not vouched for by
:Foy, and other respectable French authorities. A hell's egg was
found on the high-altar of the patriarchal church, with the in-
scription i1forron 08 Fronr.eae8 C'Death to the French ') indented
in its shell. This caused such excitement that Junot thought it
worth while to show that 0. similo.r phenomenon t.'ouId be produced
on any egg by a skilful applico.tion of acids. "When his chemists
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exhibited several branded in an equally convincing way with the
words, Vive l'Empereul"! the enthusillSlll of the credulous was
somewhat damtx:d I,
Ilccognizing thnt he could expect no further help from the
French armies in Spain, and that the insurrectioll would certainly
spread ove,' ever)' parish of Portugal that did not contain a gar-
rison, Junot wisely resolved to <.'oncentrate the outlying fractioml
of his army, which lay exposed and isolated at points far fn)m
Lisbon. At a council of war, held on June !l!5, he laid before hi~
chief officers the alternatives of evacuating Portugal Rnd retiring
on Madrid by the way of Budajoz, or of uniting the army in the
neighbourhood of Lisbon and making an attempt to hold Central
PortugoJ, while abandoning the extreme north and south. 'TIle
latter plan was unanimously adopted: in the state of ignorance in
which the generals lay as to what wus going on ·at :Mndrid and
elsewhere in Spain, the retreat by Badajoz seemed too hazardous.
Moreo\·er. it wus certain to provoke Napoleon's wrnth if it turned
out to have been unnecessary. Accordingly it was resolved to place
garrisons in the fortresses of ElvlIS, Almeida and Peniche. to fortify
Setuntl on the peninsula opposite Lisbon, and to draw in all the
rest of the troops to the vicinity of the capital. Dispatches to this
efft'Ct were sent to Loison at Almeidn, to Avril at Estrcmoz, to
Maransin at Mertola, and to Kellermann. who was watching Badajoz
from Ell'lIs 2. Many of the aidcs-de-Cilmp who bore these orders
were cut off by the insurgents B. but in the cnd copies of each dis-
patch were transmitted to their destinations. In severnl instances
the detached corps had begun to fall back on the Tagus, even
before they received the command to do so.
This was the CMe with Maransin at Mertula, who, finding
himself hopelessly isolated with 1,!tOO men in the centre of the
insurrection, had marched 011 Lisbon via Bcja. On June 26 he
reached the latter place and found its ancient walls manned by
a disorderly mass of citizens, who fired upon him lIS he drew near.
Dut he stormed the town without much difficulty, cruelly sacked it,
and resumed his mareh on Lisbon unharmed. This was not the
first fighting that had occurred in the Alcmtejo; foul' days before
1 Foy, iv. 27G; Napier, i. 97.
t For the tweh'c resolutions 'lrrivcd at by thc council of war. l;CC the
anal)'aia gi"en by Thil!bault, onc of its memberf!.
~ Foy l!lI.ya tllat of twenty messages sent to Loigoll onl)' one got through.
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Avril had had to march from E!:>tremoz to chastise the inhabitants
of Villa Viciosa, who had taken arms and besieged the company of
the 86th regiment which garrisoned their town. He SCiLttercd
them with much slaughter, and, after the usual French fashion,
plundenu !:he little place from ceUur to garret.
On receiving Junot's orders, General Kellermann, who bore the
chief command in the Alcmtejo, left a battalion and a halfl-
1,400 men-in Elva.... and its outlying fort of La Lippe. With
the rest he retired on Lisbon, picking up first the corps of AVl'il
and then that of l\Io..rnnsin, which met him at EvoJ'U. He then
entered the capital, leaving only one brigade, that of Graindorge,
at Setuval to the south of the Tllgus [July 3J.
Loison in the north did not receive his orders for a full week
aftcr they were sent out, owing to the disol'dcl'ly state of !:he iuter-
,'ening country. But on July 4 he left Almeida, after making for
it a garrison of 1,200 men, by dmfting into a provisional battalion
all his soldiers who did not seem fit for forced marching. He then
mo,'ed for seven days through the mountains of Beira to Abrllntes,
skirmishing with small bandi: of insurgents all the way. At two or
three places they tried to block his path, and the town of Guarda
made a serious attempt to defcnd itself, and was ill consequence
sacked and partly burnt. Leaving a trail of ruined villages behind
him, Loison at lust reached Abmutes and got into collllllunication
with his chief. He had lost on the way !i!00 men, mostly stragglers
whom thc peasantry murdcred; but he had inRictcd such 11 cruel
lesson on the country·side that his popular nickname (.~faneta,
'Onc·Hand ') was held accursed fOl' muny years in Portugal.
The withdrawal of the .French troops from the outlying provinces
gaye tlle illSurrcction full scope for dcvelopmcnt. It followed dose
in the track of the retiring columns, and as each valley was evacu-
ated its inhabitants hoisted the national Jhlg, sent in thcir YOWS of
allegiance to the Junta at Oporto, and began to organize armed
bands. But there was such a dearth of military stores that very
few men could be properly equipped with musket and bayonet.
Junot had long before called in the arms of the disbanded militia,
and destroyed them or forwarded them to Lisbon. [n the southern
provinces the lack of weapons was even worse than in the valley
of thc Doul'o: there wag practically no armament except a few
hundred muskets hastily borrowed from the Spaniards of Badajoz
I The 2nd Swiss, aDd four companies of the 66th regiment,
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alld Seville, and a small depOt of cavalry equipment at Estremoz
which A"ril had forgotten to carry oft: An insurrectionary junta
for the Alemtejo was formed at Evora, but its gencf!ll, Francisco
Leite, could only succeed in equipping the mere shadow of an army.
In the north things were a little better: the rising spread to
Coimbrn in the last week of June, Rnd one of its first leaders., the
student Bernardo Zagalo, sucecooed in capturing the small coast·
fortress of Pigucira by starving out the scanty french garrison,
which hOO been <:aught wholly destitute of provisions [June 27].
nernardillo l''rcire then brought up the 5,000 regular troops, which
t.he Junta of Oporto had sucCCt.'<1ecl in getting together, as ftU, us
the line of the Mondcgo. But the insurrectionary area spread
much further southward, even up to Leyria and TholllUl', which lie
110 morc than sixty-five miles from the capital. From thcse two
place<;, however, the rebels were easily cleared out by Il. small
expedition of 3,000 men under Gencral:Margaron [July 5]. JUllofs
army in thc second week of July hcld nothing outside the nnrrow
quoonUlgle of which Sctuval, Pcnichc, Abrantcs, and Lisbon form
the four points. But within that limited space there were now
24,000 good troops, coneentrated and ready to strike Il. hlow at the
fiI'ilt insurrL'Ctionury fon:c that might press in upon them.
But for a fortnight the Portuguese made no further mo\·c, and
Junot now resolved to attack U1C insurf,1'Cnts who lay beyond thc
Tllc."'Us ill the plains of the Alemtejo. His chief motive seems to
havc been the wish to reopen his communications with ElvAA, and to
keep the way dcru· towuros Badajoz, the dinx:tioll in which he would
have to rctreat, it' e,'er he made up his mind to evacuate Lisbon and
retire on Spain. Accordillgly, on July 25, he sent out the cnergetic
Loison at the head of a strong flying column-sevcn and ll. half
battalions, two regiments of dragoons, and eight gnns-over 7,000
men ill nil I. This force wus directed to lIIt!.rdl on Elvtl$ by way
1 The column comprised the following troops:-
Two hattaliOllS of ~servcGrell'lllicl1l 1,100
12tJI lAigcr (3rd halt.) 1,2,')3
15th UgCI' (3rd hatt.) 1,300
5llth Liue (3rd hatt.) , 1,428
8(;th Line, twelve companies of tlle 1st and 2nd butts, 1,667
1st Hanoverillll Legion 804
4tll and 5th Provisional Dragoons 1,248
Deducting 1,200 for dllt.'lched grenadier companies, &1;., the wllole waa well
o\'er 7,000. For det.'lils, see TIlieOault's ExpEdili(m de Portugf.l/,
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of Evora, the capital of the Alemtejo, and the seat of its new Junta.
On July 29 Loisoll appeared before the walls of that city. '1'0 his
surprise the enemy offered him battle in the open; General uite
had brought up such of his newl)' organized lmops as he t:auld
collect-they amounted to no more than a battalion and a half of
infantry and 120 horse; but to help him there had come up from
Uadajo7. the Spanish Colonel Moretti with about the same number
of fool? a regiment of regular cavalry (the' Hussars of Maria Luisa'1
Md seven guns 1. In all the allies had under 8,000 men, but they
were presumptuous enough to form a line of battle outside Evora,
and wait fOl' Loisoll's attuck. A mixed multitude of pCllSflnts and
citizens, more of them armed with pikes than with fowling-pi~,
manned the walls of the town behind them. Leite and his col-
league should have drawn back their regulars to the same position:
they might have been able to do something behind walls, but to
expose them in the open to the itSSllult of more than dOll ble of
their own numbers of French troops was absurd.
Loison's first charge broke the weak line of the allied army; the
Spanish cavalry fled without crossing swords with the French, wld
General Leite left the field with equal precipitAtion. But the
bulk of the infantry fell back on Evora and aided the peasantry to
defend its ruined mediaeval walls. They could not hold out, how-
ever, for many minutes; the French forced their way in at four or
five points, mooc a f,"Teut slaughter in the streets, and ended the
day by sacking the city with every detail of sacrilege and brutality.
Foy roys that 2,000 Spaniards and Portuguese fell; his colleague
Thiebault gives the incredible figure of 8,000. Even the ilmaller
number must include a good many unarmed inhabitants of Evora
massacred during the sack. The French lost ninety killed and 200
wounded (July 29].
On the third day after the fight Loison lllil.l'ched fOl' Eh-a'>, and
drove away the hordes which were blockading it. He was then
prcpu.ring to push a recollnaissance in force against Badajoz, whell
he received from his commander-in~chief orders to retum at once
to Lisbon. The long-expected English innlSioll of Portugal had
at last begun, for Oil August 1 Sir Arlhur Wcllcsley was already
1 The figurC'!l of the Portugucse historian, Accursio das Naves, reproduced
in Arteche (H. 35), seem indubitable, as ther go into minute accounts of the
regiments and fractions of regiments present. It seems clear that the allies
had Ilothiog like the 5,000 regular troops of which For speaks (h'. 267-~).
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disembarking his troops in Mondego Bay. Junot WAS thereJore set
011 concentrating in onler to fight, and Loison's expeditionary fon::e
was loo important a part of his arm)' to be left out of the battle.
Dropping the battalion of the Hanoverian Legion as a garrison at
Santarcm, Loison brought the rest of his 7,000 men to his corn·
mander's aid.
SECTION IV: CHAPTER Il
LANDING OJ.' THE BRITISH: COMBAT OF ROLI9A
FROM the first moment when the Asturian deputies arrived in
London, with the news of the insurrection in Northern Spain
'[June 4]. the English Government had been eagel' to intervene in
the Peninsula. The history of the last fifteen )'Clll~ was full of the
records of unfortunate expeditions sent out to aid national risings,
real or imaginary, against France. They had mostly tumed out
disastrous failures: it is only necessary to mention the Duke of
York's miscmblc campaign of 1799 in Holland, 5tc\\'u1't'$ invasion
of Calabria in 1806, and ,"Vhitelock's disgraceful fiasco at Buenos
Ayres in 1807. As a rule the causes of their ill success had been
partly incapahle leading, partly an exaggerated parsimony in the
menus employed. Considering the vast power of France, it was
futile to throw ashore bodies of five thousand, ten thonsand, or
even twenty thousand men on the Continent, and to expect them
to mainl.'tin themselves by the aid of small local insurrections, such
as those of the Orange party in Holland or the Calabrian moun-
taineers. The invasion of Spanish South America, on the hypo-
thesis that its illhabitunts were all prepared to revolt against the
mother-country-a fiction of General l\1iranda.-had been even
more unwise.
The' policy of filching sugar islands,' as Sheridan wittily c..'\lled
it-of sending out expeditions of moderate size, which only inflicted
pin-pricks on non-vital portions of the enemy's dominions-w8S
still in full favour when the Spani!Sh War began. There was hardly
n British statesman who rose above such ideas; Pitt and Adding·
ton, Fox and Grenville, and the e.·dsting Tory government of the
Duke.of Portland, hud all persisted in the same futile plans. At
the best such wariare resulted in the picking up of stray colonies,
such as CeylOll and Trinidad, the Cape, S1. Thomas, or Curayoo:
but in 1808 the more important oversea possessions of France
and her allies were still lUlsubduoo. At the worst the policy led
to cheeks and diSllSters small or great, like Duekworth's failure at
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Constantinople, the nbol'tivc Egyptian expedition of 1807, or the
catastrophe of Buenos Ayres. Castlereagh seems to ha\'e been
the only leading mall who dared to cQntcmplv.le an iuterferencc
on a large scale in Continental campaigns. His bold scheme for
the lunding of 60,000 men in Hanover, during the winter of
1805-6, had been foiled partly by the hesitation of his colleagues.
partly by the precipitation with which Frauds II made peace
after Austerlitz '.
But the policy of sending small auxiliary forces to the Iberian
Peninsula was quite fl familiar one. \-Vc had maintained 8. few
thousand men under Generals Burgoync !\!ld Townscnd fol' the
defence of ])ortugal against Spain in 1762. And again in 1801
there lmd bL'Cll a small British division employed in the farcical
war which had ended in the Treaty of Badajoz. In the year after
Austcrlitz, whcll it seemed likely that Bonapnrte might take
active measures against Portugal, the :Fox·Grendlle ministry had
offered the R€b"Cnt military aid, but had seen it politely refused,
for the timid prince was still set on conciliating the Emperor.
With so muny precedents before tllClll, it was natural that the
Portland cabinet should assent to the demands of the Spanish
deputies who approrcd in London in June,1808. The insurrection
in the Iberian Peninsula was so unexpected ~ and so fortunate
a chance, that it was obviously neressary to tUn! it to account.
Moreover, its attendant cil'cumstanc.'es were well calculated to
rouse enthusiflSJll even in the breasts of professional politicians.
Here was the first serious sign of that national rising against
Bonaparte which had been so often prophesied, but which had
been so long ill coming. Even the Whigs, who had systematically
denounced the sending of aid to the 'effete despotisms of the
Contincnt,' and had long maintaincd that Napoleon was not so
black as he was painted, were disarmed in their criticisms by the
character of U1C Spanish rising. Vvhut excuse could be mude for
the tren.chery at Bayonne? And how could sympathy be refused
to ll. people which, deprived of its sovereign alld betrayed by its
bureaucracy, had so gallantly taken arms to defend its national
, 111is fine amI not unpromising sclleme (leservcs study (sce Alison's Life of
CfUJilereogh, i. 199-!-'(2)•
• I (annot quite credit the story that Torefio and Arteche repeat of PiU's
d}·ing propl,ccy, tlmt 'Napoleon could only be ovcrtllrown by a national war,
a.nt! that such a war would prob:,IJly begin in Slmiu.'
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existence? The debates in the British Parliament during the
middle days of JWIC show clearly that both the Government and
the Opposition had grasped the situation, and that for once they
were uniu:o as to the policy which should be pursued. It is only
needful to qnote a few sentences from the speeches of Canning
I:I.S Foreign Secretary, and Sheridan as Leader of the Opposition
[June 15].
"V'hcncver any nation in Europe,' said Cunning, 'sturts up
with a detenninntion to oppose that power which (whether pro-
fessing insidious peace or declaring open war) is alike the common
enemy of nll other peoples, that nation, whatever ita former
relations with IlS may have been, becomes ipso facto the ally of
Gretl.t Britain. In fUl'llishillg the aid which lUuy be requirl....J., the
Go\'crnment will be guided by three principles-to direct the united
efforts of both countries against the common foe, to direct them in
such a way as shaH be most beneficial to our common all)" and to
direct them to such objects as may be most conducive to British
interests. But of these objects the IllSt shall never be allowed to
come into competition with the other two. I mention British
interests chicfly for the purpose of di~cll\iming them as any
material part of the considerations which influence the British
Go\·crllmcnt. No interest can be so purely British as Spanish
success: no conquest so advant~o-eous to England as conquering
Crom Frallee the <:omplete integrity of the Spanish dominions ill
every quarter of the globe,'
Shcridnn repeats the sumc theme ill a slightly diffcrcnt key;-
•Hitherto Buonaparte ha~ run n. victorions race, because he has
contended with princes without dignity, ministers wilhout wisdom,
and peoples without patriotism. He has yet to learn what it is to
combat a nation who are animated with one spirit a::,-rainst him.
Now is thc time to stand np boldly and fairly for the deliverance
of Europe, and if the ministry will <:o-operate effectually with the
Spanish patriots they shall receive from us cordial support '. ' .
Nevcr was anything so brave, so noblc, so generous as the conduct
of the Spaniards: never was thcre a more important crisis than
that which thcir patriotism has occasioned to the state of Europe.
Instead of striking at the core of the c\'il, the Administrations of
this country have hitherto gone on nibbling merely at the rind:
filching sugar islands, but neglecting all that was dignified and
consonant to the real interests of the country. Now is the moment
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to let the world know that we are resolved to stand up for the
salvation of Europe. Let us then co-operate with the Spaniards,
but co-operate in an effectual and energetic way. And if we find
that they are really heart and soul in the enterprise, let us advance
with them, magnanimous and undaunted, for the liberation of
mankind ... Above all, let us mix no little interests of our own
in this mighty combnt. Let us discard or forget British objec~
and conduct the war on the principle of generous support a.nd
active co-operutioll.'
It may perhaps be hypercritical to point out the weak spot in
each of these stirdng harangues. Dut Canning protested a litlle
too much-within a few weeks of his speech the British Govern-
ment was applying to the Junta of Seville to allow them to garrison
Cadiz, which was refused (and rightly), for in the proposal British
interest... peeped out (L little too clearly. And Sheridnn, speaking
from vague and overeoloured reports of the state of affairs in the
J)enillsula, went too far when he extolled the unmixed generosity
and nobility of the conduct of tIle Spaniards: mingled with their
undoubted patriotism there was enough of bigotry and cruelty, of
self-seeking and ignorance, lo make his harangue ring somewhat
false in the ev.rs of future generations. Yet' both Canning and
Shcridnn spoke exom the heart, and their declarations mark a very
real turning-point in the history of the great struggle with
Bonnpru.. te.
Fortunately for Great Bl'itaiu, and for the nations of the Iberian
Peninsula, we were far better prepared for striking a heavy blow on
the Continent in 1808 than we had been at any earlier period of the
war. ThCl'e was no longer any need to keep mnsses of men ready
in the south-eastern counties for the defence of England against
a 1'"'ronch inva."ion. There were no longer any :French forces of
appl'(.·ciablc strength garrisoned along tIle English Channel: indeed
Castlereagh had just been planning a raid to burn the almost
unprotected French flotilla which still mouldered ill the harbour of
Boulogne. Our standing army had recently been strengthened
and reorganized by Cl not inconsiderable military refonn. 'lllC
system had just oc'Cn introduced by which Wellington's host was
deslillcd to be recntited during the next six years. Every year
two-fifths of the l!W,OOO embodied militia of the United Kingdom
were to be allowed to volunteer blto the regular anny, whi.le the
places of the volunteers were filled up by men raised by ballot from
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the counties. This sort of limited conscription worked well; ill
the year 1808 it gave 41,786 men to the line, and these not raw
recruits, but already more or less trained to arms by their service
in the militia. All through the war this system continued: the
}>eninslllar army, it must always be remembered, drew more than
half its reinforcing drafts from the 'old COIl~titutional fort.-e.'
Hence came the ease with which it assimilated its recruits. Mean-
while the embodied militia never fell short in establishment, as it
was automatically replenished by the ballot. The result of these
chanl:,"t."S, for which Castlereagh deserves the chief credit, was a per-
manent addition of ~5.000 men to the regular force available for
service at home or in Europe.
In June, 1808, there chanced to be several considerable bodies of
troops which could be promptly utilized for all expedition to Spain.
The most important was a corps of some 9,000 men which was
being collected in the south of Ireland, to renew thc attack on
South America which hnd failed so disastrously in 1807. The
news of the Spanish insurrection had, of course, led to the abandon-
ment of the design, and Geneml Miranda, its originator, had beeJl
infonned that he must look for no further support from England.
In addition to this force in Ireland there were a couple of brigades
in the south-eastern counties of England, which had been intended
to form the nucleus of Castlercagh's projected mid Oil Boulognc.
The)' had been concentrated at Harwich and Ramsgate respectively.
and the transports for them wcre ready. A still more important
contingent, but one that lay further off, and was not so immediately
nvnilable, was the corps of 10,000 men which Sir John :i\10ore had
taken to the Baltic_ III June it became known that it was
impossible to co-operate with the hairbrainoo King of Sweden,
who was bent on invading Russian Finland, a scheme to which the
British Ministry refhsed its assent. Moore, therefore, after many
stormy intcrviews with Gustavus IV, was preparing to bring his
divigiOIl home. W"ith the aid of Spencer's troops, which had so long
been hovering about Cadiz and Gibraltar, and of certain regiments
picked out of the English garrisons, it was ea.~ily possible to pro-
vide 40,000 men for service in Spain and Portugal.
nut a number of isolated brigades and battlLlions snddenly
thrown togetha· do not form an army, and though Custlercagh
had provided a large force for thc projected expedition to the
Peninsula, it was destitute of any proper organization. 'Vith the
]808] SIR All.THUR WELLESLEY
expedition that sailed from Cork there was only half a regiment
of cavalry, and the brigades from Harwich, Ramsgutc, and Gib,.
raltar had not a single horseman with them, so that thel'e were
actually 18,000 foot to aDO horse alllong the eontingcnts that first
disembarked to contend with Junot's army. Transport was almost
equally neglected: only the troops from Cork had any military
train with them, and that they were provided with horses Md
vehicles was only due to the prescicll<:C of their commander, who
had at the last moment procured leave from London to enlist
for foreign scrvit'C and take wilh him two troops of the 'Royal
Irish Corps of Wagoners.' 'I declare; wrote 'Vellesley, 'that I
do not understand the principles 011 which OUI' military establish·
Illents are formed, if, when large corps are sent out to perform
importlUlt and difficult services, they arc not to have with V.em
those means of equipment which they require, such as horses to
draw artillery, and dri\'ers atw.ehcd to the commissariat 1.' ,"Vithout
this wise inspiration, he would have found himself unable to move
when he arrived in the Peninsula: as it was, he hlld to leave behind,
when he ltludcd, some of his h"UllS and hlll.f his small forcc of
cavalry, because the authorities hOO chosen to believe that both
draft and saddle hO!":iCS could readily be procnrcd in Portugal.
Such little cOlllrelemp,y were common in the days when Frederick
Duke of York, with the occasional assistancc of Mrs. l\1ary Ann
Clark, managed the BI·itish army. '
But the arrangement'i as to the command of the expedition
were the most ill-mallUf,recl part of the busines8. The force at Cork
was, as we have already explained, under the orders of Sir Mlmr
"Vellesley, the youllgcr brother ofthe great vieeroy who had so much
extellded our Indian Empire between 1799 and 1805. He was the
junior lieutenant-general in the British army, but had already to
his credit a more brilliant series of victories than any other officer
then living, including the nU-important triumph of Assaye, which
had so eficdr.ially broken the power of the Mahmttas. In 1808 he
was a Member of Parliament and Under-Secrotar)' for Ireland, but
Castlcrcngh (who had the most unoowldcd belief ill his abilities,
and had long been using his advice on military questions) had
picked him out to command the c....;:pedition mustering at Cork.
'Vhen its destination was changed from America to Spain, the
Secretary for War still hoped to keep him in command, but the
1 Wellesley to CastlereaghJ June 29, 1608 (IYell. Suppf. DiIJl., vi, 67),
O:llAS, I Q
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Duke of York and the War Office were against 'Wcl1cslcy 1. There
were many respectable lieutenant-generals of enormous seniority
and powerful connc...uOIlS who were eager for foreign servit.'C. NOlle
of them had Wellesley's experience of war on a large scale, or had
ever moved 40,000 men 011 the field: but this counted for little ut
head quarters. The command in Portugal was made over to two
of his seniors. The first was Sir Hew Dalrymple, a man of fifty·
eight, whose only campaigning had been with the Duke of York in
Flanders thirteen years back. He had been Govemor of Gibraltar
since 1806, knew something of Spanish politics, and was now in
a.ctive communication with Custafios. The second in command
was to be Sir Harry Burrard i: he was an old Guards officer
who had sen"ed during the American rebellion, and had more
recently commanded a division during the Copenhagen expedition
without ullY special distinction. The third was Sir John Moore,
Itnd to being superseded by him Wellcsley could not reasonably
have objected. He was I.l.t this mOlllent perhaps the most
distinguished officer in the British service: he had done splendid
work in the ·West I.udie~, Egypt, and the Netlterlands. He
had reorganir.ed the light infantry tactics of the British army,
and had won the enthusiastic udmiration of all who ha.d. ever
'5erved under him for his zeal and intelligent activity. Bnt
Moore, like \Vellesley, was to be placed under Dalrymple amI
llurrard, and not trustcd with an indcpendcnt command. At the
present moment he was still far away in the Baltic, and was
not expected to arrive for somc time. Mctl.llWhile \Vellcsley wus
allowed to !la-it in temporary charge of the expeditionary force, and
still uuder the impression that he was to ret.u..in its guidance. His
I For hints on this subject see the letter of W. Wellesley Pole, a kinsman
of Sir Arthur, ill WellillglO1i Suppumumlary Di8palchu (vi. 171). 'TIle det!iTe
that has been manifested at Head Quarters for Il.t.-tive command will render it
natural for all that bas passed to be seen through a false medium.... 'I1le
object of Ihmd Quarters, if it has any object at all, must be to koop down the
officer for wJlom the army has tlle greatest entllUsiasm, aud to prevent him
from being caUed hy the voice of the nation to the head of the forces upon
active service, rathor than to crush old officers of known incapacity and want
of following.... D;llryffivle is a Guardsman i Burranl is tI Guanlsffill.ll ;
their connexions are closely uuited to \Vindsor and Whitehall, and for years
have 110t only been in the most confidential situation about Head Quarters,
but 113ve imuibed all their military notions from tllence ;' &c.
I &m ill 1755, be WR.'l a faVOurite of tilo Duke of York, Rnd had acted R.'l
bis aide·de-camp. At this moment he held a commulld in the Home DistricL
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transports weighed anchor on July 12, and it was only on July 15
that the dispatch from Downing Street, informing him that he had
been superseded by Dalrymple and Burrard, was drafted. It did
not rench him till he had already landed in Portugal.
His political instructions had been forwarded as early as
June 30. They were drawn up mainly on the data that the
Asturian and Galician deputations had furnished to the ministry I.
Both the Juntas had been ullwise enough to believe that the
national rising would SUffil-c to expel the French-whose number.;
they much underrated-from Spain. While' empowering their
envoys to ask for money, arms, and stores, they had ordered them
to declinc thc offer of an auxiliary force. They requested that all
available British troops might be directed 011 Portugal, in order
to rouse an insurrection in that conntry (which was still CJuiet
when they arrived in London), and to prevent the troops of Junot
fmm being employed against the rear of the army of Gcncrallllake.
III dcferenl'C to their suggestions the British Govemment had sent
enormous stores of muskets, powder. and equipment to Gihon and
l~errol, hut dircetcd 'Wellesley to confine his activity to Portugal.
'111e Spaniards, with their usual inaccuracy, had estimated the total
of Junot's army at no more than 15,000 men. Misled by this
absurd undermluation, Castlercagh informed Wellesley that if he
found that hiiS oWn alld Spencer's fol'(.'0> suffieed for the reduction
of Portugal, he might· operate against the Tagus' at once. But
if more men wcre requjred, un additionnI 10,000 ba)'onets would
be provided from England, and the expeditionary force might
mCllllwhilc ask the leave of the Galician JlUlla to stop at Viga--
a halt which would have cost many weeks of valuable time.
Wellesley himself was to choose a fast-sailing vessel and make for
Corunna, where he was to confer with the Junta !md pick up the
latest information ns to the state of affairs in the Peninsula.
III accordance with these iuslructions Sir Arthur preceded tile
bulk of his armament on the C1'Ocodilc, llnd reached Cornnna in the
short space of eight days [July SW]. He found the GaliciuJls
somewhat depressed by the disaster of Medina de Rio Seeo, whose
details they misrepresented ill the most shameless fashion to their
distinguished visitor. Bc!>Sicrcs, they said, had lost 7,000 men and
six gUlls, and although he had forced lllake and Cuesta to retreat
on Bcnawnte, those gCllcruls had still 40.000 troops under arms,
I Castlereagh to Wellington (Well. Disp., iv. B,9).
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and had no need of any au.."ilillry force. 'The arrival of the
nritish money yesterday has entirely renewed their spirits; wrote
",,"cHesley, 'and neither in them lIor ill the inhabitilllts of this town
do I see any symptom of alarm, or doubt of their final success.'
This vainglorious confidcm:c \\IllS supported by an infinity of false
news; Lefebvre-DesnoueUes was said to have been thrice defeated
neur SUl'ltf,1'QSSll, and Dupont and his whole corps had been taken
prisoners 011 June ~~ in an action between Andujar and La
Carolina-a curious prophecy, for it foresaw and placed a month
too early the catastrophe of Baylen I, which no reasonable man
could have prooicted. Almost the only correct information which
was supplied to Wellesley was the news of the revolt of Oporia and
the re~t of Northern Portugal. It was clear that there was now
UIl opening for the British army in that country, and as the
Galicians continued to display their rcluetalll.-'e to rtX:Civc any
military aid, Sir Arthur went to sea again, joined his fleet of
transports ofl' Cape Finisterre, and bade them make for the mouth
of the Douro. He himself put into Oporto, where he landed and
interviewed the Bishop and the Supreme Junta.. He found them
in no very happy frame of mind: they had, as they confessed, only
been able to arm 5,000 infantry and 300 ca"a1ry, who lay under
Bernardino l'reire at Coimbra, and 1,500 men more for a garrison
at Oporto. 'The rest of these levies eonsisted of l~,OOO peasants
with pikes, 'and though the people were ready and desirous to take
arms, unfortullately there were none in the country'-not even
enongh to equip the disbanded regulars. 'The Bishop expressed
himself as much alarmed at the news of the disaster at Medina de
Ilio Seeo, and his military advisers acknowledged that in con-
sequence of that battle they had given up any hope of aid from
Spain 2. They asked eagerly for arms, of which the English fleet
carried many thousand stand, and were tt'llxious to sce Vlclleslcy's
troops landed. The place which they recommended for putting
the army ashore was Mondc6'U Duy, Ileal' Coimbra, where the
mouth of the :Mondego ]liver furnishes an indifferent harbour,
guarded by the fort of Figucira. That stronghold, it will be
1 Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Corunna, July 21 (Well. DiSlI., vi. 23-5).
'N''l,icr's st.'l.tcmcllt tl",t 'Vcllesley foullu the Supreme .lullt" in 1111
extravagant and irrational frame of minu ill by no means borne out by the
disp.'l.tches wllicll lie sent oft· from Oporto Oil July 25. '11lcy rather represent
the Portuguese as ill a state of pronounced depre.5!lioll of spirits.
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remembered, had been seized by the bold exploit of thc studcnt
Zagalo; it was now garrisoned by 300 British marines, so tbat thc
disembarkation would be snf'e from disturbance by anything save
the heavy Atlantic surf, which always beats against tlle wcstcnl
coast of Portugal. There was llO other port available along the
shore save Peniche, which was dangerously close to Lisbon, and
guarded by 11 castle still in French hands. Nearer still to the
capitnl, landing. is just possible at Cascaes and a few other places:
but thcre was no regular harbour, und Admiral Cotton .Agreed with
'Vellesley in thinking that it would be mud to attempt to throw
troops ashore on a dangerous rock-bound coast in the midst of
Junot'ii cantonmcnts. Mondcgo Bay was therefore appointed as
the general place of rendezvous for the Reet, which had now begun
to arrive opposite the mouth of the Douro. /'"
As to the Portuguese troops, the Supreme Junta aerrreed that
Dcrnnrdino Freirc and bis 5,000 men should go forward with the
British army, while the new levies should blockade Almeida, and
guard the frontier along the Domo against any possible .Advance
on the part of lHarshal Bessicres from Castile. 'l11e Junta calcu-
lated that, if supplied with arms, they could put into the field from
the thrc<J northern }Jrovim..'Cs of Portugal 38,000 foot and 8,000
horse-a liberal estimate, as they bad, including their peasant
levies, no more than 19,000 collected on Jllly 25. They asked
for weapons and clothing for the whole mass, and for n loan of
300,000 Cruzado Novas (about .2S51000}--no "ery large sum con-
sidering the grants that were being made to the Spaniards at this
time. Wellesley would only promise that he would arm the
militia and peasantry who were lying along the l\Iolldcgo in
company with Freire's regulars, 'if he found them worth it 1,'
The Bishop undertook to forward from Oporto all the remount..::
for cavalry and all the draught-mules for commisl;8riat purposes
that he could get together. He thought that he could procure
150 of the former and 500 of the latter in six days.
On AugWit 1, 1808, the disembarkation in Mondcgo Bay began,
in the face of a heavy surf which rendered landing very dangerous,
Cl:IpeciaUy for the horses, guns, and stores. :Many boats were
upset and a few lives lost 2; but the troops and their commander
I Wellesley to C.1stlereagh, from Oporto, July 2.5 (Well. Di8p., vi. 31).
t For the difficulties of disembarkation sce the interesting narrati,'e of
Landsheit of the 20tL Dragoons, p. 246. He was himself upset in the surf.
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were in good spirits, for the news of the surrender of DUPOllt Ilt
Baylcn on July 20 had reached them the day before the discm- .
barkll.tion beb"lm. '''cHesley was convin~ that Generul Spencer
would have sailed from Andalusia to join him, the moment that
thii:l b'TCllt victor)' mucIc the presence of British troops in the south
unnecessary. He was right, for Spencer, before recei\,jng any
orUcrs to that effect, had embarked his men for Portugul and calUe
into Mondego Bay on August 5, just as the last, of the division
from Cork had been plaeed on shore. It was therefore with some
15,000 men that Wellesley began his march on Lisbon 1. But
to his bitter disapPollltmcnt the young lieutenant-general had
just learnt that three commanders had been placed oyer his heml,
and that he might soon e.-.;:pect Dalrymple to arri\'c and assume
charge of the army. Castlereagh's dispatch of July 15, containing
tins unwelcome news, was delivered to Wellesley as he lay in
Mondego Bay on the thirtieth, and he hOO to make all his armnge-
1 The Iorce consisted oI ;-
Injant1'!l. Caool1'!l. Artillery.
(I) Division embarked at Cork:
20th Ligllt Drllgoons (ouly 180 \l'itll horses) .04
Artillery 226
5th Rogiment (1st hatt.) !lOO
9th
" " """36tll
"
591
OO'b
"
(1st batt.) 9;j7
40th
" "
9Z6
45th
" "
670
60th niftes (5th batt.). 9.'l6
71st Regiment (Ist batt.) 903
Dlst
" "
917
95th lURes (2ud hatt., lour oompallies) 400
8,123
(2) Spencer's troops from Andalusia:
Artillery 241;
6th ~';l11cnt(1st batL) 9-16
29th
"
8Q6
32ud
"
(Ist batt.) 874
Wth
" "
9llJ
8ZIld
" "
929
4,503 3114 47l
A total of 12,626 infantry. 394 clll'alrr. 471 artillery = 13,491; adding
rorty-five meu of the Staff Corps \l'e get 13,536.
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ments for disembarkation while suffering under this unexpected
slight. Many men would have resigned under such a blow, and
'Vellesley with his unbounded ambition, his strong sense of his
deserts, and his well-mRrked tendency to take offence \ must ha\'c
been boiling over with suppressed indignation, But he felt thllt to
a."k to be recalled, becAuse he had been degraded from a oommander-
in-<:hicf to a mere general of division, would be an unsoldicrly act.
To Cttstlereagh he merely wfote that' whether he was to command
the army or to quit it, he would do his best to ensure its SlICl-e!>S,
and would not hurry operations onc moment in order to acquire
credit before the arrivul of his superiors 2.'
Meanwhile there were yet a few days during which he would
retain the command, aud it WllS in his power to start the campaign
on the right lines, even if he was not to reap the reward of its
success. His first eight days on shore (August 2-9), were spent in
the organization of the commissariat of his army, which the Home
Government had disgracefully neglected. Except the two troops
of the Irish W tll,,''01l Train, which he had insisted on bringing
with him, he had no transport at his disposal, and, M he wrote to
Cnstlcreagh, 'the existence of the army depends upon the commis-
sariat, and yet the people who manage it are incapable of
managing anything out of SI. counting-house so' All that could
be got out of the country he utilil':oo: the Bishop of Oporto
had sent him a few horses which enabled him to raise his force of
mountcd mell from 180 to :!40', and to givc somc animals to the
a-rtillery~, to add to those that bad come from Ireland~. But
though he succeeded in equipping his OWIl three batteries, the two
which Spencer brought from Andalusia had to be left behind 011
the Mondego for want of draught-horses 6: the dismounted mcn of
the 20th Dragoons had also to be dropped. :E'or the commissariat
t_hc Bishop of Oporto had sent some mules, which were raised to
a total of 500 by purchascs in the country-side, while goo bullock.
I To ulldarstand what 'Valles-Icy must IHlV6 fait, we l1ave only to rc.:ul his
mthcr C:1l,lioos letter of 1801 (SllPP/' Di<,p., ii. 362) to his 011'11 brothel' con-
cerning his merits, his promotion, and his career. The man who could so
write must have felt the blolV in the worst way.
t Well. DiJIp., iv. 43.
I Ibid., iv. 6!J; cf. I'P' 168, 1611.
• Ibid., iv. 163. Cf. the returns for Vimiero of men present, with tbc
100 horsed men brought from Ireland.
, Ibid., iv. 1GB. ' Ibirl., iv. 59.
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carts were procured for the heavier sLores by requisition from the
neighbouring vi~o-es. It was only on the ninth that things wera
so far ready that the army could move forward. It was now
divided into six small brigades under Generals Hill, Ferguson,
Nightingale, Bowcs, Catlin Crawfurd, und Fanc: the third, fourth,
and fifth brigades had only two battalions endl, the other four
had t1U'ce t.
Wellesley had resolved to advance by the coast·road on Lisbon,
via Alco~a, Obidos, ulId '1'orrcs Vcdras, und it was along the
desolate shore' up to the knees in sand and suffering dreadfully
from thirst 2,' that his men made their first march of twelve miles
to Lugar. The distance was moderate, but the troops had been
so long cramped on shipboard that some of the regiments hud
fallen ont of condition and left many stragglers.
The reasons which had determined Wellcsley to Lake the eotlst
route, rather than that which leads from the MOlldego to Lisbon
via Santarem, were, as he afterwards explained, partly a wish to
keep ill tonch with the fleet for the purpose of obtaining supplies
-for he found that the cOlllltry could support him ill wine and
beef, but not in f1our-and partly the fact that he had learnt that
new reinforcements from England ~'ere likely to appear within
a few days. The brigades from Hllrwich and llam8gate, under
Generals Acluud ilnd Anstruther, had sailed on July Hl and might
be looked for at any moment. Sir John Moore, with the divi8ion
from Sweden, was also reported to be on his way to the south, but
could not be expected to llITive for some time. I-Ia"ing a.~certainect
that tlle French force ill Portugal wus somewhat larger than he
originally supposed, Sir Arthnr wished to pick up the troops of
Acland alld Anslruther before giving battle. In this he wus evcn
wiser than he knew, for he still estimated Junot's total disposable
for(,'e at 18,000 men 3, while it was really ~(j,OOO. To have attacked
1 TI,e brigading I\'IIS as follo\\lI :-Ist Brigade (Hill), lit11, 9tll, 38th;
2nd Brigade (f"erguson)J 36th, 40th, 7Ist; 3rt.! Urib'llde (Nightingnle), 2fJth,
62nu ; 4th Brigade (Bowes), 6th, 32nd ; 6tb Brigade (C. Crawfurd), 50thJ !.list;
6th Brigade (Fane), 46th, G/OOtll, 2/95th. Before Villliero tllO 46th alld 50th
changt->t] places (sce the narrlltive of Col. Lenell of Fane's Brigade). It is
worth noting that ex of these 8ix1:eeu battalions, as also tIle 20th Light
Dragoons, had. just returllell from Ule diEIlcartening work of the Bucuos Arm
cxpt:.'t1itiou. They were tIle litIJ, 36t11, 38thJ 40th, 46U" and 7lst.
1 JOllnlUl qf a Soldier qf the 7l"t R.egiment (FAin. 1828), p. 47.
1 We11esley to llurrardJ August 6 (We/I. Diop., iv. 63).
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Lisbon with no more than the 13,000 troop;; who had originally
disembarked at the mouth of the Mondego would have been most
hazurdolls.
W-ellesley had at first intended to take on with him the whole
of Bcmardino Freire's army. He had visited the !lortugucse
commander at Montemor Velho on the seventh, and had issued to
his ally 11 supply of 5,000 muskets. Freirc Will! anxious to persuade
him to gi ve up the coast route, and to throw himself into the
interior on the side of Snntarem. Dut the cogent reasons which
compelled him to prefer the road which allowed him to keep in
touch with the fleet., made him refu~e to listen to this plan, and he
invited the Portuguese' general to trullsfer himself 011 to the same
line. J"reire so far submitted as to move.to Leiria, where he met
the British army all August 10. But here the two commanders
came to hard words and p.'lrted. Freire, a self-willed and shifty
1I1l11l, wn.s determined not to act in unison wilh VVellesley. W1lcther
he wished to preserve his independent command, or whether he
feared (as Napier hints) to oppose his mw levies to the French,
even when supported by 13,000 British bayonets \ he now showed
himself ntterly impracticable. He began by layillg hands on all
the stores of food in Lciria, though they bad becn promised to
'VeIIesle)'. Then he made the absurd a.nd impudent statement
that hc could only co-operate with his allies if 'Vellesley would
undertake to provide rations for his 6,000 men. This proposal
was all the 1ll0l'(! astounding beClLuse he had just been trying to
persuade his colleague to mo,'e into the inland, by the statement
that resources of erery kind abounded ill Estremlldura, Rnd that
the whole British army l'Oulu easily livc upon the country-side!
Vvellesle)"s men had now been subsisting for ten days on biscuit
landed by the fleet, and it was ludicrous that he should be asked
to take upon his shoulders the whole burden of feeding the
Portuguese in theil' own country. Accordingly he uttcrly rejected
the propooal, but he insisted that l'i'Cire should lend him some
CfWalry and light troops, and these he promised to maintain. The
bulk of the Portuguesc, therefofC, rellluined behind III Leiria, their
general being left free to take up, if he should choose, his favourite
plan of marching on Santnrem. Dut 260 horsemcn-the skeletons
of three old cavalry regiments-a bnttalion of Cazadores, and three
weak line-regiments were placed at 'Wcllesley's disposition; they
1 Nal,icr, i. 197.
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amounted to IJ.bout ~,300 men I, according to the Portuguese official
figures, but the British commander repeatedly states that he suw
no more than 260 horse and 1,600 infantry 2; so it is probable
that the regiments were somewhat under the estimate given by
l?reire, 'lney wcre commanded by Colonel Trant, a British officer
in the Portuguese scn,j(;e 3,
Turning once more into the road that skirts the coast, Wellesley
marehed on the thirlccnth from Lciria, and reached Alcobw;a
011 the fourteenth, Here he got his first news of the French:
a brigade under Thomicrcs hud occupied the villaf,'C till the
previous day, and he learnt that General Delaborde, with a weak
division, was ::iolllcwhcrc in his front, in the direction of Obidos
and noli~a.
Junot had received pwmpt information of the landing of the
Bl'itish in Mondego Bay; Oil the very day after it had commenced
he was able to semI ordeN lo Loison to abandon 'his poot in front
of Badajoz and to march at once to join the main army. Mean-
while Dclu!.>onle was sent out frolll Lisbon on August 6 to observe
and, if possible, conttLin "Vellesley, till Junot should have concen-
trated his whole field-anny amI be ready to fight. He was told to
expect Loison from the direction of Thomur and Santarem, and
to join him as !loon as was possible, For his rather hazardous task
he was given no more than five battalions of infantry and a single
I According to the figures given by the Portuguese historian of the war,
Da. Luz Soriano, they st.ood as follo""s :-
Cl'vnlry of the 6th, 11Ul, !lud 12th Regiments 2.58 subres.
6th battalion of Ca:tadores 062 bayonets.
12th, 21st, and 24th line battalions ],514 "
A few troopers of the Lisbuu Police 611an1, forty..ulle in all, according to
Soriano, deserted Junot and joined the anny before Vimiero. Landshcit of
the 20th Light Dra,,""Oons mentious their arril'al, and says that they were put
ill colllpuny with l,is regiment. 'l1lis would gil'e 2,375 as tile to".1 of the
Portuguese whom Trant commanded.
1 Well. Dilp. (iv. 78) sal's 1,400, but ill hill narratil"e of Roliora Sir Arthur
accounts for I,GOCI, 1,200 in llis rigllt and 400 ill !Jis ooutre column. As
a middle figure between \Velleslcy and SoriallO, 2,000 would IJrob.'\bly
be safe.
S TIleir allies did not t.hink much of their looks. Col. Leslie describes
them thus: "I1IB poor fellows had lit.Uc or no uni{om}, but were merely
in white jackets, !lnd large broad-brimmed hats turned up ut Qlle side, somB
having feathers alld otheu none, so that they cut raUler a grotesque
appearauce' (p. 40).
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2,358
1,075
1,098
9".
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regiment of cltasseurs il clteval, with five guns I-not much more
thull 5,000 men.
Delaboroe at first thought of making a stand, and compelling
Wellesley to show his force, at Datalha near Alcobaya, where
John I had beaten the Spaniards, four and a half centuries ago, ut the
decish'e battle of Aljubarott:.n. Dut, after e.'l:amining the position,
he found it so much surrounded by woods, and so destitute of f:,rood
points of view, that he fCll.1·OO to be enveloped if he committed
I Delaborde's numbers at the combat of RoJi~a have been the cause of
mud, OOlltrOI'Crsy. 'Vclles.le}' in oue of hie dispatches estimated them at as
much as 6,000 men j the lUlvcmciOU8 TIlil:flJ,mlt wOIIl,] reduce them 'U1 low
as 1,000. Hut it is possible to arrive at something like the real figures.
Delaborde brought out from Lisbon two battalions of tl!C 70th, the 2Gth
CAtwmllr8,1 C'IW1;ul, lIlIIl five guns. TIlOmicroo joinoo Idm from Pcuiche with
the 1st Provisionlll Light Infantry (a battalion euch of the 2nd and 4th Uger)
and with the 4th Swiss.
The numbers of these corps hud been on July 10 :-
701I1 of lIle Liuo (two batts.)
2nd Uger (one batt.)
4th" "
4t11 Swiss "
26th Cha.sseurs
0,779
But each of the four French corpa had gll'en its grelludier company as :l
contribution to the' Reserve Grenadier llattaliolUl' which Junot had organized..
'111e battalions beillg on the old nille-company establishment (see Foy's large
table of the AT7IICe l%&pagne, note d) we must deduct onc-ninth of each, or
about 500 mell in all. We have also to allow for six companies of the
4th Swiss sent to garrison reniche; not for t11e whole battalion, as }o'oy says in
iI'. 300, for there were Swiss in the figllt of Roli<;a (Leslic's MWlary JqurRal,
1'. 43), IInd at Vimiero in the official state of Junot's lIrmy we fiud two
companies of this oorps with Brennier's brigade. We must deduct, then,
three-fourths of tllCm from tll(l force present with Delaborde, i. e. some 740
n,ell. 'l1lis lcal,lltl 4,2i6 men for the four I\ml a quur1.cr hattaliolls under lira
at noli~. Of course Junot's troops must hUI'e bad a few men in hospital
sincet July 15, the date of the return which we are using. Dut they cannot
hal'e been many. '11e 70tl, I"ul been fluiet in it!! quarters ill Lisbon. '/116
,-,ther three hllttaliolls had been in Loison'li Heira expedition, and had lost
some men therein, but all before July n. If we concede 300 sick Oil
August IG, it is ample, 'l'e can aIlOI\' therefore for 4,000 infantry, 250
cavalry, "nd Sl)llUl 100 gunners present witll Dc.1ubortle, i. c. I,is total fonoe
must have been about 4,350 men-a number much closer to ,,,..c.I.lt'81cy'll 6,000
than to 'n,ieDault's 1,!)()(); Foy, usually SO accurate, i9 clearly wrong iu
hringing the figures ,101l'n to 2,500 (il". 310).
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himself to a fight. AC{.'Ordingly he drew buck to Roliya, leaving
only a rearguard at Obidos to observe the approach of the l]ritish.
At the same time he detached six companies of the 4th Swiss to
garrison l'eniche, thus reducing his available force to 4,850 men,
'\\Tcllcslcy, meanwhile, kJlOwing himself to be close to the enemy.
advunced steadily bllt with C<'\ntion. He left behind his tents and.
other weighty bUfrb"U./:,te at Leiria, and moved forward with a lightly
equipllcd army to Alcob.'\'ril on the fourteenth, to Caldas on the
fifteenth. On that day the first shot of the campaign was fIred :
four companies of the fifth battalion of the 60th and of the second
battalion of the 95th Rifles discovered. the French outposts at
DrUos in front of Obidos, drove them in, and pursuing furiously
for three miles, came on the battalion which formed Delaborde's
rearguard. This corps turned upon them, checked them with the
loss of two 1 officers and twenty·seven men killed and wounded, and
only retin:.,'d whell Generol Spencer led up a brigude to savc the
riAemen.
Next morning the French were discovered to have fallen back
no further thltn lloli~a, where Delltborde had found the position
that he had sought in vain at Batalha. The road from Caldas
lLnd Obidos towards Torres Vcdras ulld Lisbon pusscs for some
miles over a sandy plain enclosed on either flank by bold hills.
The southern limit of the basin is a croos-rid,!"J'C. which connects
the other two: in front ·of it lies lloliyn., on the side-slope of an
isolated eminence which overlooks the whole plain: u mile further
south the road passes over the cross:'ridge by a sort of gorge or
defile, on the right hand of which is the village of Columbcira,
while to its left rear lies that of Zambugcira. Though Delaborde
had. drlLwn up his men on the hill of Uoli<;a down in the plain. it
was not this advanced position that he intended to hold, but the
higher und stccper line of the cross-ridge, on either side of the
defile above Columbeira. Here he had a short front, only
thrcc-qultrtcrs of a mile in length, scarped by precipitous slopes,
and covered by thickets and brushwood, which sened to mask the
strength (or rather the weakness) of his division.
Discovering Dclabome drawn up on the isolated hill of Rolilfa,
where both hi~ flanks could etlSily be tumcd, the Dritish commnnde."
resoh'ed to cndcaVoul' to CllvelOp and surround him. He waited
, TIlc WHile of Licutcllaut BlIllbllrr, of thc 2jD,'ilh. pcrlJ'lps deserVe!!
remembral.lce as that of the fiNt British officer killed il.l the l'elliusular War.
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011 the sixteenth till the rear of the army had come up. and marched
at dawn on the seventeenth with his whole fOr<:e-13,OOO British
and ~.OOO Portuguese, drawn up in a crescent-shaped formation with
the centre refused and the wings thrown far forward. On the
right Colonel Trallt, with three bnun..lions of Portuguese infantry
and fifty horse of the same nation, moved along the foot of the western
range of heights, to turn the noli~Sl position by a wide circular
movement. On the left General Ferguson, .....ith hi!! own bl'i/:,rude,
that of Uowes, and six guns, stl1.lck over the hills to get round the
eastern flank of the French. III the ,--entre the remainder of the
aml,y.-four brigades of British infantry, 400 cavalry, half English
alld half Portuguese, with tJ1C battalion of Cazadorcs and twelve gUllS,
advallced on a broad front in two lines, forming a most magnificent
spectacle: 'they came 011 slowly but in beautiful order, dressing at
intervals to colTeet the gaps caused by the inequalities ofground, and
all converging on the hill ofRoli,1l1.' Hill's brigade formed the right,
Fane's the left, Nightingale's the centre, while CatIin Crawfurd'~ two
battalions and the Cuzndorcs acted as the reserve.
Dclaborde had warned his men to be rctU1y for a sudden rush to
the rc.'lr the minute that the enveloping mow~ment should gl1'Jw
dangel"Ous. Waiting till the last pOSilible momcnt, whcn Fane's
riflemen were already engaged with his tirailleurs, and Trant and
Ferguson were showing 011 the flanks, he suddenly gave the order
for retreat. His men hurried back, easily eluding the snare, and
took post on the wooded heights above Columbeim a mile to the
rear. Wellesley had to rean"an6re his troops for an attack on the
second position, and half the morning had been wa."ted to no effect.
He resolved, however, to repeat his original 1llll.IlCEuvre. Tmllt
and the Portuguese once more made a long sweep to the right:
Ferguson's column mounted the foot-hills of the Sierra. de llara-
gueda and commenced a toilsome detour to the left 2. In the l..'Cntre
two batteries formed up near a windmill on the northern slope of
Roli~'a hill and bcl:.ran to bombard the Prench position, while E'anc's
brigade to the left on the main road, and Hill's and Nightingale's
to the right deplo)'cd for the Ilttoek.
\Vcllesley had not intended to assault the Columbeira heights
till the tllflling mo,"cments of Trallt and Ferguson lShould be well
1 Foy, iI'. 300.
2 I cannot find the authorit}" (or Napier's st.1tement that Fane joined
Fergl1SOn in the secolld move. fIc seem!! still to hal"c acted ill the centre.
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devcloped. Dut, contrary to his intention, part of his centre pushed
forward at once, and Whel} it was engaged the other troops in the
front line were sent up to its aid. 'l11c face of the hill was SCtlrreU
by four' passes' as vVellesley called them, or rather large ravines,
up each of which some of the British tmops tried to ~nctmtc.
On the extreme right the lightcomp..'l.nies of Hill's brigade,supported
by the first buttnlion of the 5th U.cgimcnt from the sume brigade,
delil'cred their attack up one gully. The second pass, just beyond
the village of Columbeira, was assuyed by the ~9th from
Nightingale's brigade, with the 9th of HilI'l; in support. The
82nd went towards the (:entre, while FUllc's two riffc lmttuliolls
and the 45th tried the heights far to the left.
The 29th Regiment, urbrcd on by the rash courage of its colonel,
L'lkC', attneked some time before any oth~r corps WllS enga..,cY'ed. It
pushed up a naITOW craggy pass, the bed of a dried-up mountain
torrent, where in some places only two or three men abreast could
keep their footing: the fw·Ulcr tlmt the buttnlion ndvanced, the
more did the m.vine recede into the centre of the enemy, and thl!
~9th was soon being fired on from three sides. The right wing,
which led, at last forced its way to the brow of the hill, find W[L~
able to deploy in a more or less imperfect way, and to commence
its fire. In front of it were the fell" companies of the 4th Swiss, some
of whom tried to sutrCnder, calling out that they were friends,
tnrning up their musket butts, find rushing in to shake hands with
the llritiijh 1. But before the 29th could fully re<.:over its formation,
it was fiercely charged from the renr: some of the Freneh troop,;
on the lower slopes of the position, finding thelllJ:lCIves likely to be
cut oft~ formed in a dense mass /lnd nJshcd straight through the
right wing of Colonel Llke's regiment froUl behind, breaking it, kill-
ing it" commander and capturing six officers and some thirty of its
rllnk and file, whom they took back with them in triumph. The
~9th reeled down the slope into a wood, where it refonlled on its
comparatively intact left wing, and then resumed the fight, aided.
by the 9th, its supporting regiment. Abont this moment the 5th
and Fane's rilles mude other attacks on the two ends of the hostile
line, but were at first checked. Delaborde and his brigadier,
1 Col. T.e>llie'g narrative, p. 43. 111C 4th Swiss WllS l\ very dh;eolltellted
corps; iodh'idullls of it boo begun to desert to the British even before Roli0
(Leach, p. 44), and a considerable numoor of them took service in the 60th
Rifles after the Convention of Cintra, refusing to return to France.
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Brellllier, had only four battalions all the ridge, as they had detached
three companies of the 70th far to their right in the direction in
which Ferguson was moving. But they held their ground ycry
gallantly, wniting till the Dritish skirmishers had begun to get
a lodgement on the brow, and then charging each detachment as it
tried to deploy, and forcing it down to the edge of'the wood that
covered the lower slopes. 'l111~ assaults were thus repuls<...J, but
the British troops would not be dellied-Wellesle~'Wfote that he
had never seen lllot'C brallant fighlillg HUlIl that of the 9th and the
~9th I-and after each reverse formed up again and came on once
more. After two hours of desperate !Struggles they made gooJ.
their lodgement on the crest at several points: Ferguson's troops
(though they had lost thei,o way and wasled much time) "began to
appear on the extreme left, and Delabordc then saw that it WitS
time for him to go.
He retirec:J by alternate battalions, two in turn holding back the
disordered pursuers, while the other two doubled to the ffi'\r. His
regimcnt of clUl89curil if cl/cuaJ, also exccuted sc\'eral partial charges
against the British skirmishers, and lost its commander mortally
wounded: the l~ol"tugucsc cavalry refused to face them. In this
way the French reached the pass behind Zambugeil'a, a mile to the
TOOl', without ally gt-eat loss. But in passing through this defile,
they were fort'e<! to club together by the IlIU't'OWIlCSS of the road,
were roughly hustled by their pursuers, and lost three 2 of theil'
guns !\ud Il few prisoners. The rest of the force escaped in some
disorder to Ca7.al da Sprega, where ""Ve1lesley halted his men,
seeing that it 'I'M now impossible to cateh Delaoorde's main body,
Two miles to the rear the French were" rejoined by the three
companies of the 70th Regiment which had been detached to the
cast. They tbcn retrcated to Monu.·chique some (ifteeu mile;
from Lisbon, where tlley at last got news of Loison and
Junot.
Delaborde had fought a most admirable reargullnl. action, holdillg
on to the last moment, and escaping by his prompt manreu...res
the Vel'y serious risk of l>cillg ellveloped and captured by the fOr<:cs
of the English, who outnumbered him fourfold. Dut he had lost
600 men and three gnns, while his fl.SSililants Imd only sullercd to
I Well, Di8p., iv. BJ,87,
t l<'oy says only one gUll, but Wellesley, who had better opportunities of
knowing,lIayll tiJat he took three (JVel/, Difip., iv. 83).
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the extent of 474 killed, wounded, and prisoners 1, nearly half of
whom were in the ranks of the 29th 2. The French flattered
themselves that they had somewhat shaken the rrwrale of 'Vellesley's
men by their obstinate resistance: but this was far from being the
case. The English had only put five and a half battalioDs 3 into the
fighting line, and were proud of having turned the enemy out of
SlIch a position as that of Cohunbeira without engaging more than
4,600 men.
U is doubtful whether Dclaborde should have fought at all:
he was holding on in the hope that Loison's division would come
up and join him, but this jundion was vcry problematical, as
nothing had been heard of that geneml for many days. By
fighting at Columbeira, Delaborde risked complete destruction for
an inad&Juate end. It was tnJe that if Loison was now close at
hand Wellesley's further advance might cut him off from Lisbon.
But as a matter of fact Loison was still far away. He,had reached
Santarem on August lS, with his troops so tired by his long
march from the Alemtejo, that he halted there for two du.ys to
rest them and allow his stragglers to eome up, Marching again
on the sixteenth, he was at Ccrcn..l, fifteen miles from Uoli~a to the
east, while Dclaborde was fighting. He barely heard the distant
ctUlIlonade, and rejoined the rest of the army at Torres Vcdras, by
a route through Cadaval and Quinta cIa Bugagliera, which erossed
his colleague's line of retreat at an acute angle [Au.b'llSt 18].
It is true that if Wellesley had been accurately informed of
Loison's position on the scvclltl.-'enth, he could ha\'e so munreuvroo.
as to place himself directly between that general and Lisbon on the
following day, by seizing the cross-ronds at Quinw. da Bugaglicra.
In that case Loison's division could only ha,'e rejoined Junot by
a perilous flank march through Villnf.l'u,nca and Saecuvcm, or by
crossing the Tagl.1s and moving along its eastern bank to the
heights of Ahnada opposite the capital. But the English geucrtll's
object at this moment WM not to cut off Loison, but to pick
I '111it!ooult solemnly gtates our loss at 2,000 men! Mlmoirl!9, h-. lOG.
S TImt corps lost no less than 190 officers and men, among whom were silt
officers ulkcIl IJriSOllcrs,
S The 5tb, 9th, 29th, 8211d, 5/6Oth, and four companies of the 2/!)5th, in
11.11 4,635 men. Ther lost respectiyely 4G, 72, 190, 25, 66, and 4.2 men, or 4.Jl
ill nil ; ,..hilc the rest of tl,e "rIlly (tell British 'md fOllr Portuguese lw,ttaliolls)
ollly lost the remail.ling 3lJ of the total of 4j!) casualties suffered on the 17th,
;. e. were not reallr engaged.
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up 0. considerable rcinforcemen4 of whose approach he had just
heard. On the morning of the eighteenth the brigade of General
Acland from Harwich had arril'ed off the Peniche peninsula, and its
advent was reported to Vle1lesley, with the additional Dell'S that
that of General Anstruther, which had sailed from Ramsgate, was
close behind. It was ull-importallt to get these 4,000 men ashore ;
they could not be landed at Penichc, whose fort was still in French
hands, and the only other anchorage Ilear was that of Porta Novo,
at the mouth of the little river Maccira, twelve miles south of
Holit;a. To cover their disembarkation Wellesley marched by the
t-ou.st-rood through Lourillhu.o, and encamped 011 the heights of
Vimiero. This movement allowed Loison, who moved by the
parallel road more inland, to puss the English and rcnch TOrl-es
Vedras.
NOTE TO CHAPTER 11
Bv far the best English account of Rolioya is that by Col. Leslie of the 29th,
in his .Military Journal, which was not priuted till 1887 (at tIle Aberdeen
UnivCl'!'!ity Press). Hc corrects Nallier on OO\'I~rlll poillUl. 1 have also found
meful details in the letters (unpublished) of Major GeU, of the samc regiment,
wbich were placed at my disposition by Mr. P. Lyttelton Gell. Leslie and Gell
agree that Colonel Lake led on his regiment too fast, contrary to Welles1ey's
intlllltiollS. TIll! narrative of Colonel Leach of ti,e 2j9,'ith is also val,,:Lble.
TI,e accounts of Laudslleit of the 20th Light Dragoons, of Colouel WHkie
in Maxwell's l'enillwor Sketchts (voL i), and the anonymous' T. S.' of the
7lst (Constable, Edinburgh, 1028) have some useful points. For and Thi€-
bault, the French narrators of the fight, were not ere-witnesses, like the six
abol'C-lllllllcd Dritish writers.
•
SECTION IV: CHAPTER In
VIi\UERO
.JIDJOT much disliked leaving Lisbon: he greatly enjoyed hi~
viceregal state, and was so convinced that to retain the capital
was equivalent to dominating the whole of Portugal', that he
attached an exaggerated importance to his hold on the place, and
was very reluctant to cut down its garrison. But it was clearly
necessary to support Delaborde and Loison, and at last he took
his departure. As 1\ preliminary precaution he resolved to deitl
it blow at the _t\lemtejo insurgents, who, emboldened by Loison's
retrrot, were creeping llcarcr to the mouth of the T~ous, and
shol\ing themselves opposite Setuval. On August 11, five days
after Dclabordc had marched off, General. Kcllcrmnnll was sent out
with two battalions and it few dragoons to drive oft' these hovering
bands, a task which he executed with ease, giving them it thorough
beating at Alcacer do Sal. HM'ing cleared this flank Junot
evacuated Setu~al and his other outlying posts beyond the Tagus,
and only retained garrisons at Forts Bugio and Trafaria, which
command the entrance ot' tlle river, and on the heights of Almado.,
which face Lisbon across the 'l\Iar de Palio.' He put in a state
of defence the old citadel which crowns the highest of the seven
hills OIl which the city is built, and established a battalion in each
of the suburban villages of llelem and Saccavem, another in I"ort
San Julian at the mouth of the Tagus, and two at Cascaes, in the
batteries which command the only point where a disembarkation
from the side of the Atlantic is barely possible. This excess of pre-
caution was largely due to the fact that a small English convoy of
transports, carrying the 3rd Regiment (the Buffs) from Madeira, had
been seen oR'the mouth of the Tagus. The duke feared that this por-
tended an attempt to throw troolls ashore in the immediate vicinity
of the capital, when he should have gone ofl' t.o meet "Vcllesley,
Altob"Cthcr .Junot left seven battalions, not less than 6,500 men,
in Lisbon and the neighbouring forts, a much greater number than
1 As Foy well puts it, the idea was that 'le Portugal etait dalls Lisooune,
et Li.SWllllC ctait Aclle soule tout le Portugal' (iv. 233).
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was really required, for, as Napoleon afterwards observed, ropiluls
wait, before declaring themselve~ for events outside to cast their
shadows before 1, Knowing that a decisive blow gi"cn to the
English would be the best way to keep the city quiet, the Duke
of Abrantes would have been wise to Cllt down his garrisons round
Lisbon to 3,000 men, howc\'cr great the risk, and take eyery
available man to meet 'Vellesley 2. It is probable that his error,
Proocnt at Vimicro.
I'rC6Cllt at Vimiero.
Present at Vimiero.
Present st Vimiero.
Ficld-anny. Present atVimicro(cx-
ccpt four cOIllIJ;mic!; Ieft.at Elvns).
Six companies at Pcuic}le. 'fwo
prcscnt at Vimiorn.
Stotlr,.".
At Staeca.vem and ill Lisbon eit)'.
Iu fort!! south of the TaguSo-moutll.
Fidd-ann}'. Present at Virnicro.
Field-anny.
Fieltl-army;
Fiol.l-army.
:Pic1d-army.
Field-amly. l~resent at Vimiero.
Field-army. Present at Vimiero.
10 garrison at Ell-liS.
00'
1,034
1,428
1,103
4th SwiM (ht batt.)
2nd Division, Loison:-
Drigade Thornicres :
'1st l'rovisional lAger '-
2nd lAger (3rd batt.) 1,075
4th"" 1,098
'2nd Provisional Uger '-
12th Uger (3rd hatt.) 1,258
16th,,}} 1,305
Brigade CharIot:
32nd Line }}
60th u "
2nd Swiss (2nd hatt.)
3rd Dh'ision, Tr::wot:-
Brigade Graiudorge :
I See his curious criticism on Junot, recorded by Thit'!bault in iv. 2GO, 269
of his Mtmoi1'u.
t For clearoCS'! it may be wort1l while to gh'C tIle dislocation of JUllot'lI
ann}' on the day of the battle of Vimiero, adding the force of each unit 011
July 16, the last 3\'ailable return.
1st DiYision, Dclabordo:-
Brigade Avril : Merl.
15th Lino (3rd hatt.) 1,00G
47th " (2nd halt.) .' I,Ml
70th " (1stau1l2nd batts.) 2,368
Drig;ule Brenuicr:
86th Line (lstand 2nd batts.) 2,501
31st UgcI' (3rd batt.)
32nd "
04' 11'art1Y on the heights of Almada,
1 oro partl)' guarding the Spanish
" 'priSOllcrg at Lisbon.
20th Line JJ 617 At Relcm.
GOth " (3rd and 4th hatts.) ],126 At C"seacs.
Brigade Fusier :
82nd Line (3rd batt.) !)(l3 Field-amly. Present at Vimiero.
MgiQII du Midi 842 At Fort San Julian.
1st I1allOl'crian LcgiOll 804 At Santarem.
All tllC four cavalry regiments of 1\!argaron's division, 1,7.54 sabres, were pre-
scut at Vimiero, save nue tr0011 of tlragOOllS capturcd "'itlt Qucsucl at Oporto.
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which no li'rench general would have committed at a later period
of the war, was due to that tendency to despise the fighting power
of the British which was prevalent on the Continent all through
the early }'ears of the century.
Not the least of Junot's troubles was the obstinate torpidity of
the Russian admira~ Siniavin, whose 6,000 seamen and marines
might ha"e takcn ovcr the whole churge of Lisbon, if only their
commander had been willing. The Russian had refused to take
part in the war as long as only Portuguese were in the field, 011
the plea that his maswr had never declared war 011 the l'rince-
Regent or recognized the French annexatioll. But when the
lll"itish had landcd, JWlOt hoped to move him to action, for
there was no doubt that Russia and the United Kingdom were
technically at wal". The Duke of Abmntes first ll·ied to induce
Siniavin to put out from the Tagus, to fall upon scattered British
COllvOyS, and to distract the attention of the blockading squadron
under Cotton. But the reply that to sally forth into the Atlantic
would probably mean destruction in two days by the British fleet
was too mtional to be overruled. Then JUllot pmposed that
Siniavin should at least take charge of the pontoons containing
the captive Spanish division of Caralfil.: but this too was denied
him, and he had to leave a battalion of Graindorge's brigade to
mount guard on the pri~ollcrs 1. The Russians were perfectly
useless to J unot, except in so far as their guns helped to over-
nwe Lisbon, and presented 0. show of force to dettt Dritish vessels
from trying to force the passage of the forts at the mouth of
the Tagus. The fact was that Siniuvill was not so much stupid"as
disaffected; he belonged to the party in Russia. which was opposed
to France, und he had pcrhaps received a hint .from home that he
was not expected to show too much 7.eal in supporting the projects
of Napoleon.
On the night of August 15, J unot marched out of Lisbon at the
head of his reserve, a. very small for(.'C consisting of a battalion of
the 82nd of the line, one of the two regiments of grenadiers, which
he had created by (.'Oncentrating the grenadier companies of the
eighteen line battalions in his armyt, the grd provisional regiment
I I cannot make out whether this was the 31st or the 32nd Uger. !o'oy and
Thiebault omit to give the detail.
! JUIlOt Imd created two of these regimonts of grenadiers, each of two
battaliollil. Tho socolld was at this moment with Loison.
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of drilbroons, a squadron of \'olunteer eamIry formed by the French
inhabitants of Lisbon, and his reserve artillery-ten guns und~r
General Taviel. He also took with him the reserve ammunition-
tmin, n large <-,onvoy of food, and his military chest containing
fl. million of francs in specie. On the morning of the seventeenth
th~ troops Lad readIed Vilh,frauca, when a fulse report that the
English were tr)'ing to land at Cascaes caused them to retrace
their steps for some miles, and to lose hnlf a day's march. On
leaming that Lisbon and its neighbourhood were quiet, JUDot
returned to the front, and growing vc.."cd at the slow march of
the great convoy which the reserve was escorting, pushed on ahead,
and joined Loison at Cereal. He hoom the distant thunder of
the gtUlS !ll noli~1\ in the afternoon, but W/lS too far away to help
Detaborde.
On the eighteenth Loison und Junot marched southward to
Torres Vedras, and heard that Delaborde had fallen back so far
that he was tell miles to their rear, at Montcchique. He only
came up to join them next day [Aub,"Ust 191 and the reserve with
it.~ heavy convoy, much hampered by lmd country roads in the
Monte Juuto hills, did not appear till the twentieth.
Junot had been much exercised in mind by the doubt whether
Wellesley would march by the direct road on Lisbon through
Torrcs Vedras and Montecbique, or would continue to hug the
shore by the longer route that passes by Vimiero and l\1afra. Not
lmowing of the approach of Acland's and Anstruther's brigades,he was ignorant of the main fact which governed his adversary's
movements. But leaming on the twentieth that the British were
still k~pjng to the coast-road, by which they could in one more
march tUn! his position at Torres Vedras, he determined to rush
upon them with his united forces and b,rivc battle. At the last
momcnt he resolved to draw a few more men from Lisbon, and
called up a battalion of the 66th of the line, and another composed
of four picked companies selected from the other corps of the
garrison-a trifling reinforcement of 1,000 or 1,!i!OO men, which
arrived just too late for the fight at Vimiero.
The organimtion ot the French army had been so much cut up
by the numerous garrisons whieh Junot had thought fit to leave
behind him, that although fivc of his six inftmtry brigades were
more or less represented in his field-army, not one of them was
complete. Hc accordingly recast the whole .system, and arranged
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his force in two divisions under Dc1nborde and Loisoll, and nreservc
brigade of Grenadiers under Kellermann. His cavalry on the other
hand was intact: ever)' onc of the four regiments of Margaroll's
division was present, and over and above them he had the squadron
of French volunteers raised in Lisbon. He had also twenty-three
guns: there should have been twent)'-six, but Delaborde had lost
three at Roli~. The total of men present amountoo to 10,300
foot and ~.OOO horse, with 700 nrtillclJ'Illcn and men of the
military train 1, or about 13,000 in all.
1,075
1,008
2,308
1 Junot's numbers at Vimiero are as much disputed as Delaborde'g at
Ro1i93' Among the J<'rench accounts tll6 figures vary from 12,500 to 9,200.
Foy, usually the most CO!lSCiClltiOUIl historian, gives 11,.500; Thicooult, both ill
his uarrath'c, published in 1616, and in his private M&noirea, descends to 9,200.
Wellesley eslimated the army tlHlt lie had fought at 14,000 (Well. Di8p. ,iv.I01).
It will be well to give the corps preseut, and to cxaminc into thcir probablo
strength. Just before the landing of the British they had stood as follows
(I have arranged tllem in tlleir new brigading) :-
(1) Division Dclabonle :-
Brigade Brennier :
2nd Uger (3rd batt.)
4th" "
70th of the Line (1st and 2nd batls.)
BrigrnIo 1110miercs :
86th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.) (minus
four companies left at Eh-as).
4th Swiss (two companies)
(2) Division Loiilou :-
Brigade Soligua.c :
12111 Uger (3rd baU.)
15t1l" "
S8t11 of the Line (3rd hatt.)
""
Brigade CharIot:
321\d of the Line (3rd baU.)
82ud
2,100
[(3) Reserve of Grenadiers:-
1st Regiment (1st and 2nd batts.)
2nd" " "
TIlis cor(Mj, beia/; formed of companies drawn from every bat-
talion in Portugal, excollt tho three foreign regimonts RUtI the
llgion du. Midi, must not be C(lWIte<! in our first estimate.]
1,007
12,705
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6,30.>
2,100
203
6.0
WO
650
100
Brought forward
(4) Cavalry Division :\rargaron :-
1sl Provisional Ch.'\SSCul'lil
ard " Dragoons
4th" "
nth" "
Squadron of yohUltoor cllyalry
Hce.ring that Wellesley was stationary in Yimiero since the
morning of the nineteenth, Junot determined to attack him at the
12,i05
(5) Artillerymen for 23 guns, engineers, train, &C.
2,261
700
15,050
But from this 15,6.5(llargo doductiolls IHwo to be mndc; oach of the c:lOVClI
line battalions present had gi\'cn its grenadier companr to contribute to the
four battalions of' Ueservo Grenadiers' which Juno! had formed. We must
therefore deduct from thorn about 1,3.50 bayonets. DelabonJo had lost GOO
men at noliy.'. L<Jisou's regiments had been thinned by the ucpiit battalion
left to garrison Almeida, and by his losses in hill campaign OIl the Douro and
in the Alcmtejo. Thiebault states that the casualties had amounted to 450
during these operatious ; the detai1sJeftat Almeida, including many sick, were
1,000 slrOllg, 80 wo mllst llubtract 1,450 from Loiooll's tot.n\. '11lis isliboral,
as some, both of the Almeida force and of the Alemtejo lo;;ses, came from
regiments lIOt present at Vimiero (e. g. the Ist Hanonal'ial\!~a.nd the 4th Swiss).
'lrc Illust make somc deduction for tbo ordinary llOllpital wastago of the
troops wbidL had come out of Lisbon with De1abordc and Junot, BC,-ell bat-
talions alld two regiments of cavalr}'. Loison's sick arc already partly ac-
counted for by the Almeida details. It would seem that 1,000 would be an
ample allowance. Whcll the French evacuated Portugal they had 3,281 men
in hOSllitnl. Of th~, 1,200 were Lho wounded of Vimiero. Of tl16 remllinder,
1,000 may hal'e belonged to the tell and two-thin!s battaliOllS prosent at the
battle, the other ],081 to the eleven and one-third not present.
For the infantry then we aUo\\,-
12,iOO of origill:ll strength, minus 1,350 GreJl3Lliel'lil, (lOO lOIlt at
Rolilfa, and ],460 in garriSOIl at Almeida or lost in the
insurret:tion, and 1,000 sick (4,400 in all) .
Add for four battalions of Uesefl"e Grenadiers
Total
Margaron's caYalry was practically intact: on July 15 it was 2,151
strong (ThiGbault); it hardly suffered in the insurrecticn.
If we allow 300 meu for casual losses lInd troopers Oil
detachmcnt Of acting a.s orderlies, it is ample .
"re must add tlle 100 yolunteer horse
Lastly, for artillerymen of four batterie8 (23 guns), engineers aod
train, &c., we nllow.
Total
'fh~ is !lot far from Wellesley's estimate of l.i,ooo meu.
10,40.5
1,8tJ1
100
700
13,056
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earliest possible moment. He was ignorant that his adversary's
halt was due to the Ilrrivnl of' Anstruther and Ac1(1nd, but knowing
that more troops were expected from the sea he resolved to fight
at once. The reserve and convoy joined him on the morning of
the twentieth; the same night he marched under cover of the
darkness und traver.sed the ten miles which separated him from
the hostile position: at dawn he was close under it.
Dut 'Vclleslcy meanwhile had reccived his reinforccmcnts, and
was 4,000 men stronger than the Duke of Abrantes supposeQ..
On the nineteenth Anstrutllcr's 1 brigade had accomplished its
dangerous disembarkation, throngh the surf that beats upon the
sandy shore north ofthe mouth of the Mut'Cira. It had been a tedious
business, many boats having been upset and some lives 1051:. On
the afternoon of the twentieth thc convoy that brought Aclallll's
brigadc was got inshore, and the greater part of the men disem-
barked in the dusk in the actual mouth of the little river, and
slept upon the bMch. Dut some of them were stili on shipboard
on the morning of the twenty-first, and came too late for the
battle of that day~.
l"hile covering this disembarkation WeUesley had taken up all
excellent position 011 tlle heights of Vimiero, with the sea at his
back. The surrounding collntr}' was pleasant, good water was
forthcoming in abundunce, und thc ncighbouring villages provided
a considerable quantity of food. The region is both more fertile
and better wooded than most of central Portugal. The only fault
633
721
054
6!J5"
"
"
I Anstruther's Brigade from llilmsgate oousistcU of-
9th Hegimeut (211d batt.)
43rd" "
62nd
97th
2,703
With them tlle 43rd and 62nd, so famous in man)' a Peninsular battle-field in
tile Light Division, made their appearance.
2 Of Acland's Brig-<lde from Harwich tllere disembarkod-
2nd or Queen's Regiment 731
20th Regiment (seven and a half oompanies) 401
96th Rilles (1st batt., two companies) 200
1,332
The ship tliat bore Colonel Rms and two amI ll. Ilalf companies of tIle 20th
had drifted so fllr off the s.horc that it did not eucceoo iu getling ibi freight
delivered till late on the tweDty.first.
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/
of the position was that it was one from which retreat wOllld have
been very difficult. But confident in himself and his men, and some-
what nnder-estimating the possible maximum of force that Junot
could bring against him, ·Wcllcslcy was thinking of nothhlg less
than of retreat. If he had not been attacked on the twenty-first,
hc would himself have pushed 011 towards the encmy next day.
He had now 16,778 British troops, besides Trant's 2,000 Portu-
guese, and thought himself competent to cope with allY force that
J unot could collect.
The position of Vimiero consists of a well-mnrkcd line of heights
sweeping from the north to the south-west, and cut through the
centre by the narrow valley of the ri\·er Maceim, on which the
villah"C ?f Vimiero stunds. 'l1le soutl.ern part of the rtlllf:,TC, which
lies nearest the sea, is especially steep and formidable: the northern
part., beyond the Maecirn, is lower and brooder: along its ridge
runs a country road leading northward to Llurinh1i.o. But 'even
here the position is vcr)' strong, for a ravine creeps along its
eastern foot and acts as El sort of ditch to the broad ridge, or
rather plateau, which the British arm)' was holding. Its only
accessible side is the north, where it sinks down into t\ rolling
upland beyond the villnJ,'C of Ventosa. In the vcr), centre of the
positiun, well in front of the main ridge, just aoovc the village of'
Vimiero, lies an isolated hill, well suited to serve as au outwork
or first line of defem:e. It was partly occupied by vineyards and
thickets, partly by open fields, and gave admirable cover for its
defenders.
'l1lis bill '''elIcsley hud chosen as the kcy of his position: on
it were placed the two brigfldes of Fane and Anstruther, seven
battalions in nil. The high ridge running from behind it to the
\iCa was held by the brigacles of Hill, Bowes, Catlin Crawfurd,
~ightingale, and Acland. That of Ferguson lay behind Vimiero,
astride of the valley of the Milceil'a. '1'11\I1I;'s four battalions of
Portuguese wcre Ilear FergusOli, on the IOll'er heights north of
Vimicro, ready to act as a rese.·vc to !i'fLne and Anstruther. The
handful of cavalr)" 240 English and 260 Porhlf:,l'\lcSC sabres, lI'ere
in the low ground on the banks of the Maceira, close under Craw-
fmd's position. Of the three batteries which Wcllcslcy had been
able to bring with him, six guns were on the projecting height U:ith
Allstruther, eight were on the high mountain south of Vimiero,
rmd four were with the reserve.
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A glance at this order of battle shows that Wellesley expected
to be attacked from the south, up the valley of the Maceira, and
that he thought that the enemy's plan would be to fort'C his right-
centre. Little or no provision is made against the plan which
Junot actually adopted, that of assaulting the British left-centre
and simultaneously turning their extreme left flank, while leaving
the right unmolested. But the whole position was so short-it
was less than three miles in length-that there was no difficulty
in shifting troops rapidly from onc end of it to the other, and, as
the event showed, no risk whatever was run.
Wclleslcy was busy arranging his linc of battle, when to his
bitter disappointment he received the news that he was superseded,
a calamity which he had been expecting to occur at any moment.
Sir Harry Burrard had arrived from England at the tail ofAcland's
COIlVOY, and was now on board thc sloop J)mzrn in Mnceira
Bay. Sir Arthur at once went off in a boat to greet him, and
to give him an account of the condition in which affairs stood,
Burrurd heard him out, and then placed a strong embargo on allY
further ofIcnsive movement. He had learnt that Sir John Moorc,
with the division from the Baltic, was now off the Portuguese coast,
and was resolved not to stir till those troops should have been
landed, Being, as it seems, a leisurely sort of man, he resolved to
sleep on board his ship for one night more, and to come ashore
next morning-a resolve which cost him that chance of command-
ing a British army in a pitched battle which so many ~nerals have
in vain desired. 'Wellcsley went oock through the surfcharged, for a
short fifteen hours more, with the destinies of the army of Portugal!.
240
226
2,658
50'
923
93.5
2,449
ll,673
944
761
'"
"
2nd Brigade, Fergusoll :
36th
40th (ht batt.)
71st "
1 It may be well to give \Vellesley's army at Vimicro :-
Cavalry, 20th Light DrugOOllS •
Artillery, three batteries
1st Brig;u:lc, Hill :
llth (ht batt.) .
9th
38t1! "
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The French cavrury had been hovering around Vimicro all
through the twentieth, and knowing that Junot was not far off,
Brought forward 0,673
3rd Brigade, Nightingale;
29th 616
02nd (Ist hatt.) 904,
1,020
4th Brigade, Bowes :
6th (1st hatt.) . 943
32nd
"
670
1,813
6th Brigade, C. Crawfurd :
45th (Ist batt.) 91.;
!)1st 911
1,832
6th Brigade, }'ane :
50th (Ist hatt.) 945
GOth (5th battH) 004
95t1l (2nd bntt. J four companies)
.'"
7th Brigade, Anstruther :
2,OOS
Oth (2nd hatt.) 033
43rd
"
721
52ud
"
664
97th
"
695
8th Brigade, Acland :
2,703
2nu 731
20th (seven and a halfcompanies) 401
95th (1st batt. J two companies) 200
1,3..12
Total British present 10,770
'Vo have also to adl! the PortuguClic of Trallt, 2,000 or 2,100 men, making
18,800 for the whole force.
Napier's estimate on p. 499 of vol. i. of hiB Peni1Utllar War, is unfortu·
!lately quite inaccurate j he has-
(I) Omitt.ctl to tle.:luct from each regimeut the 10SSM o.t Roliy1, 474 in all.
(2) Counted the 60th ltegiment t""ice. Jt hsd been moved from Cstlin
Crawfurd's to Fane's brigade the da}' after JloHp, in exchange for the 45th.
Napier has inserted it, and counted it, in botb places with itll946 men.
(3) Forgotten that S!lUucer's artillery, 245 mon, had been left behind for
want of II0rseS.
(4) Omitted ('"cry excusably) to note that two and a half eompanie8 of the
2Qlh Regimont werl! not aBllOre yet, having drifted away ou a tlisabled traIlS-
port, so that the regiment is giveu 136 too strong.
111ere is therefore a total excess of no less tban J,7!l9 British troop!!. On
the otller lland, tIle Portuguese of Trout arc probably understated by some
3.50 bayonets.
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Sir Arthur had taken all precautions against being surprised.
General Fane, in charge of the outpost.s, had pushed picket.s of
riflcmen into the "fooded heights that faced the British position
on the northeMl hank of the Maceira I; "ooettes of the 20th
Light Dra~,'"Oons were thrown out t.hree or four miles to t.he front,
And especially watched the Torres Vedras road_ About midnight
they began to hcar thc approach of the enemy; the rumbling of
his guns and caissons o\-er the wooden bridge of Villa Facaia
trilvclled for miles through thc still night air. In half an hour
W·elleslcy was warned that the :French were drawing near, and sent
the order round all his brigades to be undcr arms and in line on
their designated position an hour before daybreak 2,
Dut thc enemy was late in appearing; JUHot had halted on the
near side of the bridge of Villa Facaia, four miles away, to rest his
men alter their night march und to ullow them to cook their
breakfast. It was not till nearly nine' in the morning that dense
clouds of dust rolling along the Tort"CS Vcdras road bore witness to
the approach of the French, They were indistinctly visible, among
woods and rolling upland, as they advanced with a broad front on
each side of the vil1~1'1C of Villa Facaia-a regiment of cavalry in
front, then Loison on the left. und Dclaborde on the right side of
the road, fiually Kellermann's grenadiers, the reserve of artillery,
and the bulk of 'Margaron's cavrury. The English were surprised
to note Umt the columns showed as masses of dust colour, not of
the customary dark blue, ·On account of the hot weather they
had been provided with whit.e linen frocks, and were wearing their
uniform coats folded and buckled orer their knapsacks 3.
'''elleslcy had been expecting to see the great column swerve to
its left, and approach him along thc "alley of the Maceira, by
Cunhndos Ulld Sobreiro Curvo. But instead of so doing Junot
continued his progress lJorthwnrd, till he had complet.ely marchetl
past. the English right wing, and only fronted and deployed when
he .had got on a lcvel with Vimiero. After driving ofi' the small
I Leach's S!;etchu, p. 50. lie was himself on the lille of pickets, 200
I'ltrong, which IteM the wooded lwight from which JUllot afterwards viewed
the b.'1ttlc.
~ Kapicr says that the news was brought' by a German officer of dragoons,
who 6howOO S(Jllle consternation.' This statement much offended the lIe1'l'f;-
bearer J~'llHlsheit, a sergeant of tile 2011t I..iglJt Drag<Jons, not 1111 officer. Ho
has left his protest ill his interesting autobiography, 11. 264_
3 Col. Leslie's Mili(rsry J()UJ'1lal, p, 02.
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pickets of English riflemen who still lay out in the woods a mile in
front of l?ane's brigade I, the :French began to form a. line of battle
whose southern end was opposite 'Velleslcy's centre. But at the
same time the cava.!ry advance-guard was noted riding far away to
the north, toward Carasquiera and Pr~aanza, and it was clear that
infantry were following them. Obviously there was going to be an
attempt to tum the English position at its northern end, 011 the
comparatively gentle slopes along the Lourillhiio road.
Junot after reconnoitring the British position in a somewhat
perfunctory fashion, had resolved to leave Monc the formidable
heights occupied by the right wing, and to try to storm the low
hill in front of Vimicro with his main bcw3)'. while he turned
Wellesley's left with a secondary column. This detachment was
composed of the Srd provisional regiment of dragoons, and
Brennier's brigade, the same four battalions which had fought so
haJldsomely at n.oli~n. Dut the moment that WeUesley had seen
that his right flank was safe, and that his left was about to be
attacked, he rapidly clmngro his line of battle. Ferguson, from
behind Vimiero, started to march north. Behind him followed
three of the four brigades which had occupied the hills above the
sea. Only Hill was still left on the crest to the south-west of'
Vimicro; Howes, Nightingale, and Aclalld-six battalions in all,
taking with them six guns-dropped down into the valley of the
Maceira, crossed it behind Vimiero, and marched along the L:mrin-
hao road pt\rullcl with Brennier's movement on the opposite side of
the valle)·. In rear of these troops, and nearer the sea, Catlin
Crawfurd and the Portuguese also moved northward, and took up
a position near Ribamar, where they covered the flank of the other
corps and were in a good position for preventing any movement of
the French on the e.''{treme north-west. Junot caught a glimpse
of the extensive transference of troops to the left which his adver-
sary was making, and struck with a sudden fear lest Brennier might
be overwhelmed, sent ofi-' another brigade--Solignac's of Loison's
division-to support him. He would have been much wiser had
he kept these three battalions in h311d to support his main attack,
and merely directed Brcnnier to demonstrate against the British left
without pressing his attack home. His last movement had divided
his army into two halves, separated from each other by a gap of
nearly two miles: for the main attack he had only kept eight and
I Col. Leach's Sketches, lIP, SO, ,'i1.
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a quarter batw.1ions, three regiments of cavalry and $c,'cnlccn guns,
while seven battalions, onc regiment of cavalry, and six gUllS had
gone off on the turning movement. How long their flank march
was to be he had not calculated, for, not discerning the steepness
of the ra\·ioc at the foot of tbc13ritish position, he hud not realized
that Brennier and Solignac would have to take a vast sweep to the
north in order to cross it. As a matter of fact they got completely
out of touch with him and, what was wors~ with each other.
'Dlcir diversion did not begin till the main battle Wl.\S nearly o\'cr',
Meanwhile the French general deployed the second brigades of
his two divisions, CharIot's of Loison's, and Thomiercs' of D<:1o.-
horJe's, onl)· four and a quarter battalions in all, as a first line for
the attack on Vimicro. Kcllermnnn's four battalions of gr~nadiers
in it second line were for the moment held back, as was the cavalry
and the reserve artillery. But 5Cven gUllS went forward with the'
first line. The French came on in their usual style, a thiek line of
tirailleurs, supported by ootWion columns close in their rear.
Fane and Anstruther were yery comfortably placed for repelling
the atL:tck: the latter had drawn up the 5!lnd and 97th in linl'! on
the slope of the hill, partly hidden by it dip in the ground and
largely co,'ercd by Yines and brushwood: the 9th and 43rd wel"C
in open column to the rear, ready to act as El. reserve. Fane had
got most of the riflemen of the 60th and 95th out in front, at the
foot of the hill, in a very thick skirmishing line: only it few
companies of them were in rcscne along with the 50th (the famous
'dirty half-hundredth ') at the head of the slope. In consequence'
of the order which Junot had adopted, Thomil~res' two battalions
were opposed to Fane, and Chariot's brigade to Anstruthtt on the
southern half of the hill. In each quarter the course of the fight
Wag much the same: the Frend. tiroilleurs pushed up the slope
among the brushwood and vineyards, slowly driving the riflemen
before them. 'l11en, as they drew llCtlr the erest, the two English
brigadiers suddenly let loose their formed battalions upon the
assailmlts. There was onc ficroc volley from thc six b'llIlS on
the hill top, and then the 91th charged Chariot's men in front,
while the 5~nd swerved round and took them in flank. Onc
I 'lbiebault (iv, 188, 189) expresses (and with rea80n) his wonder that
Juuot mixed ilis divisions 80 hopelessly, and thinks that it would have been
more rnlional to send Delaborde and Ms second brigatle after Drennior, instead
of brC1lking ul' Loison's division by taking tile SUllportiog brigade from it.
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smlUllling discharge at ten paces blew to pieces the heads of the
columns of the 39lnd and 8~nd, which crumpled up in bopeles3
di~ordcr ulId rolled down to the foot of the hill, pursued by their
assailants. A few moments latcr :Fane dashed the 50th and the
reserve companies of his rifles lbO'tlinst 'l'homiercs' troops, and sent
them flying down the slope in equal disorder. The)' could not be
rallied till they had got out of mu~kctry range. und the seven gUlls
which they had brought forward with them were an captured:
Delabordc and CharIot were wounded: the commander of the 821ld
was killed I.
JlUlOt'g first attack had failed, but his spirit was not yet broken:
he rolled np half his resen'c of grenadiers, two battalions llnder
Colonel St. Clair, and sent them against the hill Oll the sallle point,
while the debris of the two wrecked brigades were rallied and
pushed forward in support. Eight guns under Foy (the historian
in after*years of the war), were brought out from the artillery
reserve and pushed to the front. The second attack, however, failed
even more disastrously than the first: the grenadiers, attacking on
a narrow front and a single point, were blown to pb:cs by the
converging fire of the 52nd, the 97th, and Fane's two riRe battalions,
as well ns by the battery on the hill, which having no longer any
British skirmishers in front of it had a free field. It was here, as
\Velleslc)"s dispatches show, that shrapnell shell, a recent invention
of the British colonel of that name, was first u~, and with the
most eftective results. St. Clair's battalions climbed halfway up
the hill, but could do no more, and finally gavc way, bearing back
with them their half*rallied supports, The fight was rolling down
the slope into the pinewood at its foot, when Junot made his
last desperate stroke. His only infantry reserve was now the 1st
lkgimcnt of Grenadiers, two battalions under Coloncl Muransill.
He resolved to throw them into the fight pollr en jinir, as he said
to his chief of the staff, but they' Illude a finish of it' in a way
very different from his intention. 111is time the assailants, led by
General ](ellerlllmlll in person, made Ilot for the front of the hill,
but for the gap bctween it and the heights to the north, trying to
turn l;'ane';; flank and to penetrate into the vil~O'C of Vimiero by
coasting round the foot of the higher ground. There were at first
I '1lC hc;;t narrative of the fight OD Vimiero Hill is tllat in General
Allstruther's 'Journal,' prinlt..l in thc mcmoir attlldu~d to 'VylU'll AUru :
Leach and Hiflcman Harris gil'C mau)' interestillg dctails.
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no troops directly opposed to the column, but soon the grenadiers
found themselves under fire from both flanks. On the soutbern
side Anstruther took from his reserve the 4Srd, which had not yet'
fireU a shot, and threw it into the ccmctccyof Vimiero, from whencc
it descended on the left flank of the leading battalion of grenadiers.
On the northern side a new force intervened: General Ac111nd on
the heights along the Lourinhao road had been acting as the
reservc of Wellesley's left wing: he was not needed there, and
seeing Kellermann's attack threatening to break in between himself
and Anstruthcr, took action on his oll'n responsibility. Marching
a little southwaTd along the ridge, he sent his two companies of the
95th Rifles, and the light companies of his two line-battalions to fall
on the right flank of the grenadiers. At the same time he turned
upon them the fire of two field-gUllS which were ill reserve IlCllr his
brigade.
The double flank attack cost Kellerlllann many men, and brought
his column to a standstill, but he held his ground for some time,
till the 43rd closed in upon him at the eastern end of Vimiero
vill~<Y'C. Both French and English were in great disorder, the
houses and enclosure-walls having broken up their formation.
There was a furious hand-ta-hand fight, volleys were interchanged
at the dishmce of five yards, and both sides used the bayonet
freely, At last the grenadicrs gave way and retired sullcnl)'
towards thcir original position: they had. lost many men, but so
had thc 43rd, who from a wcak battalion of 700 men had forty
killed and seventy-nine wounded.
All alollg the line thc Fr(>J}ch were now falling oock, Md JWlOt
brought up Cl. regiment of dragoons to cover the retreat of the dig·
ordcred IllUSSCS. 'Vellesley now resolved to make use: of his hand-
ful of cavalry: close behind Vimiero there were drawn up the MO
sabres of the ~Oth Light Drllcooons, with 260 Portuguese horsemcn
in two squadrons on their flanks 1, 'Now, Twentieth, now is
the time!' cried 'Vellesley, lifling his cocked hat, and Colonel
Taylor wheeled his regiment from behind the sheltering hill
and dashed at the retreating l"renchmen. The two Portuguese
squadrons started level with him, but after going a few hundred
)'ard~ and receiving a shot or two, they broke, fell into disorder,
and finally bralloped to thc rear a.mid the hoo~ of Allstruthcr's
I AII this comes from the narrative, which I have already utill~cd in more
than one place, of Sergeant Lmdsheit of the 20th.
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brigade. But the 20th rode at the French dragoons who stood in
their path, burst through them, and then plunged among the flying
infantry, sabring them to right and left and taking many prisoners.
They could not be sWJI.>d till they had hewn their way through
the fugitives, to the place where Junot himself sat watching the
rout of his men. The charge had been pushed beyond all reason·
able bounds, for the men were mad with excitement and would not
• halt. But as they rode up the French hill they were checked by
a stone wall, and at the Mme time charged by the two reser....e
regiments of Margaroll's horse. It was a wonder that the head-
strong troopers were not annihilated, but the larger part returned
in safety to the English lines, leaving behind them their colonel I
and twenty men slain, twenty-fouf wounded, and eleven prisoners.
'Ve must now turn to the northern part of the battle-field,
where the main stress of thc fighting did not begin till the engage·
ment round Vimiero was nearly over. This was the result of the
reckless WfLy in which Junot had sent his flanking brigades to
attack over unexplored ground. 'When Brennier reached the point
at which he would naturully have wheeled inward to climb the
slopes along the Lourinhao road, he came upon the deep and
rtlggro valley of Toledo, the steepness of whose slopes he did not
realixe till he had almost rcacht.'<! its brink. Ha\'ing guns with
him, the French brigadier thought the obstacle impassable, and
tumed northward again in a long sweep by the village of Carros·
queira, the grd Dragoons still heading his march. In this wide
flanking movemcnt hc passed quitc out of sight of thc British.
Dut Solignae, with the second brigade which Junot had told off for
the northern diversion, was not so (:autious. He too camc upon the
ravine; but instead of turning it he sought out its least precipitous
point and passed it near its head, underneath thc farm of Vcntosa.
Having crossed, he deployed his three battalions, brought up his
right shoulder, and ascended the gentle slope. Dy this movement
he was devoting his brigade to destruction. On the hill above
he could see only the thin line of British skirmishers, but
1 Taylor, like tJle llCroic Blukc, amI. like Gralmm the \'ictoJ:' of Barossa.,
\I'M one of Oxford's few fighting men. Every visitoJ:' to Christ Church sees
his memorial. stone, stating how he had reformed a.nd diS<liplined the
regiment, when it came home a skeleton from ti,e nrest Indies in 180:;,
and had practically to be l'llised anew. Since then it had been in the
unfortunate expedition to Buenos Ayres.
OM;'N. I 8
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hidden behind the crest was the main body of Wellesley's right
wing, the seven ooltalions of Fergllson, Nightingale, and Dowcs.
They had long watched the approach of the French, and were lying
down in battle order. III front were I"ergllson's three regiments,
the 36th, 40th, and 7lst, and onc of Nightingale's, the 89nd.
A couple of hundred yards to the rear was the second line, the
~9th of Nightingale's brigade, and the 6th and 32nd, which formed
Dowes' command. Acland and eatlin Cmwfurd were a mile away •
ill different directions, but not too far to have been called in if
n~essury.
'Vhcl1 Solignac's men reached the brow of the hill, the four
llritish battalions in the front line rose up and marched to meet
them. Their long array completely overlapped at both ends the
advancing columns and their screen of light troops I, At the
distance of one hundred yards all the four regiments directed a
converging volley on the French, which almost swept away the
tirailleurs and shook terribly the supporting masses, Then they
reloaded and advanced in silence on the enemy, who were shouting,
firing irregularly, and cndcayouring to deploy, with their officers
all in front. For troops in such disorder the nenr approach of the
majestic two-deep line of 3,300 bayonets was too much, They
wavered and fled llorth\\'nrd along the summit of the ridge, carrying
with them their commander, Solignac, desperately wounded. 'Die
British pnrsue<l, halting at inlcrvals to pour a volley into the
retreating masses, and picking up on the way many prisoners, and
also the three guns which the enem)' had laboriously dragged up
the hill.
The pursuit was 5topped by anune.xpected development. General
Drcllnicr had hcard trom afar the heavy musketry fire which told
him that his supporting brigade was engaged. He was now on
the summit of the bcights, having at lust accomplished his long
flank march. Pushing hastily forward, be came to the edge of a
saddle-backed dcpression in the ridge, and had the 5pectaclc of the
:fight at his feet. The 36th and 40th were engaged in driving the
wrecks of Solignac's mCll blIck in a north-westerly direction, while
the 71st and 82nd, halted around the captured guns, were resting
and reforming their ranks. ""Vithout a moment's hesitation,
Drcnnicr UIXCW bis four battalions upon the two rcgimcubl that
I There is a good account of this chltrge in tbe anonymous 'T. S: of the
71Et, p. 50.
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lay beneath him. He hud taken them by surprise; attacked'
diagonally by fresh troops, find charged by the two squadrons of
dragoons that accompanied the French, they reeled back in some
disordcl' and abandoned the guns that they had taken. But they
rallied in a moment, and returned to the fight aided by the Ji!9th 1,
the reserve regiment of Nightingale's brigade. There was heavy
firing for a moment, but vcry soon llrennicr's troops broke and
fled up the slope which they had just descended. Their flight was
covered by the dragoons, who suffered severely in holding all' the
pursuers, losing many officers, among them the young Arrighi, a
kinsman of the BOllaparte family. llrennier was left on the field
wounded and a prisoner, and not only did his men lose the gUlls
which they had just recaptured, but they also left behind the three
which had accompank'<1 their own column. Their hurrieu retreat
was accelerated by the fire of a half-battery, brought up from the
reserve, whieh played upon them with effect till they lnul plunged
down into the ravine and regained their original position Oll the
opposite heights.
All the fighting here had been done by Ferbruson's and Nightin-
gale's five battalions. Bowl'S' bribrudc did not fire a shot or lose lL
man, and Catli.:n Crawfurd and the Portuguese were only beginning to
approach the scene of action when llrcnllier's column broke up and
fled. The main honours of the fight must be given to the 71st
and 82nd, who lost respectively 112 and 61 men out of the total
of 27£ casualties suffered in this part of the action.
Two and a half hours after the battle began the French, both
in the north and the south of the field, were retiring in confusion.
The British were awaiting eagerly the order for a general advance
-especially :Ferguson, who, with the 36th and 40th, hud got part
of Solignac's brigade pinned into an angle of the hills, from which
they could not easily escape when attacked. Dut instead of the
order to advance there came a prohibition to mo\'e, and the French
were allowed to withdraw unmolested. The stream of fugitives
from Drcl1nier's and Solignac's fight joined that from the. centre;
then both shook themselves together and formed up in more or
less order on the heights. 'l11e reserve artillery under Hulot and
Prost (Fa)' had been wounded) kept up a distant and ineffective
fire towards the hill of Vimicro, more to put heart into their own
• There are clear acCOUllts of this figbtillg in Col. Les1ie's autobiography,
p. 61, as well Ill:! in tile narrative of' T. S: of the 7lst.
.2
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inflUllry by the noise of their guns than ill any hope of harming
the English. Margaron's ca.valr.y showed a front behind them, and
the two belated battalions from Lisbon, which Il.l'ri"t.-d about nOOIl,
were sent to the front and displayed on the edge of the heights to
make some show of force. But the }'I'tmch wuuld not have stood
a serious attack: every single unit of their infantry had been
deeply engaged and had suffered a thorough defeat. More than
half their guns (thirteen out of twenty-three) had been captured.
The cavalry was ill better case, though two of its regiments had.
suffered severely, yet it could not by itself have resisted the attack
of the ,'ictorious British. A vigorous push would have sent the
whole mass reeling backward, not on Torra Vedros or Lisbon-
for these roads would have been barred to them when 'VeUesley
advanc«l-but on the rugged path, over the spurs of the Sierra cia
Baragueda, which leads to Santarem.
Blit while theE'rench were striving to rally and to form a new front,
the leaden hand of Sir Harry Burrard was laid upon the British
army. That leisllrely person had only landed on the Illoming of
the twenty-first, and the battle was in full progress before he rode
up from the beach to Vimiero. He had the grace not to interfere
with the movement;; of troops which 'Vellesley had already ordered ;
but when the victory Will; won, and his subordinute rode up to him
crying, 'Sir Harry, now is your time to advance, the enemy is
completely beaten, und we shnll be in Lisbon in three days ',' he
refused to listen. The army, he said, had done enough for one
day, and he intended to wait for the arrival ofS~ Jolm Moore and
the division from the Baltic before making any further move.
Gl'eatly disconcerted by this stolid opposition, Wellesley launched
forth into argument: the French arm)', as he pointed out, was now
so pltlccd that it had lost control of its line of retreat on Tor:rcs
Vedras and Lisbon. Hill's intact brigade, and those of Fane and
Anstruthcr had but to udvUlu:e a mile 01' so, Ilnd the French were
irretrievably cut off from their base of operations. At the same
time the five brigades of the left wing, of which those of Bowes
and Crawfurd were absolutely intact, might so hustle and press tbe
retreating enemy that he could never rally. At this moment
arrived an aide-de-camp from Fergl!son, who begged to be allowed
to go on: 'a column of broken troops 1,500 to 2,000 strong had
in their confusion got into a hollow, and could be cut off from
1 Evidcncc of Col. Torrcns at tllc Court of Inquiry (PTOCeedill~, I). 127).
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their main body by a movement ill advance of his brigade 1,' The
enemy had lost all their artillery, were retiring in the utmost
confusion, none of them save the cavalry were regularly formeJ,
and it was his hope that he might be allowed to continue to
go forward. Burrard still remained olxlurate, though 'Wcllcslcy
pointed out to him that he ·had nine thousand fresh troops in
hand, that e,'cl)' soldier had a day's food cooked in his haversack,
that the mnmlUlition reserve was ready to move, and that, with
twelve days' provisions in the camp and an ample store of
munitions, he had it in his power to march forward both
rapidly and with complete security 2. But all these arguments
were of no effect. The slow and cautioU!i Burraro chose to belic,-c
that JWlot might still have a large and inl:£lct reserve, that his
cavalry was too dangerous to be meddled with, and that the
dispersion of the Bt'itish brigades (there were morc than thrc<!
miles between Hill's extreme right and FergtlSOn's extreme left)
would make a general advance a very dislocated and hll.Zltrdous
business 3. He utterly refused to listen to any further discussion,
and, as the French were llOW in full retrent. and disappcnring oyer
the eastern horizon, ordered t.he troops back to camp. They
returned with colours flying and bands playing, dragging the
captured French guns, and with a considerable column of prisoners
in their midst. But every one, from Generals Spencer and Ferguson
down to the younb"CSt private, was utterly puzzled at the tame and
inconsequent end to such a glorious day. ____
The losses hud beeu very moocrak'-four officers and 131 men
killed, thirty·seven officers and 497 men wounded, two officers and
forty·nine men missing. Of the total of 7£0 no less than 573 werc
from the ten battalions of l'iJ.ne's, Anstruther's, and Ferguson'>l
brigades. 'I1lOse of Hill, DolVes, amI Ctltlin Crawfurd did not
return a single casualty. The handful of prisoners were mainly
supplied by the £Oth Light Dragoons, and by the two rifle
battalions, whose pickets had been driven in at the commencement
of the fight 4. The French IOSSC::l wcre vcry diflcrellt: both Foy
, :Message scnt by Fergu6Qu, borne by his aide-de-camp, Captain i\lcllish
(P-roceedillgt< of the Court of inquiry, p. 121).
3 Evidence before the Court of Inquiry of We1lesley (P1-oceeditlgl, pp. no,
117), Rud of Col. Torrens (p. 127).
I Burrard'! aceount of his own views before the Court of Illquiry (PNJo
cudillgt, pp. 115,116, 135).
• Sec mble oflosscs at Vimiero ill HIe Appendix.
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and Thiebault ncknowledge a total of 1,800, and this may be taken
as a minimum: of these some 300 or 400 were unwounded prisoners.
Dclaborde and three brigadier-generals-Charlot. Brcnnier, and
Solignae-as well as Colonel!! Foy and Prost of the artillery, wcre
wounded. Two battalion commanders were killed, a third and the
disabled Brcnnicr wcre prisoners.. Men and officers were alike
dishearlened: every single corps present had been engaged: even
the !!quudron of volunteer Cll"alry had been ill action against
'1'a)'lor's dragoons: more than half the guns had been lost, and the
oflh:crs who brought back those that remained asked thcmselves in
wonder how they had ever been permitted to get away'. But at
least they were unmolested in their retreat: using the two
battalions that had just come up from Lisbon as his rearguard,
Junot retired unharmed, but full of despair, on Torres VeUrlli!.
It was not till early on the next morning that the last stragglers
of his scattered army drifted in to join the main body.
1 &mtlfmir8 MiUtaire8 of Hulot, who curnnuUldlll1 one of the two reserve
batteries, p. 235: 'J'l!tais l!tonne de ne pas "oir l'elluemi fondre sur mes
pieces,' &e.
SECTION IV: CHAPTER IV
Tfl E CONVENTION OF CINfRA
Folt only onc single day did the incubus of Burrnrd rest upon
the British army in Portuga~ though that day was one on which
he succeeded in changing a decisi....e vidor)', which might have laid
a whole kingdom at his feet. into an ordinary successful defensive
action. He had stopped Welleslcy's triumphant march at noon
011 August ~l; early 011 the morning of the t\\'enty-second Sir
Hew Dalrymple appeared in Maceira Bay, disembarked, and took
over the <:olllllland. He naturally began his tenure of control by
interviewing his two predecessors, whose divergent views as to the
situation and its requirements were laid before him. He ww; an
old man, and unpractised in the field; he had only seen war in the
wretched Flanders campaign ofl793-4. His prejudice was in favour
of caution, and he was not slow to let it be seen that he regarded
Wellesley's actions in the past, and still more his plans for the
future, as rash and hazardous. 'On the first interview that I had
with Sir Hew Dalrymple; said WeUesley at the Court of Inquiry
in the following winter, 'I had reason to believe that I did not
possess his confidence: nay more, that he was prejudiced against
any opinions which I should give him I.' '111e veteran's iIl-com.'ealed
hostility was, we cannot doubt, mainly due to an unhappy
inspiration of CastlCl-eagh, who hlld sent him a letter bidding him
'take Sir Arthur "rellesley into his particular confidence, as he
had been, for a length of time past, in the closest habit,,; of com~
munication with His Majesty's ministers ~ith respe<.:t to the affairs
of Spain.' He was also directed' to make the most prominent use
of him which the rules of the serviee would permit 2,' Such a
letter ,·ery naturally caused Dnlrymple to look upon the young
lieutenant-general as a sort of emissary from the Government, sent
to overrule his plans and curb his full power of command. He
was inclined, consciously or unconsciously, to entertain a strong
1 WeUesley's evidence at the Court of Inquiry (Proceedingl, p. 61).
, Castleroogh to Dalrymple, July 15 (IYel/. Di8p., it.. 18).
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prejudice against anJthing that Wellcsley might recommend: and
we cannot doubt that the latter, always stiff and haughty, was at
this momcnt ill a litate of suppressed fury at the foiling of his plans
by Burrard on the preceding day. Probably, in his own cold way,
he let his indignation appear, and Dalrymple may have been glad
of an excuse for repressing him.
'TIle plall which W"cllesley had drawn up for thc conduct of thc
campaign, and which he now urged upon his chief, is detailed ill
the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. He had hoped to get
Sir John Moore's division, whose arrival was just reported, sent
to SuntarclD, to cut ofi' any attempt of JUllot to cscapc out of
the Lisbon peninsula by following the road along the right bank
of thc Tagm;: the Portuguese were to be brought up to assist.
Meanwhile the army which had fought at Vimiero was to turn
the position of Torres Vedrns, on which tlte enemy had retired.
by marching along tlle sea-coa.~t by the route that leads to Mafra.
If Junot let them march pnst him, he would infallibly lose Lisbon;
for they could, by forcing the pace, arrive in the capital as soon as
he. If he abandoned Torrcs Vedras, and fell back on Mafra or
Montechique as soon as he saw them moving, he would have to
fight a second battle on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, with
nil army which had been gravely demoralized by the events of
Roliija and Vimiero, and which could not receive much succour
from Lisbon: for the populace of that city, when apprised of
the defeat of the French, would undoubtedly ha"e burst into
insurrection, and would have required for its repression every mun
of the 5,000 t troops who had been left to hold it down. There
was a third possibility, that JUllot, on hearing that the Engiish
were marching past his flank, might have hastened from Torres
Vcdras to attlu.:k their line of murch by onc of the cross-roads
(such as that from Torres Vedras to Puente de Roll), which cut
down to the Atlantic coast. But ,~rellcslc)' had eomillL-ro himself
that this chance would not Occur; hc reckoned, very rightly, on
the exhaustion of the cnemy on the day nftcr such a crushillg blow
as Vimiero. As a matter of fact, on the mOM\ing of the twenty-
second, at the moment when the head of the Briti~h eolull1n, if
it had marched, would have been outflanking their positioll, Junot
• TIlis figure, of CGurse, does not includo tl'll gnrrisolUl of thll outlying
places, out only tI,osc immlltliatcl)' in IU1(] llbout the callital, after the 66th
and campagnie8 d'ilile marcbed to Torres Vedras.
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and those of his generals who were not hors de combat were sitting
in council of war at Torres Vedras, with despair in their souls,
and resolving to ask for terms 011 which to evacuate Portugal.
Kellermalln was just about to ride in to the English lines to open
negotiations I, The idetl. of an •oflimsivc return' by the French
was in the head of the cautious Burrard 2: but not in that of
'Vcllesley, who had made IIp his mind' that they would act in
Portugal as th,ey did in Egypt: they tried their strength once in
the field, and having failed they would ha,'c continued to retreat
till they could have &"Ot into safety. I do not believe that any
corps could ha,·c fallen on the flank of our march on the twenty-
third.' The Duly course open to the l<rcnch, in his opinion, was
to throw over any idea of holding the capital, withdraw its garrison,
and cross the Tngus at Sncca\'em or Villaf'rnnca., or Sallta.rem, by
lIleaus of the ships which Jay in the river, and the lart,"e fleet of barges
which is alwtlys to be found in and near Lisbon. Having passed
the Tagus they might cut their way through the insurgents of the
Alemtejo, disperse the Spanish ledes about Elvas and Bndajoz,
alld press north through Estremadura to join Bessieres 3. This
very idea did for a moment flash through the brains of some of
Junot's (."Quncil of war at TOrl"l2s Vcdra:s: but there lay on their
minds, like a nightmare, the remembrance of their awful march
t1u·ough the Estremadumn mountnins ill the preceding nutumn.
If, journeying unopposed from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, they had
been nearly starved in that wilderness, what would be their fde
if they had to cut their way through an insurrection, ·with the
English army hunging on their heels? The most hopeful could
only say that perhaps half the army fnight struggle through to
Old Castile.
Wellcsley's arguments to Dalrpnple had no further effcct than
to induce that general to make np his mind that the troops should
march not on the twenty-second but on the twenty-third, and not
on Mafra but on 'l'orres VcdrlLS. Sir John Moore's division was to
be brought down at once to Maceira Bay, to join the main army.
and not to be sent (as Wellcsley had urged) to Santarem. With
I Hulot, Mblloiru Mifilairu, p. 236.
2 QuestiollS Il£!ked of Wcllcsley by Burrard at the Court of Inquiry (1'ro-
~edi'lgs, p. 133).
I Wellesley to Mr. Stuart, Aug. Z,5, lOOS (WeU. Diap_, iv. 100); WeUesley's
address at the Court of Inquiry (Proceedings, p. 132).
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the aid of this reinforcement Dalrymple hoped to be strong enough
to force back Junot into Lisbon. The resolve meant fatal delay:
Moorc did not begin to disembark till August 25, and his last
men did not get ashore till August 30. On that day only eould
Junot have been attacked seriously, and meanwhile he would have
obtained nine days in which to fortify his positions and to place
Lisbon in a thorough state of dcfcnce. 'TIle consequenccs enwiJoo
would ha\'e been a long siege, the probable devastation of the
Portuguese capital, and the protraction of operations into November
and December. Even then there would still have been Elvas and
Almcida to bc recaptured 1.
But things were not destined to take this course. Dalrymple
was busy drafting his orders for the movement of the next day 011
Torres Verlras, when an alarm ran through the camp that the
French were at hand, and the whole force flew to arms. This
rumour was causerl by the folly of a Portuguese cavalry officer,
whose vedettes had seen French horsemen in the distance; he
imagined an army on the move and reported its approach. What
he had really seen was General Kellermann, with two squadrons
of dragoons as his escort., bearing the white flag, and about to
propose to the British commander-in-chief the evacuation of
Portngal by the Fre.llCh army under a convention.
'Ve have already mentioned the fact that on the early morning
of the twenty-second, Junot had called together at Ton'es Vedras
a coWlcil of war <:omposcd of all his surviving generals-Loisoll,
Kellermann, Delaborde (who attended though suffering from two
scvere wounds), 'l'hicooult, the chief of thc staff, TavicI, the com-
mander of the artillery, Col. Vincent, the chief engineer, and
Trou~t, the chief commissary at Lisbon. JUllot's spirits were
very low: he began by explaining that he had onl)' fought at
Vimiero to save thc honour of the French arms, not beeausc he
hoped for victory-a statement which will not bear investigation
in the light of his prcvious dispatches and letters 2. The British,
he said, were e.'i:pecting huge reinforcements from the sea: Freire
was now moving on Obidos, Mother Portuguese corps on Santarem:
the reports of the state of public opinion in Lisbon were most
alarming. Under these circumstances, onght the army to try the
fortune of battle a second time? And if it must, what plan
I TIlis ill 'lrdlesley'll own ,'icw (Well. Dh,I'" iv. 12], 184, 1&5).
: (''f. for JUlIOt'S address, }'oy, iv. 34], aud 11Lio:ibault.
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should be adopted? If it could not, what alternative remained?
'Vhen such was the spirit of the leader, it was easy to foresee the
replies of his subordinates. The army, they soon resolved, had
done its best in the most honourable fashion, but it was not ready
for anothcr fight. Indeed the stragglers had not yct finished
pouring into 'l'orres Vedroi, and the wearied rearguard which
covered them had only reachl..'<1 the defile in front of the town two
hours attcr midnight I. The army, unmolested as it was, did not
get into fighting trim again till two days anel' Vimicro. On the
twenty-second it was still in a state of complete disorganization:
if Dalrymple had marched on Mafro. he would not have found
a man in his path.
Having resolved that the army was not rendy for another battle,
the council of war had three alternatives before it: to fall back to
cover Lisbon on the positions of MaCro. and Monteehiquc; to
evacuate Lisbon, cross the Tagus, and make for Elvas; or to try
to negotiate with the British. 'The decision was soon made in
favour of the third: Lisbon, ",ithout regular fortifications, and
swarming with a discontented populace, would be a mere snare
for the army. The retreat via Elvas on Old Castile would mean
the slow but certain destruction of the whole corps 9. l~or it was
now known that Joseph Bonaparte had evacuated Madrid, and
that Burgos was probably the nearest point where a Freneh force
was to be found. Not onc of the offkers present had the heart
to make a serious proposal for sueh a retreat. It only remained to
try whether Dall'}'mple was open to receive an offer: if he could
be tempted by the prospect of receiving Lisbon with all it'l
magazines and riches inwd, he might allow the French army to
return under safe conduct to their own land, Kellermann, who
could understand English, more or less. and WtlS considered a skilful
diplomatist, was charged with the negotiations. He rode out of
'l'orres VcdriLS betwccn ten and elevcn in thc moming with his
escort, charged with ample powers to treat, As he passed the
rearguard in the puss, four miIL'S outside the town, he told the
officer in command that he was going to visit the English' to see
if he could get thc army out of the mousctrnp 3.'
I Hulot, &Uveni,.8 Mililllil'U, pp. 235, 23G.
2 But it is 8llid that Deluoordo llrgetl the IIOSSibility of tbis mOHl.
, Hulot lleard this himself. KeUennann said' qu'il allll.it trou\'er les
AuglaisJ pour voir a IIOUS tirer de la souricihe' (p. 236).
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By two o'clock Kellermann was conferring with the English
commnndcr-he was astonished to find that it was Dalrymple and
not Vlellesley. The reception that he met was an agreeable
surprise to him. Dalrymple showed his pleasure ut the bronching
of the idea of a convention in the most undisguised fashion. The
fact was that he was very glad to avoid the possible dangers of an
immediate advance and a second fight. He called in Burrard and
'Vellcsley to the interview, and from his wlgunrded 'asides' to
them, Kellermalill soon learnt that Moore had not yet landed, and
that till he was ashore Dalrymple did not fecI safe. This wwe
the Frenchman a confidence which he had not at first possessed,
find he at once WlSumed an nir of self-reliance which he had becn
far from showing when he rode out of Torres Vedms. Instead of
merely trying to save the army at all costs, he begun to haggle
about details, a.nd to speak about the possibility of resuming hosti-
lities-the last thing in the world that he really desired I.
There was no doubt that a convention by which Portugal and
all its fortresses could be rt.'Covered without the necessity of firiJlg
another shot was an eminently desirable thing. ''\'e11csley did not
hesitate a moment ill advising his superiors to take the offer.
Burrard had given away the certainty of recApturing Lisbon
yesterJay: Dalrymple, by delaying his advMCe, hau on this very
moming sacrificed the second chancc (a much less brilliant one,
it must be eonfessed) of ending the campaign by a single blow.
If JUJ1ot's proposals were rejected and hostilities were resumed,
there lay before the British army either a siege of Lisbon, which
could not fail to ruin the city, or a long stcrn-chase after the
French, if they should resolve to cross the Tagus and march off
through the A]emt.cjo. No doubt it would sound better in the
ears of the British public if the surrendcr or destruction of JUJlot's
army could be reported. Dut 68 a matter of practic:ll expediency,
the recovery of Lisbon and all its wealth, unharmed was worth far
more than the capture of a French nnny at the cost of much time,
many lives, and the ruin of tbe Portuguese capital. The loss of
25,000 soldiers would be nothing to Napolcon, who disposed of more
than half a million men: the blow to his pride would be almost
ns great if he lost Portugal by a convention lIS if he lost it by
f\ capitulation. As a matter of fact he was much incensed at
JUIlOt, and would have dealt hardly with him if Dupont had not
J Foy, iv. 344, 345; Well. Digp., iv. 108.
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drawn oll' his wruth by failing in an even more disastrous
fashion I.
After hearing whnt KcllcnlJaun had to say. the three English
generals withdrew into all inner room, and after a vcry short
discussion agreed to treat. The)' told their visitor that he might
have a forty-eight hours' suspension of hostilities at once, and that
they would open negotiations on the b~ncral base that Junot and
his army should be allowed to evacuate l'ortugal by sea. without
any of the forms of ctlpitulatioll, and be returned to their own
country on Uritish ships, The details would take much discussion:
meanwhile tlley invited Kcllcnllo.ull to dine with them and to settle
the main lines of the Convention before he returned to his com-
mander. There was a long post-prandial debate. which showed
that 011 two points there was likely to be trouble; one was the
way in which Siniavill's Russian lIeet in the Tngus was to be
treated: the other was how much the French should be allowed to
carr)' away ",'ith them from Portugal. Kellcrmnnn said that he
n.sked for no more than their' military baggage and equipment... ;
but he seemed to have a Itlrb"C idea of what came under these
headings ~.
Meanwhile the terms of the suspension of hostilities were success-
fuUy drafted; the line of the Zizanclre rivcr was to be fixed as
that of demarcation bctwcc.n the two hosts. Neither of them was
to occupy TOrI"Cs Vedras: Dalrymple undertook to get the armi~
stice I'C<:ognizcd by Freire and the other Portuguese generals in
the field. They were not to advance beyond Lciria and Thomar.
The bJ'U.I'risolls at Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and elsewhere were to
be included in the Convention, unless it should turn out that any
of them had surrendered before August M-which M a matter
of fact they had not. The Russian fleet in the Tagus was to be
tren.ted as if in a neutral port. 'l11is last clause was much objected
to by Wellesley, who found also several minor points in the agree-
ment of whieh he could not nppro\'e. Dut by the directions of
I Sce the curious aCCQuut of the Emperor's interviews with legendre and
TIlieOault, the chiefs of the staff' to Dupont and Junot, who Ilppenre<:l before
him simultaneously at Valladolid in Jannal'}', 1809. The imperial thunderg
played so fiercely on the Ilnny of Andalusia that the anny of Portugal got off
e:liJ,ily (l1,icll.'lult, iv. 247-9). Rut Napoleon said that the Ellgligl, llUd !laved
him the pain of crushing all old friend by sending Dalrymple, Burrard, and
Wellesley before a eourt--martial.
t Welleslcy at the Court oflnquiry (Well. IMp., iv. HJ9).
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Dalrymple lie signed the suspension of arms after a protest; his
superior had told him that it was 'useles.~ to drive the li'rench w
the wali upon points of form I.'
Thc subsequent negotiations for a delillite convention occupied
seven days, from August 23 to 30. On the first-named day Junot
evucuated Torres Vedras, nccording to the stipulations of the
agreement made by Keliermann. He retired to the line of hills
behind him, esta.blishing Loison's division at Mufrn and Dcla-
borde's at Montechique. Dalrymple, on the other hand, moved
his head. quarters forward to Ramalhal, a position just norUl oC
Torre:; Vedra.<;, and only nine miles from Vimiero. III this respect
he profited less than the French Crom thc suspension of hostilities;
it is truc that he got leisure to disembark Moore's troops, but Junot
gained the much more important advantage of Ho safe retreat to
El. good position, and of leisure to strengthen himself in it. It must
not be supposed, however, that he was in a comforta.ble situation;
Lisbon wus seething with suppressed rebellion. The news of
French victories, which had bL-c1l published to quiet the people,
had soon been discovcred to be nothing more than an impudent
fidion. At any moment an insurrection might have broken out:
thc garrison and the mob were alike in a state of extreme nervous
tension, which took shape on the one side in assassinations, and
on the other in wanton firing at every person who appronched a
sentinel, or refused to stand when challenged by a patrol.
The ncgotiations for a definitive convention suffered several
checks. At one moment it seemed Iikel)' that the Portuguese
army might gi\'c trouble. General Freire arrived at RIlUJalllal in
a state of high wrath, to protest that he ought to have been made
a party to the suspension of hostilities. There was, as Napicr
remarks, more pJllusibility than real foundation in his objection 2,
for his motley army had taken no part whatever in the operations
that had brought J lInot to his knees. But he could make a distinct
point when he asked by what authority Dalrymple had gh'cll
promiSCfi as to his neutrality in the agreement with Kcllermann,
or laid down lincs which he was Ilot to pass. Freire was all the
bolder hecause his levies were now being strengthened by the
for<.'es from Oporto which the Bishop had lately raised, while n
small Spanish brigade under the Marquis of Valladares, lent by
1 Wellesley's evidence before tbe Court of Inquiry (Procudinge, p, 83).
J Napier, i. 225.
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the Galician Junta, had come down as far as Guarda. But he
conl:cnlcd himself with protests, without committing any definite
act that might have rendered the Convention impossible.
A more danhrerow; source of possible l"uptmc WM the view of the
situation taken by Sir Charles Cotton, the admiral in command of
the British blockading squadron off the mouth of the 1'agus. As
Vlellesley had forC!S(!cn, the naval men were determined to secnre
the possession of the Russian ships of Silliavin. Cotton refused to
entertain the proposal that such a force should be allowed a free
depurture from Lisbon.. as if from a neutral port, und should be
given a long start before being pursued. He had held the Uussians
under blockndc for many a weary month, and was not going to
abandon his hold upon them. 'Vby should the French evacuation
of Portugal place Siniavin in a better position thun he had ever
occupied before? The admiral declared that he saw no reason
why the Hussialls should be ineluded in the Convention at all. If
there was going to be any agreement made with them, he should
conduct it himself, tre!ltillg dircdly with Silliavin instead of
through a French intermediary.
Sir Hew Dalrymple W!l.S forced to report to the French com-
mander these objections of the admiral. It seemed possible for
a moment that the difliculty would not be got over, aud that war
must recommence. ""Vellesley sb'ollgly advised his chief to try the
game of blufl'----to anuounce to JUllot that operations would be
resumed at the eud of the stipulated forty-eight hours, as Sir Charles
Cotton had objected to the terms of the m·misticc, but that he was
prepared to take into consideration any new proposals which might
be made to him before the interval of two days expired 1. Such
a firm policy, he thought, would induce the French to yield the
point-all the more because Junot and Sinia,rin were known to be
on very bad terms. But Dalrymple would not accept this plan.
He me!rely reported the admiral's proposals to JUDOt, without any
intimation that the resumption of hostilities must result from
their rejection. This move placed the power of playing the! game
of brug in the Frenchman's hands. SL"Cing that Dalrymple did not
seem to desire to break oft' n~O'()tiations, he assumed an indignant
lone, tUld began to talk of his determination not to COIlct..JC an
inch, and of the harm that he could do if he were forced to fight.
• 'l11e English might take uway the hulI-drofl:cd cOll\'cntion; he
I Evidellce on"·ellesley before the Court of Inquiry (Proceedi1ltp, pp.1l7-9J).
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would have nonc of it. He would defend Lisbon street by street:
he would burn as nluch of it M he could not hold, and it should
cost them dear to take from him what remained 1.' At the snme
time he made a final proposal to Siniavin, that he should put
ashore his 6,000 seamen and marines, to take part ill the dcfenee
of Lisbon on the land side. This was only part of the game of
bluff~ and intended for the benefit of the English rather than
of Siniavin, for Junot knew perfectly well, from the latter's previous
condud, that he was be.nt on playing his own hand, and would not
fire a single shot to help the French.
All Junot'5 desperate language was, in fact, no more than a device
to squeeze better terms out of Dalrymplc. The actual point Oil
which the argument grew hot was a mere pretext, for the Russian
admiral utterly refu!lCd to assist the French, and intimuted that
he should prefer to conclude a sepamte connmtion of his own with
Sir Charles Cotton. Clearly it was not worth while for the Duke
of Abrantes to risk anything on behalf of such a torpid ally.
Accordingly the Convention was reduced to a definitive form
between August 27 and SO. Colonel George l\[IlITay, the qua.rter-
master~general, acted as the British negotiator, while KeIlermallll
continued to represent Junut. The details were settled in Lisbon,
where Murmy took up his residence, ~ndillg back frequent reports
to his superior oniccr ut Ramalhul. Dalrymplc and Cotton
carried their point in that no allusion whate"er was made to the
Russians in the document. Junot fOWld a salvc for his injured
pride by remembering that he had slipped a mention of Napoleon
as 'Emperor of the French,' into the text of the suspension of
hostilities 2: in this he thought that he had won a great success,
for the British Government hOO hitherto refused to recognize any
such title, and had constantly irritated its adversaries by allud·
ing to thc llltlSter of the Continent as 'General Bonaparte,' 01' the
•actual head of the French executive.'
Thc terlllS of the Convention need close study s: it comprised
twenty-two articles and three supplementary par~rrraphs ofaddenda.
The first article provided that the Freneh should surrender Lisbon
1 :Fo}', i\'. 352, and 1lIi€hault.
1 Article 1 of the armistice mcutioned 'his Imperial and Royal Majesty,
Napoleon I,' though this formula did not recur in the Convention, which only
spoke of the 'French Army.'
I Tho full text will be found in the Appendix:.
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and the Portuguese fortresses in their existing condition, without
lUlnllillg or dismantling them. The second and third granted the
army of Junot a safe departure by sea in English vessels: they
were not to be considered prisoners of war, might take their arms
and baggage, and were to be landed at any port between Rochefort
and L'Orient. 'fhe fourth, fifth, and sixth articles attempted to
define the property which the French might take away-their
horses, their gUlls of French calibre (but not any that they might
have found in the Portuguese arsenuls), with sixty rounds for each
piece, their wagons, their military chest, in shor4 'all their equip-
ment. and ull that is comprehended under the name of property of
the army.' It was found, later on, that these pal"aorrraphs had been
too loosely worded, nnd gave much .endless occasion for dispute;.
The next six articles settled the mallner in which the departing
army was to embark. a.nd the order in which each of the strongholds
that it enu:uated was to be given up to the British. The thirteenth
and fourteenth articles arranged for the appointment ofcommissaries
bycach side, todenl with disputed points in theConvelltion,and added
the curious clause that' where a doubt arose as to the meaning of
any a.rticlc, it should be explained fuvourably to the French nrmy.'
But the fifteenth, sixteenth, and sevcnteenth articles were the
most objectionable part of the Convention. It was true that they
secured that no more ta.-.;:es or contributions were to be raised by
J unot, nnd that undischarged fines which he had laid on the
Portuguese should be regarded as cancelled. But they also
provided that French civilians in Portugal might either depart
with the army, or, if they preferred it, might be allowed to remain
behind unmolested, and have a year in which 'to dispose of their
property. This might perhaps pass: not 80, however, the ensuing
clause, which provided that Portuguese subjects should not be
rendered accountable for their political conduct during the :French
occupation: all who had taken service with the usurping govern-
ment were to be placed under the protection of the British, and
to suffer no injury in person or property. They were also to be
granted liberty to depart with the French army if they chose.
The fi~·c remaining articles were unimportant. The eighteenth
seemed the release of Caraffa and the rest of Junot's Spanish
priooners, Ilnd provided that in return the few French officers of
the army of Portugal, whom the Spaniards had captured at Oporto
and Elms, should be liberated. The twenty-first permitted Junot
OMAN. I
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to send one of his aides-de-camp directly to Fmnce to can')' the
news of the Convention, so that preparations might be made for
the reception of the troops 1.
Three unimportant supplementary articles were added below the
signatures of Murray and Kellermann: one stipulated that French
civilian prisoners in the hands of the English and Portuguese should
be rclCtlsed, another that JUllot's army should subsist on its own
magazines till it embarked, a third that the British should permit
the entry of provisions into Lisbon, now that the Convention had
been concluded.
Such was the celebrated agreement which was destined to gain
a most unhappy notoriety in England under the name of the
•Convention of Cintra,' Il. designation which it is hard to lllldcr-
stand, for it was first sketched at Toms Vedras, and was discussed
and ratified at Lisbon. The only COllnexion which it had with
Cintra was that Dalrymple's dispatch to the British GoYernment,
enclosing the document in its latest form, was dated from thut
pleasant spot in the environs of Lisbon. But it would perhaps
be pedantic to give any other name to such a well-known document,
than that under which it has been known for the last ninety-three
)'ears.
After a careful investigation of the details of this famous agree,
ment, the conclusion at which the impartial student will probably
arrive" is that while on the military side it was justifiable, it
prescnt<..J. grave political faults. In order to recover Lisbon with
its arsenals, its forts and its shipping, all intAct, Dalrpnple might
without serious blame have b'TtLllted even more to the French. By
-the Convention he saved, not only the wealth of the capital, and
-the lives of the troops who must have fallen in 8torming it, but,
most important of all, time. If he had but known the value of
that commodity, he might have been in Mildrid at the head of
all his British troops by October I, or even earlier. •I do not
'know what Sir Hew proposes to do,' wrote 'V"ellesley the mOl'ning
after the Convention was signed, I but if I were in his situation
I would have !20,OOO men ill Mildrid in less than a month from this
day 2.' But the importance of time was never realized by the old
commander-in-chief: he WM superseded long before his army had
, For the strange war in which JUllOt utilized this permission {or his
pel'llODal profit, see page 281.
2 WeJlcslcy to .Mr. Stuart, Sopt. 1, UlOO (Well. IMp., iv, 121).
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evcn movcd up to thc Portugucsc fronticr. Looking, therefore, at
the Convention in the broadest aspect, we hold that its military
advantages entirely outweighcd those which might have been secured
by a prolongation of hostilities. But this conclusion does not
mCtln that there were not points in the military part of the Be"Tee-
ment that might have been modified with advantage.
It is when wc turn to the political section of the Convention
that we light upon grave faults and mistakes on the part of
Dalrymple. The first and foremost was that he signed the docu-
ment without previousl)' submitting certAin portions of it to the
Portuguese government. In the sixteenth and seventeenth articles
the British general took upon himself to grant certain favours both
to French civilians resident in Portugal, and to Portuguese subjects
who had taken service under Junot, which he had no authority to
concede. These were points which concerned not the British army
but the Portuguese civil administration, and should not have been
decided without a consultation with our allies, and a permission from
them to make terms on their behalf. The sixteenth article allowed
Frenchmen resident in Lisbon to remain there for ayear aner the
Convention, if they did not chose to leave the country with Junot
and his troops. '1'0 permit subjects of the hostile power to remain
in Lisbon for so long was, of course, most distasteful to the
Poetuguesc government, which was naturally desirous of expelling
at once, according to the ordinary customs of war, a bod)' of persons
many of whom had made themselves the partners and instruments
of Junot's peculations, and who for the next twelve months would
serve as spies and purveyors of intelligence to the French Emperor.
Nothing more than the leave to quit Lisbon in Junot's wake shonld
have been secured to them, unless the Junta of Regency gave its
consent. The seventeenth article is even more objectionable: a
considerable portion of the bureaucracy of Portugal hud been weak
and criminal enough to acquiesce in the French usurpation, and to
make Ulemselves the tools of the Duke of Abrontes. It was natural
that their countrymen should feel deeply indignant with them; and
their lot was likely to be so hard that it was but rationaJ nnd humane
to give them leave to quit the kingdom. But considering that
they had deserved very ill of the state, it was surely \\'cong for the
British general to proniise to take them under his special protec-
tion, and to gnllrnntee them against injury to their persons or
lu·operty. He had no power to grant thcm an amncst.y for their
72
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past ill-doing; that could be given only by the Portuguese govern-
ment. "When the latter resumed its ordinary functions at Lisbon,
it was absurd that it should be pre\'ented, by the Convention, from
taking into consideration the cases of such of these unpatriotic
persons as it might wish to deal with. 'Vhen. therefore, Keller-
mann broached to Dalrymple the sixteenth and seventeenth articles,
the latter should have refused to occcpt them without n reference
to the Junta at Cporla. He might hll.\'e granted both the French
and the Portuguese satellites of Junot 0. free passage out of
Portugal, with such of their goods as they could carry, but more
than this he could not rationally concede OIl his own authority.
It was fortunate, therefore, that the practical hann done did not
turn out to be very great. Both the aliens and the natives covered
by these two clauses were so perfectly aware of their own unpopu-
larity in Lisbon, that they absconded ~most en 1/UUJae. The
populace of the capital had given them fair warning of what
they might expect, for not only were they threatened and insulted
in the streets whenever they were out of sight of a French sentr}',
but unknown hands posted 011 the walls lists of houses to be sacked
and individuals to be hung as soon I\S Junot's army should have
sailed. The watchwords, 'Death to the French' and 'Death to
the traitors,' were muttered even under the muzzles of the cannon,
which luul been trained 011 all the main streets, to h-'Cp dowlI the
insurrection for the few days which had to elapse before the
embarkation. The invaders, therefore, had to take away with
them a very large body of civilian dependants, headed by the
Comte de Novioll, n French bnigrf:, who, after being hospitably
entertained in Li!!oon for many years, had shown hi!! gratitude by
oceepting the post of head of Junot's police-a capacity in which
he had much odd business to transact.
But besides Articles XVI and XVII of the Convcntion there
were other clauses to which.Dalr}'mple should not have given hi!!
assent without consulting the representatives of his nllies. Almcida
WAS being blockaded by a mass of Portuguese militia, and Elvas,
a few dl\Ys after the treaty had been signed. was nttaekcd by a
Spanish force sent out from Badajoz by Galluzzo, the Captain-
General of Estremadum. No British soldier had yet been seen
within a hundred miles of either fortress. 'Vhat was to be done
if the generals of the besieging troops refused to abide by an
aglWmcnt which the}' hud not bc<!ll asked to ·sign, "nd which ha~
•
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not e\'en been laid before their respectiyc govenlDlcn~ ere it was
definitively ratified? A grave crisis, as we shall find, was created
by Dalrymplc's neglect to foresee this diflieulty. His conduct all
through the days of negotiation was very strange; not only did
he make no proper attempt to communicate with the POltuguese
authoritiClS, but he actually left his own government uninformed of
his proceedings for a fortnight. He failed to send them any
dispatch to announce the armistice of August ~~, and only for-
warded that detailing the Convention of August SO on the fourth
day of the succeeding month.
Dalrymple's main reason for lellving the Portuguese out of the
negotiations was that the Junta at Oporto had not yet been
formally recogni7.ed as the legitimate government of PortUgall.
'Wcllcslcy, no doubt, hud conferred with the Bishop, given him
arms and munitions, procured from him food and draught animals,
and asked his advice, but the British ministry had not yet
acknowledged the existence of any regular executive in Portugal.
'l'his being so, Dalrymplc thought himself justilieq in acting as if
there were none in being; and it cannot be denied that thereby he
saved himself much present trouble, at the cost of future friction.
AU, therefore, that he did was to inform the J uuta's agent at the
]jritish head quarteI1l, one Pinto da Sou:r.a, that he was negotiating
with Junot for the evacuation of Lisbon, and that he Wall open to
receive any observations which the Junta might make. The same
announccment was made to Dcrnnroino Freire, who hnd ridden o"cr
to U.amalha1 2 to complain that he and his army were not men·
tioned in the armistice of August 22. Both Freire and the Junta
were treated as persons whose opinions it was useful to obtain,
not as com;tituted authorities whose consent to the definitive
COll'.'cntiOIl was necessary in order to make it binding. Dalrymple
tried to cover himself during the subsequent inquiry by main·
taining that thc Convention was purely military, and concerned the
French and English armies alone: but this plea carmot seriously
be put forward in face of .Arlicles XV, XVI, und XVII, all of
which arc concemed with problems of civil go\'ernment, which
would arise after the French anny should have embarked. Each
1 Dalrymple'8 MenlQir of iM AlIid'nl of Por/uglll, p, 66,
: Dalrymple BayS that he signed the armistice so soon after landing, and
with such an incomplete knowledge of the situation in Portugal, that he Ilid
not know Ulat Freire's army was all)'wiJere in hi8 neiglIlmurhood (p. 65).
•
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of these articles clearly required the ratification of some proper
Portuguese authority to make it valid.
Both the Bishop of Oporto and General Freire were deeply
wounded by the way in which Dalrymple ignored their status-
the prelate 1U0re justly than the soldier, for he had done his best
to assist the British army, while l~reire by his captions and i1n-
practicable behaviour had been more of a hindrance than a help.
The Bishop charged the representative of the Supreme Junta. ill
London to complain to the British Goyemment as to the behaviour
of their generals, denouncing not only their neglect to make the
Junta. a party to the Convention, but also the terms of that docu-
ment, which were stated to be far too favourable to Junot. Owing
to Dalrymple's extraordinary delay in apprising the ministry of
the details of the treaty, the Bishop's excited denunciations of the
agreement had currency for nearly a fortnight, before anyone in
England kncw what exaclly hud been granu:d to JUllot, or how
far the J nnm was justified in its wrath.
SECTION IV: CHAPTER V
THE :FREr.."CH EVACUATE PORTUGAL
THE Convention of Cintra being once signed, the difficulties
which were bouud to nrisc from the unwisdom of some of its
articles were not long in showing themselves. Indeed the first
fortnight of September tumoo out to be a '-ery critical time.
The Portuguese authorities were furious: Dalrymple found the
greatest trouble in preventing the insurgents of the Alemtejo,
who had gathered opposite the mouth of the Tagus under the
Conde de Castro Marim 1, from attacking the French detachments
in the forts on the left bank. Their commander protested against
the Convention, and actually appealed to Admiral Cotton to re-
pudiate it: fortunately he was content to confine his opposition
to words. But there was much more trouble at Elvas: the Junta
of &trcmaduro. did not object to the settlement, and liberated the
French prisoners who were in its hands, according to the proposal
in the cightc<mth article. But Gallu73.o, the Captain-General of
that province, showed himself much more disobliging. He refused
to call off the troops under his lieutenant De Arce, who were
beleaguering Eh'as, and behavt.'<1 in the most dictatorial manner
within POrlugnese territory, raising not only requisitions of food
hut contributions of money. He c~·cn seized. at Campo Mayor,
the military chest of the Portuguese general Leite, who commanded
the wrecks of the force that hOO been beaten at Evora by Loison
in July 2. His detestable behaviour had the good effect of throwing
the nati~·es of the country on the English side, and Leite welcomed
the arrival of troops from Lisbon, which enabled him to prote;t
with effect against the misdoingg and plunderingg of the Spaniards.
Dc An:c's troops were doing no real good: thcy only maintained
I Better known, from his court office, as the MonteiNJ Mor, which answers
to our < Ma.ster of the Horse,'
I Sce Lcite's iudignant lotters to Dalrymple in Nnpier, vol. i. App. xii.
De Arce is the real name of the Dearey of whom Napior speaks Oil p, 24:t
Cr. Dalrymple's MemQir, p, 02,
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a di!;tant and futile bombardment of the citadel of La Lippe, ill
which the garrison of ElvllS had taken refuge. The French com-
mandant, Girod de Novillars, laughed their efforts to scorn, and
refused to listen to the proposal8 for n capitulation which they
kept pressing upon him. In spite of orders from the Junta of
Seville, bidding him abandon the siege and march for Madrid with
his army, Galluzzo persisted in his ridiculous proceedings till
nearly the end of September. It was only when Dalryrnple moved
up to the neighbourhood first the 20th Regiment, and then two
whole brigades under Sir John Hope, that the Captnin-Geneml
drew off his men and retired into Spanish territory [September 25].
Then Girod and his garrison, which was mainly composed of the
4th Swiss Regiment, were able to march to Lisbon under British
escort and embark for Francc. They did not sail till October 9,
so long had Galluz7.o's freaks delayed them.
The garrison of Almeida dcparted about the same time: they
had maintained themselves without difficulty against the Portuguese
insurgents, but duly )'iclded up the place on the (U'rival of BI'itish
troops. They \','ere marched down to Oporto under an escort of
200 men, a force 80 weak that it nearly led to a disaster. For
the mob of Oporto, under the pretext that church plate and other
public plunder was being carried off by the French, fell upon them
as they wcre embarking and nearly made an cnd of them. It
required all the exertions of the escort, the Bishop of Oporto,
and Sir Robert Wilson-who was then on the spot organizing hil'>
well-known 'Lusitanian Legion '-to prevent the populace from
boarding the transports and slaying the whole of' the l''reneh
battalion. 'The baggage of the departing troops was seized and
plundered, find they barely suocecded in escaping with their lives '.
Meanwhile, long before the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida had
been brought down to the coast, Junot and the main body of his
anny had departed. The {.'OllImander-in-cilicf him:re1f had sailed
on September IS, the first division of his army on the fifteenth,
the rest between that day and the thirtieth. The last weeks of
the French occupation of Lisbon had been most uncomfortable for
nIl parties conccmOO. The populnt'C was seething with discontent,
I Foy, iv. 361, 3G2 j Napier, i. 240, 247. Napier 8Ullpressoo HIe pIIrt taken
in saving thc J.'rcuch by the Bishop and by 'Vilson, to neither of wllon!
were his feelings friendly. .'oyacknowledges the services of both. 'Ibere is
a good account of the whole by WilSOll, in his papers at the Record Office.
1BOO] THE FRENCH PLUNDER LISBON 281
8Silsssinating isola.ted soldiers, and threatening it general rising.
The French were under nrms dny and night, with cannon tminoo
down every street and square. Unpopular ofIk'efS, such as LoisOll,
could not stir from their quarters without a large escort. Sullen
at their defeat, and still more angry at having tu abandon the
heaps of plunder which they had amassed, the French were in 8
most diso~liging mood in their dealings with the Portuguese, and
in a less degree with the English. The main source of irritation
was the yery necessary measures which lUll tu be taken for searching
the baggage of the departing ann)'. A commission had been formed,
consisting of KCUCrmRllll all the ODC side and General Bcresfonl
and Lord Proby on the other, to settle in all disputed cases what
was military equipment and legitimate personal property, tUld
what was not. The English commissioners discovered the most
llStounding hoards of miscellaneous goods alllong the bags Ilnd box1..'S
of the invaders I. The conduct of most of the French offieers,
from the commandcr-in-ehief downwards, was most di:;gmccful.
A few examples may suffice: JlInot, hy the twenty-first article of
thc Convention, had been grunk.>d leave to send a single oflkoer
to France with news for the Emperor. This officer. his aide-de-
camp Lagmve, took with him for his gcncrul's private profit the
most ,'aluable set of books in the Royal Library of Lisbon, fourteen
volumes of a manuscript Bible of the fifteenth century, illustrated
with miniatures by the best Florentine artists-a gift to King
Ellluuucl from one of the Uenaissance popes. Junot's widow after-
wards sold it to the French government for 85,000 francs. Lagrave,
huving stnrted before the commissioners had. begun to work, f,1'Qt
off with his boxes unsearched. But other interesting items were
discovered in the baggage of the Duke of Abrantes-one was
£5,000 worth of indigo in fifty-three large chests, another was a
quantity of valuable specimens of natural history from the public
museum. General Delaborde was found to be in possession of
a large collection of sacred pictures which had adomed Lisbon
chw'Ches. Scattered through the baggage of many officers was
a quantity of church plate-apparently part of the property seized
1 Napier, will. Jlis Cllstomary ullIderne/lS for French susceptibilities, 1138 ollly
very general allusions w t1ICSC di!igTIl.Ccful pooulations. J\ly details are
mainly from 'flJiCbault (iv. 198-200), who frallkly eonfesses everything, and
gives many scandaloU6 particulars. He .....as, as Napoleon wrote, 'not delicate
ill mOllcy matters.'
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to pay the war contributions which Napoleon had imposed Oil
Portngal: but it had in some mysterious way passed from public
into private possession l • In the military chest were l:.l'Qld buN to
the value of 1,000,000 francs which had come from the same
source, but the paYllUl.Skr-gcncral tried to get them out of the
country without paying the numerous account.<; owed by his depart-
ment to private individuals in Lisbon. They were not discharged
till this individual, one Thonnellier, had been put under arrest, and
thrcatcm..-d with detention after the rest of the army .\!hould have
sailed 2, Another most scandalous proceeding discovered by the
<:oIllUlissioners was that JUDot, after the signature of the Cum-en.
lion, had broken open the J)eposito l'ublico, the chest of the
Supreme Court of Lisbon, which contained moneys whose rightful
ownership was in dispute between private litigants. He took from
it coin to the value of .225,000, which was only wrung out of him
with the greatest difficulty. Even after a vast amOllnt had been
rerovered, the French sailed with a military chest containing pay
for three months ahead. for the whole army, though they had
entered Portugal penniless. For a general picture of their behaviour
it may suffice to quote the report of the British commissioners.
'The conduct of the Freneh has been marked by the most shameful
disregard of honour and probity, publicly evincing their intention
of departing with their booty, and leaving acknowledged debts
unpaid. l!~inally they only paid what they were obliged to dis-
gorge.... Unmindful of every tie of honour or justice, the French
army has taken away a considerable sum in its military chest, still
leaving its ucbts unpaiu to a very large amount 3,'
It was no wonder that the resentment of the Portuguese was so
great that the last French who embarked could only get away
under the protection of British bayonets, and that many of those
who straggled or lin/"rered too IOllg in remote corner.J of the toWIl
lost their lives. The wild fury of the Lisbon mob surprised the
British officers who were charged with the embarkation 4: they
I cr. 11liCbault, Napier, IlUd somo curious details given ill the Anmwl
Regi6ter ror 1808, with l'roby and Beresrord's Report.
s .«'or previous acts and plans of this shameless person soo Thil:!ba.ult, iv.
Ml-3.
, Heport or Geneml Bercsrord and Lord Proby to Sir Hew Dalrymplo
after tIle evacuation.
• Fur the tnmults and murders at tile embarkation see Col. Lcslic's Military
Jounlul, pp. 00-76, and Col. Wilkic's b'rl!lliBh ill Spain, p. 16.
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knew little of what had been going on in the capihtl for the last
nine months, and could not understand the mad rage displayed
against the garrison.
But finally the last French bayonet disappeared from the streets
of Lisbon, and the populace, with no object left on which to vent
their fury, turned to illuminations, feastSt and the childish delights
of fireworks. They did not show themselves ungrateful to the
army of libct'tltioll; Itll the British officers who ha"e described
the first weeks after the evacuation of Lisbon, bear witness to tlle
cuthusiuslIl with which they were received, and the good feeling
displayed by their allies t, It was only in the highest Portuguese
quarters that dissatisfaction was mmpant: the Bishop of Oporta,
General Freirc, and the Monteiro Mol', had all suffered what they
considered an insult, when their consent was not asked to the
Convention of Cilltra, and made no secret of their anger against
Dalrymple. But it does not seem that their feelings affected any
large section of the people.
The French army embarked for its native soil still 25,747 strong.
It had entered Portugal ill the previous November with a strength
of nearly 25,000, and had received during the spring of 1808 some
4,500 recruits: in the month of lUny, before hostilities began, its
full force had been Q6,594!. Of this total 20,090 were under arms
at the moment thnt the Convention was signed, 3,522 were in
hospitnl, sick or wounded: 916 were prisoners in the hands of the
English or the Portuguese. There remnin, therefore, some 4,500
men to be aceounted for: these, however, were not all dead. More
than 500 had deserted and taken service with the British before the
embarkation: they came, almost without e."{ceptiOD, from the ranks
of the three foreign battalions which had been serving with Junot,
the 1st Halloveriuns and the 2nd and 4th Swiss s. .As the total
force of these corps had been only 2,548, it is clear that about
olle man in five deserted. TillS was natural ill the cnsc of the
Germans, who were old subjects of Georb"C Ill, and most unwilling
recruits to the French army, but the eqlUllly well-marked defection
I See Col. Steel'ens' Remini8Ce11ct8, pp. M, M; Col. Wilkie, p. 14 ; Col.
Leslie, pp. 65, GO.
t Well. BUPIH. :/A.$p., vi. 207 (figures given for May 23), Bud TIliClnult.
, Napier, i. 246; Foy, iv. 363. Wc have already had occasion to note
the proclivity of the 2nd Swiss to desert. The 4th Swiss, who had formed
the garriSOIl of Eh-as, showed e_~act1}· the &line tendency.
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of the Swiss is very notable. Most of the latter were enlisted for the
5th Datt..'llion of the 60th Rifles, while the Hanoveriansjoined their
l'Ountl'ymen in the ranks of the King's German Legion 1. 111e real
deficit, then, in .Junot's anny was about 4,000 men: this represents
tile total loss of life by the fights of Roli~ and Vi micro, by the
numerous combats with the POI·tugncse, by the stragglers cut ofi'
during the forced marches of July and August, and by the onlioary
mortality in hospital. It must be considered on the whole a very
moderate casualty list: JUllOt'S corps, when it re-cntered Spain to
serve once more under the Emperor, was still 22,000 strong. It
would havc been even a trifle higher in Ilulllbc~ if a transport carry-
ing two companies of the 86th Uegiment had not foundered at sea,
with the loss of every man on board.
It is ncecssa.ry to gi~-e some account of the fate of Siniadn's
llussian squadron, before dismissing the topic of the evacuation
of Portugal. The admiral, as we have already had occasion to
state, had steadfastly refused to throw in his lot with Junot and
to join ill the Convcntion of Cintr/:\.. Hc prefcrred to make till
agreement of his own with Sir Charles Cotton. It was a simple
doc:ument of two articles: the first providl.u that the ninc sail
of the line and one frigate, which formed the Rus.~ian fleet, should
be given up, scnt to England, and 'held as a deposit' by his
Britannic majesty, to be restored within six months of a peace
between Great Britain und Russia. TIle second was to the efieet
that Siniavin, his officers and crews, should be sent back to llussia
on English ships without being in.any way considered prisoners of
war, or debarred from further service.
Admiral Cotton, it is clear, regarded the ships as important and
the crews as worthy of slllall attention. It was profitable to Great
Bl·itaill to keep down the Dumber of vessels in the power of
Napoleon, though now that the Danish fleet was captured, and the
Spanish f1ect transferred to the other side of the balance, there
could be no longer any immediate danger of the French taking the
offensive at sea. TIle casy terms of release granted to the personnel
of the Russian squadron suggest that the British admiral had
determined to reward its commander for his persistent refusal to
help JUllot. It almost appears that Cotton looked upon Siniavin
I A tablo ill the Pariiallumlary Papert Telutioe 10 Spain ulld PO"rlll!lal shows
that the Legion rl-ech-cu 163 rccruits from this sourcc. Thc 6/60th obtained
a much larger numberl haling still over 200 Swiss with them ill 1800.
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as a secret friend, and treated him accordingly. Milder term~
could hardly have been devised, for the moment that the harbour~
forts of Lisbon were surrendered to the British, the Russians must'
obviously be made prisoners, since they could not get out of the
river. It is probable that the two admirals thoroughl)' understood
each other's mind, and that the llussian was undisguisedly pleased
at the disaster of his detested Frendl allies.
'l'he most pressing necessity in !}orlugal, after the French had
departed, was the construction of a new national government, for it
was clear that the Supreme Junta at Oporta represented in reality
only the northern provinces of the realm, and could not be ac(;epted
-as its president, the Bishop, suggested-as a permanent and
legitimate executive for the whole kingdom. Constitutionally
speaking, if one may use such a phrase when dealing with a country
like Portugal, the only body which possessed II clear title of au-
thority was the Council of Regency, which Prince Jobn had nomi-
nated nine months before, on the eve of his depllltut'C for Brazil.
But this council had long ceased to act; its members were dis-
persed; several had compromised themselves by submitting to the
French and taking office under Junot; and its <..'Omposition gave no
promise of vigorous action for the future. If a choice mnst be
made between the Junta at Oporto, which WAA ru.:tive and patriotic,
though perhaps too much given up to self-assertion and intrigue,
and the effete old Regency, there could be no doubt that the
former possessed more claims to the confidence of the Portuguese
nation and its English allies. But it WM not necessary to ndopt
either alternative in full: Wellesley, who had already got a firm
grip upon the outlines of Portuguese politics, ndvised Dalrymple to
invite the old Uegency, with the e.'l:ception of those members who
had compromised themselves with the French, to l'Cllssemble, and
. to bring pressure upon them to co-opt to the vacant places tllC
Bishop of Oporto Bud the other prominent members of the Junta,
11lis pl'Oposal would have secured legality of form (since the old
Regency would theoretically have continued to e.-.;ist), while intro~
dueing new Ilnd vigorous elements of undoubted patriotism into
the body 1, But Dalrymple preferred to reinstate, by a procla-
mation of his own, those members of the Regency who had l1c"cr
1 Wellcsley to Lord Castlcreagh, Sq>t. tl (Well. £)Up., iv. 137). In ~I}ite of
Napier's denunciation of the Bi~hop, Wellesley bears good witness in his
favour, e. g. iv. 140.
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wavered in their allegiance to Prince John [Sept. 18]. He called
upon all public bodies and officials in the realm to obey this recon~
stituted executive. Here was an undoubted mistake; it was
wounding to Portuguese pride to sce the ccntral governing body
of the kingdom created by the edict of an English general:
Dalrymple should surely have allowed the Regents to apprise the
nation, by a proclamation of their own, that they had resumed their
former functions. However, they fell in with 1Ycl1eslcy's plnns so
far as to co-opt the Bishop of Oporto as a colleague, though
refusing uny plru.:cs to the rest bf his Junta.. TIle whole body now
consisted of three original members, the COllde de Castro Marim
(otherwise known as the Monteiro Mar), Francisco Du CWlha, and
Xavier de Noronhn, of two persons chosen from it list of possible
substitutes, which the Princc-Rcgent had left behind, Joam de
1\1cndollt;a and Gcnero.1 l\1igueI Forjas Coutinho, and of two
co-opted members, the Bishop and the Condc das Minas, an old
nobleman who had shown n very determined spiri t in resisting
Junot during the days of his power.
On the reconstitution of thc Regency the Junta of Oporto, with
more self-denial than had been expected, dissolved itself. The
minor juntas in the Algarve, the Alemtejo, and the Tras-os-Monlcs
followed its example, and Portugal was once more in possession of
n singlc exccuti\'c, whose authority was freely nx:ognizL.(l through-
out the kingdom. Unfortunately it turned out to be slow, timid,
and divided into eliqucswhich were always at mrianccwith eo.chothcr.
'Vc have already seen that owing to various causes of delay, of
which GallUZ20'S preposterous proc.:cedings at Elvns were the most
prominent, the last French troops did not quit Portugal till Sep-
tember had expired, and that Junot himself and the nmin body of
his army had only begun to lelwe on the fifteenth of that month.
It would have been impossible for Dnlrymple to udV!lllL'C into
Spain till the l"rench had left Lisbon, however urgently his
prcscllL'C might have been required. Dut it would perhaps have
pro\·ed feasible to push fonml'd towards the Spanish frontier a
considerable part of his army, and to make prcparatiolls for the
movement of the whole towards I\Iadrid or Salamanca as soon as
the evacuation should be complete. DlLIrymplc, however, was as
leisurely as the generals of the old days before the Revolutionary
·War. He kept his troops cantoned about Lisbon, only pushing
forward two brigades towards Elvas in order to bring Galluzzo to
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reason, Bnd dispatching the 6th Regiment as a garrison to Almeida.
He seems to have been quite as much interested in the administra-
tion of l~ortllgal as in the further prosecution of the war in Spain.
,"Ve find him much busied if) the reconstruction of the Portuguese
government and army, reviewing and rearming the Spanish division
of Cara.nu before shipping it off to CattUonia [Sept. 22], and spend4
ing a great deal of time over the redistribution into brigades and
division;; of his army, which had now swelled to something like
35,000 men, by the arrival of Moore's force and certain regiments
from .l\:Indcira, Gibraltar, and England. He was also engaged in
endeavours to organize it. proper commissariat for this large body
of men, a hard task, for every brigade arrived in the same state of
destitution as to means of transport as had those which landed
with WeIlcsley a.t Mondego Bay on the first of August. But in all
his actions there was evident a want of vigour and of purposeful
resource, which was very distressing 1:0 those of his subordinates
who were anxious for a. rapid and decisive advance towards the
main theatre of war in Spain.
No one felt this more clearly than Wellesley, whose views as to
his commander's competcnce had nevcr changed sincc that hour on
the morning of August 22, when Dalrymple had refused to march
on Mafm, and had decided to delay his advance till the /\dvent of
MooTe. Sim;e then he had offered his advice on several points, and
had almost always seen it refused. Dealing with the disputed details
of the Convention of Cintra, he had spoken in favour of meeting
the French demands with high-handed decision: hence he wa.~ vexed·
by DaL-ymplc's tendency towards wcakness amI compromise. One
of his special grievances was that he had been ordered to sign the
armistice of August 22 as representing the Bdtish army, although
he had privately protested against its details 1. His unofficial letters
home during the first half of September are full of bitter remarks
on the wcakucss of the policy that had been adopted, and the lllany
fanlts of the Convention 2. Seeing that warlike opera.tions appeared
1 Wellesley to the llishop of Oporto, Sept. 6 : < 1 was present during the
negotiation of the agreement, a.nd by tllO dwre of the Commallder-ill-Chief
] signed iL But I did lIot 1I~"'Otiate it, nor call I in lOlly mllllrlCr be COll-
sidered resllonsible for ia contents' (Well. nitp., iv. 134). Wellesloy to
Castlereagh, Oct. 6 : • I do not consider myself I't'sponsible in any degree for
the terms ill whic11 it was framed, or for any of its provisions.'
t Wellesley to Mr. Stuart (Well. IJiitp.J iv. 120). To Lon! CastlerCllgh
(iv.l18). To the Duke of Richmond (Svppl. Diap., vi. 129).
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~ikely to be postponed for an indefinite time, he at lust asked and
obtained leave to return to England, after declining in somewhat
ncid term!:! an offer made to him by Da.I.ryrnplc that he should go
to Madrid, to concert a plan for combined operations with Castanoa
and the other Spanish generals. • In order to be able to perform
the important part allotted to him,' .he wrote, • the person sent
should possess the confidence of those who employ rum, and be
acquainted with their plans, the means by which they hope to carry
them into execution, and those by which they intend to enable the
Spanish nation to e."ecute thnt which will be proposed to them.
I certainly carnlOt consider myself as possessing these advantages 1.'
Wellesley also refused another and a less tempting offer of a
mission to the Asturias, for the purpose of seeing what facilities
that prm1nce would offer M the bnse of operations for a British
anny. He was not a ldraftsman,' he wrote, or a 'topographical
engineer,' and he could not pretend to describe in writing the
character of such a region. In short he was set on going home,
and would not turn from his purpose. But before leaving Portugal
he wrote two remarkable letters. One was to Sir John l\foore, the
third in command of the ann)', telling him that he regarded him
as the right person to take charge of the British forces in the
Peninsula, and would use every effort with the ministers to get the
post secured to him. 'It is quite impossible that we can go on as
wc arc now constituted: the commllnder-ill·chief must be changed,
and the country and the Ilnny naturally turn their eyes to )'OU as
their commander 2.' The second and longer was a letter to his
patron Castlereagh, in which he laid down his views as to the
general state of the war in Spain, and the way in which tllC Bdtish
army could be best employed. It is a wonderful document, as he
foretells in it all the disasters that were about to befall the Spaniards
from their reckless self-confidence. The only real fighting-force
that they possessed 'I'M, he said, the army of Castailos: the rest,
with the possible exception of Blake's Galicians, were' annies of
pcusantry,' which could not be relied upon to meet the French in
the field. Though they might on some occasions fight with success
I Wellesley to Dalrymple (Well. Disp., iv. 138).
I Wdlesllly to Moorc, SCI't. 17,1808 (Well. DUrp., p. 142). Mocro, aa
a noted Whig, was imagined not to be a per80na gl'flla at head quarters;
WellesJ.c)' offers, in the most handsome way, to endeavour to smooth matters
for him.
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in their own mountains, 'yet in others a thousand Vrench with
Cfl\'wy and artillcry will disperse thousands of them.' 'Illey would
not, and indeed could not, lea\"c their native provinces, and nu
ofliccl' could calculate upon them for the currying ant of ll. great
combined opemtion. How then could the British army of Portngal
be best cmploy«!' to aid such allies? The only efticient pll\l1,
'\Vcllesley concludes, would bc to place it upon the flank and 1'&'\1'
of allY E'n:m:h advance to Madrid, by moving it up to the valley
of the Douro, and basing it upon Asturias and Galicia. Posted in
the kingdom of J..COl1, with its port<. of Impply at Giholl, Col1mnn,
and Ferrol, it should CO-OPCl"l1tC with Blakc, allU hang upon the
right flank of the French army which was forming upon the line
of the Ehro. The result would be to prevent the invaders from
moving forward, even perhaps (here Wellesley efl"Cd from ignorance
of the enemy's numbers) to obli&f'C them tu retire towards their OWll
frontie!". But Bonaparte could, unless occupied by the affairs of
Central Europe, increase his armies in Spain to anye.,·tent. The
moment that he heard of an English fOh"£! in the field, he would
consider its destruction ll5 his first object, and 50 multiply his
!lumbers in the Pcninsula that the British (:ommandel' would Jut\'C
to give back. 'There must be a line of retreat open. and that
retreat must be the sea.' A<.'Cordillgly, Sir .Arthm· l"('L'OlUmelll!L'<.1
that the Asturias should be made the ultimate base, and the
tffinsports and stores sent to its port of Gihon '.
This letter was different in its general character from the other
reports which Castlcreagh was receiving: most ot' the corre-
spondents of the Secretary for 'Var could write of nothing but
the enthusiastic patriotism of the Spaniards and their enormous
rcsollrcL'S: they spoke of the Freud, as a dispirited renllmnt, rendy
1 '1l1is letter, written to Ql1Itlere.tgh from Zamlmj<ll (Well. DiJrP., iI'. 127-32),
is Olle of the most conclusive proofs of \\'elll,'sley's milill.r)' genius. He
"alued the Sl""l.llish armies at their true force. He foresaIl' that Uonaparte
would make' the drilling of the leopard into the sea' a point of lIOUOUI', and
WOllltl send corps 011 corps into Sp.'\in in order to 6eel1nl it. He cl'en noted
that the affail'!j of C...ntrnlEurope, , of which I have no knowledge whatel'er,'
would be the onl)' possible reason that might prevent the Emperor from
inundating tIle Peninsula. with his legions. He 83W that t}lll presence of tho
Briti;;il in Lcon would be the one thing that WOllltl keep the Frelle], from
subduing VentrallSpain : a disaster in the Oouro valle)' Wag the nightmare of
the Emperor, as half a dozeu of his dispatches show. The first news that
Moore was 1Iear Vall:ulolid drew Kapoleon from Madrid in wild hailte, and
defern.'ll for six IllOUtLS tile conquest of the valley of thc Guadiaua.
O.lJAN. I U
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to fly, at the first attack, behind the line of the Pyrenees. It is
therefore greatly to the credit of Castlcreagh that he did not
hesitate lo pin his faith upon Welleslcy's intelligence, and to order
the execution of the vel")' plan that he recommended. It WAS
practically mrricd out in the great campuign of Sir John 1\100l'C,
after the collapse of the Spanish armies had justified every word
that Sir A.rthur had written about them.
Wellesley sailed from Lisbon on September 20, and reached
IJlymouth on October 4. On his arrival in England he was met
with news of a very mixed character. On the one hand. he was
rejoiced to heal' that both Dalrymple and Burrard had been
."to'Ctl.llcd, and that Sir JOhll MOOl'e had been pla(,'(.>d in {''OIlIU1and. of
the British forces in the l"'eninsula. He \\Tote at once to the
latter, to say that there could he no greater satisfaction than to
serve under his orders, and that he would return at once to Spnin
to join him: 'he wowd forward with zeal eyery wish' of his ne\\"
eommander 1. It was also most gratifying to 'Vcllesley to knOll"
that the dispatch of September 25, by which Moore was given the
command of the army of Portugal, WI'eCted him to mon~ i.nto
Northe.rn Spain and base himself upon the AFrt;nrias and Galieia, the
very plan which formed the main thesis of the document that we
have been discussing. There can be no doubt that Castlel'cagh
had recognized the stratet:,rical and political "eritics that were
embodied in Wcllcsley's letter, and had resolved to adopt the line
therein recommended.
I Wcllesley to !l1oore, Oct. 8 (Well. Slll'pf. Dilp., vi. ]50, 151).
SECTION IV: CHAPTER VI
THE COURT OF INQUIRY
ThERE wa.<; another and a less pleasant surpri;;e in store for
'Vclk>sley when he landed at Plymouth. Hc lcurnt that if he
himself disliked the armistice of August ~2, and the Convention
of Cintru, the British public had gOlle fi\.l' beyond him, and was in
1\ state of frantic I'tlc"e concerning them. To his anger and amaze-
ment he also learnt that be himsclfwas considered no less responsible
for the two agreements than were Dalrymple and Burrard. The
fact that the former had told him to set his signature opposite to
that of Kellermann on the document signed at Vimiero, had misled
the world into regarding him as the negotiator and framer of the
armistice. 'Every whisperer who disliked the llallle onVcllt.."Slcyl'
-and Sir Arthur's brother, the Governor-General, had made it very
unpopular in certain quarters-was busy propagating the story that
of the three generals who had lately commanded in Portugal, each
one was as slack and supine ns the othC!rs.
The wave of indignation which swept across England on the
receipt of the news of the Convention of Cintra is, at this distance
of time, a little lll.u-d to uuderstund. Suecesses hud not been 80
plentiful on the Continent during the last fifteen years, that all
agrccment which bTllve back its liberty to a whole kingdom need
have been criticized with vindictive minuteness. But the news of
llaylen had set the public mind on thc look-ant for /iJrther triumphs,
and whcn the dispatches which gave an account of Rolirtl and of
Virnicro had come to rand, there had been a confident expectation
that the next news l'cl.:eivt.'<! wuuld be that JUJlot's anuy had been
scattered or captured, and that Lisbon had been set free. Then
came a gap of thirteen days, caused by Dalrymple's stmllge fit of
silence. The only intelligence that reached London in this interval
was the lJishop of Oporto's letter of prote<;t against the armistice,
in which, without giving ally definite details about that ag'l'ccment,
t· The Duke of Richmond to Welles1ey, Oct. 12, 1800 (Well. S«ppl. Di,p.,
vi. 033).
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he denounced it as insulting to l'ortllgal and Ilnworthy of England,
The public wa... prepared, therefore, to hear that something timid
and base hod been done, when Dal..rymple's dispatch of September g,
enclosing the Convention of Cinh'a, came to hand, It was easy to
set forth the terms of that treaty in an odious light, Junot, it .....IIS
said, had been beaten in the field, he was completely isolated from
0.11 the other French armies, and his surrender must have foUow('(1
in a few days, if the British generals had only chosen to press thei,'
advantage, Instead of this, tIlCY preferred to let him return to
France with the whole of his troops, and with most of his plunder,
He was not ellcn compelled to release a corresponding number of
British prisoners in return for the freedom secured to his army.
Iu fad, his position was much bettcr uftcr than before hi~ defeat
at Vimiero, for the Convention granted him a quiet and safe retl11'n
home with his force intact, while, even if he had won some 8UCCe;;.~
in battle, the best that he would have been able to secure himself
would have been a retreat on Northern Spain, through the midst
Qf grClott dangers. Excitable politicians and journalists used the
most exaggerated language, and compared the Convention with
that of Kloster Se\"Cll, and thc conduct of thc gClICl'Ills who hud
not pressed the campaign to its logic."l.l em] with Admiral Byng'~
shirkillg before )1illorca, Caricatures were iSSut~l showing
Dalrymplel llurrard, and WeUesley sporting the white feather,
or hanging from three gibbets as traitors', Nol' was Admiral
Cotton spared: hc was denounced in bitter terms for taking the
Uussian ships as 'deposits,' when he should have towed them into
Spithcad. as prizes: moreover the repatriation of the Russian crews
was asserted to be a deadly blow at OUI unfortunate all)' the King
of SwcUcn.
The rage against the Convention was not confined to anyone
class or faction ill the state, If some Whigs tried lo tUl"ll it into
the shape of an attack on the government" there were plenty of
Tork'S who joined in tlH~ cry, begging their leuUers in the ministry
to dismiss and punish the three unpopular generals. A number
of public meetings were held with the object of forcing the hands
of the Duke of Portland and his colleagnes, but the most prominent
part ill the agitation wus taken by the Corporation of London,
I Toreiio, then acting all agent {or the Anurian Junta. in London, hu
mucl, interesting information on this point. He saw tl'e gibbet l:.1ricature
aud papers published with black l'<JgCS (i. 2.51).
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UecaUing the old days of '''hIkes and Beckford, they rcsoln~d that
the Lord Mayor, with a deputation of Sheriffs, Aldermen, and
Common-Councillors, should present a petition to the King begging'
him to order' an inqniry into this dishonourable and unprecedented
transaction, for the discovery nnd punishment of those by whose
miseonduct ano incapacity the cause of the kingdom and its :allies
has been so shamclessly sacrificed.'
Accordingly such a petition was laid before the King on Octo-
ber 12. Its b)fIns IU'C worth a moment's attention, Wl they show
very clearly the points on which popular indignation had been con-
centrated. 'The treaty,' it states, 'is humiliating and degrading,
hecause after a signal victory, by which the enemy appears to have
IJCCll cut off' from all moons of succour or escape, we had the sad
mortification of seeing the laurels so nobly acquired torn from the
11I'0ws of our brave soldiers, and tenns granted to the ellemy dis·
gt'accful to the British name.... By this ignominious Convention
British ships are to convey to I"rance the French army and ib
plunder, where they will be td; liberty immediately to l'Ccommencc
their active operations against us and our allies. And the full
recognition of the title and dignity of Emperor of France 1, while
all mention of the Government of Portugal is omitted, must be
cOllsidercd as highly disrespectful to the authorities of that
(;ountry.' There was another clause denouncing the sending back
of the Russian sailors, but not so much stress was laid on this
point. Fimllly the King is asked 'ill justiee to the outraged
feclingr. of a brave, injured, and indignant people, whose blood and
treasure have been thus expended,' to cause thu guilt)' persons to
be punished.
King Georgc III replied to these flowers of oratory by a short
speech which displays admirably that power of getting an occasional
lucid glimpse of the obviolls in which he was by no metlns deficient.
He was fully sensible, he said, of the loynlty and good intentions
of the City of London, but he wished the deputation to remember
that to pronounce judgement without previous trial and investiga-
tion was hardl), consonant with the principles of British justice.
He WlLS always rend)' to in..~titute an inquiry when the honour of
the British anns wag in question: and the interposition of the
I Thc lloCtitioners Ollgllt in fairness lo Iml"C slate.l tllat tllis was only made
ill the document setting forth the armistice, alii) not ill the defiuitive
Convention,
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City of London was not necessary to induce him to set one on foot
in this cuse, when the hopes 1l11d. expectntions of the nation had
been so mnch disappointed.
It was nut, however, till seventeen Jays Itltcr that his majC:llty's
formal orders for the summoning of a Court of lnquiry •to in-
vestigate into the late Armistk-e and. Convention concluded ill
Portugal, and all the circumstances connected therewith,' were COnl-
lIIunicated to the Commander-in-Chief. Dalrymplc and Burrard.
both of whom had now returned to England, were directed to hold
themselves in readiness to present themselvcg before the court, and
WeUesley, for the same reason, was directed to abandon his project
of going back to the Peninsula in order to !>erve under Sir John
.Maore,
The members of the celebrated Court of Inquil'y, which COlU·
meneoo its sittings on November ]4~ 1808, were seven in number,
all general officers of great respectability and advanced )'e~ men
more likely, for lhe most part, to sympathize with caution than
with daring. The president was Sir David Dundas, the author of'
tl. celebrated drill-book which had long been the terror of young
officers: the other members were Lord Moim, Lord HeathfieJd I,
the End of Pembroke, and Generals Craig, Sir G. Nugellt, and
Nicholls. Not one of them has left behind a name to be remem-
bered, save indeed Lord Moim, who, as Lord RawdOll in the old
American 'Var, had won the victory of Hobkirk'~ Hill, and who
was destined to be the next Viceroy of India and to make the nallle
of Hustin61'S famous for a !lecoml time in the East.
The court began its sittings on November 14, and did 1I0t
tcrmim\te the!n till December 22. In the great hall of Chcbca
Hospital, where its pl-oceedings were held, there was much warm
debate. As the details of the Campaign of Portugal were gradually
worked out, not only by the cross-examination of Dnlrymplc,
Burrard, and Vlellesley, but by that of many of the other officers
of ronk who hud been in Portugal-Spencer, Acland, Fergusoll,
Lord Burghersh, and others-the points on which the verdict of
the court lllust turn gradually bccaUle cleal·. They wcre six ill,
number :-Had Burrard been justified in preventing 'Vellesley from
pur:;uing the French at the end of the btlttle of Vimicro? Hftd
Dalrymple erred in refusing to take '''eHesley's advice to march
1 Not, of course, the Eliot who llall defcllded Gibraltar so well in 1780-3,
but his son, thc second Lord Heathlield.
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on l\iafrn tile next morning? Should Kellcrmllnn's offel' of an
armistice have been accepted on the twenty-second, and, if so, were
the terms granted him too favourable? Lastly, was the Convention
of Cintra itself justifiable under the existing cil:Culllsmnccs, am.I
were all its articles reasonable and proper? 111 lleh c\'idence WtU;
produced for and against each view on every onc of these topics.
On the (irst two "Vcllesley practically impeached Burrard And
Dalrymple for unwarrantable slackness and timidity. He was so
much in lo\'e with his own bold plans that his supel·ior's caution
appeared to him ('.()utemptible. He stood up to them and cros.;-
questioned them with nu acidity and a complete wunt of dcfcrcnt.:c
that seemed very reprehensible to military men steeped in the old
tl1lditions of unqucstioning deference to OIlC'S senior ofiiecrs. Sit·
Waltel' Seou, who followed the inquir.y with grcut interest, calkod
him 'a haughty devil,' but e...prcssed his admiration for him at the
&'lme moment I. It is curious to find that "\\'ellesley showed less
angel' with llurrard, whose caution on the aftemooll of the twenty~
first really wrecked his plan of campaign, than with Dalrymplc.
'111e latter had snubbed him on his first arrival, had persistently
refused him his confidence, and would not state clearly to the court
that the armistice, though it bore Wellesley's name, had not been
drawn up or appro\'ed in detail by him. Of the numerous minol'
witnesses who were examined, all who had served n.t noli~a and
Vimicro spoke 011 'Vellesley's sidc: Speneer und Ferguson were
espeeially strong in their statements. The fact was that they were
illtcnsdy proud of their two lights, und looked upon Burrll.rd us
the mall who had prevented them from entering Lisbon in triumph
after capturing JUllot and his whole host. So strong. wus this
feeling that the brigadIers and field~offjCCl'S of the eight brigades
that fought at Vimiero hud pl'cscntL>d 'Vcllcslcy with a handsome
testimonial-a service of plate worth £l,OOO-as a sort of mark of
confidence in him, and of protest against those who had stayed his
hand.
On the othcl' hund, Burmrd anti Da.lrymple urged all thc justi~
ncations of caution. Each had arrived at a crisis, the details of
which (:ould not be propcrly known to him from sheer wunt of
time to master them. Each acknowledged that 'IVellesley had
vehemently pressed him to strike boldly and promptly, but thought
that he hud not OC'C1l j ustifled in doing so till he had made out for
I Lockhart's Life of ,sir \Vulta SeoU, H. 22G.
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himself the exact situation of a£J'airs. Burrurd plendcd that JUllot
might have possessed reserves unknown to him, which might have
changed the fortulIe of the I1ght if a hcudlong pursuit had been
ordered. 'Vellesley had told him that none such existed (and this
turned out to Junc been the fuet), but he himself had not st.'C1l any
dear proof of it at the time 1. Dalrymple went even further, and
stated that he had l"ollsidered the whole conduct of the campaign,
from the landing in l\fondego Day till tilC battle of Vi micro,
terribly rash 2. If he had permitted the army to march on Mafra
on the twenty-second, the Frcnch from Toncs Vcdrns might have
taken him in the flank as he passed through a "ery difficult countrYl
and the most disasll"OlIS results might have ensued. He was posi-
tive that nothing hazardous ought to ha\'e been attempted, and
that it was necessary to wait for Sir John Moore's division before
prcssing the French to extremity.
'Vith regard to the armistice and the Convention, all the three
h"euernls, when defending thelllseh'cs, agreed that they were wise
and justifiable. To clear the Freneh out of Portugal without
further fighting, and to recover Lisbon lllld all it!:! resources intact,
were ends so important that it was well worth while to sacrifice
even the practical certainty of capturing ull Junot's army, after
n resistance that might have been long and desperate. nut as to
the wisdom of certain clauses and articles, both in the document
of August 22 and that of August SO, there was considerable dif-
ference of opinion. ,1\'ellesley proved that he had opposed mall)'
details of each agreemcnt, and that he was in no wiLy responsible
for the final shape taken by them. He only assented to the general
proposition that it was right to let the .French army depart under
a convention, rather than to force it to a' capitulation. He con-
sidered that Dalrymplc had yielded far too much, from his ullwillillg-
!lCSS to 'drive JUllot into a corner.'
On December 22 tllC Cow't of Inquiry issued its report It WilS
:l very cautious and a rather inconclusive document. nut its main
point was that nothing had been done in Portugal which calk'<l for
the punishment of any of the parties concerned: 'On a consideration
of all the circumstum:es. wc most humbly submit our opinion that no
further military proceeding is necessary,' i. e. there was no ground
for a eourl-mnrtial on anyone of the three British f,tCllcrals. As to
1 Hurrurd before the Court of Inquirr (Proceedings, l'P, 1Hi, 116, 13.5).
~ Dalrymple before the Court of Inquiry (Well. Disp., iv. 178,180,181).
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Burrard's refusal to pur;me the French 011 the afternoon of \'imiero,
there were 'fair military grounds' fur his decision: the COllrt
omitted to say whether the decision itself was right or wrong. <It
could not prolloullec with eonfidcncc whether or not a pursuit
(:ould have been efficacious.' As to the h"lt on the folbwing day,
Jor which Dalrymplc no lcs~ than llurrnrd was responsible, ' under
the extraordinary circulllstances that two new commanding generals
arri\·ed from the ocean !\nd joined the army within the space of
twenty-rom hours, it is not surprising that the army was not
cll.r1'ied forward until thc sC(:ond day after the actiun, frolll the
nccessity of the generals becoming acquainted with the adual state
of things, and of their army, and proceeding accordingly.' Finally,
ItS to the Convention, 'howsoever some of us may differ in our
fOCntiments respecting its fitness in the relative situation of the
two armies, it is our unanimous dedaration that unquestionable
".eal and firmness appear to have been exhibited throughout both
by Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur
'Vellesley.' There was a special compliment inserted for 'l\feUesley's
benefit, to the effect that his whole action, from the landing in
Mondego Day down to the battle of Vimiero, was < highly honour-
llble und succe:;sful, and such 0.9 might huve bL"en expected from
n distinguished officer.'
Sueh n report amounted to l\ plain acquittal of nil the three
generals, bnt it left so much unsa.id that the Government directed
the Commander-in-Chief to requirc fl'Orn the members of the court
their decision as to whether the armistice of the twenty·second and
the Convention of the thirtieth were advisable, and, if' they were
rulvisable, whether their terms were proper, and honourable. On
th~ twenty-seventh the court retlll'ned its nnswer: there was, this
timc, 110 ulll\nimous report, but a series of written opinions, for
the members of' the body differed from each other on many points.
As to the armistice, six members replied that the)' approved of it,
one, but he the most distinguished of the seven-Lord Moira-
~fl.id that he did not. On the question as to the definitive Convcn·
tion there was more difference of opinion: Dunclas, Lord Heath~
lield, Cmig, and Nugent thought it fair and reasonable; Lord Moim,
the Earl of Pembroke, and Nicholls considered it as unjustifiable,
cOIlf;idcring the relative sitnations of the two armies. The two
lm;t-named ofiiL'Cl'S add..>d short explanatory note:; to their opinions,
while Lord Moim subjoined to his a long and elaborate argllment,.
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a document which does not seem in the least to deserve the. slight.
iug referem.-e made to it by Napier 1. ' It is vel'y sensible in its general
drift. Lord Maim contended that while all August ~2 there was
no reason why an armistice should 110t have been concluded, yet
the puper drawn up b)' Kcllcrmanll contninoo clauses that limited
llndul)' the demands which the British commander might make ill
the subsequent Convention, Dalr)·mple ought, before conceding
them, to have reflected that Junot's anxiolls and hurried ofter of
tcrms betokened dcmoralization. If thc French had beel! prcsse(l,
nnd a confident and haughty answer returned to their envoy, Junot
would have (lCcepted any conditions that might be imposed upon
him. His army 'I'M in such a slate of disorder Ilnd dismay that it
was most unlikely that he would have tried either to burn Lisbon
or to retreat across the Alemtejo. Moreo,'er, the contention that
the deliverance of Portugal was the one object of the e.'<peditiOll,
and that it was duly secured by the Convention, was a mistake.
Lord Maim wished to point out that our armies were sent forth,
not only to emancipate Portugal, but also to destroy the forces
and lowcr the prestige of France by eycry means in their power.
By forcing Junot to a capitulation, or by making the terms of the
Convention more stringent, a much grClltCI' blow might have ht'(.'ll
dealt to Bonaparte's reputation. As an instance of what might
huve been done, he suggested that some remote and iucon\'eniellt
landing-place-Belle Isle for example-might have been imposed
upon thc French troops, or they might have been compelled to
engage not to serve for some specified time against England and
her allies,
The COlllt of Inquiry had thus delivered its Inst opinion. But
the matter of the Convention was not even yet at an end. The
ministry rcsolved to inflict a rebuke on Dalrymplc, lIot for his
military.action, on which they completely accepted the verdict of
the scven generals, but for his politicul action in allowing the
Articles XV, XVI, nnd XVII to be insm·ted in the COJlVentiOIl.
These, it will be remembert.'<1, wcre the clauses which com:eded
certain privileges to the I?rench inhabitAnts of Lisbon, Imd to the
Portugucse who had t.'Ol1lpromised UiClllSclvcs by taking service
under Junot. The Duke of York, ..RS commander~in-chief, was
I He calls it 'IL laboured criticism, whicll nevertheless left the pith of the
(jllclltioll Crltircly Illltouclled' (Napi,:r, i. 249). I have printed Lord Moinl's
plea in an .-\ppelldix, to show that it is well·reasonC'd and practical.
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ordered to convey to Dalr)'lllple 'His Majesty's disapprobation of
those articles in the CollYelltion in which stipulations were made
affecting the interests and feelinhtS of the SfWllish uml POI·tugue;;e
nations l .' It WllS to be impressed upon Sir Hew that it was
must improper and dUIlf,'"CfOUS to admit into a militury convention
articles of such a descriptioll, which (especially when carelessl)' and
inCilutiously fmmctl) might lcud to the .llIost injurious couse-
Cluences. }'urthennore, Dalrymple was to be gravely censured for
his extraordinary delay .in not scnding the nell's of the urmistk'C of
the twcnty-sccond till September 3, whereby' great public incon-
venience' hud been cllllSL-d.
It cannot be denied that these rebukes were well deserved; we
hm'c nlrcndy pointed out that the three articles to which allusion
is made wel'C the only part of the Convention for which no defence
is possible. It is equally clear that it WAS the thirteen days' gap
in the information sent home which gave time fol' the rise and
development of' the unrellsoning popular agitation against t.he
whole agreement made with Junot.
As to the \'eroict of the oollrt, it does substantial justice to the
case. There ex.isted 'fair military reasons' for all that Burrul'J
and Dalrymple had done, or left undone. In a similar way' fair
military l'CUSOllS' can be nllegcd for most of the main slips and
errors committed during any campll.il,,"I1 in the Napoleonic ''Var-for
Dnpont's stay at Andujar, or for Murray's retreat from Tarragollll,
or for Grouchy'::! OPCI'll.tiOllS 011 June 17 and 18,1815. It wO\lld
he unjust to pllllish old and respectable generoJs for mere errors of
judgement, and inubility to risc to the height of the situution.
Burrard and Dalryrnple had sacrificed the most brilliant possibili~
tics by tbeir torpid caution, uftCI' refusing to listCll to Welleslcy's
cogent arguments for bold action. But their conduct had resulted
neither fmm cownrdiC<! nor from dclibcmte perversity. The blame
must rest quite as much on the government, which had entrusted
the expedition to elderly men unaccustomed to command ill the
field, as 011 those men themselves. And as to the details of the
armistice and Convention, we may well accept Wellesley'8 verdict,
that the gain l>CCured by the l'Cscue of Lisbon with all its wealth
intact, nnd by the pl'Omp~ termination of the campaign, full)'
justified the resoh'e not to drive Junot to extremity.
Dut there was an unexpressed. corollary to the verdict of the
l 1'lw Kill!J'8 OpiJliQ/4 QI~ tlw CQlIt~mtiQll qf Oilltra, l'aragraJlhs 4, 5, aud G.
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court which the ministry fully rcnli:r.ed, and upon which they
acted. llurrul'd and Dalryrnplc, with their' fair milimry reasons,'
must never again appear in the fielJ. It ww; not by such men
that Donapurte would be foiled und Spain emancipated, and so
they were relegated to home service and quiet retirement for the
rest of their lin.'S. 'Wellcslcy, 011 the other hand, was marked out
R5 a man of enel'g)', resource, and determination, eminently fit to
be employed ngnin. 'Within four months of the termination of
the proceedings of the Comt of Inquiry he WllS once more in
command of the British army in the llcninsule. t.
I 'The proceedings terminated Dee. 27, 1308. Wellesley took np the
command at Lisbon 011 April 26, 180£1.
•
SECTION V
THE STRUGGLE IN CATALONIA
CHAPTER I
DUI-IESME'S OPERATIONS: FIRST SIEGE OF GEUO:'\'A
(JUNE-JULY, 1008)
'l'Hl<:nE is still one comeI' of the Iberian Peninsula whose history,
during the eventful summer months of 1808, 'vc have not yet
chronicled. '111C rugged and warlike provim:e ot' Catalonia had
alretldy begun that heroic struggle against itll French garrison
which wa<; to endure thronghont the whole of the war. Far more
thall Illly other section of the Spanish nation do the Catulw\1>
deserve credit fOl' their unswerving patriotism. Nowhere else was
the Will' maintained with such resolution. When the struggle
cOlluucncl.'(} the French were already masters by treachery of the
chief fortresses of the land; the force of Spanish regular troops
which lay within its borders was insignificant: there was no recog-
ni7.ed leader, no general of repute, to head. the risillg of the
province. Yet tile attack on the invatlcr:; was deli\'crcd with a
fierceness and a persistent energy that was paralleled in no other
(Iuartcr of the Pcninsula. For six ycars llltU'::.hal after marshal
rav8{,...oo the Catalan valleys, sacked the towns, scattered the pro-
vinciallcvies. But not for one moment did the resistance slncken ;
the invaders could never control It foot of h'tl'ounu be,rond the
narrow space that was swept by the cannon of their strongholds.
The spirit of the nu:e was WI W1Ul"OkcIl in 1813 as in 1808, and
their untiring bUilds still held out ill the hills, ready to strike at
the cnemy when the least chance was o/lcl'Cd. Othcr provinces
had equal 01' greater advantage> than Catalonia for protracted
resistam.'C: lliscay, the Asturias, and Galicia wcre as rugged,
Andalusia far more populous, Valencia mOl'e fertile and wealthy.
But in none of these was the struggle carried on with snch a (:Olll-
bination of energy anti persistence as in the CutalulI hilli. Perhaps
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the greatest testimony that can be quoted in behalf of the people
of that dC\'otcd province is that Napier, bitter critic as he was of
all things Spanish, is forced to say a good word for it. • The
Cal:.alalls,' he writes, 'were vain and superstitious; but their
courage was higher, their patriotism pUl'er, and their ~lforts more
sustained than those of the rest. The 801Ilatenes were bold and
active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and the juntas
apparently disinterested I.' No one but a cmoeful student of Napier
will realize what a handsome testimonial is contained in the some·
what grudging language of this paragraph. ,",Vhat the real eredit
due to the Catalans was, it will now be our duty to display.
It will be remembered that ill the month of February the French
general Duhesme had obtained possession of the citadel and forts
of Thwcelona by a particularl)' impudent aJld shameless strntagem 2.
Since that time he had been lying in the city that he had sei1.ed,
with his whole force concentrated under his hand. Of the 7,000
French and 5,000 Italian troops which composed his corps, all
were with him save a single battalion of detachments which had
been left behind to garl'ison Figueras, the fortress close to the
French frontier, which commands the most import/mt of the three
roads by which the principality of Catalonia mll be entered.
Duhl..'l;llle believed himself to be entirely secure, for of Spanish
regular troops there were barely 6,000 in aU scattered through the
province J, and a. third of these were Swiss men:enaries, who, accord-
ing to the orders of Uonaparle, were to be taken at once into the
French service. That there was any serious dallf,rcr to be feared
fi'om the miqueletes of the mountains neyer entered into the heads
of the Empcror or his lieutenant. Nor does it seem to have
occurred to them that allY insurrection which broke out in Cata·
"in mrioU8 forts
on coast.
"
"
"
"
"
840 strong at Tarrega (near
Lcrida).
Geroua.
Tarragona.
Barcelona.
I Nllpicr, Hi8/0ry of/he Peninsular War, i. 90.
I See pp. 36, 37 of this book.
" They were the following :-
Regiment of Eslrem:ldurn
Regiment of Ultonia 421
Two battalions of Wimpfeu's Swiss Uegiment 2,149
Two brattnlions of Spanish and '\'alloon Guards 1,700
Cavalry Hcgirnent of Boroon 058
Artillery . 300
6,068
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],183 at Port l\JallOll.
],381 "
] ,570 at Palma.
2,121 "
],341 at Port l\Jahon.
] ,267 at Palrllll.
604 "
G80 "
500 "and Portl\Jahou.
lonia might be immediately supported from the Balearic Isles,
where a heavy garrison was always kept, in order to guard against
allY descent of the British to recover their old stronghold of Port
Mahon 1. If Napoleon had realized in Ma)' that the Spanish
rising wa." about to SWC<lp o,'er the whole Peninsula, he would not
have dared to leave Dullesme with such a small force. But per-
sisting in his original blunder of believing that the troubles which
had bl"Okcn out were merely local and sporadic, he was libout to
order Duhesme to make large detachments from a corps that was
already dallb~rously weak.
'111e geography of Catalonia, as we have had occasion to relate
ill an earlier chapter, is mther complicated. Not only is the prin-
cipality cut oft· by its mountains from the rest of Spain-it face."
. towards the sea, while its neighbour Amgon faces towards the
Ehro-but it is divided by its numerous cross-ranges into a number
ot' isolakd valleys, bctwlX'u which communication is very difficull
Its coast-plain along the Mediterranean is generally narrow, and
often cut across by spurs whieh run down from the mOUlltuins of
the inland till they strike the sea. Except on the eastern side
of the principality, where it touches Aragon in the direction of
Lerida, there is no broad c..'i:panse of lcvel ground within its borders:
much the greater part of its surface is upland and mountain.
Catalonia may be divided into fOUl· regions: the first is the
district at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, drained by the .Fluvia
and the Ter. This narrow corner is called the Ampurdam; it
contains all the frontier-fortresses which protect the province on
the side of :Fruncc. Rosas commands the pass along the sen.-shme,
Figueras the main road fmm l}crpignan, which runs some twenty
miles further inland. A little further south both these roads
1 The Spanish garrisons in the Balearic Isles cOllsisted of the following
troops :-
Regiment of Granada (thrce butts.)
Regiment of Soria (three batts.) .
Regiment of Dorbon (three butts.)
S\viSll Regiment of Bcsclmrd (two hatts.)
Light Infuntry of Barcelona., No. 2
" n Aragon, No. 2
Militia Battalion of Majorca •
6th HussaJ'll (Hll8flret &pano/c..)
Artillery
10,647
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meet, and arc blocked by the stl'ong city of Gerona, the capital of
all this region and its most imporLunt stratehrical point. South
of' Gcrona. a cross-range divides the Ampurdam from the coast-
phin of Central Catalonia; the defile through this range is covered
by the small fortified town of Hosmlrich, but there is an alterna-
tive route from GeroUlt to Barcelona along the coast by Blaue.'i
and Arens de Mar. (2) The rh'er-basin of Ccnb'nI Catatonia is
that of the Llobregat, near whose estuary Barcelona stands. Its
lower <.'OUI'SC lies through the level grouud along the coust, but
its upper waters and those of it~ tributaries drain a series of high-
land valleys, diflicult of tl(:CCSl!l and divilkoJ from each other I>y
considerable chains of hills. All these valleys unite at the foot of
the crag of Montsen'at, which, crowned by its monastery, O\'CI'-
looks the plain, and stands sentinel over the approach to the uplMd.
In the mountains behind Montserrat was the main stronghold' of
the Catalan insurrection, whose ra.llying-plaecs were the high.lyill,!(
towns of MallreAA, Cardona, Berga, and Solsona. Only three
praeticable roW cnter the valleys of the Upper Llobrcgat, OIlC
eommunicates by the line of Manresa and Vich with the Ampnr-
dam; a second goes from Manresa via Cervera to Lerida, ami
ultimately to the plains of Aragon; the third is the high-rood
from Barcelona to Manresa, the main line of approach from the
llhorc to the uplnnd, But there is lUlothcr route of high import-
1\]H..'e in this section of Catalonia, that which, sUl.lting from Barce-
lona, avoids the upper valley:>, strikes inland by Igualruln, crosses
the main watershed between the coast and the Ebro valley below
Cervera, and at that place joins the other road from ManreSiL and
the Upper Llobregat, and continues on its way to Lcrida and the
plains of Aragon. This, passing the mountains at the point of
least resistancc, forllls the great trunk-road from Barcelona to
Madrid.
rl1le third region of the principality is the eoastland of Turrlt-
gana, a district cut off from the coastland of Barcelona by a well-
murked cross-ridge, which runs down from the motmtains to the
sea, and reaches the latter near the mouth of the IJobregat. The
COlllllllmiClLtioll between the two ll1aritime districts is by two rond,:,
one passing the cross-ridge by the defile of Ordal, the other
hugging the beach and findillg its way between the hills and thc
water's edge by VilllUlUCVU, de Sitjas. '11.e eoastland of Tarffib'"Om~
is not drained by a single rirer of considerable volume, like the
•i
J
•
•i
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•
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Llobregat, but by a number of small streams such as the Frallcoli
and the Gnya, running parallel to each other and at right angles
to the coast. Each is separated from the next by a linc of hills of
moderate height. 'TIle southern limit of this region is the Ebm,
whose lower course is protected by the strong fortress of 'l'ortosa.
lts main line of internal communication is the great coast~route
from Barcelona to Tllrmgona, and from Tarragona to the mouth of
the Ebro. Its touch with Aragon and Central Spain is maintained
by a good rood from Tarrllf,'Oua by Montblnnch to Lcridn.
The fourth and last region of Catalonia is the inland, which
looks not towards the Mediterranean but to the Ebro and Aragon.
It is drained by the Segrc, all important stream, which after being
joined by its tributaries, the Noguera and the l>allaresa, falls into
the Ebro not far to the south of Lerida. The tracts around that
town are flat and fertile, part of thc. main valley of the Ebl'O. nut
the head~waters of the Segre and its afBuents flow through nB1TOW
and difficult mountain valleys, starting in the highest and wildest
region of the Pyreneeii. They are very inaccessible, and served by
no roads snitabJe for the nse of an army. Hence, like the upper
valley of the Llobreh"tl.t, they sen't.'t1 as places of rcfuh'C for the
Catalan insurgents when Lerida and the flat country had been lost.
The only place of importancc in these highlands is the remote
town of Seu d' Urgel J, a mediaeval fortress near the sources of the
Segre, approached by mule-paths only, and quitc lost in thc hills.
Catalonia, then, is pre-eminently a mountain land, and one
presenting special diffictllties to an invader, becausc it has no
central system of roads or valleys, but is divided into so many
heterogeneous parts. Though not fertile, it was yet rich, and
fairly well peopled when compared with other regions of Spain~.
Its wealth came not fmlll agriculture but from commerce and
manufactures. Barcelona, a city of 180,000 souls, was the !,rreatest
Mediterranean port of Spain: on each side of it, along the coast,
are dozens of large fishing-villages and slllall harbour-towns, draw-
ing their living from the sea. Of the places which lay farther bttck
from the water thcre were many which madc an ample profit from
1 Urgel is more accessible from France than from Spain. The easiest path
to it is that which, st.a.rting from Mont-wuis, crosses the Spauisll frontier at
Puycerda, anti follows the lU:l."\iI-waler of the Segrc to the foot of the hill on
which the Seu stands.
I The population of the Prillcipality in 1803 was 3<58,000 souls.
OllAN. f ;r;:
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their manufactures, for Catalonia was, and still remains, the work-
shop of Spain. It is the only province of the kingdom where the
inhabitants have developed industries on a large scale: its textile
produt.'ts were especially successful, and supplied the whole Pen-
immla.
.More thull any other part of Spain, Catalonia had suffered from
the war with England and the ContinentAl System. The closure
of its ports hnd told cruelly upon its merchants and manufacturers,
who were full)' aware that their sufterings were the logical con-
sequence of the French alliance. They had, moreover, a' historic
grudge against France: after encouraging them to revolt in the
seventeenth century, the Bourbons had then abandoned them to
the mercies of the lGng of the Castilians. In the great war of the
Spanish Succession, Catalonia had taken sides against France and
Don Philip, and had proclaimed Charles of AlIsh·ia its king-not
because it loved him, but because it hated the French claimant.
Even after the Peace of Utrecht the Catala.ns hnd refused to lay
down their arms, and had made a last desperate struggle for pro-
vincial independence. It was in these wars that their miguektes I
had first made their name famous by their stubborn fighting.
These bands were a levy en mQsse of the population of military
age, armed and paid by their parishes, not by the central govern-
mcnt, which could be called out whene\"cl' the principll1ity was
threatened with invasion, }'l'om their liability to turn out when-
ever the alarm-bell (somatcn) 'I'M rung, they were also known as
somatenes. The system of the Quinta and the militia ballot, which
prevailed in the provinces UDder thc crown of Castile, had never
been applied to the Cataluns, who gloried in the survival of their
ancient military <''llstoms. The somatenu had been called out in
the French war of 1793-5, and had done good. service in it,
distinguishing themselves far more than the troops of' the line
which fought on the frontier of the Eastern Pyrenees. The
memories of that struggle were still fresh among them, lInd mll:ny
of the leaders who had WOIl u. name in it were still fit for service.
In Catalonia then, more than in an~' other comeI' of Spain,
there were all the materinls at hand for a vigorous popular insur-
rection, even though the body of regular troops in the principality
1 So called from Miquelot de Prets, the Cntalan c01Utotliere who 8ervcd
under Caesar Borgia. From him the light infantry, once called almogavara,
got the name of mique/etu.
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was insignificnnt. The Catalans rose to defend their provincial
independence, and to recover their capital, which had been seized
so shamelessly by the trickery of Duhesme. They did not <.'OIl(.'CCll
themselves much willl what was goil,lg on in Aragon and Valencia,
or evcll in Madrid. 111eir fight with the invader forms an episode
complete in itself, 11 sort of undcrplot in the great drama of the.
Peninsular'Var, which only touches the main struggle at infrequent
inten'o.ls. It was not affected by the campaigns of Castile, still1css
had it any noticeable influence on them. It would be equally
possible to write the! history of the war ill Cntulollia as a sePtlrtl.te
treatise, or to compile a gelleral history of the war ill which
Cntulollia was barely mentioned.
~'hen the echoes of the cannon of the second of May went rolling
round Spain, they stirred up Catalonia no less than the other
provinces which lie at a distance from the capital. The phenomena
which appeared in the South and the ''Vest were repeated here, in
much the same sequence, and at much the same dates, as elsewhere.
But the rising of the Catalaus wus greatly handicapped by the fuct
that their populous and wealthy capital was occupied by l~,OOO
French troops. Barcelona could not set the example to the smaller
places, and for some time the outburst was spasmodic and local.
'11le chief focus of rebellion was Lerida, where an insurrectionary
Junta was formed on May ~9. At Tortosa the populace rose
a few days later, and murdered the military governor, Santiago
de GuzmBn, because hc had been slow and reluctant to place him-
self at their head. On June 2 Manresa, in the upper valley of the
Llobregat, followed their example, and from it the flame of insur-
rection sprend all over the central upland. In lla.rcelona itself
there were secret meetings, and suspicious gatherings in the streets,
on which ])llhesme had to keep a watchful e)'e. But the main
preoccupation of the French ~llera1 WIlS that there were still
several thousand Spanish troops in the town, who might easily
lead the populace in an erneute. He had got rid of one regiment,
that of Estremadum, in May: he gave it orders to march to
Lcrida, whcre the magistraks and peoplc refuSt,."Cl to rc<:civc it
within their walls, dreading that it might not be ready to join ill
their projected rising. This wus 0. vain fear, for the corps rcadily
took its part in the insurrection, and marcbed to join Palafox at
Saragossa. But therc still remained in Barcelona 0. battalion each
of the Spanish and the Walloon Guards, and the cavalry regiment
x2
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of Borbon, some ~,500 men in all. To Duhesme's intense satis-
faction, these troops, instead of keeping together and attacking
the French garrison when the llews of the revolt reached them,
began to desert in small parties. Far f!'Om attempting to compel
them to stay by their colonrs, Duhesme winked at their evasion,
and took no notice of their proceedings, even when a whole squadron
ot'the llorbon Regiment rode off" with trumpets sOIUlding and its
officers at its head. ,"Vithin a few days the greater part of the
Spanish troops had vanished, and when Duhesme was directed by
his master to disarm them, there were very few left for him to deal
with. These scattered remlJants of the Guard Regiments drifted
in small bands all over Catalonia, some were found at Gerona, others
at 'l'arragona, others at Rosus. Nearly 400 went to Al'llgoll tllld
fought under Palafox: at Epila: another considerable body joined
the Valencian insurgent.'> 1. But thcse two strong veteran battalions
never were united again, or made to serve as a nucleus for the
Catalan levies z.
Saved from the peril of a rising of the Spanish regiments in
Barcelona, Duhesme had still the insurrection of the province on
his hands. But he was not left free to deal with it £lceordillg to
his own inspirations. By the last dispatch from Napoleon which
reached him before the communieations with Madrid and Bayollne
wefC cut, a plan of campaign was dictated to him. The Emperor
ordered him to chastise the insurgents of Lerida and Manresa,
without ceasing to keep a stl'Ong grip on Barcelona, and on the
line of touch with France through Figueras. But, as if this was
not enough to occupy his small army of 12,000 or 13,000 men,
he was to provide two strong detachments, one of which was to
co-opcrnte with Moncey in Valencia, and the other with Lcfebvre-
Desnouettes in Ar~l'f'Qn. A glance at the Emperor's instructions
is enough to show how entirely he had misconceived the situation,
and how thoroughly he had failed to realize that all Spain was up
III anns. The first detachment, 4,000 strong, was to march on
Ledda, and to enter Aragon along the line of the Ebro. It was then
1 There were 400 Spnuigll Guarus at the fight all the Cubrillns, ""ho must
have come from the battaliOll at Baree1ona.
i I cannot make out the movements of the cavalry regiment of Dorbon; it
was certainly a~ Barcelona, 000 9trollg, in MII}'. But in July it hnd got
uown to Andalusia, and was marching with a gtrength of 401 in the arm)' or
Castaiiog.
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to move 011 Saragossa to join Lefcbvre. The second detachment,
also 4,000 strong, was to move on Valencia via. Tortosa, join
Marshal Mance)', and finally occupy the great JUl.."a! arsenal of
Cartagena. ·With the 5,000 men that remained Duhcsrne was to
hold do~'n Darcelona and Central Catalonia., while keeping open
the line of communications with Figueras anu Perpignan.
Either Dllhcsme was as blind to the real state of affairs as his
master, or he considered that unquestioning obedience Wi!.8 his
first duty. He told off the two columns as directed, only cutting
down their strength a little, so as not wholly to ungarnish Barcelona.
For the Valencian expedition he told off' General Chabrnn, with
the best brigade in his army, three- veteran French battalions of
the 7th and 16th of the line I, With. this force he sent his single
brigade of French ClLvalry, two regiments under General Bcssicres
(the brother of the Duke of lstria). The whole amounted to 2,500
foot and 600 horse. For the attack on Lcl'ida, he had to send out
troops of more doubtful value-all foreigners, for there were no
more French to be spared. General Schwartz was gi\'cn onc Swiss,
two Neapolitan, and one Italian battalion', with no more than
a single squadron of etl\'alry, for his IDlU'Ch was to lie over a vcry
I This force was Goulas's Brigade of Cltabran'g Division, viz. :-
7tll of tlll) Line (1st and 2nd battll.) . 1,78ii
16th tJ (3rd batt.) 780
-- 2,574
a.nd llessieres' Cavalry :
3rd Provisional Cuirassicrs (minus one
squadron) 205
3rd Provisional Chasseurs 416
with ciglit guns.
, Schl'l'artz's force was:-
2nd Swiss (3rd batt.) 580
16t Neapolit.1.ns (1st IInd 2nd batts.) . 1,944
1st It-lliau VeJitu(1st hatt.) ,,19
One squadron of the 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers
621
3,043
204
3,190
3,247
with four guns.
(Thnt the deta.ched squadron "'ere euirnssiers is provoo by A~he, ii. 86. The
French authorities do not give the regiment.]
Foy makes the odd mistake of saying < trois bataillons du deuxieme Suisse,'
instead. of' le troisicme loitta.i11on dll deuxicme Suissc.' 'I1lere was only one
battalion of this regiment with Duhesme.
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mountainous country. His whole force was 3.200 strong. To
the general directions given by Napoleon, Duhesme added some
supplementary orders of his O....T1. Chabran WtUl to pass by Tarra·
gona, leave a battalion in its citadel, and take Wl a compensation
the two battalions of 'Vimpfcn's Swiss Regiment, which was to be
incorporated in the French army. It was e.'l:pectcd that he would
get into touch with l\Iarshal Moncey when he should rcuch Castellon
de la Plana. Schwarl7" on the other hand, was told to march by the
mountain road leading to Manrcsa, in order to punish the inhabit-
ants of that town for their rebellion. He was to fine them 750,000
francs, and to dcstl'O)' a powder-mill which the)' possessed. He was
then to march on Leridn, from which he was to evict the insurrec-
tionary· Junta: the city was to pay a heavy war-contributioll, Rnd
to receive a garrison of 500 men.. With the rest of his brigade
Schwartz was to join the French forces before Saragossa, not later
thau June 19.
Schwartz started fmm Ban·doua on June 4: a tempest forced
him to wait for a day at Martorel, in the coast-plain, but on the
sixth he reached the pass of Bruch, at whose foot the roads from
19ualada and from Manrcsa join. HCl'C he met with opposition:
the news of his approach had spread all up the valley of the
Llobregat, and the 80matellea of the upland towns were hurrying
forward to hold the defile by which the high-road from Barcelona
climbs into the upper country. At the moment when the invaders,
marching in themost careless fashion, were making their Wll.y uplthc
hill, only thc lcvy of l\Ianresa was in position. They were a mel"C
handful, 300 or 400 at most, and many were destitute of muskets.
But from the cover of a pine-wood they boldly opened fire upon the
head of Schwartz's column. Surprised to find himself attacked,
the French general deployed a battalion and drove the $omatenes
out of thcir position: they retired in grcnt disorder up the hill
towards Manresa. Schwartz followed them with caution, under
the idea that they must be the vanguard of a larger force, and that
there were probably regular troops in support, further along the
defile. In this he was wrong, bllt the retreating Manresans
received reinforcements a few miles behind the place of the first
skirmish. They were joined by the levies of San Pedor and other
villages of the Upper Llobregat, marching forward to the sound of
the single drum that was to be found in the upland. The peasants
ensconced themselves ill the rocks and bushes all either side of the
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road, and again offered battle. Schwartz took their opposition
much too seriously, extended a long front of tirailleurs against
them, but did not push his attack home. 'Soon other bands of
somatelles from the direction of Tgualada began to gather round
his left flank, and it seemed to him that he would soon be surrounded
l\nd cut oj}' from his line of communications with Barcelona. His
regimenb were raw and not of the best quality: the Neapolitans
who composed more than hnlf his force passed, and with reason, 8.S
the worst troops in Europe. He himself was a cavalry officer who
l;ad ncver hcld independent command before, and was wholly
unversed in mountain warfare. Reflecting that the afternoon wa'l
far spent, that he was still twelve miles from Mam-esa, and that the
whole country·side was on the move against him, he resolved to
abandon his expedition, Instead of hurling his four battalions
lIpon the 8Omawnea, who must have been scattered to the winds
if attacked by such superior numbers, he dre\\' back, fonned his
men in a great square, with the cavalry and guns in the middle,
and began a retreat across the more open parts of the defile. The
Spaniards followed, pressing in the screen of tirailleurs by which
the square was covcred, and taking easy shots into the solid mass
behind them. After six miles of marching under fire, Schwanz's
Swiss and Italians were growing somewhat demoralized, for nothiJlg
could be more harassing to raw and unwilling troops than such
I.!- retreat. At last they found their way blockcd by thc village of
Esparraguera, where the inhabitants barricaded the streets' and
opcned a hot fire ..upon the front face of the squnce. Seeing his
men hesitate and break their ranks, Schwartz hastily bade them
scatter right and left and pass round thc village without attempt-
ing to storm it. This device suceceded, but when the two halves
of the column reunited beyond Esparraguera, they were in such
diwrder that there was no means of stopping them, The whole
streamed into Martorcl in a confused mass at nightfall, after
a retreat whose incidents remind the military reader, in every
detail, of the rout of the British troops in the march to Le..xinglon,
on the (irst day of the old American ,Var of 1775_
""hen he reached the plains Schwartz was able to retire unharmed
to Burcclona, having saved three of his four guns 1 and lost no very
1 One gun was loot after leaving Esparraguera by the fall of 0. rickety
bridge o\-er the Abrera (Arteche, ii. 93, 04). Foy and other French narrato:a
do not mention this lC/Sil,
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larf,"e proportion of his men. But he had suffered the disgrace of
being worsted by inferior numbers of undisciplined peasantry, find
brought his troops back in tl. state of demoralization, which was
vcry disoouragillg to the rest of the garrison of the Cataloniall
ropital. Duhcsmc, instead of taking him to tusk, fully approved
of his retreat, on the ground that if he hnd pushed on for Manresa
and Lcridn. he would probably have lost his whole brigade.
U.eaLizing at last the true strength of the insurrection, and leanl-
ing that the somaten was sounding in c\'cry village, and that the
peasantry 'yete flocking together in thousands, Duhesme deter-
mined to COD<...cntrate his whole force, and l;ellt oroCl'S to Chabran
to abandon his VaJencian expedition and return at once to Barce-
lona. He was probably quite right in his resoh'c, though Chuhran's
retreat was the determining fact that ruined Moncey's campaign
in the provim..e south of the Ebro. '111e Emperor had sketched
out the whole plan of operations on false premises, and when the
new military situation had de\'clopcd itself, it would have been
absurd for his lieutenants to carry out his original orders in blind
and servile obedience.
Chabrnn's column had reached Ta.rrttgoua when it received
Duhesme's letters of recall. It had started on June 4, and
found the coastland still quiet, Ule insurrection not having yet
spread downwards from the hills. On arrh'ing at Tarragona
Chabran took possession of 14e citadel, and issued ordcrs to the
two battalions of Whnpfen's Swiss Regiment, which formed the
garrison of the place, to prepare to march with him against
Valencia. The Swiss officers showed no alacrity in falling in with
this plan. They were not animated by the patriotic fury' which had
carried away the rest of the Spanish regular troops into the in-
surgent camp. On the other hand they felt no enthusiasm at the
idea of joining the French in an attack on their late employers.
They were deferring obedience to the orders of the l<'rench general
on various futile pleas, when the news of Schwarlz's defeat at
Druc.b rellChed Tarragona. Directed to return in baste and to
rejoin Duhesmc, General Chabran marched off on June 9, leaving
Wimpfen's mercenaries behind: they would not follow him, and
dl..'Clart.'d in favour of the insul'gent Junta at Lerida the moment
that his back was turned. The retreating French column had to
brush aside severnl considerable bands of IJQmaienes, which tried
to arrest its progress, fol' the coastland had taken anus after the
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combat of Bruch, and its levies hoped to treat Chabrall as their
compatriots of the upland had treated Schwartz. But the three
veteran French battalions were of tougher material than the
Neapolitans and Italians who had been routed Oil the sixth, and
successfully cut their way back to Barcelona. They were aided by
the unwisdom of the insurgents, who, instead of trying to defend
the difficult defile of Ordal, CIlme down into the plain. ·When they
attacked Chabran at Vendrell and Arbos, they were charged by his
cavalry and scattered to the winds with heavy loss. The l:rcnch,
when the actions were over, sacked with every circulIlstance of
brutality all the villages which lay along their path 1. On .June 11
they got iuto touch .with Duhesme's outposts, and on the twelfth
re-entered Uarcelona.
111c whole of the' Army of the Eastern Pyrenees' was now re-
united under it<; comlllll.ndcr's hand, and Duhcsmc thought himself
strong enough to punish the peasantry of the Upper IJobregat
for their ,'ictory at Bruch, On the fourteenth Chabran, with his
own brigade and the Swiss and Italians of Schwartz, marched from
Martorel to assault onl,.'(! more the pass which tile lIplanders had
defended so well eight days before, But the woods and rocks of
Bruch were now manned by many thousands of 80'1/ultenea: 0,11
Central Catalonia had sent it<; levies thither, and they wcre sup-
ported by 400 regulars flXm} Lcrida and four pieces of artillery.
After feeling the position, and directing against it at least one
serious uttack, Chabran drew back !Uld refused to press on
the action-apparently influenced by the manifest reluctance of
Schwartz's troops to advancc, no less than by thc strength of the
ground. After losing nearly 400 men he retired to the plain and
marched back to Bart:clont\. [June 15].
Duhesme had a more pressing business in hand tllaD the
chastisement of the mOlmtaincers of the Upper Llobregat. He
had now learnt, by the fact that couriers from Francc had ceased
to arrive, that his communications with Figueras and Upper Cilta.
lonia llll.d bt..'Cll cut, and it was absolutely necessary that they
should be reopened. This was to prove a harder task than he
imagined: tJle 8omateru:s were now up in every valley as far as
the French frontier; they had driven into the citadel of l?iguerns
the weak battalion of detachments that had been left to hold that
I For details see Arteche, ii. 98, re, 31l\1 Foy, iI'. 160, who adds that Arbos
, rut pill~ et rtduit en cClJtlrcs, oonformtmeJll alU' Ulf.lgefl de la !)Ilerre' Cl)
2,133
2,163
1,.517
150 I
-- 5,003
740
'87
BOG
Artillerpnen for eight guns
Cal'alry :
3rd Provisional Cuirassicrs 400
3rd " Chasseurg 416
Italian OIul,6eur,a OhetiaJ 5\).l
2nd Neapolitan " 388
(Minus oue squadron left at Han;elonll, sny 200)
Brigaue of Schwartz :
1st Neapolitans (1st and 2nd batts.). 1,944
1st Italian Velitu (1st b-'1tt.) li19
(Minus 300 men lort in the actions ut
Druch on June 6 and 14)
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town, and some of the bolder spirits were feeling their way
through the Pjtrenean I'Cl'CSSes to commencc raids on Roussillon.
Such alann was felt at Perpignan that the general commanding
the district had begun to call out the national guards, for he hud
Q.O regulars at his disposal save a few hundred men of details
and detachments, who were waiting to go forward to join their
regimc':lts in Duhesmc's corps. But all this was unknown at
Barcelona, and it was with very little conccption of the difficulties
hefore him that Duhcsme resolved to march on Gerona and reopen
the main road to France. He told off for tills sen'k-e onc half
of the infantry battalions which composed his arm)'-the Italian
division of Lecchi, consisting of the brigades of Schwll.rtz and of
Milosewitz, the latter of which had hitherto remained in garrison
at Bmx:clona, and had not taken part in the futile attacks on the
defile of llruch. He also took with him nearly the whole of his
cavalry. four French and-three Italian squadrons of cuirassicrs and
chassellfs, and a battery of eight gnns, This gave'him a formidable
force of 5,900 men 1, about half of the total strength of his corps
when the 10$.,>€S suffered at Brucll and elsewhere are deducted,
Duhesme had resolved to march on Gerona by the comparatively
eas)' road along the sea-coast, rather than by the alternative route
which passes further inland by the valley of the Besos and the
town of Hostalrich. Even in the lowland, however, he found the
80Hln.tcnes prepared to oppose him. At the castle of Mongat,
1 Brigalle of Miloscwib :
2nd Italian Line (2nd \mtt.)
4th " (3rd batt,)
lith " (2n(1 b-'1u.)
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only six miles outside Barcelona, he met the first swarm 8,000 or
9,000 strong. They had procured a few guns, which they had
mOWlted so as to sweep the road, llnd lay in disorderly masses
along the crest of a rising ground. Duhesme, amusing them in
front by a false attack, sent a strong column to tUl'fl their right
flank: seeing themselves likely to be enveloped, the peasants fled
after a short skirmish, in which they suffered eon.siderable loss.
Pushing ommrd, Duhesme alTi"ed that same afternoon at the
large open town of Mataro, a pl&:e of ~O.OOO souls given over to
the manufacture of glass and cotton goods. The populace had
hastily barricaded the outlets of the streets with carts Ilud piles
of furniture, and discharged two or th~ cannon ~"'8.inst the
approaching enemy. But Miloscwitz's Italian brignde easily burst
through the feeble defences and took Mataro by storm. Its
attempt at resistanee was considered by Duhcsme to justify its"
sack, and he granted the plunder of the town to his men, who
only moved on the next day after Iltwing thoroughly robbed every
dwelling of its portable goods and murdered a considerable number
of the inhabitanta. The French army of Catalonia was the most
motley and undisciplined force of all the imperial hosts in Spain,
and for that reason it wos by far the most cruel and bmtnl in its
behaviour to the natives, who had not as yet justified any such
treatment by their manner of condncting the war. Any ferocity
which they showed from lIiis time onward was a well-dI:.'Sen'cd
revenge for what they had suffered.
Leaving Maturo on the eighteenth, Duhesme arrived before
Gerona on the twentieth, after burning most of the villages on
the road, in revenge for the constant molestation which he sullcred
from the 801natenea. He found the city placed in a state of
defence, so far as was possible in the case of an old~fashioned
fortress called upon to stand a siege at ten clap' notice. There
was a small regular garrison, the Irish regiment of Vltonin, under
its two lieutenant-colonels, O'Donovan and O'Daly: but this corps
only counted 350 bayonets. In addition there were a few trained
artillerymen, and the armed citizells of tile town, not more th~n
!2,OOO in aU, for Gerona. had but 14,000 inhabitants. The place
lies on either side of the small stream of the Onn, just above its
confluence with the river Ter. On the south bank is the main
part of the town, strll.e"'gling up the side of n steep hill, which is
crowned at its enstel1l end by an ancient citadel, knowll (like those
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of several other Catalonian towns) by the name of Monjuich.
Further westward, along the crest of this hill, lie three other Cam,
those of the Constable, Queen Anne, and the Capuchins. These,like
the citadel, are detached works, not connected by any line of wall
hut only by u ditch. TIle town, which is completely commanded
by the four forts, has no protection on the south side of the Qna
but a mediaeval wall, destitute of a ditch and not morc than
twenty fect high. But on the other side of the river, the northeMl
suburb, known us the Mcrcada~ having no liue of outlying heights
to protect it, had been fortified in the style of Vauban with a
regular front of five bastions, though, like the fortifications of the
city, it was without a ditch.
Duhcsmc had 110 huttering-train, and his force of 5,900 men
was insufficient to invest the whole circumference of the city of
Gcrontl and its forts. But, like Monccy before Valencia, he was
resolved to make an attempt to storm the city by escalade, or by
battering in its gates. He left alone the citadel and the line of
works on the hill, only sending a single battalion to demonstrate
against the fort of the Cnpuchins. His rcnJ. attack was directed
against the sole point where the old enceinte of the city is not
fully protected by the forts, the gate of the Carmen, on the very
brink of the QI1a. In no ver)' honourable spirit, he sent in one
of his aides-de-CAmp, with a white flag, to demand the surrender
of Gerona, and while that officer was conferring with the' governor
and the local Junta, suddenly launched his column of assault
against the f,"ilte, hoping to catch the Spaniards off their guard.
The attack was a failure: the heavy guns from the forts above
silenced the French field-artillery which tried to batter in the
gate. Then Duhesme sent fonvard a storming party, with artillery·
men at its head bearing petards with which to blow open the
cntmnce: but the heavy musketry-fire from the walls laid low
the head of the column, and the rest swcrved, and fell back to
get under cover. A feeble demonstration beyond the Olia against
the bastioJls of Santa Clartl. and Sail Francisco had not even the
desired effect of distracting the attention of the defenders of the
Cannen Gate.
Seeing his attack foiled, Duhesme sent in at dusk a second flag
of truce, inviting the JUllta of GCl'ona to send out deputies to
confer with him 011 certain points which he was desirous of sub-
mitting to thcm. The Catalans were simple enough to comply
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with his offer: they would have been wiser to avoid all negotiations
with such an enemy. For tIus parley was only intended to cover
a second assault. Seeing that he could not hope to batter his
way into the place by means of his light field-artillery, Duhesmc
was preparing a greAt esca.ladc under cover of the night. The
point which he chose for it was the bastion of Santa Clara, Oil
the centl'e of the low front of the Mcrcadal, beyond the 01111.. He
colled.ed a quantity of ladders from the neighbouring villages,
U1\d told ofI' f01' the nssnult the three battnlious of' the brigade of
Schwartz.
At ten o'clock 1 the Italians crept up beneath the ramparts,
where the citizens on guanJ. do not seem to have kept a good look
out, and delivcT<:!(1 their attack. But these raw troops, moving in
the darkness, made many mistakes: the chief one was that many
of the ladder-party went llStrny among the water-courses and field-
walls, so that the pl'ovision of ladders proved insufficient. The
garrison of the bastion, however, had been ttLken completely by
surprise, and allowed the head of the column to cscalaile the
twenty-foot wall with no more hindrance than a few musket-shots.
The Neapolitan Colonel Ambrosio and the leading files had actually
mounted, and driven back the citizens to the gorge of the bastion,
when there urrived reinforcements, 1\ company of the Regiment
of lTItonia, which charged with the bayonet, drm'e the Italians
back, lLnd hurled them over the rampart. An Irish lieutenant,
Thomas Magrath, and l.\ Carmelite friar seized and overturned the
ladders, at the cost of the life of the former. When the garrison
began firing down into the mass of assailants crowded at the foot
of the wall, and the neighbouring bastion commenced to discharge
it flanking fire of artillery, the Italians broke Rnd fl(.--o.. A set.'Oud
attempt at an escalade, made two hours later at another bastion,
failed even more lamentably, for the garrison were on the alert
and detected the assailants before they drew near the walls.
Convinced that he was too weak to take Gerolla without siege-
artillery, Duhesme broke up his camp and fled under cover of the
'light, marking his retrent by EL third insincere attempt to open
1 Napier sa)'!! that the assault W!IS delivered at seven in the evening, before
dark (i. 79); but all th~ Spanish aC(ounUo speak of it a8 having taken place
loug after dark, though before rnidnigllt (cf. Art.ecl16, Toreflo, and l\Iiuali,
quoted by the former); so does Foy (iv. 168), who fixes the hour as' between
nine and ten.'
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negotiations with the garrison. He hastily made off by the same
road by which be had come, and returned to Barcelona by forced
marches, drOppillg on the way one of his Italian brigades at
Mataro [June 24]. In the whole expedition he had lost 700 men I.
SO ended the first attempt on Gerona, to the great credit of its
gnllant defenders, and more espeeiully to that of the wCllk Irish
regiment which had borne the brunt of the fighting, Duhesme's
whole campaign bore a singular resemblance to that which Moncey
was making at the same moment in Valencia, and, like it, ,~as
wrecked ·on the initial blunder of supposing that Spanish towns,
defended by a population ill a high state of patriotic enthusiasm,
eould be Clll'ried by escalade without any proper preparation by
artillery. French genemls soon got to know .their adversaries
better: the same levies that could be easily scattert.'<1 in the open
field were formidable under c(H"er of stone walls.
On returning to Dal'Celona, Duhcsmc found that the insurgents
of Central Catalonia had dmwn close to the capital in his absence.
Eight or ten thousand $omatclle$ had come down to the line of
the Llobregat, had broken it.<; bridges, had entrenched themselves·
opposite its fords, and were preparing to blockade Barcelona.
~'hey had brought up a considerable numbel' of guns taken from
the batteries On the cOilSt, which had so long kept watch upon the
English. But of regular troops there were only 0. few prcsent-
a mixed body of 400 men from Lerida, and some small remnants
of the old Spanish garri~n of Barcelona. The command seems
to have becn held by Jiliul Bllhret, a ·lawyer of Lerida, who had
been named colonel of miiJueletes by the Junta of his native town.
Duhesme was detcrmined not to be deprived ofhis hold on the coast-
plain by this tumultuaryarnlY. On the thirtieth he sallied out
from :Barcelona with Goulns's French brigade and three of Lccchi's
ltalian battalions, accompanied by the cuirassiers of Bessieres.
Though the line of the Llobregat is marked by stcep banks, and
though a considerable number of guns were mounted behind it,
the position was too long and too much exposed to be capable
of defence by undisciplined bands of mountaineers. While the
Italians lllena.ced its front, Goulns and Bcssicrcs fordcd thc river
and turned the flank of the Catall1ns. Chased out from the villages
I Yet bc llllll tllC Il1anlillOoo:1tn write to t]lC Emperor that {after solne slight
skirmishing, he did not think it worth while to make a serious attack on
Geroila.· (Nap. Corre8p., :xvii. 34(7).
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of San Boy and Molins de lle)' by a sweeping charge, they were
pursued across the plain, stripped of all their artillery, and forced
to take refngc in their old positions along the edge oHhe mountains
of Montserrat, after losing a considerable llumher of men.
Less successful was another stroke against the insurgents which
Duhesme endeavoured to deal five days later. General Chabmn,
with the Italian brigade that had been left ut l\Io.taro, a regiment
of French cavalry and a field-battery, moved out to clear the hills
o,l)O\·c the coast, and to sweep the valley of the lksos. He had
before him the 80matenes of the regions about Vich, Hostalrich,
and Santa Colomn, under Francisco l\1ilru.1S, a hulf-pay lieutenant·
colonel, who had been placed at their head by the local Junta.
Chubran {arecd his way for some distance inlund till he reached
Grallollers, always harassed but never seriously attacked by the
insurgents. Milans, who showed nil through his career a real
genius for guerilla warfare. had ordered his levies never to stand
>I'hen pressed, but to hang about the cncmy's linc of march, cut off
his pickets and scouting parties, and fall upon the baggage-train
which h'ailed at the real' of his column. These tactics wcre
perfectly suc{:essful: having reached Granollers after a most toil-
some march, ChabrallrcfuM:d to push furthcr among the mountains,
turned back, and retreated to Mataro, accompanied "home by the
8Omat<mcs, who pursued him to the very outskirts of the town, and
cut off' his stragglers and mally of his baoagage animnls [July 4].
The moment that the Catalan insurrection gloew serious, Duhesme
had sent repeated appeals for help to the Emperor: the land route
to Pcrpignall being cut, he had to use smnll vessels which put out
to sea at night, risked capture by the English ships lying off the
coast, and when fortunate reached the harbours of ColJioure or
Pori-Vendres, just beyond the Pyrenees. Napoleon looked upon
the Catalonian war as a. very small matter, but he was fully resolved
that Duh~llle must be succoured. Accordingly he determined to
concentrate a division at Perpignall, but he refused to allot to
it ally of his veteran French troops. He swept together from the
Southern Alps and Piedmont a most heterogeneous body of 7',000
or 8,000 men, even worse ill quality than the motley a.rmy which
he had entrusted to Duhesme, The command was entrusted to
a capable oflicer, General Ueille, onc of the Emperor's aides-de-
camp, who was told to a.dvance and relieve Figueras, aftcr which
he was to stretch out his hand to Duhcsme, who would push
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northward to meet him. His improvised army consisted of two
battalions of" rccruits just levied in the lately anne.'i:ed duchy of
Tuscany, and l"onstituting the nucleus of a new regiment with the
number 113, of a battalion of national gnards, !lome mobilized
gendarmerie, n batWioll of thc 'Legion of Reservc of the Alps'
from Grenoble, five •battalions of det:a.chments,' and the single
battalion which formed the (,"ontingent of the little republic of
the Valais I. The cavalry comprised two squadrons of 1'uscan
dl'Ue<:rOOus, and two eacad'l'OI/8 de lIIarcll,e of French cuil'V.'>siers and
chasseurs. There seem to have been no more than two batteries of
artillery allotted to the fOl'{:e 2. Reille was informed that othcr
troops from Italy would ultimately arrive at Perpigllan, but that
they wcre not to be expected till the end of July or the beginning
of August. .For the relief of :Piglleras and the opening up of
communications with Duhcsme he must depend on his ovm forces.
Travelling with commendable rapidity, Reille arrived at Per-
pignnn on July 3. Of ull the detachments that were marching
to join him he fOWld that nothing had yet· reached the frontier
but the local national guards and f:,"Cndarmerie, the two Tuscan
840
1,300
'60
500
000
260
300
200
840
1,100
840
840
I The Valais was a republic Crom 1002 till 1010, when it was annexed to
t11e Empire, as the 'department oC the Simplon.'
I From Nap. Crnrup., 14,O'J2, 14,150, 14,161, Bnd 14,168, we get the COIll-
position oCthis Corce. They account for the following :
Two batb>. oC the 113th (TlISC"loll!l)
National Guarilil oC the P)"rcllces Orientales
let l'rovisional.Battalion of Perpign3n (companies Crom the
depOts of the 1st, 5th, 24th, G2nd oC the Line, and 16th
and 22ml Le-ger)
2nd Provisional.Battalion, similarly formed Crom the Z3rd,
60th, 79th, Olst oC the Line, and the 8th and 10th
Uger
A mb:ed battalion oC the 10th and 32nd French and 2nd Swiss
Another from the 7th and 1l3rd of the Line.
.o\uotl'er CrolO the 2wJ, 66tll, and 37th oC the T.ine
One battalion oC the '5th Legion oC Resel."Ve' from Gren-
able.
Battalion oC dIe Valais
Two squadrons of TUSCfin Dragoons
Two flCiJdrong de marcM (French)
Two batteries oC artfllery
8,370
There were also nine companies of gcmlarmerie aod ' departmental rcscn-cs-'
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battalions, a company of the 2nd Swiss Regiment, and artillerymen
enough to serve a couple of gUlls. ,"Vith DO more than the Tuscans
and the Swiss, less than 1,600 men in all, he marched on Figueras
on July 5, dispersing on the way some bands of somatenClf, who tried
to oppose him at the passage of the Muga. He threw a convoy
hito the place and strengthcnoo its garrison, but L"Quld do no morc,
for all the country beyond Figueras was up in arms, and his raw
Italian recruits could hanlly be kept to their colours. Indeed he
was forced to make them march in solid columns whene....er he
moved them, for when ordered to deploy they always fell into
disorder, and tried to make oft' to the rear 1.
But by July II lleille had begun to receive many of the drafts
and detachments which the Emperor was pouring into Perpignan,
and having now three or four thousand men disposable, he resolved
to strike a blow at Rosas, the small seaport town which blocks the
coast-road from Perpignall to Barcelona. Marching through the
plains of the Ampurdam he reached his objeeth'e, an insignificant
place with a dilapidated onter entrenchment and a citadel of some
slllall strcngth. It was defcndl.u by no morc than 400 mUjueletes,
Md had but five guns on its land-front But the little garrison
showed a bold face, and when Reille proeceded to invest IWsus he
found himself attacked from the rear by four or five thousand
8Qmalellel levied by Don Juan Claros, a retired infantry captain
who had called to arms the peasantry of the coast. They beset
the besiegers so fiercely that Ueille resolved to abandon the invest·
ment, a determination which was assisted by the sight of a British
lille-of-n.'\ttle ship 2 landing marines to strengthen the gurrison.
Accordingly he cut his way back to Figucras on the twelfth,
harassed all the way by the bands of Claros, who killed or took
no less than ~oo of his mcn s. Rosas was to defy eaplurc for some
months more, for Reille's next cffort was. by his master's direction,
devoted to a morc important objl.oct-thc clearing of the great road
from Perpigllan to Barcelona, and the opening up ofcommunications
with Duhesme.
I Foy, iv. 16.5,166.
OilA"'·. I
I The Mrmtague. 0{74 guns, Captain R. w. OtIVa.y.
I For, iv. l60.
y
SECTION V: CHAPTER II
THE STRUGGLE IN CATAf,()NIA (JULY-AUGUST, 1808):
THE SECOND SIEGE OF GERONA
FOR the first six weeks of the war in Catalonia Duhesme and
Rcillc had been opposed only by the gallant 3Omate7ltIJ. or the
handful of regular troops who had been stationed in the princi-
pality when the insurrection broke out, the greater purt Imd
drifted oft' to the siege of Saragossa. or to the stmggle in the south.
Only the Irish regiment at Gerona, and certain fragments of the
disbanded battalions of the Guards from llarcclona had aided the
peasantry in resisting the invader. The suc(.'f!ss of the Catalans,
in hemming in Dnhesme and checking UeiUc's advance, is all
the more notable when we reflect that their levies had not been
guided by any central orga.ni7Aticm, nor placed under the command
of any single general. The Junta at Lends. had done little more
than issue proclamations wld serve out to the aomak'1w$ the
moderate amount of munitions of ~'ar that was at its disposition.
It bad indeed drawn out tl. schcmc for the raising of a provincial
army-forty ierci08 of miqueletes, each 1,000 strong, were to be
levied nnd kept pennanently in the field. But tltis scheme cxislOO
only 011 paper, and there were no means of officering or anlling
such a 1Il1lSS of mcn. Even as late as August 1. there were only
6,000 of them embodied in organi7.ed corps: the mass of the men
of military age were still at their own lIresides. prepared to tUl'll
out at the sound of the 801/mien, whene,ter a French column
appeared in their neighbourhood, but not ready to keep the field
for more than ll. few days. or to transfer their service to the more
distant regions of the principality. The direction of these irregular
band<; was still in tile hands of local lenders like Claros, i\'IiliLllf:,
and Bagel, who aided each other in a sufficiently loyal fashioll
when they had the chance, but did not obey any single commander-
in-chief. or act on any settled military plan. 'l'heir suceesses htul
been dne to their own untutored intelligence and courage, not to
tlle carrying out of any TCIDllar policy.
This period of patriotic anarchy was now drawing to an end;
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regular troops were beginning to appen.r on the scene ill considerable
numbers. and the direction of the military resoW'CeS of Catalonia
was about to be confided to their generals. The change wns 1I0t
all for the better: during the whole struggle the Spaniards showed
themsclves admirable insurgents but indifferent soldiers. After onc
more short but brilliant period of success, the balance of fortune was
about to turn against the Catnluns, and a long series of disasters
was to try, but never to subdue, their indomitable and persevering
ooumge.
lVe have already shown that the only body of regular troops
available for the succour of CatoJonia was the corps of 10,000 men
which lay in the Balearic Islands. That these thirteen battalions
of veterans hn.d not yet been thrown ashore in the principality wns
mainly due to the over-caution of the aged General Vives, the
Captain-General at PoJ.ma, to whom the charge of the gtUTisons
of Majorca and Minorca was committed 1. He had a deeply rooted
idea that if he lcft Port Mahon unguarded, the English would
find some ex.cuse for once more making themselves masters of
that ancient stronghold, where thc Union Jack had waved for
the greater part of the eighteenth century. Even the transparent
honesty of Lord Collingwood, thc ,·ctc.Iml admiral of the Mediter-
ranean fleet, could not reassure him. It was only when strong
pressure was applied to him by his second in command, the
Martluis del Pulacio, governor of Minorca, and when he had
receivoo the most explicit plooges from CoIlingwood concerning
the disinterested views of Great Britain, that he <:onsented to
disgarnish Port Mnhon. His mind was only finally made up, when
the Aragonese and Catalan battalions of his army burst· out into
open mutiny, threatening to sei7.e shipping and transport themselves
to the 'llo.inland without his leave, if any further delay was made
[June 30]. A fortnight later Vives permitted Del Palacio, with the
greater part of the Balearic garrisons, to set sail for the seat of war.
The Aragoncsc regiment landed near Tortosa, and marched for
Sarngossa: but the bulk of the expeditionary force, nearly 5,000
strong, was put ashore in Catalonia between July 19 and 23.
Meanwhile affairs in the principality had taken a new turn.
I Neither Torefio nor Arteche mentions the trouble caused by this tiresome
old man, to whom the delay ill succouring Catalonia was due. Fo\" the
uegotiations with Ilim sce Lonl Collingwood's COrI'CSllOndcllce (Life, ii. 291,
292), and I<"oy (iv. 181). y'
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Duhesme had remained quiet for six days after Chabran's check
at Granollers, though his position at Barcelona grew daily more
uncomfortable, owing to the constant acti\'ity of the 3(ftIULtell£S.
But when he learnt that Reille's vanguard had reached E'igueras.,
and that he might expect ere long to be aided by a whole division
of fresh troops from the north, he resolved to renew his attack on
Gerona, the fortress which so completely blocked his communica-
tions with France. Sending Ulessuges by sea to bid his colleague
meet him under the walls of that place, he sallied out from
Barcelona, on July 10, with the ltlrgel' half of his army. This
time he took with him the ,French brigades of Goulas and Nicolas
only, leaving Ban:clona to the care of Lecchi and the foreign
troops. He felt that the situation was too grave for him to trust
the fate of Catalonia to the steadiness of Lomhard or Neapolitan
regimcnt;s. So leaving four Italian and one Swiss battalion, 3,500
men in all, in the Barcelona forts, he marched for Gerona with
seven French bnttalions, a regiment of ltulian cavalry, and twenty·
two gUlls, of which ten were heavy siege·artillery. At Mataro he
picked up Chabran, who had been resting there sin<.'e his che<:k at
Granollers on July 4, and incorpomted with his expedition the
Italian battalions which that officer had with him, as well as a
regiment of l?rench cavalry. TillS gave him a total force of some
7,000 men 1; yet his march was slow and difficult. Milans with the
somatenea of the upland was always hallgiug upon his left flank,
flud Lord Cochrane with two British frigates followed him along
the coast, bomoo.l.'ding his columns whenever the road came within
cannon-shot of the sea. At Arens de Mar Duhesme halted for
no less than five days, eitJlel' from sheer indecision as to the
advisability of proceeding with his project, or because he was
I The numbers of these corps before the fightiug commenced in June had
been:
Goulas'& Brigade (three batts.)
Niculas's Brigade (fuur batts.)
Two Italian battalions
3rd P.roviaiona.l Cuirassiel"!l .
2nd Ne.ajlolitaJl C1l1ll>seul'll
Artillery .
2,574
2,891
1,300
409
388
260
~ 7,812
Dut as the Italians, Goulas, and the cnirassiers had all been engaged several
timCII, and had suffered seriou8 losSes, we must deduct 800 men at least, in
unler to get the figures of July 17. Foy gives ouly 6,000. .
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waiting for definite news of Reillc. At last he made up his mind:
two routes meet at Arens, the main chaWls~e from Barcelona to
GerollR via. Tordcra, and a cross·road which ~ks the same end
by It. detour through the small hill-fortress of Hostalrich. The
three battalions of Goulas's brigade were sent by this latter path,
with orders to endeavour to sci:r.e the place jf they could. The
main column, with the battering-train, followed the high-road.
Goulas found Hostnlrich too strong for him: it ',I'M garrisoned
by 500 mifJllcletes under Manuel O'Sullivan, a captain of the
Regiment of Ultollia, who gallantly held their own ~<Yilinst all
attempt at escalade. 'l'he French brigadier thereupon abandoned
the attack, crossed the mOllntains, llnd joined his chief before
Gerona on July 22. Duhesme meanwhile had bt..>C1l harassed for
three days by the 80matenea of Milans, and, though he always
drove them off in the end, had lost much of his baggage, and an
apl)reciable number of' men, before he reached the banks of the
Ter. On the day after he Wag rejoined by Goulas he forced the
passage of that river and took post before Gerol1fl.. On the next
morning [July 24] he was n;joiccd to meet with the vanguard
of Reille's division descending from the north. That general had
started'from Figuerns two days before, \\;th all the fractions of his
motley force that had reached the front, two Tusca.n battalions,
the 8\\;ss 'from the Vfl.lllis, three l?rench bataillomr de marclu,
the two •Provisional Battalions of Pcrpignan,' and some other
improvised units, with a total strength of some 6,500 men. He
established his head quarters at Pucnte Mayor to the north of the
city, on the right blll1k of the Ter, while Duhesme placed his at
Santa Eugenia on tbe left bank. There were brood and casy
communications between them by means of two fords, and the
bridge of Salt, tl. little further from Gcrona, was also available.
'l1lirteell thousand men seemed enough to make an end of an oId-
. fashioned fortress like Gerona, held by a gnrriSOll which down to
the first day of the siege counted 110 more than 400 regular troops
-that same Irish regiment of Ultonia which had stood out against
Duhesme's first attack in June. It was fortunate for the defenders
that at the very moment of the arrival of the :French they received
a powerful reinforcement. The light hlfantry regiment named the
2nd Volunteers of Barcelona, 1,300 strong, entered the city on the
night of July :?l:?l t, slipping between the .heads of Duhesme's and
I Not Oil tile twcuty-fifUl, a6 Napier says (i. 83), following apparcutly the
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Reille's columns. This corps had formed part of the garrison of
Minorca: instead of being landed at Tan-agona with the rest of
Del Palacio's troops, it was dropped at San Feliu, the nearest port
on the coast to Gerona, and had just time to re.nch that place
before its investment was completed.
Duhesme had resolved to avoid for the future the fruitless
attempts at es<.'alade, which had cost him so many men during his
first siege of Gerona, and to proceed by the regular rules of polior·
cctics. He had with him a battering.traill more than sufficient
to wreck the ancient walls of the city: accordingly he opened a
secondary attack on the lower town on the left of the Ona, but
turned the greater porl of his attention to the citadel ofMonjuich.
If this work, which from its lofty hill commands the whole city,
were oncc mastcred, the place could Dot hold out for tl day longer.
By this arrangement the charge of the main attack fell to Reille,
and Duhcsme himself undertook onl), the demonstratioll against
the MercadaL The French began by establishing themselvcs on
the lower slopes of the tnblelnnd of which Monjuich occupies thc
.culminating point. They found shelter in three ruined towers
which the garrison was too weak to occupy, and raised near them
three batterics with six heavy guns and two howitzers, which
b1lttered the citadel, and also played upon ccrtnin parts of the
town wall near the gate of San Pedro. The batteries in Duhesme's
section of the siege-lines consisted olll)' of mortars and howitzers,
-which shelled and several times set fire to the Mercadal, but could
.make no attcmpt to open breaches ill its walls.
The siege.approaches of the French before Gerona were con·
ducted with all astonishing slowness: it was not till sixk'Cn dn}'s
after they had established themseh'es on the slopes round Mon-
juich, that thc.)' began to batter it in a scrious fashion [Aug. 12].
This delay was partly due to the steepness of the ground up which
the guns had to be dragged, partly to the necessity for sending
to Figueras for extra artillery material, which could only be
brought slowly and under hea\')' escort to the banks of the Ter.
But Duhesme's slackness, and the want of skill displayed by his
engineer oflk'CI'S, were responsible for the greater portio~ of the
dela.y. Moreover the illYestment of Gerona was so badly managed,
·that not only did the garrison keep up a regular communication
dates gi\'cn by Cabanes. 1 have followed Arteclte here, as his seaTCb illto
.times and .seasons scems more careful than that of any other authority.
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at night with the chiefs of the 80matenes who lay ont on the hills
to the west, but convoys repeatedly left and entered the town ill
the dark, without meeting a single French picket or patrol.
This delay of n fortnight in pressing the attack on GCl'ona led
to two important results. The first was that the news of the
capitulation of Baylen :reached both camps, producing grave dis-
cou~rrement in the one, and a. disposition for bold action in the
other. The S(.'(:ond was that Del Palncio and the troops from
Minorca had time granted to them to prepare for interference in
the siege. The marquis had landed at Tarragonn on July 23,
with all his division, save the regiment sent to St. Fe1iu and the
Aragoncsc battalion which had been directed on Tortosn. Im-
mediately on his arrival the insurrectionary Junta of Catalonia
transferred itself from Lerida to Tllrragona and elected Del Palacio
Captain-General of the principality. Thus a real central authority
Wl\S established in the province, and a single military direction
could at last be given to its armies. TIle new Captain-General
was well-intentioned and full of patriotism, but no great strategist I.
His plnn was to press Barcelona with the bulk of his l'cgulur forc($,
!'o that Lecchi might be compelled to call for instant help from
Duhcsme, while a small column under Ule Conde de Caldagucs was
to march on Gerona, not so much with the hope of raising the
siege, as to aid the sClYIwtenC$ of the Ampurdam in harnssing
the investing force and throwing succours into the city z.
Accordingly the main body of Del Palacio's army, the regiments
of Soria, Granada, and Durban, with ·Wimpfen's two Swiss bat-
talions from Tarragona, marched on the Llobregut, drove in
Lecchi's outposts, and confined him to the immediate environs
of Barcelona. The 8t)l1UJienes came to give help in thousands,
Rnd a cordon of investment was established at a vcry short distance
fmm the great city. On the sea-side Lord Cochrane, with the
J.mpf:rieuse and Cambrian friguks, kept up a strict blockade, so
that Lc<:chi, with his insufficient and not too trustworthy garrison
of 8,000 Swiss and Italian troops, was in a most uncomfortable
position. If it had not been that Barcelona was completely com-
manded b)' the impregnable citadel of Monjuich, he could not
I Colliugv.·ood «(j()rre8p(mdell~, ii. 271) calls llim 'a fat ullwieldy marquess,
....ho, if bis principles are good, lJas a very limited ability:
, For Del Palacio's intentions see his onlers to Caldagues, quoted by
A.rtllC:he (ii. 622).
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ha.ve maintained his hold on the large and turbulent city. His
last outpost was destroyed on July 31: this was the strong castle
of Mongat, six miles out on the coast·road from Barcelona to
Mataro. It was held by 11 company of Neapolitans, 150 men with
seven guns. Attacked on the land-side by 800 miquektea under
FranL-i!:K:o Bar<:elo, and from the sea. by the broadside of the
111lpericuse, the Italian officer in command surrendered to Lord
Cochrane, in order to save his men from massacre by the Catalans.
Cochrane then blew up the castle, and destroyed the narrow coast-
road on each side of it by cuttings and explosions I, so that there
was no longer any practicable route for guns, horses, or wagons
along the shore. Thus hemmed in, Lecchi began to send to
Duhesmc, by ·various secret channels, appeals for instant aid, Ilnd
reports painting his situation in gloomy but not much exaggerated
colours. He asserted that the aomatc7Iea were pushing their in-
cursions to within 600 yards of his MVll.Ilced posts, and that there
were now 30,000 Catalans in anns around him. If he had said
10,000 he would have been within the limits of fact.
On Augmt 6 the Captain.Genera~ after carefully arranging his
troops in the positions round Barcelona, sent off' Caldagues to
harass Duhesme in the north. This enterprising brigadier-general
WU!! gh'ell no morc than four companies of regulars, three gull!$,
and 2,000 miqueletea from the Lerida district under their colonel,
Juan Bagct. Marel.ling by the mountain rood that goes by Hos-
talrich, and picking up many recruits Oll the way, he established
himself ou the fourtt."euth at Castella, in the hills that lie between
Geroua and the sea. Here he was met by all the aomakne, of
Northern Catalonia, under their daring leaders, Milans and Claros.
Thc investment of Geroua was so badly managed, that whcn the
news of Caldagues' approach was received, two colonels (O'Donovan
of the Ultonia Regiment and La Valeta of the Barcelona Volunteers)
were able to penetrate the French lines and to confer with the
commander of the army of succour. These two officers were really
conducting the defence, for the titu.lar governor~ Bolivar, seems to
have been a nonentity 2, who exercised no influence on the course
I For a good nllrrllti\·c of ·t!,cse operations sec JArd Coc1lraUC'lI auto-
biography, i. 262-5.
, It if; very odd, u Arteehe remarks (ii. 611), that none of the oontem-
pon,,"}' Spanish lJarralivll!:! mention tlll~ name of Doli,'ar. l1ley only speak of
La Valeta and O'Dono\'an as llCllding the defence.
I808J CALDAGUES RELIEVES GERONA 8~9
of events. At Il council of war which they attended, it was resolved
to tr)' ll. stroke which was fllr bolder than anything that the
Captain-General had contemplated when he sent Cnldagues north·
ward. The relieving force was to attack from the rear Reille's
troops on the heights before Monjuich, while at UIC same time
every mall that could be Rp8.red from the garrison WAS to be flUllg
on the breaching batteries fwm the front. Duhesme's army in the
plain beyond the O,1a was to be left alone: it was hoped that
the whole business would be over before he could arrive at the spot
where the fate of battle was to be decided. There were somewhat
over 8,000 men disposnble for the atl:ack: 1,000 regulars and fOUf
hundred miquektea were to sally out of Gerona: Caldagues could
bring up 7,000 more, all raw levies except UlC four companies of old
troops that he had brought from Tarragona. He had also fi\'e field-
guns. As Duhesmc and ReiJIe had 13,000 mcn, of whom l,gOO
wcre cavalry, it was a daring experiment to attack them, even though
their forces were distributed along an extensive line of investment.
A bold and confident f:,teneral, placed in Duhesme's position, would
not have waited to be attacked in his trenches, '!1le moment that
he heard of the approadt of Caldagues, he would have drawn off
half his battAlions from the siege, Md have gone out to meet the
relieving army, before it could get within striking distance of
Gerona. But Duhesme was not in the mood for adventurous
strokes: he was chilled in his ardour by" the news of the disaster
of Baylen: he was worried by Lecchi's gloomy reports; and he
had been pondering for some days whether it would not be well to
raise the siege and march off to save Barcelona, But the ravages
which his bombardment was producing ill the beleaguered city, and
the fact that a breach was beginning to be visible in the walls of
Monjuich, indu<.'Cd him to remain before the place, hoping that
it might fall within the next few days. If this was his determina-
tion, he should at least have made preparations to receive Caldagucs:
but no attempt whatever appears to have been made to resist an
attack from without.
On the moming of August 16, the Spaniards struek their blow,
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, the 1,400 men of the
garrison deployed from behind the cover of the citadel, and charged
down upon "the trenches and batteries of the besiegers I, They
1 The Barcelona Volunteers under.La Valeta led; the Vltouifl, under
Major Heury O'Donnell, supported.
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completely swept away the battalion of the 5th Legion of Reserve,
which was furnishing the guard of the trenches, captured the siegc-
!,"lUls, and set 6re to the fascines oftbe batteries. Then pushing on,
they drove off the Swiss battAlion of the Valais, and the two TUSC8n
battalions of the 113th Regiment, pressing them down hill towards
Rcille's head quarters at Puen!e Mayor. The Prench general rnllicd
them upon the Ist Regiment de },farche, which formed his reserve
at this point ofthe line, and mounting tllc slope retook some of the
works which had been lost. But at this moment Caldagues' whole
army appeared upon the heights, pressing forward in four columns
with great confidence. 'l'he sight of these multitudes checked Reille,
who hastily drew back, evacuated Pucntc Mayor "lid withdre..... to
the other !mnk of the Ter. Duhesme, on his side, abandoned all
his outlying positions and concentrated his whole force in front
of the villugc of Santa Eugenia.
The Catalans were wise enough not to descend into the p~in,
whel'C Duhcsme's cavalry and guns would have hud u free hand.
Caldagues refrained from passing the Ter, llnd merely drew up his
anny on the slopes above Pucnte :Mayor, ready to receive battle.
But the expected attack never came; Duhesme held back all the
afternoon, and then fled away under cover of the darkness. His
losses in the fighting on the hills had not been hellYy-sevellty-five
killed and 196 wounded-but his spirit was broken. He would
not risk Ull llSSlI.ult 011 such a strong position with his motley and
somewhat demoralized anny. For a moment he thought of leading
his whole force bnck to Rcille's base at Figueras: but the reflection
that in this case Lecchi would probably be destroyed, and he himself
be made responsible for the loss of Bun:elona by the Emperor,
deterred him from such a cowardly move. Bidding Reille take the
northern road and keep open the communications with France, he
drcw off the rest of his army to the south to rejoin his Italian
comrades. The move was made with some panic and precipitation:
the remaining siC!,'C.guns were buried in a perfunctory fashion, and
some stores destroyed. Then Dnhesme marched away o"er the
mountains, pursued by the 8omatC1ietJ of Milans; while Reillc
retired across the plains of the Ampurdarn, and had a fairly easy
journey to Figueras. Claros, who tried to harass his retreat, never
dared to close in upon him in the open.country, fcaring his cllvalry
and guns. Far more toilsome was the lot ofDuhesme's column, which
had to mll.rch for twenty miles through very broken ground, chased
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by the levies of Milans, to whom the whole district was familiar.
When he reached the sea at Mal!,'Ttlt he found that his troubles
were only growing worse. The aomatelles hung on his right flank~
while Lord Cochrane's frigate the Irnpmcltse followed him on the
left hfUld, giving him a broadside whenever his march lay within
cannon-shot of the beach. Moreover, the peasants had been cutting
nnd blasting away the road under CochranC\1 direction; and at
each point where one of these obstmctions had been made, it was
necessary to drag the guns and wagons of the column across almost
impassable hill-sides 1. :F'inding that he was making no appreciable
progress, and that his men were growing utterly demoralized, Du-
hesme at last took a desperate step. He blew up his ammunition,
hurnt his baggage, cast his field-guns into the sea, and fled away
by hill·tracks parallel with the shore. After long skirmishing with
the aomatcnea he reached Mongol, where Lecchi came out to his aid
with 1000 men and a battery-all that could be spared from the
depleted garrison of Barcelona. There the Catalans stayed their
pursuit, and Duhesme's harassed battalions poured back into the
dty, sick of mountain warfarel half-starved, and carrying with them
!lothing but what they brought in on their baeks [August 20]. As
Il fighting force for offensive operations they were useless for some
weeks, and all that their general could do was to hold for foraging
purposes as much of the open ground about Barcelona as he could
manage to retain. Nothing more could be essayed till Nnpoleon
should vOllchsafeto send hea,'y reinforcements to Catalonia, fOf the
purpose of reopening the severed communications with .E'ranee.
Two obvious criticisms on these operations in the month of
Angust mllst be made. The first is that Del Palacio might probably
have destroyed DuhcSlllC'S whole army, if, instead of scnding out
his lieutenant Caldagues with a handful of regulars and 2,000
mUjllelde8, he had marched on Gerona with his entire force, the
5,000 old troops from Port Mahon and the whole of the local levies
of Central Catalonia. l.ecchi was so weak in llarre!olla that a few
thousand 801IloterleJl (:ould havc kept him in chf..'Ck, for he dnrcd not
ungarnish the city. If the Captain-General had thrown every mlln
into the struggle at Gerona, it seems certain that Dnhcsmc lUust
either have been annihilated or have fled away with Reille to
l"iguerns, abandoning Barcelona to it<; inevitable fate.
'l11e second comment is equally obvious: Duhesme's generalship
1 See Cocbralle's autobiography, i. 26<>.
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was even worse than that of Del ])alacio. Since the Spaniards
came against him not with the whole army of Catalonia, but with
n mere detachment of 7,000 sQlnatel/es, he should have formed a
covering fOl'Ce of 5,000 men, and have fallen upon them while
they were still at some disbuu:c from Gcrona. Instead of doing
this, he allowed them to encamp for three days unmolested at
Castella, a village no more than five miles distant from Reille'~
outposts. There they concerted their operations with the garrisoll,
and fell upon the investing force at the moment that suited them
best. It is the c.rlraordinary apathy or neglect displayed by
Duhesme that justifies Caldaglles' bold stroke at the French lines.
Finding the enemy so torpid, he might well venture all assault
upon them, without incurring the charge of rashness of which
Napier finds him guilty 1. In other circumstances it would have
been mad for the Spanialu, who had no more than 7,000 8QmatenM,
to att.nck a French army 13,000 strong. But seeing Duhesme so
utterly negligent-and his army strung out on a long front of
investment, without any covering force-Caldllgues was quite
justified in making the experiment which tumed out so successfully.
Duhcsme tried to extenuate his roult, by giving out that he had
been about to abandon the siege even before he was attacked, and
that he bad orders from Bayollne authorizing such a step. But
we may be pennitted to join his successor St. C}T in doubting
both the original intention and the imperial authorization 2. Thel'C
is at least no trace of it in the cOlTcspondencc of Napoleon, who
as late as August 23, seven days after the fight outside Geronll,
was under the impression that Re~le's division alone might suffice
to captUl'C the city, though he was prepared if necessllry to support
him with other troops. On the se\'enteenth of the same month,
the day on which Duhesme Ixlgnn his diStlStrous retreat 011
Barcelona, Napoleon had already made up his mind to supersede
him, and had directed St. Cyr, with two fresh divisions, to take post
at Perpignan. But in the orders given to the new commander in
Catalonia there is no sign that the Emperor had acquiesced in the
raising of the siege of Gerona, though it may perhaps be deduced
from tl later dispatch that he had not disapproved of the strength-
ening of Lecchi's garrison at Barcelona. by the withdrawal o(
Chabmn's division from the leaguer 3•
I Napier, i. 89. t St. eyr, Journal de rAnnk de OataIogM, 1800-9, p. 16.
t 'I1Je uutices uf the a.rmy of Catalonia alld its intended operations are not
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Meanwhile Napoleon had recognized that even with Reille's
reinforcements, Catalonia was not adequately garrisoned, and on
August 10 had directed 18,000 fresh troops upon the principality.
'l'hcse, moreover, were 1I0t the mere sweepings of his depots, like
lteillc's men, but consisted of two strong divisions of old troops;
Souham's was composed of ten French battalions from Lombardy,
Pino's of 10,000 men of the best corps of the army of the kingdom
of Italy 1, A little later the Emperor resolVL'<1 to send one division
more, Germans this time, to Catalonia.. Instead of the 13.,000
men whom he had originally thought sufficient for the subjugation
of the province, he had now set aside more than 40,000 for the
task, and this did not prove to be onc man too muny. No Letter
testimonial could be given to the gallant somalenu, than that
they had forct.'<i the enemy to detach so large a for<:c against them.
Nor could any better proof be given of the Emperor's fundamental
misconeeption of the Spanish problem in :May and June, than the
fact that he had so long been under the impression that Dullcsme's
original divisions would be enough to sulxluc the rugged and warlike
Catalan principality.
Before Souham, Pino, and the rest could arrive 011 the scene,
Il~any weeks must elapse, and meanwhile we must tum hack to the
main Coul1!C of the war in Centml Spain, where the (,'ondition of
affairs had been profoundly modified by the results of the Capitu-
lation of BnylcH.
very numerous in Napoleon's dispatches. Foy acoopts DuhcsmC'lI story tll:\t he
had intended all along to raise the'siege after receiving from Bayonne an order
to suspend active operations (iv. 177). Dut it seems difficult to read this
into the Emperor's llispatdHlS; Napoloon received the news of lla.ylclI on
Aug. 3, but did 1I0t begin PUslliog lnrge reinforcements on to Cntalonia till
Aug. IQ (.Nop. COrreGp. J 14,24!J), nor supersede Duhesme by St. Cyr till Aug. 17
(Nap. Correq>., 14J UO). On Aug. 23 he coucludes thatDuhesme would be best
placed at Barcelona, but that Heille must takeGerona with his divisiou, whicIJ
may be reiufon.:ed by that of ClLnbot, lIewl)' nrrivC(fnt PCl'),ignall, or eveu by
more troops due from Italy in a few weeks. The expectation which he
e;(pressea, that Heille alone might very poeeibly be strong enough to capture
the plllCe, is enough to SIIOW tlmt he did not intend to raise the siege, hut (at
most) to order Duhcsllle to strengtllClL Leccl,i with mon dmwn off from the
leaguer-which is a very different thillg from that gelleral's statement of
the case.
I 111C Emperor writes to Eugene Be.'lulmmais that thc 10,000 Italians,
horse, foot, alld artillery, must be 'un e;(trait de I"ann(ie italienllO dana le
cas de se Cake honneur,' the best that could be got (Di,patch 14,24!J, Aug. 10).
SECTION VI
THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAYLEN
CHAPTER I
THE FRENCH RETREAT TO THE EBRO
WmLE de-filing with the operations of the French armies in the
various provinces of Spain, we have observed that at every point
the arrival of the news of Dupont's disasl:.cr at Bnylcll produuxl
notable results. It was this unexpected intelligence that drove
the intrusive king out of Madrid within a week of his lUTival, amI
ere the ceremonial of his proclamation had been completed. It
brought back Bessicres from the Esla to the Arlanzon, alld raised
the siege of Sarngossa. Knowing of it Juuot summoned his
council of war at Torres Vedras with a sinking heart, and Duhesme
lacked the collfidcllCl::! to try the ordeal of hnttlc before GCI'<mu.
Beyond the Pyrenees its influence was no less marked. Napoleon
hud imagined that the victory of Rio Scco hud pructicnlly decided
the fate of the Peninsula, and at the moment of Baylen 'I'll.'!
turning his attention to Austriu rnthcr than to Spain. On July 25,
five days after Dupont had laid down his arms, he was meditating
the reinforcement of his army in Germany, and drafting oroeril
that directed the garrisons of northern France on Mainz and
Strasburg 1. To a mind thus preoccupied the. news of the disaster
in Andalusia crone like a thunderclap. So far was the Spanish
trouble from an end, that it was as,'>uming an aspect of primary
1 Napoleon to.Terume, King orWestph/llin,July25 (Nap. Oo,.re*p., 14,230):
~ L'Autriche arme: elle nie ses annements, elle anne dOllc contre nOI19.•..
l'uisque I'Autriche anne, iI rant donc armer. Au~i j'ordonne que la Grande
Armcc soit TCnforct!e. l\1cs troupes !iC reunisscnt a Strasbourg, :Maycnce,
Wesel; &c. Compare this with the great harangue made to Metternich
on August 15 (Nap. Oorretp., 14,254) aud with Nap. 0JrreIp., 14,248, which
discuSSCII the C(Klperaliou of RU6Sia in a war with Austria.
1808J NAPOLEON AND THE NEWS OF BAYLEN 335
importance. If Austria was really intending mischief, it was clear
that the Emperor would have two great continental wars on his
hands at the same moment-a misfortune that had never )'et
befallen him, It was nlready beginning to be home in upon him
that the treachery at Bayonne had been a blunder as well as
a emnc. Hencc came the wild rage that bursts Qut in the letters
written upon the days following that on which the news of Baylcn
reached him at Bordeaux. 'Has there ever, since the world
began,' wrote Bonaparte to Clarke, his minister of war, •been such
a stupid, eowardly, idiotic business AS this? Behold Mnck and
Hohenlohc justified! Dupont's own dispatch shows that all that
has occurred is the result of his own inCOllccivable folly.... The
loss of £0,000 picked men, who have disappeared without c\'cn
inflicting any considerable loss on the enemy, will necessarily hp.v~
the worst moral infiuence on the Spanish nation.... Its effect on
European politics will prc\'cnt me from going to Spain myself....
I wish to know at once what tribunal ought to try these generals,
and what penalty the law can inflict on them for such a crimc l.'
A similar strain runs through his first letter to his brother Joseph
after the receipt of the news-' Dupont ha... soiled our banners.
What folly and what baseness! The English will lay hands on
his army 2. Such c\'cnts make it necessary for me to go to Paris,
for Germany, lloland, Italy, and all, are tied up in the same
knot. It pains mc grievously that I ClLnnot be with you, in
the midst of my soldiers 3,' In other letters the capitulation is
'a terrible catastrophe,' 'El. horrible affair, for the cowards capitu-
lated to save their baggage,' and (of course) 'a machination paid
for with English gold 4. These imbeciles arc to suffer on the
scaffold the penalty of this great national crimes,' The Emperor
, Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 3 (Nap. (Jorf'elfp., 14,242).
• i, e. Najwleoll is aware Umt U,cy will lJever allow the army to be taken
home by sea, as the capitulation provided.
• NapoleolJ to Josepil, Aug. 3 (Nap. Corresp., 14,243): (L' Allemagne,
l'Italie, la Pologne etc., tout 8e lie,' is tIle Eml}(lror's pIlnL'lC.
• NI/p, (}(Jrre~l'" 14,244, 14,272, 14,283,
& A few words as to Dupollt"s fate may be added. His experience/! during
tile next four yean throw a curious light on Ule administration of military
• jUlltice under tlle Jo:mpire. He, together with Vedcl, Chabcrt, MareoM:ot,
Legendre, and the aide-d~mpVilIoutreys, were. arrested 011 returning tu
France, and tllTown into llrisoll. The)" were told to prepare for a trial before
tlle Supreme High Court (Huule CoU1' lmpbiuk), aml 3 long series of inter-
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did well to be angry. for the shock of Bnylen was indeed felt to
every end of Europe. But he should have blamed his own Macchia-
vellian brain, that concei\'t.-d the plot of BayOHIlC, and his own
overweening confidence, that launched Dupollt with 20,000 half·
trained conscripts (not, as he wrote to Clarke, with vingi mille
hommea cl'ldite et clwi.ris) on the hazardous Andalusian cllterpl"ise.
Meanwhile he had to face the situation: within a few hours of
the moment when Villoutrcys placed DUPOllt's dispatch in his
hands, he had so far got over the first spasms of his wrath that he
WM able to dictate a gC:ncrnl plan for the n:x:OllCClltrution of his
armies 1. 'Ve have compared the French forces in Spain to a
broad wedge, of which the point, diredcd against the heart of the
insurrection, was formed by the three di\isiollS of Dupont's corps.
This point had now been broken off; but the Emperor, still
clinging to the ideo. of the wedge, wished to preserve Madrid rold
to form in and about it a new army fit for offensive operations.
'Vith this force he would strike at the insm'gCnbJ of Andalusia and
Valencia when they marched. on the capital, while Bessieres in the
rogatoriell 1'1'39 administered to them. A militarj' commission drew up a pre-
liminary report on the case: Oil reading it the Emperor $IIW that Dupo"t had ll.
fair defeuce to make on all the charges brought against him, with the exceptioll
of that ofmilitary incapacity. He countermanded the order for a trial, and tlll'l
prisonen (aner wne months of confinement) were released, but left under
police surveillance. After Dupont had spent two yean and a half of peace
in the country-house of a relative, l,e was suddenly llrrestcd at midnight on
Feb. 12, 1812, and given a se<::ret triaJ,llot before a conrt of justice o:r a court·
martial, but before a special military commission. He was allowed neither
counsel 110r documenbl, and forced to defend himself at forty-eight hours'
notice. The judges de<:la:red him guilty of having signed a capitulation con·
taining <des conditions honteuses et avilissant.e6,' hut not of haviug SUITen·
donld witllOut noocssity, or of having S110WII cowanlico or truuson. Since the
capitulation had been <contrary to the political interests of the Empire, and
had compromised the safety of the State,' while yet 'there wouM be grave
inOOllvcnienoo in giving the accusoo a public trial,' the court advised tbe
Emperor to deprive Dupont of :rank, title, and penSion, and to relegate him
to the country. The other accused officers might suHer the same penalties.
Refusing: to oonsider this a sufficient punishment, Napoloon shut up Dupont
in the lonely fort of JOIIX, in the Jura, where he remained a prisonCl' till the
fall of the Empire. Vede1 and Legendre were pardoned, and afterwards
served in Italy. Chabert and Villoutreys were put on half-pay.
I TIle <Note lIur la situation actuelle de l'.&!paglle,' whicll forms No. 14,241
of the (](rrrupcmmmce. It is dated at llordeaux, Aug. 2, the \'ery day on which
Villoutre)'s b:rought the news of the capitulation.
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valley of the Douro, a.nd Verdier in the valley of the Ebro were
still to prC8Cn'c a forward position, and shield the army of the
l..ocntre from the Bank attacks of the Galicians and the Arilao-on.
esc. The troops left around Madrid at the moment of the disaster
of Baylcll were parts of the three divisions of Mauccy's corps 1,
one of Dupont's, and the brigade which had escorted Joseph Nnpo·
loon from llurgos, together with 8,000 horse-a toW of about
!!3,OOO men. Bonaparte judged that this was not enough to
resist the combined altll.ck of Castafios and of the ValcllciullS and
l\{urcialls of Saint March and Llamas. Accordingly he intended
that Bcssicrcs should lend the King two brigades of infantry-
a deduction frOln his force which would compel him to fall back
from Loon into Old Castile ~-and that Verdier should spare a
brigade from the army in front of Saragossa 3, though it was none
too strong for the task before it. Six battalions from the reserve
at Bayonne were to make a forced march to Madrid to join the
King. Thus reinforced up to 35,000 men, the corps at Mn.drid
would be able, as the Emperor supposed, to make head ag1l.inst
any combination of Spanish troops that could possibly be brought
~fl1linst it.
But all these arrangements were futile. Bonaparte at Bordeaux:
was separated from his brother at the Retiro by so many miles that
his orders were grown stale before they reached their destination.
His scheme was made out 011 August 2, but 011 the preceding day
King Joseph and his whole army had e\'a.cuated Madrid. The
terror of Baylen was upon them, and they were expecting every
moment to find themselves attacked by Castafios, who was as
a matter of fact celebrating trimhphal feasts at Seville. Wjth a
, Viz, Musnicr's division of Monccy's corps
F're-re's division of Dupont's corPs
Hujet'll brigade of JUorlot's division of .Monccy's cOrpll
Remains (5 batta.) of Gobert's llivision of JUoucey's corps
Hey's brigade of infantry (Josel'IJ'ij escort) ,
Infimtry Bnd Gal'air}' of the Imperial Guard.
Cavalry of the Line
6,500 men
4,400 JI
3,700 '"
2,o()() "
2,000 "
2,500 "
1,700 "
23,300 JI
t Ldebnc's brigade, which belonged to Morlot's division of Monlley's eOi'll!!
-it had 1J.een lent to BlllISicrcs for tlle moment-aud J{eynaud's brigude,
i. e. 6,300 foot, also two CIIvalry regiments, making 6,000 in all.
I Bazaneourt's brigade of two veteran regiments (14th and 44th of the
line), the 1381. that had arri\'ed at Sarngo8ll3.
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haste that turned out to be altogether llllllcccssa.i-y, Moncey's corps,
escorting the King, his court, and his long tmin of Spanisll
refugees, crossed the Somosierra and did not halt till they reached
Aranda de Duero, in the plains of Old CllStile. Napoleon was
forced to make other plans in view of this retreat, whose m0l'81
consequences were hardly inferior in importance to those of
Dupont's capitulation. For both the Spanish nation and the
courts of Europe looked upon the e\'acnation of Madrid as
marking the complete downfall of Napoleon's policy, and por-
tending a speedy retirement of the invaders behind the Pyrenees.
It is certain that if the spirit of Joscph nnd his advisers had becll
unbroken, they might have clung to the capital till the reinforce-
ments which the Emperor was hurrying to their aid hud arrived.
It is probable that the 35,000 men, of whom So.vary and Monecy
could then have disposed, might have held Castaiios in check till
the anny from the Rhine had time to come up. Yet there is every
excuse for the behaviour of the French commanders, for they could
not possibly have known that the Spaniards would move with such
astonishing slowness, or that they would refrain from hurling every
available man on Madrid. And as a matter of faet the evacuation
of the capital. turned out in the end to be advantageous to Napoleon,
for it inspired his adversaries with a foolish self-confidence "·hich
proved their ruin. If the)' had been forced to fight hard in New
Castile, they would have been obliged to throw much more energy
into the stnlggle, and could not have slackened their efforts under
the false impression that the French were absconding in disma), to
Bayonne.
When Bonaparte learnt that his brother had fled from Madrid
and crossed the passes into Old Castile, he was forced to draw out
a wholly different scheme from that which he had sketched on
August 2. The King, he wrote, with Moncey's corps, must take
post at Arandn, where the Douro is crossed by the high~road from
France to Madrid. His ann)' should be strengthened to a force of
30,000 men: meanwhile .Bessieres and Verdier must protect his
flanks. The fonner with 15,000 men should take Vnlladolid as
his head quarters and guard R.e,o-ainst any attempt of Blake to
resume the offensive. As to Verdier, sincc he had been instructed
to a.bandon the siege of Sa~rroSSfL-a grave blunder-he m"ust be
dra\\ll back as far as Tudcla on the Middle Ebro. From that
"point he would easily be able to •contain' the tUlDultuary arlll)'
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of Palafox. ]f the Spaniards showed, signs of pressing in on any
part of the front, the King, Verdier, or llessieres-as the cnse
might demand-must not hang back, but-endeavour to shatter the
vanguard of any ndvancing force by a bold stroke. At 0.11 costs
the war must not be wilo~ in a timid style-in short, to adopt
a well-known military axiom, 'the best defensive would be n
vigorous local offEmsive 1.' Meanwhile it should be known that
enonnous reinforcements were in march from the Rhine and the
Elbe. This was indubitably correct, for on August 5 the Ist
and 6th Corps of the 'Grand Army,' and two divisions of heavy
cavalry, had been flent their orders to breAk up from their garrisons
and set out for Spain 2. The Viceroy of Italy Ilnd the Princes of
the Confederation of the Rhine had also been directed to send
large contingents to the Peninsula: the troops from Italy.were to
move on Perpignan and strengthen the anny of Catalonia.; those
from the German states were to march all J3ayonnc and join the
main army 3. Somewhat later the Emperor directed still further
masses of men to be dra....'tl off' from Germany, namely Marshal
Mortier with the 5th Corps and two more divisions of dragoons',
while the whole of the Imperial Guard came down from Paris on
the same elTlmd 6. There were still nearly 100,000 of the old o.Mny
left in Spain 6, and the rcinfon.:ements would amount to 130,000
more, a force which when united would far surpass both in numbers
and in quality any army that the Spaniards would be able to get
together ill the course of the next two months.
It was from Rochefort and 011 August 5 that Napoleon sent off
his orders to his brother to stay bis retreat at Arnnda de Duero,
and to keep J3essieres at Valladolid and Verdier at Tudela. Once
more the distances of space and time were too much for him.
Before the dispatch from Rocheforl came to hand, Joseph and
SavaIJ' had already abandoned Aranda: they left it on the sixth
and by the ninth were at Burgos. At Ulat city they were met by
:Bessicrcs, who according to the King's orders had fallen back from
1 Note on tile situation of Spain, Aug. 6 (Nflp. CQrrup., 14,246).
I Napoloon to Clarke, Aug. S (Nap. (J{)rrup., 14,244).
I Napoleon to Eugene, Aug. 10 (Nap. Correltp.,14,249), llud to Clarko(Nap.
(J(}rresp., 14,256).
• Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 17 (Nap. (J{)rrtltp., 14,256).
S E:zcept of ooun;e the brigade of fusiliers and tlle thNO cavalry regimeol.8
wllich were already in Sl),,\in.
• Or 08,000 to be e:zact, unless Reille'g force in Roussillon be adlled,
,2
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the Esla. to the Arlanzoll. Napoleon's elaborate scheme for thl'!
maintenance of the line of the Douro had thus fallen through, as
completely as his earlier plan for the defence of Madrid. Seeing
tlm.t his omeN W~re dearly out of date, Monccy and Bcssieres I
agJ"eed that they might be disregarded. The next line suitable for
an army acting on the defensive was that of the Ebro, aud to the
banks of thut river the dispirited army of France now withdrew.
The head quarters were established at Miranda: the troops of
Bessieres and Moncey were massed at that place and at Logr0l10,
with a strong detachment across the Ebro at Pancorbo, and some
cavalry lying out as far as Burgas: Verdier's army. after finally
raising the siege of Saragossa, fell back on Milagro, the point
where the Aragon falls into the Ebro. Thus some 70,000 men
were concentrated on a comparatively short and oompact front,
covering the two great roads which lead to France by Vittoria and
by Pampeluna. Against any frontal attack from the direction of
Madrid the position was very strong. But a glance at the map
shows that the flanks were not properly protected: there was
nothing to prevent Blake from turning the extreme right by an
advance into Bis<-'8.y. or to prevent Palafox from turning the
extreme left by a march 011 Pampeluna via Tafalla or StmgllesR.
If either of these moves were made by a powerful force, the anny
on the Ebro would be compelled either to abandon its positions
in order to go in pursuit, or else to leave them occupied by a
detacgment insufficient to resist a serious attack along the lille of
the high-road from Madrid. Both those operations were ulti·
mately taken in hand by the Spaniards, but it was at too late an
hour, when the reinforcements from Germany had begun to arrive,
and when ample means were at the disposal of the French generals
for repulsing flank attacks, without drawing off men from the line
of the Ebro. TIle astounding slowness of the Sptllli~ and the
lamentable want of union between the oommanders of the .various
provincial armies, ruined allY chance that there might have been
of success. The troops of King Joseph were safely installed in
their defensive positions by August 15. On that day the leading
columns of the Spanish army had ouly just arrived at l\fadrid.
It was not till a month later that the number of troops brought
forward to thc line of the Ehro approached the total strength of
the host of the intrusive King. The offensive operations of Blake
~ Sav.lIry had left the army 00 Aug. 4, aod returned to France.
1808] JOURDAN TAKES COMMAND 8<1
and Palafox did not commence till the second half of September,
whell the columns ofthc 'Grmld Army' were ulready drawing near to
the Pyrenees, and all possible chance of success had long gone by.
They were not developed till October, when the (.'Owlter-stroke of
the French was fully prepared. From August 15 down to the day
of the battle of Zornoza (October 31) there are two months and
a half of wasted time, during which the Spaniards did nothing more
than stir up all ineffectual rising in Biscay and gradually push to
the front scattered l.'Orps whose toW did not amount to much niore
than 100,000 men. The troops of Bonaparte on the other hand-
now under UlC orders of Jourdn.n, who fUTivcd at Miranda on
August 25 I_had little to do but to ward off the feeble attempts
to cut their CQmmunicntiOIlS in Biscay, and to incorporate, brigwlc
by brigade, the numerous reinforcements which kept marching in
from Bayonne. For even ere the three veteran corps from Germany
came to hand, there was a continuous stream of troops pouring
across the Pyrenees. Most important, perhaps, of all the arrivals
WR." that of Marshal Ney, the toughest and most resolute of a.1l the
Emperor's fighting.IllCIl, who brought with him a spirit of elite....
prise and confidence which had long- been wanting in the army of
Spai1l 2.
I See his Mtnwires (pp. GG, 67) for the situation at this date.
• Hc arrived at lrun 011 Aug. 30 (Madrid Gazette, Sept. 17th, 1808)•
•
SECTION VI: CHAPTER II
CREATION Ol~ THE 'JUNTA GENERAL'
0",' August 1, Madrid had seen the last of the French: yet
it was not till the thirteenth that the Spanish troops appeared
before the gates of the capital. Even then it was not the victorious
amlY of Andalusia which presented itself, but only the Valencian
corps of Llamas, a mel''e di"ision of8,000 men, which would not ha\'e
dared to push forward, had it not known that Joseph Bonaparte
and o.ll his train were now far on their way towards the Ebro.
During the thirteen days which elapsed between his departure and
the arrival of the Valencians there was a curious interregnum in
Madrid. It took some time to convince the populace and the local
authorities that the hated imaders were really gone, and that they
were once more their own masters. Nothing reflects the state of
public opinion better than the Madrid Gazette: down to August 1,
it shows the Imud of a Freneh editor; 'His l\Iajesty' menns King
J oseph~ and all the foreign intelligence is coloured with French
,'jews. On August !t, the foreign influenee begins to disappear,
and we Ilote a very cautious and tentative proclamation by the old
'Council of Castile.' That effete body, shorn by the French of
most of its prominent members, had repeatedly yielded to the
orders of Murat and Savary: it had carried out many decrees of
the new executive, yet it had never actually recognized the legality
of King Joscph's accession. Indeed at the last moment it had
"triven, by feeble methods ofevasion and delay, to avoid committing
it.<>elf to this final step. But we may guess that, had there been no
Baylen, the Coullcil would finally have made up its mind to' swallow
the pill '-if we may use onee more Mural's characteristic phrase.
Howcver, the flight of Joseph had saved it from beillg foreed to
range itself on the side of the traitors, and its members were able
to stay behind in Madrid without fcaring for their nceks. In their
first manifesto there is not a word that could have offended Savary,
if he had returned UIC next day. It preaches the uel,'e:lSity of calm,
order, and quiet; no one must stir up mobs, compromise the public
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safety, or vex his respectable neighbours I. The rest of the paper
on this und the two following days is filled up with CSSlLyS on
geography and political ecollomy, lists of servants seeking plnces,
tl.lld eolourless foreign news many weeks old. Such piteous stuff was
not likely to keep the people quiet: on August 4 a mob assembled,
broke open the house of Don Luis Viguri (one of GOOoy's old
confidants), murdered him, and dragged his body throngh the
streets. }~earing that they too might be considclw Afrallcesadvs
the Council published a second proclamation of the most abjed
kind. The' melancholy instance of insubordination 'of the previous
day Cll.uses them' inlolera.ble sorrow' and is 'unlikely to tend to
public felicity.' 'l11C loyal and ~nerous citi;,,cns ought lo wait for
the working of the law and its ministers, and not to take the-
execution of justice into their own hands. The clergy, the local
officials, every employer oflabour, every father ofa family, are begged
to hclp to maintain peace and order. Then comes a page ofnoti<.'Cs
of new books, and a short paper on the ethics of emigration l Of
Feroinand VII or Joseph I, of politics domestic or foreign, thel'C
is not a word. Two days later the Council at last makes up its
mind, and, after a week of most uncomfortable sitti.ng on the fence,
suddenly bursts out into an 'Address to the hOllourableand generous
people of the capital of Spain,' in the highest sb'aill of patriotism:
'Our lovoo King is in chains, but his loyal subjects have risen in
his name. Our gallant armies have llChicvcd triumphs over" the
invincibles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena." All Europe stands
surprised at their rapid victories. These fellow citizens of ours,
crowned with the laurels of success, will soon be with us. Mean~
while the Council must beg the patriotic citizens of Madrid to
abstain from riot and murder, and to turn their energies into
more useful channels. Let them prostrate themselves before the
altu.r ill gru.teful thanks to God, and makc prcparntions to rc<:cive
and embrace the oncoming bands of liberators.' Domestic in·
telligcllcc becomes for the futuro a list of Freudl atrocities, and
of (sometimes apocryphal) victories in the remoter corners of
Spain 2. Foreign intelligence is served up with an English rather
I Proclamation of the Council, dated Aug. I, published Aug. 2 ill the
GaZe/le. There illllll ori/plllll l.'(Ipy of ti,e broadsheet ill the Vaughalt Paperf.
! On Aug. 9 the reader is im'ited to believe that IloU$!lillon has risen
8j;(ainst Napoleon, and that the peasantry llave stormed its frontier-fortrw of
Belle.g:<rtlc.
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than a French flavour. The arsenal of 'Volovich l' is shipping
scores of cannon and thousands of muskets for the use of the
brave Spnniards, the treasures of Great Britain ore to be poured
into the hands of the insurrectionary Juntas, and so forth. All
this l:omcs El. little late: the good intentions of tile Council
would have been Illore clear if they had been expressed On
August 2 instead of. August 7, when the Frcudl were still at
Buitrago, rather than when they were far away beyond AraJUla
de Duero 2.
It is really astonishing to find that the Council made a bid for
power, and attempted to assume the pose of a sellate of warm-
hearted patriots, after all its base servility to I\furat and Savary
during the last six monlhs. Its president, Don Arias Mon y Velanle,
actually had the audacity to write a circular-note to the "ariou~
provincial Juntas of Spain, proposing that, as a single central
government must obviously be established, they should send repre-
sentatives to Madrid to concert with the Council on means of
defence, Ilnd lend it tile aid of their illflucncc and authority.
That such a discredited body should attempt to assume a kind
of presidential authority oyer the local Juntas who had raised and
directed the insurrection WM absurd. The replies which were
returned were of the most uncompromising kind: the Galician
JWlta taunted the Council with having been 'the most active
instrument of the Usurper.' Pulafox, speaking for Amgoll,
wrote that it 'was a corporation which had not done its duty.'
'l1lC ttetive and ambitiou!> Junta of Seville willhed to accuse
the Council before the face of the Spanish people 'of ha\·ing
sub\'erted the fundamental laws of the realm, of having brivcn
the enemy every facility for seizing the domination of Spain, of
having lost all legal authority and become !lull and void, and
of being suspected of deliberate treason of the most atrocious sort
possible.' The Valencians voted that' 110 public OOdy of any kind
ought to enter into correspollde!ll'e with the Coullcil of Castile, or
I i. e. Woolwieh.
, lt is IUIl'd to agree with Napier'8 verdict that < The Council ,Wall not
wanting to itself; the individuals comprising it did not hesitate to seize the
reins of power wllen the French had departed, and tlll~ prudence with "'hieh
they preserved trultquillity in the eapitalJ and prevented all reaction, prove~
that they were not .....ithout merit, and form~ a striking contrast to the COIl-
duct of the provincial Juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of exees5
was committed and e\'en encouraged' (Napier, i. 290).
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come to any understanding with it l .' All these rebuff's to the
Council were well deserved, and it is clear that the provincial
Juntas were entirely jnstified in their action. Dut it is to be feared
that there lay at the bottom of their hearts not merely honest
inctignation at the impudent proposal that had been laid before
them, but a not unnatural desire to cling as IOllg as possible to their
existing power and authority. In many of the provinces there wt\s
shown a most unworthy and unwise reluctance to proceed at once
to the L'Ollstructioll of a single governing body for Spain, even whell
the proposal was put forward not by a discredited corporation like
'the CoLWcil, but by men of undoubted patriotism.
The eredit of starting a serious agitation for the erection of a
'Supreme JlUlta' must be given to the Murcians, whose councils
wcre guided by the old statesman :Florida Blanca, a survivor from
the da)'s of Charles Ill. As far back as JUlle 22 they had issued
a proclumation setting forth the evils of provincial particularisill,
and advocating the establishment of a central govel'Tlment. NOlle
of the other Juntas ventured openly to oppose this laudable
design, and some of them did their best to further it. But there
were others who clung to power, und were determined to surrender
it at as late a date as they could man~"f!. The Junta of Seville
was fm.' the worst: that body-as we have had occasioll to mcntion
in another place-was largel)' in the hands of intrigucrs, and had
put forth lmjustifiable claims to domillatioll in the whole southern
part of the realm, even usurping the title of 'Supreme .Junta of
Spain t\lld the Indies 2.' III their desire for self-aggrandizemcnt
they took most unjustifiable steps: they suppressed Florida Blanca.'s
:i\'lurcian proclm.natioll, lest it might stir up an agitation in Anda-
lusia in behalf of the establishment of a central government 3. But
this Wll.<; a comparatively vcnial sin: their worst act was to stay
the march of Castai\os on Madrid after Baylen. The prctclo.t uS<.'d
was that they wished to welcome the victorious general and his
army with triumphal entries and fctlSts of rejoicing-things entirely
out of place, so long as the French were still holding the capital
of the realm. '1'0 his own entire dissatisfaction Castafios was
dragged back to Seville, there to display the captured guns and
flags of the .French, and to be received with salvos fired by patriotic
1 All these quotations come from tlle documenu inserted by Torefio in his
fifth book (i. 202).
~ See page 09, 3 Lord Collingwood's CQr~,polldellct) ii. 98.
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ladies who had learnt the drill oftlle artilleryman l • But he SOOn
found to his disgust that the Junta WI\S reaUy aiming at the
employment of his troops not for national purposes hut for their
own aggrandizement. They wished to speak with 40,000 Illell at
their back, and were most reluctant to let the army pass the
Sicrrn Morena., Jest it should get out of their control. Their most
iniquitous design was to overawe by armed forC1.: their neighbours,
the Junta of GrMMa, who refused to recognize them lIS a central
authority for Andalusia, and had given th~ir assent to the Murcian
proposal for the prompt formation of a national brovernment.
They were nctually issuing orders for a division to march against
the Granadnns, when Castaf'ios-thongh a man of mild and COIl-
ciliatory manners-burst out in wrath at the coWlcil board.
Springing up from his chair and smiting the table a resoUllding
blow, he exclaimed, 'Who is the man that dares bid the troops
march without my leave? Away with all provincial differences:
I am the general of the Spanish nation, I am in command of an
honourable army, and we are not going to allow anyone to stir
up civil wa1' 2.' Conscious that the regiments would follow the
victor of Baylen, and refuse obedience to mere civilians, tlle Junta
dropped their suicidal project. But they turned all their energy
into devising prdexts for delaying the march of the army on
Madrid. Their selfishness was undisguised: when Castafios begged
for leave to march on the capital without further delay 3, the
Conde de 'Itlly (the most intriguing spirit among all the politicians
of Seville) responded with the !>imple question, 'And what then
will become of U8?' He then moved that the Junta of Andalusia
should concern itself with Andalusia. and Portugal alone, and not
interfere in what went on beyond the Sierra l\forena. This
proposal was a little too strong even for the narrow.mindcd
particlllacists of the Junta: but though they let Cnstai'ios go, they
contrived excuses for delaying the ffi!U'ch of the greater part of his
army. He did not get to Madrid till August 23, more than
ll. month after Baylen, and then brought with him only the single
division of La Peus, about 7,000 strong. The other three
I Arteche, ii. 124. I 'l'orelio, i. 264.
, This story is told by Lord ColIingwood, ill an official Ilil!p3-tch to Castle-
rengh, dated July 29. He states that he kllOWlI tllllt the ool101\uy took place,
and clearly had the information from Castafios himself (Coflingwood Corre-
'prJ/ldenC6, ii. 100).
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divisions, those of ROOing, Jone!!, and Coupigny, did not cross the
Sierra MOrclla for many week~ after, and some of the troops had
not el'en left Andalusia at the moment when the French resumed
offensive operations in October. On various specious prehml"el
the .Junta detained many regiments at Seville and Cadi7" giving
out that they were to fonn the nucleus of a new' army of reserve,'
which was still a mere skeleton three months after naylen had.
been fought. If we compI\rc the Andulusian arllly-list of November
with that of .Tuly, we find that only seven new battalions I had
joined the anny of Castailos in time to fight on the Ebro. It is
true that a new division had been also raised in Granada, and sent
to Catalonia under General Booing, but this was due to the energy
of the .fuum of that sman kingdom, which was far more active
than Umt of Seville. Andalusia had 40,000 men under arms ill
July, and no more than 50,000 at the beginning of November,
though the Junta had promised to have at least thirty reserve
battalions ready before the end of the autumn, and had received
from England enormous stores of muskets and clothing for their
equipment.
In the' northern parts of Spain there was almost as much con·
fnsion, particularism, and selfishness as in the south. The main
sources of trouble wcre the rivalry of the Juntus of Asturias and
Galicia, and the extravagant claims of the aged and imbecile
Cuestn, in virtue of his position as Cnptaill~Gcncrt\l of Castile.
It will be remembered that in June insurrectionary Juntas had been
established at l.eon and Valladolid, the fonner purporting to repre-
sent the kingdom of Leon, the latter the kingdom of Old Castile.
Each hud been undel' the thumb of Cuesta, who looked upon them
as nothing more than committees established under his authority
for the ciyil government of the provinces of the Douro. Bul; the
disaster of Medina de Rio Seeo destroyed both the power and the
credit of the Captain-General. Flying before the French, the Juntas
took refuge in Galicia, where they settled down at Ponferrada for
a few days, and then moved to Lugo, whither the Junta of GaLicia
came out to meet them. The three bodies, joining in common
session, chose as their president Don Antonio Valdes, the Bailiff
of the Knights of Malta, who was one of the representatives of
Castile. They claimed to be recognized as the supreme civil
I Tiradores de Espana, Provincial de Cadi:l;, Cannona, Baylen, NlI.\'ag de
Tolosa, 3rd and littl Volunteers of Seville.
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government of Northern Spain, but their position was weakened by
two mischances. The Asturian Junta refused to have anything to
do with them, and persisted in remaining sovereign within the bor-
ders of its own principality. Eyen more vexatious was the conduct.
of Cuesta: though he was wandering in the mountains with only
three or four thousand raw levies-the wrecks of Rio Seco-he
refused to recognize any authority in the three federated Juntas,·
and pretended to revoke by his proclamation WIY powers vested in
those of Castile and Lean. The' fact was that he knew that they
would lend support to his military rival Blake, and not to himself.
He feigned to regard the Captains-General and the old Audklleias,
or provincial tribunals, as the sole legitimate powers left in the
kinhtdom, and to consider the Juntas as irregular assemblies desti-
tute of any valid authority. In what a scandalous form he trans-
lated his theories into action, we shall soon see. Meanwhile he
refused to co~opcratc with the troops of Galicia, and mnde llO
attempt to follow the retreating French. All his efforts were
directed to increasing the numbers of the mass of raw levies which
he culled the' Anny of Castile.' But from the whole of the provinces
over which he claimed authority he had only succeeded in scraping
tOf,rethcr 12,000 men by the middle of September, though as far as
population went they represented nearl)'a sixth of the people ofSpaill.
TIle want of any central executive for directing the armies of
the patriots had the most disastrous results. By September 1
Castalios and Llamas had not more than ~O,OOO men at Madrid.
Galluzzo's army of Estremadura, which ought to have joined them
long before, was still employed in its futile siege of ElVRS. Cuesw.
was hanging back in Castile, as jealous of Castanos as he had been
of Blake. 'l11C only armies which were in touch with the French
were Palafox's troops on the Ebro and the Valencian division of
Suint March, which the Junta of Valencia (showillg more patriotism
than most of their mlleagues) had pushed up to Saragossa to aid
the Aragonese. Blake, with the powerful army of Gulicia, had
descended to Astorga. when Bessieres retreated to Burgas. But
from A:storga he advanced most cautiously, always clinging to the
southern slope of the Cantabrian hills, in order to avoid the plains,
where the cavalry of the l.<rench would have /l free hand. It was
not till &ptember 10 that he had concentrated his main body at
Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro, where he was at lust Ilear
enough to the front to be able to mmmence operations.
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'TIle whole month of August, it is not too much to $8.)', was lost
for military purposes because Spain had not succeeded in furnishing
itself with a L'entral govcmmcnt or a commander-in-chief. It had
been wasted in constitutional debates of the most futile kind. To
C~'cry onc, except to L-crtain of the more selfish members of the
.Juntas, it was clear that a way must be found out of the existing
Ilnarchy. Three courses SCCffiL..Q. possible: onc was to appoint a
Regent, or a small Council of Regency, and to entrust to him (or
to them) the conduct of affairs. The second WIl5 to sumlllon the
Cories, the old national parliament of Spain. The third was to
establish a new sort of <:cntrnl f,"Ovemment, b)' inducing each of
the existing Jnntas to send" deputies, with full powers of representa-
tion, to sit togdher as a 'Supreme Central Junta' for the whole
realm. The project of appointing a llegent had at first many
adl'ocntCS: it occurred to both Castai\os and Palafox, and each
(as it chanced) pitched upon the same individual as most worthy
of the post 1. This was the Archduke Charles of Awtria, the sole
general in Europe who had won a military reputation of the first
class while contending with the French. He would have been an
excellent choice-if only he could have been secured. But it did
not take much reflection to sce that if Austria allowed her gl'Catest
captain to accept such a post, she would involve herself in instant
war with Bonapt\rl;c, and if sueh a war broke out the Archduke
would be wanted on the Danube rather than upon the Ebro.
There was no other name likely to command general confidence.
Some spoke of the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo 2, the last prince
of the Spunish royal house who remained in the rcalm. But he
was an insignificant and incapable person, and much discredited
by his dallyillgs with Murnt in the days before the illsurrection
had begun. Clearly he would be no more than a puppet, worked.
by some astute person behind the viceregal throne. Other names
suggested were those of the young Dom Pedro of Portugal (son
.of the Prince-Regent John), and of Prin~ Leopold, the son of
Ferdinand IV of Sicily. The former was a grandson, the latter a
nephew of Charles IV. Both therefore were near to the throne,
but both were foreigners, young, untried in matters of state, and
utterly unknown to the Spaniards. Dom Pedro's claims were not
1 See Artecbe, iii. 118.
t lo'irllt cousin to Charles IV, being the son of the Infante LuisJ and brother
of Godoy's unfortuullte wife.
850 CREATION OF THE 'JUNTA G&'1ERAL' [A",
strongly pushed, but the Sicilian court made a strenuous attempl
to forward those of Princc 1.cQpold. Their ambaSsador in London
tried to enlist the support of the English Government for him:
but Canning and Castlereagh were anxious to avoid any appear-
ance of dictating orders to Spain, and firmly refused to COl.U1tcllance
the project. Before their reply came to hand, King Fcrdinand (or
rather that old intriguer, his spouse, and her son-ill-law the Dllke
of Orleans) sent the prince to Gibraltar, on a man-{)f-war which
they htu:l obtained from Mr. Drummond, the British minister at
]lalermo. By lending his aid to the plan this unwise diplomat almost
succeeded in compromising his government. But most fortunately
our representatives in Spain nipped in the bud this intrigue, which
could not have failed to embroil them "ith the Juntas, none of whom
had the least love for the Sicilian house. "When the Tllullderer
arrived at Gibraltar [August 9] Sir Hew Dall'ymple-thell just 011
the eve of starting for Portugal-refused to allow the prince to
land, or to distribute the proclamations which he had prepared.
These were the work of Lcopold's brother-in-law, Louis Philippe
of Orleans, who had accompanied him from Palermo with the de-
sign of fishing in troubled waters, a craft of which he was to show
himself in later days a past master. If Leopold shoUld become
regent, Orleans intended to be the 'power behind the throne.'
Dalrymple detained the two princes at Gibraltar, and when he was
gone Lonl Collingwood I took the same attitude of hostile neutrality.
Tired of detention, Louis Philippe after a few days sailed for London,
in the vain hope of melting the hearts of the British Cabinet. The
Sieiliau prilll:(l lingered some time, protesting against the fashion
in which he was treated, and holding secret colloquies with deputa·
tions which came to him from many quarters in which the Junta
of Seville was detested. But there was no real party in his favour.
What benefit could come to Spain from the election of a )'outh of
nineteen, whose very name was unknown to the people, and who
could help them neither with mell nor with money, neither with
the statesmanship that comes from experience, nor with the military
capacity that must be developed 011 the battle-field? After remain-
ing long enough in Spanish waters to lose all his illusions, Prince
, I Nallicr is wrong in llinting t1H1t CllllWUg ICllt 1lilOllClf to tIle Sicilian
scheme (i. 177, 178) ill onler to disoblige CasUereagh. Collingwooo's dis--
patches show that he opposed it, as much as did Dalr)'lnple, and thereby won
approval from his governmeut (CfJilingwood 00rrt8pa11~, ii. 216, 217).
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Lcopold returned to his mother in Sicily 1. There had never been
any fOWldation for a per~istent rumour that he was to be made
co-regent along with the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and the
Conde de MOlltijo. Not even the least intelligent members of the
Juntas would have consented to hand over the rule of Spain to this
strallb"e trium\'irate-an imbecile, a boy, and a turbulent intriguer.
There was about us much chance that another vain project might
be carried out-an invitation to General Dumouriez to take
command of v.ll the Spanish armies. Yct this plan too was seriously
brought forward: the Frenchman would not have been unwilling,
but the Spani~h oflk'Cril, fluslu."'<i with their recent SUCc(''8ses, were
not the kind of people to welc;ome a foreign leader, and one whose
last military exploit had been to desert his own army and go over
to the enemy.
Much more specious, at first sight, than any proje<.:t for the
establishment of a regency, was the proposal mooted in many
quarters for the :summoning of the Cortes-whose name recalled
so many ancient memories, and WM connected with the days of
con:stituliollal freedom in the Middle Ages. But not only had the
Cortes been obscured by the long spell of autocracy under the
Hapsburg and Bourbon kings, but it wns by its very constitution
unsuited to represent a nation seeking for a new and vigorous
executive. It wns fnll of mediaeval anomalies; for example the
Asturias had never been represented in it, but had possessed (like
'Vales in the fourteenth and fifteenth centnries) separate govern-
mental machinery of its own. This might have been altered
without much difficulty, but it was more fatal that the distribu·
tion of seats in the lower estates represented an archaic survival.
Many decayed towns in Castile sent members to the COl·tes, while
011 t.he other hand the warlike and populous prO\'im:c of Gulicia
had only onc single vote. To rearrange the representation on
a ratiollal basis would take so long, and cause SO much provincial
jealousy, that it was recognized as pradically impossible.
There remained therefore only the third plan for creating fI.
supreme b'Uvel'nment in Spain-that which proposed that the
various exibting Juntas should each send deputies to somc con·
venicnt spot, and that the union of these representativC!l should
constitute a central authority for the whole realm. This scheme
was not so clearly constitutional as the summolliJlg of tile Cortes
I He sailed OD Nov. 4 (Mad,.id Gazelle).
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would have been, nor did it provide (or real unity of direction in
so complete 0. way t\.8 would have been secured by the appointment
of a single Uegent. But it had the practical advantage of con-
ciliating the various provincial Juntas: though they sacrificed
their local :sovereignt)', the)' obtained at leust the power of
nominating their own master!!. ]11 each of them the more active
and ambitious members hoped that they might secure for them-
selves the places. of delegates to the new supreme assembly.
Accordingly the Juntas were induced, one after another, to consent
to the scheme. Public opinion ran so strongly ill favour of unity,
and the existing administratiw chaos \I'M so clearly IIndesirabl~
that it wss impossible to prote~t against the creation of a Supreme
Central Junta. Some of the provinces-notably.Murcia, Valencia,
and Grano.dn--showed a patriotic spirit of self-abnegation and
favoured the project from the firsl Even Galicia and Seville,
where the spirit of particularism was strongest, dared not openly
resist the movement. There were malcontents who suggested that
a federal constitution was preferable to a centralized one, and
that it would suffice for Ule provinces to bind themselves togcUlcr
by treaties of aUian~ instead of handing themselves o"cr to a
newly created executive. But even in Aragon, where federal union
with Castile seemed more attmethc to many than complete in-
corporation, the obvious necessity for common military action
determined the situation l , Every province of Spain at last adhered
to the project for constructing a Supreme Centrnl Junta. Even the
narrow-minded politicians at Seville had to assume an attitude of
hearty consent. But tbcir rcluetam.'(l peeped out in the suggestion
which they made that the Junta should meet, not at Madrid, but
at Ciudad Real or Almagro in La Mancha., places convenient to
themselves, but obscure and remote in the eyes ot' inhabitants of
Asturias or Galicia. Their aversion to Madrid was partly caused
by its remoteness from their own borders, but much Illore by
jealousy of the Council of Castile, which still hung together and
exercised local authority in the capital. Other JWltas showed
their aversion for the Council in the same way, and ultimately
the place selected for the gathering of the new govemrnent was the
royal residence of Amnjuez, which stands to Madrid much as do
Versailles or 'Yindsor to Paris and London. This choice was an
l Note the federdlist vieW!! of tlL6 Arsgonese Migllcl PriucipcJ quoted by
Arte<:he (ii, 121).
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obvious mistl.lke: the (:cntral government of a country loses in
dignity when it does not reside in the national capital. It SCCffi!:l
to distrust its own power or its legality, when it exiles itself from
its proper abode. At the best it casts n slur on the inhabitants of
the capital by refusing to trust itself amollg them. Madrid, it
is true, is not to Spain what Paris is to Franee, or London to
EllgIA.lld: it is a comparatively modern place, pitched upon by
Philip II as the seat of his court, but destitute of ancient memories.
Nevertheless, it was nt least infinitely superior to Aranjucz as a
meeting-place. 011 geographical or strnlcgica1 grounds they arc so
doS<! that no advantage accrues to one that does not belong to the
other. But for political reasons' the capitol was distinctly preferable
to the almost suburban palace 1. If the existence of the Council of
Castile so much disturbed the Junta, it would have been quite
pOf;sible to dis.<;olve that discredited body. No one would have
made allY serious effort in its favour, even in the city of its abode.
I Both Florida BlanC/l and Jovellanos were ill (,wOllr of making Madrid the
meeting-place. The Andalusians defeated tbem.
O.lf.\S. J
SECTION VI: CHAPTER III
THE' JUNTA GENERAL' IN SESSION
THE provincial Juntas, when once they had consented to sacrifice
their locnl sovcrcibrJlty, made no great delay in forwa,rding their
representatives to the chosen meeting-place at Aranjuez. The
number of deputies whom they sent to the Supreme Central Junta
was thirty-five, seventeen provincial Juntas each cOlltribll~illg two,
:.md the Canary Islands one. The 13iscayun provinces, still wholly
in the posses.<;ion of the French, had no local body to speak for
them, and {'"Quld not therefore choose deputies. The number thus
m:ri;voo at was not a vcry convenient one: thirty-fh'c is too few for
a parliament., and too many for an executive government. More-
over proportional representation was not secured; Navarre and
the Dalearic Islands were given too much weight by having two
members each. Andalusia, having eight deputies for its four Juntas
of Sc\'ille, Jaen, Granada, and CordO\'a, was over-represented when
compared with Galieia, Amgon, and Catalonia, which had eath no
more than two. The quality of the delegates was very various:
among the most notable were thc ex-ministers Florida lllanca an'cl
Jovellanos, who represented respectively the better sides of the
Conscrvativc and thc Libcrol parties of Spain-if we may use such
terms. The former, trained in the school of'benevolent despotism"
under Charles Ill, was a good specimen of the eighteenth-century
statesman of the old sort-polite, expericnced, cnergetic, a ripe
scholar, and an able diplomat. But he was eighty years old and
failing in health, and his retul1l to I\ctive politics killed him in
a few months. Jovellanos, a somewhat younger man \ belOll~ ,
in spirit to the end rather than the middle of the cighu.'Cnth
century, and was imbued with.the ideas of liberty and constitutional
government whieh were afloat all over Europe in the early days of
the French Ilevolution. He represented modem libemlism in the
shape which it took in Spain. For this reason he had suffered
1 He Wail born in 1743,
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many things at the hands of Goooy, and emerged from a long
period of imprisonment and obscurity to take his place in the
councils of the nation. Unhappily he was to find that his ideas
were still those ofa minority, and that burcll.uCTllCyand obscurantism
were deeply rooted in Spain.
Of the other members 1 of the Supreme Junta, the Bailiff Valdcz
and Francisco Palafax, fresh from his brother's triumphs at Sara-
go~ were perhaps the best knowll. Among the rest wc note
a considerable number of clergy-two archbishops, a prior, and
three mllons--but uot more than might have been expected in a
country where the Church was so powerful. Military men were not
so strongly rcprcsenk"'<1, being only five in number, and three of
these were militia colonels. The rest were mainly local notables-
gl'£l.lldecs, marqui~ and counts predominated over mere COlll-
moners. Some of them were blind particularists, and a few-like
the disreputable Conde de Tilly-wcrC intriguers with doubtful
antecedents. The whole body represented Spain well enough, but
Spain with her weaknesses as well as her strong points. It was not
a very promising instrument with which to achieve the liberation
of the Peninsula, or to resist the greatest general in Europe.
Considered as a government of national defence, it had far too
little military knowledge; a haphal'.ard assembly of priest..", poli-
ticians, and grandees is not adapk'<1 for the conduct of a war of
independence. Hence came the incredible blindness which led it
to refuse to appoint a single eOffimander-in-chicf. and the obstinacy
with which it buried itself in constitutional debates of the most
futile sort when Napolcon WllS thundering at the ga~ of Spain.
The meeting of the Supreme Junta Wag fixed for September 25,
but long ere that date came round the military situation WllS
assuming new developments. The first modification in tlie state of
affairs WlIS Ctlmed by the aoorti"e attempt of the Basque provinces
1;0 free themselves. The news of Baylcn had caused as great l\ stir
in the northern mountains as in the south or the east of Spain.
But Biscay, Guipu7,c0ft, and Alava had considerable French garrisons,
and the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte 1;0 tile Ebro only increased
the number of enemies in their immediate neighbourhood. It
would have been no less patriotic than prudent for these provinces
to delay their insurrection till it had some chance of proving useful
I For a complete list of the n:unes and profeliSioDS of the members of the
Junta, sce the ApIKludix.
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to the general scheme of operations for the expulsion of the French
from Spain. If they could have waited till Blake and Castaftos
had rcaeln.'<! the Ebro, and then Iltwc taken tlrUlS, they might hnl'e
raised II most dangerous distraction in the rear of the French, and
have prevented them from turning all their forces 8.r,...wnst the
regular armies. But it was mad to rise when Blakc was still at
ABtorgn, and Castaiios had not )'ct reached Madrid. It could not
have been e.xpected that the local patriots should understand this:
but grave blame falls on those who ought to have known better.
The Duke of lnfantado, who was ncting under Blnkc, and Colonel
Doyl~ the English representative at that general's head quarters,
did their best to precipitate the outbreak in Biscay. They promised
the Biscayan leaders that a division from Asturias should come to
their aid, and that English anns and ammunition should be poured
into their harbours I. At the first word of encouragement all
Discn.y took arms [August 6]: a great mass of insurgents collcct.c<l
at Bilbao, and smaller bands appeared along the line of the moun-
tains, e~·en as far as Valcarlos on the very frontier of France. But
no cxtemal aid came to them: the AsturinnS-ll.vcrse to every
proposal that came from Galicia-did not move outside their own
provincial boundary, and no other Spanish army was within striking
distance. Bcssicrcs was able, at his leisure, to detach General
Merlin with 3,000 men to fall on Bilbao. This brigade pro"ed
enough to deal with the main body of the Biscayan insurgents,
who after a creditable fight were dispersed with heavy 1055-1,200
killed, according to the French commander's dispatch [August ]6J.
Bilbao was taken and sacked, and English vessels bringing-now
that it was too late-5,OOO stand of arms for the insurgents,.
nar1'Owly escaped capture ill its harbour. All along the line of
the Basque hills there was hanging and shooting of the leaders
of the abortive rising 2. The only re6ult of this ill-aclviSl.'<1 more
was that Bessicrcs was warned of the danger in his renr, and kept
a vigilant eye for the future on the coastland. The Biscayans,
as was natural, were much discouraged at the way in which they
had been left in the lurch by their fellow countrymen, and at the
inefficacy of their own unaided eHarts. 'l11Cy were loth to rise
a second time.
It was not till twenty days had passed since the fall of Bilbao
I Sce tllc letters of Doyle quoted in I'\lLllicr, i. 287.
~ Joseph Bonaparte to Napoleon, Sept. IJ, 1008.
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that the first attempts at combined action werc made by thc
Spanish generals. On September 5 there met at Madrid a council
of war, composed of Castanos, Cucsta, the Valcncian General
Llamas, and the representatives of Dlake and Palafox-the J)uke
of Infanhulo and Calvo de Rozas, intendallt-gcneral of the arlllY
of' Aragon. These officers met with much suppressed jealous)· and
suspicion of each other. The Duke had his eye on Cuesta, ill ac-
cordance with the instmctiolls of Dlake. Castmios and Cuesm were
at daggers drawn, for the old Captain·General had just proposed
a cmp iI'etat against the J unts. to the Andnlusian, and had bee.n
repulsed with scorn I. The representative of the army of Aragon
had been charged to sce that no one was put abovc the head
of Palafox. When the meeting openeU, Cuests. proposed that it
should appoint SI. single general to direct all the forces of' Spain.
The others demlllTCd: Cuesta was much their senior in the army-
list, and they imagined-probably with trnth-that he would
claim tilC POllt of cOlllmander-in-chief fOI· himself, ill spite of the
memories of' Cabezon and Ilia Seeo. They refused to listen to
his arguments, though it was l:crtaiu that unity of t:ommand wa:,;
in every way desirable. Nor was any disposition shown to raise
Custailos to supreme authority, though this was the obvious step
to take, as he was the onl)· general of Spain who had won a great
battlc in the open field. But person~l and provincii1l jcalousy
stood in the way, and Castaiios himself, though not without
ambition, was destitute of the arts of cajole!")', and made no
attempt to push his own eandidature for the post of commander-
in-chicf. Perhaps he hoped that the Supreme Junta would do him
justice ere long, and refrained for that reason from self-assertion
before his colleagues. Nothing, therefore, was settled on Sep-
tember 5, save a plan for common operations against the French
1 I find tile story of CuClltn's projected coup d'e/llt (in Torefio, i. 2G7), Wllich
Wll.S supposed to rest on the authority of Castafios alone, completely corrobo-
rated in Sir Charles Vaughao's pril'ate diary·. On Sept. }.5 Vaughan, whilo
passing through Segovia, met Cuesta, Wl10 told him' that two measnres were
absolutely necessary: (I) the abolition of the llroviucial Juntas, aud the
Tt'storatiou of the ancient lluthority of the Cllpl.ains-General and &at Audi-
tllcia; (2) The exercise of military force over the Junta at Ocai\3. (i. e. the
8upreme 'Central Junta ') sufficient to compel tllem to elect an executh'e
&Quncil of three or nl'o persons to be plnccd Rt the head of differcnt dcport-
ments, Rnd to be ~ponsible to the nation at large.' This is precisely what
Cuesta propo6ed to Castaiios.
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on the Ebro, Like all schemes that are formed from a compromise
between the views of several men, this was not a very brilliant
strategical effort; instead of providing for a bold stroke with the
whole Spanish army, at some point on the long line between BurgO!\
and Mil~rtrO, it merely brought the insurgent forces in half-a-dozen
separate columns face to face with the enemy. Dlake, with his own
army and the A<rl.urians, was to be asked to ooncentrate near Reynosa,
at the sources of the Ebro, and to endeavour to turn Bessieres'
flank and penetrate into Biscay I, He would have 80,000 men, or
more, but not a single complete regiment of cavalry. Next to
him Cuesta was to operate against the front of Bessieres' corps,
with his < Army of Castile,' eight or nine thousand raw levies backed
by about 1,000 horse. He undertook to make Burgo de Osma
his point of starting. More to the east, Castat10s was to gather
at Soria the four divisions of the army of _t\.ndalusia, b\lt at present
he had only that of La lleiia in hand: the .Junta of Seville was
detaining the rest. Still more to the right, Llamas with his 8,000
Valcncians and Murcians was to march on Tudela. Lastly Palafox,
with the annyof Aragon and the Valencian division of Saint March,
was to keep north of the Ebro, and turn the left flank of Moncey's
corps by way of Sallgucsa: he t'ould bring about ~-5,OOO men into
line, but there were not more than fi,'e or six regular battalions
among them; the rest were recent levies. When the aOllY of
Estremadura should come up (it \vas still about Elvas and lladajo7.)'
it was to join Castanos; and it was hoped that the English forces
from Portugal might also be directed on the same point.
But meanwhile only 75,000 men were available in the first line;
and this force, spread along the whole front from Reynosu to
Sanguesa, and acting on wid~ external lines, was not likely to make
much impression on the French. TIle numbers of the invaders
were considerably greater than those of the patriot-Il.rnlies. Jouroall
had 70,000 men b)' September 1, and was being reinforced every
day by fresh oottalions, though the three corps from GermOOI)'
I'-were still far off. Before the Spaniards l.'QulJ. move he Ilppreciahly
outnumbered them, and he had the inestimable advantage of
holding a colllparntivel)' short front, and of being able to con-
centrate on any point with far greater rapidity than WM possible
to his adversaries. Even bud they thrown all their forces on one
single point, the French, always using the' interior lines,' could ha\"e
• So Torefio. Arteche 6a}'8 that he was to concentrate at Arandli.
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got together in a Yer)' short time. 'The onl)' weak point, indeed,
ill the French position .was that Dessieres' vanguard at Burgos WllS
too far forward, and in ~ome peril of being enveloped between
Blakc and Cuesta. But this detachment, us wc shnll se<; wus ere
long drawn back to the Ebro.
Before the eumpaign began the Spaniards oOtailJ(..'<1 onc notable
advantage-the removal of Cuesta from command, owing to hill o\l'n
incredible arrogancc and folly. It will be remembered that he
regmxlcd the JlInta.~of Leon and Castile as reca.lcitrant subordinates
of his own, and had declared all their acts IIull and void. \Vhcn
they proceeded, like the other Juntas, to elect represcnbl.tives for
the meeting at Aranjucz, he waited till the deputies of Lcon were
passing near his camp, and then l'mddenly descended upon them.
DOll Antonio ValdC7" the Bailiff of the Maltese Knights, and the
Vi7,conde de Quintanilla, were arrested by his troopers all(l shut up
in the ensUe of Scgoyia. Hc announced that thcy should be tried
by court-martial, for failing in obedience to their Captain-Gencral.
This astonishing act of presumptioll drew down on him the wrath
of the Supreme Junta, which was naturally eager to protect its
members from the interference of the milimry arm. Almost its
first act on assembling was to order him to appear at Aranjnez
and to suspend him from commalld. Cuesta would have liked to
resist, but knowing tlmt his own army was weak and that Blake
and Castmios were his bitter enemies, he had to yield. He came
to Aronjuez, and was superseded by General Eguia. Valdez and
QuinmniUn. were immediately released, and took their seats in the
Supreme Junta.
The sessions of that body had begun on September 25. Twenty·
four members out of the designated thirty-five had assembled on
that day, and aftcr a solemn religious ceremony had rc-proclaimed
Ferdinand vn, and elected 1?Iorida BJancn. as their President.
They then proceeded to nominate a Cabinct, chosen entire1y from
outside their own body. Don Pedro Cevallos was to be Minister
of Foreign Affairs: he had served Ferdinand VII in that cnpacity,
but had smil'Chcd his reputation by his submission to Bonaparte
after the treachery at Bayonne. However, his ingenious justification l
I His very elaborate vindication of bimself can be reau iu hig p.'\mphlet of
September, 1808, which was translatcd into EllgliEh in the same winter, and
reprinted in London. It contains a good account of tile Barouue busiueEs,
and man)' \'aluable state pal/era.
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of his condu<:t, and his early desertion of King Joseph, were allowed
to serve as an adequate defencc. DOll Anoonio EscafLO was
Minister of Marine, Don Benito Hermida. :Minister of Justice, DOll
Fhmcisco de Saavedra Minister of the Interior. The most im·
portant place of all, that of Minister of 'Var, was given to an
utterly unknowll person, ~IlCl'!ll Anwnio Corncl, instead of to
any of the officers who had distingnished themseh'es during the
ra-ent campai!,'lls. He was to be aided by a supreme (''Qundl of
war, consisting of six members of the Junta, three of' whom were
civilians without any military knowledge whatever. No intention
of appointing a COlllllulIlder-in-chicf was shown, Rnd the MinistC!,
of War corresponded directly with all the generals in 'charge of the
provincial armies. Nothing (:ould have been more ill judged; from
the want of a single hand at the helm all the oncoming operations
were doomed to inevitable failure. The supreme direction was
nominally entrusted to the obscure war-minister and his councillors,
really it lay with the generals in the field, who obeyed orders from
hend quartcrs only just as much as they chose. Eac.h pWJoo his
own game, and the result was disaster.
Aglall<:e at the subjects which were discussed by the mcmbeTs of
the Junta, during its first weeks of session, suffices to show the short-
sightOOlll'SS of their policy, and their utter inability to grasp the
situation. They should have remembered that they were a govem-
ment of natioual defent:e, whose main duty was the expulsion of
the French from the soil of Spain. But military subjects fUnlished
the smallest portion of their subjects of debute. They published
indeed a manifesto to the effect that they intended to levy an
army of 500,000 foot, and 50,000 horse-a much greater force
than Spain in her most flourishing days could have raised or
maintained. But this paper army was never seen in the field:
less than a third of the number were under anns at the moment
ill December when the Junta hud to By from Aralljucz, before the
advancing legions of Napoleon. Nor was it likely that it great
army could be raised, equipped, and disciplined, while the ccntral
government was devoting the greater part of its attention to
futilities. The most cruel comment 011 its work lies in the fact
that its troops were ill furnished, badly armed, and half starved,
at the momcnt when the provinces were doing their best to provide
equipment, and e\'ery POlt in Spain was gorged with cannon,
muskets, munitions, and stores sent from England-a great part
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of them destined to fall into the hands of the French. l'attly
from want of experience, but still more from want of energy, the
Junta failed to use the national enthusiasm and the considerable
resources plaeed ut its di:spo.."ll.1.
When we look at the main topics of its debates we begin to
understand its failures. A good deal of time wus spent in voting
honora.ry distinctions to it<;; own members. The I'resident was to
be addressed as 'his highness,' the Junta l\S a corporation was 'its
majesty,' if we may use the ludicrous phrase. Each member
became' his excellelle)" and received the liberal sulary of 120,000
reats (£l,!WO), besides the right of wearing on his breast a gold
plaque with an embossed represcntation of the castern and
western hemispheres. There was a good deal of dispensing of
places Md patronage in the army and the civil service among
relatives and dependencies of 'their excellencies,' but not more
perhaps than happens in other countries in war-time when Q new
government comcs in. At least the changes led to the getting rid
ot' a good many of Goooy's old bureaucrats. The real fault of the
Junta lay in its readiness to fall into factiolls, amI fight oyer
constitutional questions that should ha.ve been relegated to times
of peace. Among the thirty-five members of the Junta a clear
majority were, like their president, F10rida Blanca, Spaniards of
the old school, whose idCllS of government were those of the auto~
cratic sort that had prevailed under Alberoni and Charles Ill.
They looked upon all innovations as tinged with the poison of the
French Revolution and savouring of Jacobinism and infidelity.
On the other hand there \I'M a powerful minority, headed b)'
Jovellanos and illChulillg l\Ialtill de Gamy, the secretary of the
Junta, the Marquis of Campo Sagrado, Valdes, Calvo de Ro-illS,
and others, who held marc modem "icws and hoped that the main
result of the war would be to make Spain a constitutional monarchy
of the English type. How far this dream was from realization
was shown by the fact that among the first measures passt..'tl
through the Supreme Junta were ordinances allowing the Jesuit<;;
(expelled long sill(.'c by Charles Ill) to return to Spain, recreating
the office of Inquisitor-General, and suspending the liberty of the
press. Such 1IJl.'lUiUt'C:l filled the libel'Ul section ill the Junta with
despair, by showing the narrow and reactionary views of the
majority. But the greater purt of the time spent in session by
'its majesty' was wasted on' pm-el)' constitutional questions.
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Firstly ·there was 8. ]ollg polemic with the Council of Ca.'ltile,
whose hatred for the Junta took the form of starting doubts as to
the legality of its eoustiLution I. It suggested 1I11\t nil constitu-
tional precedents were against a body so numerous as thirly-fh"e
persons taking charge of the bJ'Qvernance of the realm. Former
conncils of regency had been composed of three or five members
only, and there was no legal authority for breaking the rulf', The
Council suggested that the only woy out of the difliculty would be
to call the Cartes, and that assem hI)' would at oll(;e supersede the
authority of the Supreme Juuta. Instead of arguing with the
Council of Castile, the new government would have done well to
am~st or disperse that effete and disloyal hody; but it chose
instead to indulb"e ill a war of manifestos and proclamations which
led to nothing. To find the supreme government consenting to
ltl'gue about its own legality was not reassuring to the nation.
Moreo\'er, Jovellanos and his followers spent much time ill
impressing on their colleagues that it was their duty to appoint
a regency, and to cut down their own unwieldy numbers, as well
as to provide machinery for the summoning of the Cortes at some
not too distant date. To be reminded Ulat they were no pel'-
manent corporation, but a temporary committee dressed in a little
brief authority, was most unpleasant to the lllfljorit)'. They
discussed from every point of view the qnestion of the regency and
the Cortes, but would not )'ield up their own supremacy, Indeed
they proposed to begin legislation on a very wide basis for the
reform of the constitution-business which should rather have
been left to the Cortes, and which was particularly inappropriate
to the moment when Napoleon was crossing the Pyrenees. The
great manifesto of the Junta (October ~6] sets forth its inten-
tions very dead)'. 'The knowledge and illustration of our ancient
and constitutional laws; the changes which nltercd circumstances
render necessary in their re-establishment; the reforms necessary
in civil, criminal, and rommercial codes; projects for improving
public education; a system of regulated economy for the collection
and distribution of the public revenue ... are the subjects for the
investigation of wise and thoughtful men. The Junta will form
different committees, each entrusted with a particnlar department,
to whom all writings on matters of government and administration
may be addressed. The exertions of each contributing to give
I For these documents see the Madrid Gazelle of Oct. 4.
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a. just diredioll to the public mind, the go\'ernment will be
enabled to establish the internal happiness of Spain t.' From
another official document we learn that' among the most grave
and ~rgent objects of the attcntion of the Central .Tunta will be
the encouragement of agriculture, the arts, commCI'Cc, and naviga-
tion 2.'
Clearl.y nothing could be more inappropriate and absurd than
that this govcrnment of llationnl defence should turn its attention
to subjects such as the reform of national education, or the en-
couragement of the arts. It is equall}' certain that if it should
propose to 'consider the changes necessary in our ancient laws,' it
would be going beyond its competence; for such business belonged
only to a permanent and properly constituted national assembly,
such a<; the Cortes. This was not the time for constitutional
debate;, nor wus the Central Junta the body l;}lUl should hU\'e
started them. .<\.ll their energies should have been devoted to the
war. Dut misled u.s to the situation by the long quiescence of
the French arm)' on the Ebro, they turned their minds to every
topic that should have been avoided, and neglected the single one
that should always have been before their eyes. It was in vain
that Calm de R07..RS, the Aragonese deputy, and a few more, tried
to keep their eollengucs to tlle poinl The majority fell to debating
on the subjects on which the despotic and the liberal theories of
government clash, and spent themselves on discussions that were as
heated as they were futile. Mcallwhile the lime that should have
been tumed to account ....·us slipping away, and the army was not
being reinfon::oo. A glrulce at the field-states of thc Spallish
troops, comparing those of August 1 witll those of November 1,
sufficiently proves this. The provinces which had been recovered
by the retreat of the French to tlle Ebro wcre not doing thcir
duty. The wide and populous regions of Old Castile and Leon
lmd sent 4,600 men to Rio Seeo in July: in October the}' had less
than 12,000 under arms 3. From New Castile there seem to have
1 Manifesto ofthe Junta to the Spanish people, Oct. 26.
t Madrid Gazette of Oct. lU, p. 1,301.
t Napier is not quite correct ill 8/Lying (i. 293) tlmt 'Lcon never raised
a single soldier for the CIlUse.' .It had tllrce battalions of volunteers (2,400
men) at Uio Seco, and raised four more at Leon, Zamora, Ledesma, and
Henaventc in September (Madrid Gazette, Sept. 28). Hut tllis WlUl a poor
oontribution for a kingdom of four pro\'inees and 620,000 souls.
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been raised nothing more than four battalions of Madrid Volunteers,
a weak cavalr)' regiment, and two battalions of Cazadorcs de Cuellea
and Tirad<ffC8 de Custil/a: at allY rate no troops but these arc to be
found recorded in the lists of the armies that fought in October,
November, and Dc<.'cmbcr, 1808. Even allowing tlm! New Castile
may htwc supplied recruit'! to its own corps of embodied militia
sen·ing with the AndalWlian army 1, it is clenr that, with a popu-
lation of 1,200,000 souls, it ought to have done much more in
raising new regiments. And this was the district in whose very
midst the Junta was sitting! Wlmt little was done in Madrid
seems to have been mainly the result of private enterprise: the
Gw.eUe for Oetobe" is full of vohmtary donations of horses,
saddlery, and money, for the eqnipmcnt of a corps of dragoons
for the army of Old Castile, and of similar gift.~ received" by Calvo
de Uozas for the army of Arngon. But there are IlO signs of
requisitions by the government for the purpose of raising an army
of New Castile, which could certainly have been done. The king-
dom with it.~ five provinces ought to ha,'e given 40,000 men insteud
of 4,000: for Asturias, with only 370,000 souls, had raised 13,000:
Arugon with 650,000 had placed no less thun $Ji!,OOO levies in the
field: and Estremadura with 4!O,OOO had sent to the front l!t,OOO
men by October, while keeping 10,000 more of undrilled recruits
in its depOts 2. New Castile, as we have already had occasion to
remark, had 1,Ji!OO,OOO inhabitants, and yet hnd. only added to its
original five battalions of militia six more of volunteers, and a
single regiment of horse, at the moment when Napoleon's armies
came flooding across the Ebro. The Central.Junta's authOlitr in
A.ndalusia 01' Galicia was much limited by the survival of the
ambitious local Juntas. But in Lean and the two Castiles there
was, when once Cuesta had been got out of the way. no rival power
1 1 see no proof that even this Wll.':! dOllc. TI,cre were only five of thern,
the l'rouilrcialu of Cuenca, Toledo, Ciudad Real, Alcazar de Don Juan,
and Siguen~. Toledo and Al=r had .5iD and fillS under arms at the time
of Daylell, ami only .500 em:!I, apt,,"rcntly, in Nov. 1808. S(lC Art.eche,
iii. 40(1.
I F'or tlle Asturians see the tablc in Arteehe (it 6,'n): they were still 10,000
strong after having shared in lllake's disastrous campaigll. For the Estrema-
UUl'<lns COlll!"'lre tile list of rcgilllelll:ii rdised ill the Mollrid Gazette ofOet. 21,
gi\'ing a total of 23,600 men, with the actual morning state of the Est:rem~
uurall troops at .Madrid 011 their way to Burgos, 12,04G iu all, giren in
Artecbc (iiL Hi).
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in the field. No onc was to blame but the central government, if
the full resources of those regions were not utilized in Septembel",
October, find November. The English rcprcscntath"cs at iVIndrid
saw all this, and did their best to stir up the Junta. But it WllS
not likely that mere foreigners would succeed, where Cnstaiios and
the other more energetic Spanish officers had failed. Alre..'ldy in
October the situation appeared most unpromisillg: ,,,re have made
repeated representations,' wrote Mr. Stuart, the lll;tish minister,
'and I have gi\'cn in paper after paper, to obtain something like
promptitude and vigour: but though loaded with fair promises in
the commencement, we scan:ely quit the members of the Junta
before their attention is absorbed ill petty pursuits and in wrangling,
which impedes even the simplest arrlUl&"Cmcnb nc<.'cssury for the
interior government of the country.... In short, we are doing
what we can, not what wc wish; and I fiSSure you we have
infamous tools to work with I,' Exactly the same impression is
produced by a study of the dispatches of Lord "\-\'illiam llentinek,
our military representative at Madrid, and of the diary of
Sir Charles Vaughall, who carefully attended and followed the
debates of tlie Central Junta at Al1mjuez. It was clcur to nny
dispassionate observer that time was being wasted, and that the
best was not being done with the fL\'ailable materia.!.
This was all the more inexcusable because the nation was
thoroughly in earnest, and prepared to make any sacrifices. The
voluntary contributions made both by provim:es und by individuals
were astollllding when the poverty of Spain is taken into considera-
tion 2. It was the energy iUld will to use them on the part of the
leaders that was wanting. Moreover, England was pouring in
supplies of nIl sorts: before November 16 she had sent at least
Hl~.OOO muskets and other military equipment of all kinds to
the mlue of several hundred thousand pounds. Defore the same
date she had forwarded 4,725,000 dollars in hUlu cash s, and
Mr. Frerc, the newly appointed minister, brought another million
to Corunna.
1 Stuart to Moore. from Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808.
, For deL'uls see tlle I.aLle9 in ArgucllclI. aut! tile grants recorded in the
Jfadrid Gazette for SeptemberJ October. and November.
3 I take these figures as to what had been actually received from VaugllanJ
who was at Madrid, in constant communication with Stuart and Bentinck.
l1,ey rCl'rC$Cut what lmd been paid o,"er and acknowkodged, not what had heel!
promiaet! or provided, and may be taken as accurate.
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Instead of utilizing cn~r)' possible re>ourcc the government went
on debating about things unessential, as if the war had been ended
at Baylen. It would neither conduct the new campaign itself, nor
appoint a single commander·in-chief to conduct it in its behalf.
'Vith absolute truth Colonel Graham wrote from the head quarters
of the Arm}· of the Centre that' the miserable s)-stem established by
the JWlta was at the bottom of all misfortunes. I pitied poor
Cnstaiios and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the greatest
degree ','
l Graham to Moore, from TuoJclaJ Nov. 9, 1808.
SECTION VI: CHAPTER IV
AN El'lSODE IN THE BALTIC
IT will be remembered that one of Napoleon's preliminary
measures, in his long campaign against the freedom of Spain,
had been the 1'Clllo\'al of the flower of her tu:my to the shon'!> of
the Baltic. In the spt;ng of 1807 the Marquis of La Romana,
with fourtccn battalions of infantry and five regiments of cavalry,
'all completed to war strength, had marched for Hamburg. After
wintering in the Hansentic towns, Mecklenburg, and Swedish
Pomcrauia, this corps had been moved up early in 1808 into
Denmark I. It is clear that there WM no military object in
placing it there. The Dunish fleet was b"Oue, carried off by
Lord Cathcart's 'expedition in the previous September, and there
wus no pl"()oobility that the English would retmn for u second visit,
when they had completely executed their plan for destroying the
naval resollrces of Denmark. France and Sweden, it is true, were
still at war, but King GUSULvuS wus so much occupied by the
defensive struggle against the llussia!ls in l"inland, that it was
unlikely that he would detach troops for all objcctlcss expedition
against the Danes. On the other hand the Anglo-Swedish fleet
was so completely dominant in the Daltic and the Sound, that
there was no possibility of launching an expedition frolll Denmark
against Southern Sweden. Even between the various islands at
thc mouth of the Baltic, where the water-distances arc very short,
troops could only be moved at night, and with infinite precau-
tions against being surprised on the passage by English frigates.
Gothenburg and the other harbours of South-westem Sweden served
as convenient ports of call to the British squadron told ofr for the
observation of the Cattegat, the two Belts, and the Sound.
Nothing could be done a..:,<minst Sweden, unless indeed a frost of
I The Spanish troopg, though the best of the whole army, do not seem to
ha\'e much impressed the German observer witll their disciplille. See the
l\IooklcllLurgcr Von Suckow's observatiOll8 Oil what he saw of them in his
Prom Jella tIJ MlJtCOw, p. 92.
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e...ceptional severity might close the watenvay between Zealand
and Scania. Even then an attempt to make a dash at Helsillgborg
or Malmo would involve so many difficulties and dangers that few
generals would haWl cared to risk it.
La Romana's corps formed part of an army under Marshal
Rcrnadotte, whose sphere of command extended all over the
south· western shores of the Baltic, and whose head quarters WCI'('
sometimes at Schleswig and sometimes at I...iibeck or Strll.lsund.
Hc bad considerable French and Dutch contingents, but the
bulk of his force consisted of 30,000 Danes. In preparation for
Napoleon's scheme against the Spanish Bourbons, La Romana's
forces had been carefully scattered between Jutland and tJIC
Danish Isles, so that there WM 110 large central body concentrated
under the Marquis'l> own hand. The garrisons of the SplUIish
regiments were interspersed between those of Danish troops, so
that it would be difficult to get them together. In March, 1808,
when the Emperor had at last shown his hand by the treacherous
seizure of Pampeluna, Barcelona, and Figueras, the troops of La
Romana were cantonoo as follows. Six battalions were in thc
island of Zealand, mainly in and about the old royal residence of
Roeskildc I, Four battalions and two cavalry regimcnts wcre in
Fi.inen, the central island of the Danish group, and with them
La Romana himself, whose head quarters were at Nyborg 2, One
battalion lay in the island of Langcland, close to the south coast
of Funen 8, In the mainland of Jutland were three cavalry
regiments and three battalions of inftlntr~y4, qUlll"'tered in the little
towns at the soUthetl1 end of the Cattegat-Fredericia, -<\.a1'huu8, and
Randcrs. In Zcaland the 4,000 Spaniards were undcr the eycs of
the main Danish army of observation ~tJ'8.inst Sweden. In Fiinen
La Romana's 4,500 horsc and foot were cantonoo in small detach-
ments, while a solid body of 3,000 l)anes garrisoned Odense in
the (:entre of the island, scparating the Spanish regimcnts onc frolll
another. In Langeland, along with the Catalonian light battalion,
were a company of French grenadiers and about 800 Danes, The.
troops in Jutland were mixed up with a brigade of Dutch light
l Infantry regiments of Guadalajara :md Asturias, of three battalions Cl\ch.
t Infantry regiment of I'rincesa (tluee battalions), light b.1ttaliOll of Barce-
lontL, and cavalry regiments of Alnmlll'.'lllnd Villllvici~a.
I Light battalion of 'Voluuteers of Ca.talonia.'
• !nfJ.ntry regirneut of Zarnora, cavalry regimcllts Del Rey,A1ga.rve, Infante.
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cavalry and some Danish infantry. Napoleon's own provident eye
had been roving round Denmark, and he had himself given the
orders for the dislocation of the Spanish l:orps in the fashion tha.t
seemed best calculated to make any common action impossible. '1'0
keep them in good temper he had recently raised the pay of the
officers, and UlUlounced his intention of decorating La. llomantl.
with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. Bemadotte, by
his desire, displayed the greatest confidence in his auxiliaries, and
took a troop of the cavalry regiment Del Rey as his personal escort
while mO\1ng about in Denmark I. .
In spite of all this, the Marquis Iind his officers began to grow
uneasy in April, 1808, for the stream of dispatches and letters from
Spain, which had OC'CII reaching them vel)' regularly during the
winter, began to dry up in the spring. When the first communica-
tion from the new ministry of Fenlinand VII reached La. Ropmna
he found that it contained a complaint that the home government
had receivcd no reports from the cxpeditionary forcc since January,
and that fifteen separate dispatches sent to him from Madrid had
failed to get any answer, The fact was that Napoleon had been
systematically intercepting e\'ery document which the war minister
at one end of the line, and the Marquis at the other, had been
committing to the French P9st 2. The last dispatch hud only
come to hand because such an important announcement as that
of the accession of King Fcrdinand hud been scnt by the hands of
a Spanish officer, whom Bonaparte or Fouche had not thought
proper to arrest, though they had intercepted so mueh official cor·
respondence. The Emperor himself had. sent orders to Bcmadotte
that the news of the revolution at Aranjuez should be kcpt as long
as possible from the Marquis Md his troops 3: and so it came to
pass that only a ycry few days after the events of March 19 became
known in Denmark, there followed the deplorable intelligence of
the treachery of Bnyonne and of the Madrid insurrection of May 2,
These tidings pl'Oduccd the same feelings in Nybol'g and Frcdericiu.
that they had caused at Seville or Corunna. But on the shores of
the Bultic, further north than any Spanish troops had e\'cr been
before, the expeditionary wrps felt itself helpless and surrounded
by enemies. Yet as Joseph O'))onnell, then one of La. Romana's
I Arteclte, Hi. 151. ~ Bourrienne, Mbnmrell, I'iii. 20.
• Napoleon to Bertllier, March 29, 1808 (Nap. Corrup., 13,699).
OH.l.N. I 11 h
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staff, observed: 'TIle more they tried to persuade us that Spoin
was tranquil, and had settled down to enjoy an age of felicity under
Napok'On, tlle more clearly did we ful'est.'e tile scenes of blood, strif~,
and disaster which were to follow these incredible events I.'
On June 24 there reached Nyborg the intelligence which showed
the whole of Napoleon's schemcs completed: it was announooi to
La Romana that Joseph Bonaparte had been proclaimed King of
Spain, and he Wll.'j ordered to transmit the news to his troops, and
to inform them in General Orders tllll.t they wcre now serving fl. new
master. The only commentar)' on this astonishing illfonnation
which the Spanish o(fk-cI'S could procure (.'Ollsistcd of the nauseous
banalities of the MOlliteur concerning the' regeneration of Spain.'
A very few days later the first ray of hope shone upon the
humbled lLnd disheartened general. One of the earliest ideas of
the British Government, on hearing of the Spanish insurrection,
had been to open communications with the troops in Denmark.
Cnstlulos, in his first interview ·with the Governor of Gibraltar, had
expressed his opinion that they would strike a blow for liberty if
only they were given the chaul,,"e. The fleet of Sir Richard Keates
so completely commnnded the llaltic that it would be possible to
rescue the Spanish e..xpeditionary force, if only it were willing and
able to cut its way to the coast. But it was ncccsstl.ry to find out
whether tlle Marquis was ready to risk his neck in such an
enterprise, and whether he could depend on the loyalty of his
troops.
To settle this al1~importantquestion some agent must be found
who would undertake to penetrate to La. Romann's head quarters,
a task of the most uninviting kind, for it was quite uncertain
whetllct the Spaniard would eagerly join in the plan, or whether
he would make up his mind to espouse the cause of Napoleon, and
hand over his visitor to the French police. To find a mall who
knew the Continent well enough to move about without detection,
and who would take the risk of placing himself at La. Romana's
mercy, in case his offers were refused, did not seem easy. Dut the
right person was pitched upon by Sir Arthur Wellesley just before
he sailed for Portugal.. He recommended to Canning a Roman
Catholic priest of the name of James Robertson. This enterprising
ecclesiastic was a Soot who had spent most of his life in a monastery
at Ratisbon, but had lately come to England and was acting as
1 See his words quoted in AJ'te(:he, Hi. 164.
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tutor ill the house of an English Catholic JX>er. He had some time
J)e(ore offered himself to Wellesley R8 A man who knew Germany
well, and was prepared to run risks in making himself useful to the
Government 1.
Under the belief that the Spaniards were fitill quancn.'<1 in the
Hanse towns and Holstein, Canning oont for 110bertson and asked
him whether he would undertake this dangerous mission to NOl'theMl
Germany. The p.·iest acx:epted the offer, and was dispatched to
Heligoland, where l\Ir. Mackenzie, the British agent in this lately
seizM island, found him a place on board a smuggling vessel bound
for the mouth of the \Vesel'. He was safcl)· landed near Bremer~
halen and made his WA)· to Hamburg, only to find that the Spaniards
had been moved northward into the Danish isles. '.fhil! made the
mission more dangerous, as ltobcrtson knew neither the country
nor the language. l3ut he disguised himself as a German com·
mel'cial tn:l.\'eller, and laid in a stock of chocolate and cigars-thirw;
which were very rare in the North, as along with other colonial
produce they were proscribed by the Continental System, and could
only be got from smugglers. It was known that the Spanish
officers felt deeply their pl"ivll.tion of the two luxuries most dear to
their frugal roec, so that it seemed very natural that a dealer in
such goods should attempt to fuld a market among them.
Getting to Nyborg without much difficult)" the priest took his
fate in his hands, and introduced himself to La Romana with 8. box
of cigars under one arm and a dozen packets of chocolate under the
other. '¥hen they were alone, he threw himself on the l\1arqui'S's
confidence, owning that he was n priest and a British subject, not
a German or a commereilll traveller. rn.e Spauit\rd was at first
suspicious and silent, thinking that he had to deal with an agent
provocateur of the I·'rench Go"emment, who was trying to make
him show his hand. Robcrtson had no written vouchers for his
mission-they would have been too dangerous-but had been given
some verbal credentials by Canning, which soon com·inced La
Romullu of his good fuith. The Marquis then owned that he
was diSf:,"llsted with his position, and felt sure that Napoleon
had plotkod. the ruin of Spain, though what exactly had happened
at Ba)'onne he had not yet been able to ascertain. Robertson
Ile."tt laid before him Canning's offer-that if the expeditionary
I See his interesting little book, A Secret ,lfiuicm 10 the ~1l;6hI6la ill 1808,
published at Edinburgh in 18ii3 by llis relative Alexander Fraser.
nb2
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force could be OOIl(,:cntmtctl and got to the coast, the Bultic fleet
should pick it up, and see that it was landed atMinorca, Gibraltar,
the Canaries, in South America, or at an)' point ill Spain that the
Marquis might select.
La Romana asked for a Hight to talk the mattcr over with his
staff; and next day gave his full consent to the plan, bidding the
pl'iest pass the word on to Sir Richard Keates, and discover the
cttl"liest day on which transporl;g could be got read)' to cany off
.his men, Robertson tried to comnllUlicnte with a British frigate
which was hovering off the coast of Flinen, but was arrested by
Danish militiamen while sigualling to the ship from a lonely
point on the beach. His purpose was almost dis(xwered, and he
only escaped by a series of ingenious lies to the militia colonel
before whom he was taken by his captOI'ii. l\-[O\,ing further south,
he 1l.c0'8.in tried to get in touch with Sir Richard Keates, and this
time SUt'(.·cc(h.>d. 'J.11C ncws was passed to London, and tnmsporls
were prepared for the deliverance of the Spaniards. Cnnning also
sent to Fijllen an agent of the Asturian .Junta., who would be
able to give his counh'ymcn fulluc\\'S of the insurrection that had
taken place in June,
Meanwhile La Romana had sounded his subordinates, and found
them all coger to join in the plan of evasion, save Kindclan, tllC
brigadier-general commanding the troops in .Jutland, who showed
such unpatriotic "iel"l's that the offieer sent to confcr with him
dropped the topic without revealing his commission. The plan
which the Marquis had formed WllS rather illl,renious: Bel'lll1dotte
was about to go round the gnrrisons in his comml1nd on a tour
of inspection. It was agreed that \mder the pretext of holding
a grand field-day for his benefit, all the scattered Spanish troops
in Flinen should be concentrated at Nyborg. The regiments in
Zealll1ld and Jutland wcre to joill them, when the arrival of the
llritish fleet should be reported, by seizing the Danish small craft
in the htwbours nearest to them, and crossing O\'er the two Belts
to join their commander.
An unfortunate crmtretcmps, howcver, interfered to prevent thc
full execution of the scheme. Orders came from Paris that all
. the Spanish b-oops were to swear allegiance to Joseph Bonflpartc,
each corps parading at its head quarters for the purpose on
.July 20 or 91. This news caused grave disorders among the
subordinate offieers and the men, who were of course in complete
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ignorance of the plan for evasion. La Romana and his councillors
held that the ceremony had better be gone through-to SWCl\l"
under compulsion was not perjury, and to refuse would draw down
on the Spanish corps overwhelming numbers of Danes arid :Frcnch,
so that the whole scheme for escape would misearry. Accordingly
the troops in Jutland Rnd Flmen went through the ceremony in
a morc or less fu.rdcal way-in some cases the men are said to have
substituted the name FCl'dinand for the !lame Joseph in their
oath; while the officers took no notice of this rather startling
variation.
But in Zealand things went otherwise; the two infantry regiments
of Guadalajaru and Asturias, when paraded and told to take the
onth, burst out into mutiny, drove off those of their own officers
who tried to l'cstrain them, killed the aide-de-calllp of the French
Gcncral. Fririon, who was preoiding at the <.:crcmOIlY. and threatened
to mareh on Copenhagen. Next day they were surrounded by
Ill!lSSCS of Danish troops, forced to llluol'Cllder. disarmed, and put
in confinement in small bodies at \'arions points in the island
[August 1].
This startling ne,,",,!! re\'cl:llcd to Bernooottc the true state ot"
feclil1g in the Spanish army, and he wTote to l.a llomana to
aIlIlOUll(.'C that he Wlll! about to visit the Danish Isles in onler
to inquire into the matter. Fortunately there came at the same
mOlllent llews from England that the time for escape was at hmld.
On August 4, only tlll'Ce days after the mutiny at Uoeskilde, the
brigantine .Mosquito, having on board Hafae} 1.obo (~c emissary
of the Asturiall deputies), reached the Baltic, and commwlicated
by night with some of the Spanish officers on the island of
Lnngehlnd. The British Reet hud sailed, and the time for
action had arrived.
Accordingly Ln UOmUll& gave the word to the officers in each
gurrison to whom the secret had been entrustedo On AU6rtlst 7,
the troops in :Fiinen concentmted, and seized the port of Nyhorg;
the Dancs were completely takcn by surprise, and no rcsistun(.'C
was made save by Ugallant and obstinate naval officer commanding
a bloig in the htll'bour. He fired on the Spaniards, and would not
yield till an English frigate and five gunboats ran into the port
and battered his vessel to pieces.
On August 8 the troops in Jutland struck their blow; the
infantry regiment of Zamora at l~l'e<1ericia seized a number at'
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fishing-vessels, and ferried itself over into Flinen with no difficulty.
General Kindelan, the only traitor in the camp, had been kept
from all knowledge of what was to happen: when he StlW his
troops on the move, and received an explanatory note from La
Romana putting him in possession of the state of uflitirs, he
feigned compliance in the plan, but disguised himself and fled
to the n('arcst :French cantonment, whel'~ he gave enemy u full
account of the startling news. The cavalry regiments Infante
and Del Rey had the sullle luek fuI their comnules of ZtlIllora: they
seized boat" at Anrhuus, and, abandoning their h01'SeR, got across
unopposed to Fiinen. Their eomrades of the rC!,riment of Alb"tU've
were less lucky: they were delayed for some time by the indecision
of their aged and imbecile colonel: when Costa, their senior captain,
took command and marched. them from Horsens townrds the port
of Fredericia, it was now too late. A brigade of Dutch Hussars,
warned by Kindelan, beset them on the way and took them all
prisoners, Costa, seeing that the responsibility would fall on his
head, blew out his bmins at the moment of surrender.
Romana had concentrated in Fiinen nearly 8,000 men, alld was
so strong that the Danish general at Odense, in the ccnb-e of the
island, dared not meddle with him. On August 9, 10, and 11 he
passed his troops over to the smaller island of L:Ulgeland, whcre
the regiment of Catalonia had already diStlnned the Danish gar-
rison and sch·.cd the batteries, Hcre he was safe, for LtUlgelalld
was far out to sea, and he was IlOW protected from the Danes by
the English warships which were beginning to gathcr on the spot
A few isolated men from Zealand, about 150 in all, succeeded in
joilling the main OOdy, having escaped from their guards and
!leir.ed fishing-boat,,: but these were all that got away from the
regiments of AstUl,ias and Guadalajal'tl, the mutinccrs of July 31.
For ten days lAngeland was erammed with 9,000 Spanish troops,
waiting anxiously for thc expected British squadron. On the
twenty-first, however, Admiral Keales appeared, with three sail
of the line and several sllIuller craft. On these and on Slllttll
Danish vessels the whole army wa.~ hastily embarked: they reached
Gothcnburg in Sweden on AuglL'it 27, and found there thirty-seven
llU'ge transports sent from England for their accommodation.
After a long voyage they reached the Spanish coast in safety, and
the whole expeditiollllry corps of the North, now 9,000 strong,
was concentrated at Santllnder by Oetober 11, The infantry was
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sent to take part in the second campaign of General Blake. The
dismounted cavalry were ordered to move to Estremadura, and
there to provide thcmsch'es with horses. La Romall& himself was
called to Madrid to interview the Junta, so that his troops went
to the front tmder the charge of his second in command, the Count
of San Roman, to take parl: in the bloody fight or Espinosa.
SECTION VII
NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF SPAIN
CHAPTER I
FRENCH AND SPANISH PREPARATIONS
'VHfl,E the Supreme Junta was expending its energy on discuss-
ing the relative merits of benevolent despotism and representative
govenlment, and while Castai'ios fretted and fumed for the moving
up of reinfon:cmcnts that never arrived, the French Emperor was
getting ready to strike. It took many weeks for the veteran
divisions from Glogau and El'furt, from Bayreuth and Dcrlin, to
traverse the whole breadth of the French Empire and reach the
Pyrenees. 'While they were trailing across the Rhincland alld
the plains of France, well f"eted and fed at eveI')' important town I,
their master employed the time of waiting in strengthening his
political hold on Central Europe. We have seen that he was
seriously alamled at the possibility of an Austrian war, and alluded
to it in his confidelltialletters to his kinsfolk. But the court of
Vienna was slow to stir, and as August and Septcmber slipped by
without any definite move on the Danube, Bonaparte began to
hope that hc was to be spared the dungerous problcm of waging
two European wars at the same time. Meanwhile he assumed an
arrogant and blustering tonc with the Ausb'ian Governmcnt,
warning them that though he was withdrawing 100,000 men from
Germany, he should replacc thcm with ncw lcvies, and was still
strong enough to hold his own 2• l\fetternich gave prudent and
I For the banquets given (under imperial orders) by the cities, see Nup.
(J()rr·eap., 14,291, 14,331. Clearl)' Napoleon I understood t11e 'policy of cham-
pagne and sausages' as well as his nepl,ew.
, COllsidering tlle delicate nature of tIll) political situation, Na.poleon's
language to the Austrians WIIS most rude and provocative. See the long
il.lterview with Metternich [Aug. 15] reported b)' Champagny in his dispatch
(l\'flp. (Jorreap., 14,254) : 'Vous aye:/: leve 4.00,000 hon1ll1es: je "::lis ell lever
1800] THE INTllitvIEW OF ERFlJRT 377
evasive answers, and no immedia.te signs of a. ruptUl't'! could be
discerned. But to make matters sure, the Emperor hastened to
invite his ally the Emperor Alexander of Russia to meet him at
Erfurt. 'The ostensible object of the conference was to make
a final effort to induce the British Government to Bel-OCpt terms of
peace. Its real meaning was that Bonaparte wished to reas.<;ure
himself concerning the Czar's intentions, and to see whether he
could rely np:m the support of Russia in the event of a new
Austrian war. There is no need to go into the details of the
meeting (September ~7 to October 14), of the gathering of four
vassal kings and a score of minor prim.'Cs of the Confederation of
the llhine to do homage to their master, of the feasts and plays
and reviews. SUffil'e it to say that Napolcon got what he wanted,
a definite promise from the C7,ar of an offensive and defensive
alliance against all enemies whatsoever: a special mention of
Austria was made in the tenth clause of the new treaty 1. ]11 return
Alexander obtained leave to carry out his designs against Finland
and the DaJlubian principalities: his ally was only too glad to see
him involved in any enterprise that would distruct his attention
from Central Europe. The Emperor Francis ]] hastened to dis~
arm the suspicions of Napoleon by sentling to Erfurt un cnvoy:!
charged with all manner of pacific declarations: they were accepted,
but the a(:<.-eptance was accompanied by a message of scarcely (:on-
ceo.led threats 3, which must have touched the court of Vienna to
the quick. Strong in his Russian alliam:e, BOlltlpurte chose mtller
to bully than to cajole the prince who, by the strangest of chances,
was .destim.u within eighteen months to become his fatller~ill~law.
The quiet reception given to his hectoring dispatches showed that,
for the present at least, nothing need be feared from the side of
Austria. The Emperor's whole attention could be tumoo towards
Spain, After telling off a few more rebriments for service beyond
200,000. La Confcdcrntion dn Rllin, qui Jlmit renvoyc ses troupes, va les
reullu et faire des levees. Je retablirai les places de Silcsie, au lieu d'cvacuer
cetto province et leg etatg Prussiens, oomme je me le proposais. L'Europe
!;Cm sur pied, et le Illus leger incidunt lunCllura le COmmUlJcemcnt des hos~
tiIites; &c.
1 • DallS le cas 01.1 1'Autricbe se mettrait en guerre conlre la Franco,
I'Empereur de RllSiIie s'engtJgC It se declarer centre l'Autriche, et u("ire cause
commune al'CC la Jo'rancc' (Article X, clause 2, of the Secret Trent)·).
2 Baron Vincent.
3 See the dislmtch (Bap. CQrTUp., 14,380).
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the Pyrenees, and giving leave to the princes of the Confederation
of the Rhine to demobilize their armies, he left Erfmt [October 14]
and came rushing back across Germany and l~rance to Paris; he
stayed there ten days L\lld then started for Dayonne, where he
arrived on the twentieth day after the termination of the conferenee
[November 3].
Meanwhile the ostensible purpose of that meeting had been
carried ont, by the forwarding to the King of England of a joint
note in which France and Russia offered him peace on the basis
of Uti PO$$ithtia. It was a vague and grandiloquent document,
obviously intended for the eye of the public rather than for that
of the old King. The two Emperors expatiated on the horror8 of
war And on the vast changes made of late in the map of Europe.
Unless pea.t.-e were made' there might be greater changes still, and
all to the disadvantage of the English nation.' The Continental
System was working untold misery, and the eessation of hostilities
wonld be equally advantageous to Great Britain and to her
enemies. King George should' listen to the voice of humanity;
and assure the happiness of Europe by consenting to a general
pacification.
'l1lOugh well aware of the hollowness of these protestations,
which were only intended to throw on England the odium of
continuing the Wtu', the British Cabinet took them into serious
consideration. The replies to the two powers were carefully kept
separate, and were written, not ill the llame of the King (for the
personal appeal to him was merely a theatrical device), but in that
of the ministry. '1'0 Russill. a very polite answer was returned,
but the question on which the possibility of peace rested was
brought stmight to the front. ""Vould Fmnce acknowledge the
e.'i:isting government of Spain as a power with which she was pre-
pared to treat? Cunning, who dmfted the dispatch, was perfectly
well aware that nothing was further from the Emperor's thoughts,
and could not keep himself from adding an ironical clause, to the
effect that Napoleon had so often spoken of late of his regard for
the dignity lUld IVclfare of thc Spanish peoplc, that it could not be
doubted that he would consent. The late transactions at Bayonnc,
'whose principles were as unjust as their example was dangerous
to all legitimate sovereigns; must clearly have been carried through
without his concurrence or approbation.
Thc repl)' to France was still more um:ompl'Omising. 'The
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King,' it said, 'was desirous for peace on honourable terms. The
miserable condition of the Continent, to which tillusion had lx."Cu
made, was uot due to his policy: a system devised for the destruc-
tion of British COlllmeree had recoiled on its authors and their
instruments.' But the distress even of his enemies was no source
of pleasure to the King, and he would treat at once, if the repre-
sentatives of Sweden, Portugal, Sicily, and Spain were admitted
to take part in the negotiations. It was to be specially stipulated
that the' Central Junta of Government' at Madrid was to be Cl.
party to any treaty of pence_
The two British notes brought the replies from St. Petersburg
and Paris that Canning expected. Count Romanzoff, writing for
the CmI', could only state that his master had acknowledged
Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain, and could not recognize the
existence of nny other legal authority in that kingdom. But if
this point (the only really important one) could be got over, the
Uussinll Goyennllellt was reudy to treat on Cl. basis of ua Possk!dw,
or any other just and honourable terms. The French reply was,
a!! wa.'Inatural, couched in ycry different langullgC. Napoleon had
been irritated by Canning'::! sarcastic allusions to the failure of the
Continental System: he thought the tone of the British note most
improper and insulting-' it comes from the same pen which the
Ellglish ministry employs to fabricate the swarm of libels with
which it inundates the Continent. Such language is despicable,
and unworthy of the imperial attention \'
Considering the offensive and bullying tone which Bonaparte
was wont to use to other powers-his note. written to Austria
a few days before was a fail· example of it-he had little reason to
be indignant at the epigrams of the English minister. Yet the
latter might perhaps have done well to keep his pen under control,
and to forget that he was not writing for the A1li'i.Jf.I(;Q!Jin, but
l.'omposing an oflicial document. Even though Napoleon's offer
was hollow and insincere, it should have been met with dry
COUl'tesy rather than with humol"Ous irony.
Of course Bonaparte refused to treat the Spaniards as a free
and equnl belligerent power. He had declared. his brother King
of Spain, and had now reached that pitch of blind autolatry in
which he I'e/:."llrded his own fiut as the sole soul-ce of lcgnlity. In
common honour England could not abandon the insurgents; for
I Napoleou to Champagny (N(lp. Om-e8p., 14,64.3).
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thc Emperor to allow his brothe.r's claim to be ignored was equally
impossible. In his prcsent state of mind he would have regarded
such a concession to the cncmy as an acknowledgement of disgrncc-
ful defeat. It was obvious that the war mllst go on, and when
the Emperor suggested that England might treat with him with.
out stipulating for the admission of the Junta ail a party to the
negotiations I, he must ha\'e been perfectly well aware that he was
proposing a dishonourable move which the ministry of Portland
could not possibly make. His suggestions as to a separate treaty
with England on the basis of Uti, P08sideti.,., werc futile: he intended
that they should be declined, and declined they were. But he had
succeeded in his end of posing before the Freneh nation and the
European powers as a lover of peace, foiled in his devices by the
unbending arrogance of Greut Britain. This was all Ulat he had
desired, and so far his machinations attained their object 2.
Long before the Ellglish replies had been scut off to Champagny
lmd llomalll':off, the much-delayed campaign on the Ebro had com·
mcnced. All through th~ months of August and S~ptember the
French had behaved a." if their adversaries were acting on propel"
military principles, and might be expected to throw their whole
force on the truc objective point. Jourdan and his colleagues had
no reason to foresee that the Spanish Government would launch out
into the hideous series of blundcr~ which, as a matter of facl;, were
committed. That no commander-in-chief would be appointed, that
the victoriotls troops of B'tylen would be held back for weeks ill
Andalusia, that no strenuous effort would be made to raise ne,;'
I Napoloon to Clmmpagn)' (Nap. OfJ/7eSP" 14,643),
2 It is strange to find that Napier was cOIlvinced tl1at Napoloon had a real
'.Iesire for pe'U:e, aud Iloped to secure it by the propo,sals of October, UI08.
He writes (i. 210): ' TIle Euglisl1 millistenllWertcd Umt the wllole proceeding
was an artifice to sow distrust among his encmies, Yet what enemies were
they among wllOm lIe could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden, Sicily,
Portugal! the !lotioll as applied to tlu~m WIIS absurd; it is more probable that
he was sincere, He said so at St. Helena, and the circumstances of the periOlI
warrant a belief ill tl18t ~rtion.' llut Napier has failed to see that the
design Wall not to ' sow distrust among his cncmies.' lbe whole business Il'llS
intended to influence to'Tench public opinion, and ill a secondary way tile
public opinion of all Europe. Bonaparte wished to pose as a friend of peace,
ami to bestow on England the unenviable rol0 of t]IC scltish fomenter of wnrs.
With mallY simple folk in Jo'1'allcc and elsewhere he succeeded, but no
Englishman, save one blinded by a dislike for e\'er)1:hing Tory, could hal'e
been deceil'ed.
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fil'mies in Lean and the two Castilcs,.were chances that seemed so
improbable that King Joseph and his advisers did not take them
into consideration. They expected that the Spaniards would mass
the armies of Andalusia, Estremadura, Castile, and Ar~O'()II, and
endeavour to turn their left flank 011 the side of &nguesa and
}'nmpehma, or that (the other rational course) they would send the
Asturians, the Andalusialls, and the Castilians to join Blakc, and
debouch down the line of the Upper Ebro, from Re)"lloSil. on to
Vittoria and l\:liranda. In the first case 70,000, and in the latter
CMC 80,000 men would be flung against onc flank of the French
position, and it would be necessary to concentrate in hot haste in
order to hold them back, Dut, as a matter of fact, the Spanish
forces did not even come up to the front for many weeks, and when
they did appear it was, as wc have seen, not in the form of one
great army concentrated for a stroke on a single point, but as
n number of weak and isolated columns, (."tLCh threatening 11. different
part of the long line that lay along the Ebro from Miranda to
l\1ilngm. '\\711CIl feeble demonstrations were mud.e against so many
separate sections of his front, Jourdan supposed that they were
skilful feints, intended to cover some serious attack on a weak spot,
Rnd acted accordingl.y, holding back till the enemy should develop
his real plan, and refusing to commit himself meanwhile to ofiensiye
operations on a. serious scale. It must be confessed that the chaotic
und inconsequent movcments of the Spaniards bore, to the eye of
the observer from the outside, something like the appearance of a
deep plan. On Angnst!21 the Conde de i'\Iontijo, with a. column
of' the Aragonese army, felt his way up the Ebro as far as the bridge
of Alfaro, neurly opposite the extreme left flank of the French at
l\fi1agro. "Vhen attacked by Lefebvre-Dcsnouetles at the head of
Il few cavalry and a horse-batter)', the Spunish gcnerm refused to
stand, and retreated on Tudela. Marshal Moncey then pressed
him with an infantry didsion, but Montijo again gave back. The
French thought th(\t this moye must be a mere diversion, intended
to atlrnct their attention to the side of Ar~<'l'Qn, for Montijo had
acted with such extreme feebleness that it was unnatural to suppose
that he was making anything but a feint. They were quite wrong
however: })nlufox had told the <:ount to push as far up the ELm
AS he could, without any thought of rayouring operations by Blake
or Ca.~taii.os, the former of whom wru; at this moment not far in
fi:ollt of Astorga, while the latter was still at :Madrid. Montijo
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had given way simply because llis troops were raw levies, and
because there were no supports behind him nearer than Saragossa.
It was to no effect, therefore, that King Joseph, after the fighting
in front of Alfuro und Tudelu, mOlled his rescne8 up the river to
Miranda. thinking that the real attack must be coming from that
side. '111ere was no real attack intended, for the enemy had 1I0t 8S
yet brought any considerable force up to the front.
It wus not till nearly three weeks later that the Spaniards made
another offensive move. This time Blake WllS the asSailant. On
September 10 he had at last concentrated the greater part of his
army at Ucynosa-thc ccntre of roaUs at thc SOUI'{.'C of the Ebro, of
which we ha....e already had to speak on several occasions. He had
with him four divisions of the army of Galicia, as well as a
'vRnguard brigade' and a 'reserve brigade' of picked troops from
the same quarter. Close behind him were 8,000 Asturiuns under
General Accvedo. The whole came to 32,000 men, but there were
no more than 400 cavalry with the corps-a fact which made Blake
very anxious to keep to thc mountains and to avoid the plains of Old
Castile 1. He had left behind him in Galicia and about Astorga
more than 10,000 men of new levies, not yet fit to take the field.
'I11ere were also some 9,000 Asturiau$ in similar case, held back
within tlle limits of their own principality 2.
III the elaborate plan of operations which had been sketched out
at Madrid on September 5, it will be remembered that Blake's
army was intcnded to (,"O-operate with those of Castaiios and of
Eguia. But he paid no attention whatever to the promises
which his represcntative. Illfantado, had made in his name, and
e.xccuted an entirely different movement: there was no eommander-
in-chief to l:ompcl him to act ill unison with his colleagues. The
Castilian and Eslremoouran armies were not ready, and Castmlos'
had as yet only a feeble vanguard facing the enemy 011 the Central
Ebro, his rear divisions being still far back, ou the road from
Andalusia. Blake neither asked for nor received any assistance
whatever from his colleagues, and set out in the most light-
heaTted way to attack 70,000 Freneh with his 39l,000 Galic.ians
and Asturians.
His plan was to threaten Burgos with a small portion of his
1 For the orgallizntiull and state of Blake's fon;e, see the ApIJlllldix.
t The A8turias had raised nineteen new battalion!!: of these eight went
forward with Blake, and eleven remained behind.
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army. while with tile main bod)' he marched on Bilbao, in order to
rouse Biscay to a. second revolt, and to turn the right flank of the
French along the sea-shore. Accordingly he! sent his 'vanguard'
and' reserve' brigades towards Durgos, by the road that passes by
Ona and Briviesca, while with four complete divisions he moved 011
llilbao. On the twentieth his leading column turned out of that
town General Monthion, who was in garrison there with a weak
brigade of details and detachments.
Here at 181>t, as it seemed to Joseph Bonaparte and to Jourdan,
was the long-expected main attack of the Spaniards. Accordingly
they concentrated to their right, with the object of meeting it.
Dessiercs cVllCUatcd Dnrgos and drew bn.ek to the line of the Uppcr
Ebro. He there replaced the King's l"t..'i!Crve, and the ill{''Olllplete
corps that was forming at Miranda and Vittoria under the com-
mand of Marshal Ney: thus these troops became available for
operations in Biscay. Ney, with two small infantry divisions,
marched on Bilbao by way of DUffingo: Joseph, with the reserve,
followed him. But when the Marshal reached the Biscayan
capital, the division of Blake's army I, which had occupk-d it for
the last six days, retired and took up a defensive attitude in the
hills above Valmaceda, twenty miles to the Welit. Here it was
joined by a second division of the Galician amlY 2, and stood fllSt
in a very diffi(:ult country abounding in strong positions. Ney
therefore held back, unwilling to attack a force that might be
30,000 strong (for all that he knew) with the 10,000 men that he
had brought. Clearly he must wait for King Joseph and the
reserve, in case he should find that Blake's whole anny was in front
of him.
But the King and his corps fuiled to appear: Bessicres had sent
to inform him thltt lllake, far from having moved his whole army
on to Bilbao, hud still got the bulk of it in positions from which
he could march down the Ebro and attack Miranda and Vittoria.
TIus was to a eerlain extent tru~ for the first and sc<.'ond divisions
of the Galieian army were now at Villarcayo, on the southern side
of the Cantabrian hills, a spot from which they could march either
northward to Bilbao or eastward to M:iranda. Moreover, lllake's
•reserve' and' vanguard' brigades were still about Prius and Onn,
whither they had been pushed before the French evacuated llurgos.
I The 4th Galiciau Division under the :Marquis of Portago.
, TIlO~ 3n1 Galicilltl Division Ullullr Gencml Riquolme.
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Hessi~res, therefore, had much to say in favour of his view, that the
point of danger was in the Ebro valley and not in Biscay. King
Joseph, convinced by his argnments, left Ney unreinforced, and
took post with the 6,000 men of the central reiCl'Ve at ViUonll..
His conclusion that B.i1bao was not the b'ue objecth'c of the
Spaniards was Sooll confirmed by other mO\'ClIlcllts of the enemy.
The feeble columns of Castaiios were at last showing all the Central
Ebro, and Palafox was on the mo\'c on the side of Aragoll.
Under the idea that alllllake's llisca.yan expedition' had been no
more than a feint and a di"ersion, and that the real blow would be
struck 011 the Ebro, JOuroUll and the King now directed Ne)' to
come back from Bilbao and to take up his old positions. The
Marshal obeyed: leaving General Merlin with 3,000 men in the
Biscayan capital, he returned with 7,000 bayonets to La Guardia,
011 the borders of AJava alld Navarre. His old head quarters at
Logrofio, beyond the Ebro, had been occupied by the head of olle
of Castanos's columns. He did not attack tllls force, but merely
cncamped opposite it, on the northern bank of the river [October 5F.
It is now time to review the position and forces of the Spanish
armies, which were at last up in the fighting linc. Blake's 3fl,OOO
Asturians l! and Galicians were divided into two masses., at Valma-
Cl-da and Villarcayo, on the two sides of the Cantabrian hills. They
were within three marches of each other, and the whole could be
tUMled either against Biscay or against Vittoria, as the opportunity
might demand. But between Blakc and the central divisions of thc
Spanish army there was a vast gap. 'l11is, at a later period of the
campaign, was filled up by bringing forward the 12,000 men of
the Estremaduran army to Bm'gos: but this force, insufficient as
it was for the purpose, had not reached the fi'ont; ill the middle
of October it had not even arrived at Madrid 3, There seems to
have been at Bul'gos nothing more than a detached battalion or
two, which had occupied the place when Bessieres drew back
towards the Ebro~. Of all the Spanish forces, the nearest organ-
I All th~e moves are best described inl\1arshal Jourdan's Mtmoirt8 (edited
by GroUc11Yi j>"ri.~, 1800), IlP. 71-0.
~ Acevedo's 8,000 Astllriaos joiaed lllake at Vil1:lrca}'o 011 Oct. 11 (see his
dispatch in Mudrid aa~l!ltt, Oct. 2.5).
3 1 gatllcr frOll! iJfullrid Ga~eUe (Oct. 21, p. 1,333) tlmt it was still org:llIi"k-
Ing in and about Badajoz on Oct. 6, and did not begin to march till later.
• Volunteers of llell;].vellte from the ann)' of Castile, and Thy Militia of
Blake's amlY.
Part of Northern Spain
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il'.ed corps on make's right consisted of the main body of this same
army of Castile. This division, for it was no more, consisted of
about 10,000 or 11,000 men: it contained it few regular corps
(Jlegiment of Cantabria, a battalion of Grenadiers, ~he Leon
:Militia) which hud been lent to it by the army of Andulusiu, and
twelve raw Leonese and Castilian batWions, of the new leYy which
Cuesta had raised. There were also some 800 cavalry with it.
The commander W(lS now Pignatelli, fol' Eguin (who had origillnlly
been told off' to the post) had fallen sick. This small and in·
efficient force was at Logrono all the Central Ebro, having taken
possession of that place when it was evacuated by Marshal Ney in
the last week of September. A little furUlCr down the river lay
the 2nd Division of the army of Andalusia, which, under the
orders of Coupigny, hud taken a creditable part in the battle of
Baylen. Released by the Junta of Seville in September, it had
at last gone forward and joined Castailos. But it was somewhat
changed in composition, for three of' its original fourteen battalions
~llul been withdrawn 1 and sent to Catalonia, while three new Anda-
lusian corps had replaced them. Its commander was now General
Grima.rest, Coupigny having been told off to another sphere ofduty.
The division numbered about 6,000 bayonets, with 400 or 500
cavalry, and a single battery. It occupied Lodosa, on tlle north
bank of' the Ebro, some twelve miles down-stream from Logrono.
Quite close to its right there lay at Calahorra the 4th Division
of the. army of Andalusia, under La Pefia-a somewhat stronger
fOl"Ce-about 7,500 foot, with 400 horse and two batteries.
The only remaining division at' Castailos' 'Army of the Centre'
consisted of the Murcian and Valellcian corps under Llamas. This
had entered Madrid 8,000 strong 011 August 13, but one of its
regiments had been left behind at Aranjuez to guard the JWlta.
It now consisted of no more than 7,000 men, and lay at 'l'udela, in
close touch with Lt. Pci'ia's Andalusiuus. The total, therefore, of
Castanos' army in the 5e<:ond half of October did not amount to more
than 31,000 foot and 3,000 horse. 'l'he 1st and 3rd. divisions
of the Andalusian army, long detained beyond the l\1oreiia by the
Junta of Seville, WCl"C but just commcncing to arrive at Madrid:
1 These thrce Granadall battaliOIlS had been scut, along with the rest of the
levies of that killgdol.l1, to form part of tile division which Rcdillg \\"llS leading'
to Catalonia. They had been replaced by the new Andalusian battalions of
&aylen, Navaa de Tolosa, aud 5th of Seville.
0)1"1'<. Ice
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of their 15,000 men less than half 'reached the front in November,
in time to take their share in the rout of Tudela. Even these
were not yet at Castai'ios' disposition in October 1.
The l'ight wing of the Spani!lh army of the Ebro consisted of
the raw and half·organi7ro masses composing the army of Aragon.
Palafox had succeeded in getting together a great body of men
from that loyal province, but he had not been able to form them
into a force fit to take the field. Owing to the way in which
Aragon.had been stripped of regular troops before the commence-
mcnt of the war, there was no solid body round which the new
levies conla be organized, and 110 supply of trained officers to drill
or discipline the thousands of eager recruits. It would seem that
in all no less than 52,000 were raised, but no force in any degree
approaching these numbers took the field. Every village and
every mountain valley had contributed its parfJida or its company,
but with the best of wills Palafox had not yet succeeded in in-
corporntillg all these smaU and sca.tte:ed units into regiments and
brigades. Many of them had not even been anned; yery few had
been properly clothed and equipped. Nevertheless no fewer than
thirty-nine battalions in a state of grelltcr or less organization
were in e.'tistellce by the end of October. They varied ill strength
to the most extraordinary degree; many were no more than 300
strong 2, one or two were enormous and ran up to 1,500 or 1,400
bayonets. Of the whole thirty-nine battalions only three belonged
to the old regular army, and these corps-whose total numbers
only reached 2,350 men-had been largely diluted with raw
reeruits s. Of the remainder some belonged to the terci08 who
had taken arms in June, and had served through the first siege of
Saragossa, but u large number ha.d only been raised after Verdier
had retired from before the city in August. It would seem that
I Castanos himself, in his exculpatory mernoir, will not allow that he ever
11lid more tl13n 20,000 mon, el'en including the belated troops of t1le 1st and
3rd Andalusiau divisions which came uIl hi NOI'cmber.
'I See the tables in Artoohe, Hi. 470,480. The Regiment of Calatayud was
only 310 strong, that of Doyle 300, and that of Navarre 302; 011 the other
hand tile 2nd Volunteers of Arngon luull,302, tlle ]8t Volunteers of Huesca
1,31O,lIl1d the overgrowu < Aragonese fusiliers' no less than 1,83G,
• 3rd Spanish Guards 600, Estremadura 600, 1st Volunteers of Aragon
1,141. TIll~e figures are from a return of Nov. 1, sent to England hy Colonel
Doyle, thou ill high favour with PlIlllfoJ:. Jt fiuy Uc foulld in the ltecord
Office.
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the total of Palafox's Aragonese, who went to the £rout for the
campaign of October and November, was about 12,000 men. The
rest were left behind at Saragossa, being not yet organized or
equipped for field service.
But Palafox had nlso in his army troops which did not belong
to his nath"e kingdom. These were the Murcians and Valencians
of Saint March and O'Ncillc, who after taking part in tile cam·
paign against Moncey. had not marched with Llamas to Madrid,
but had turned olf to aid in mising the siege of Saragossa. Saint
MR~h had brought with him fourteen battalions and a cavalry
regiment, O'Neille had with him three more infantry t"Otps. The
total of their' force reached 11,!!OO bayonets and 6!W sabres.
Adding these to the best of his own Aragoncsc levies, Palafox
sent out 23,000 men: of these only about 800 were cavalry 1.
A fOl't-c such as this, backed by the mass of uIlorgalli7.ed levies
at Saragossa, was barely snfliciellt to maintain a defensive position
on the frontiers of Aragon. But the Junta, with great unwisdom,
came to the conclusion that Palafox was strong enough not only
to hold his own against the French in his immediate front, but to
spare some troops to reinforce the army of Catalonia. Dy theiJ;
orders he told off six battalions-some 4,000 men-who were
pluced under the command of his brother, the Marqnis of Lazmi.,
and dispatched to Lerida with the object of aiding the Captain-
General of Ca.talonia to besiege Duhesme in Barcelona.
Nor was this the only force that was drawn off from the main
theatre of the war in order to take part in helping the Catalans,
who had hitherto proved quite strong enough to help themselves.
The Junta directed Reding, the victor of Dll.ylcn, to take command
1 Tho Valencian and Mureian contributions to the anny of Aragoll consisted
of the following troops :-Onll old line regiment of tllree battalions (Volunteers
of Custile), the militia battalion of Soria, and of Ilew levies the 1st l'lld 2nd
Volunteers of Murein, the 2nd Volun~rs of Valencia, the regiments of Turin
(tllrOO battalions),Alicante (tllreo b.1.Urlliolls), Segorbe (two batt.1.liOIlS), Borbon,
Chelm, and Cazadorl.l6 de Fen ·'lIdo VII, the Dragoons of NUIllUIlCia (all
old corps), and two squadrons of Ilew Valencian cavalry. I get these Ilames
partly from the return of No\'. 1 in the Record Office at London, partly from
Saint March's return ofhill killed am} wtlllllded at Tudela. Some more Murcian
corps started to join Palafox, but were not in time for Tudela., though they
took part in the second defence of Saragossa.: \'iz. 3rd and .5tll Volunteers of
Mureia, the regiment of Florida nlanc,1., ami 1st amI 2nd Tir:ulorel! of l\fureia.
Their start from Murcia on Oct. 13 is noted in the Madrid Gazette of 1808
(p. 1,336).
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of all the Gl'anadan troops in the army of Andalusia, and lead
them to'1'01'tosa with the object of' joining U7.all. 'Vith ll.eding
there marched nearly 15,000 men 1: to raise this force all the
regiments belonging to the kingdom of Granuda had been drufted
out from the ht and 2nd Divisions of Castanos' army, which were
thus mutilated before they reached the Ebro. To those COIll-
paratively veteran troops were added eight new battalions of raw
levies-the regiments of Bw.a, AIIllCrill, LoXfl, and Santa Fe.
Starting on their long march from Granada on October 8, the
head of Hedillg'S column had only reached Murcia on October Q:l!,
and was thus hopelessly distEmt from any point where it could have
been LL'>Cful when the campaign began 2, Nor was this the last
c,1etachmcnt which the Junta directed on Catalonia: it sent thither
Palt of the prisoners from LisbOll, whom the Convention of Cintrn
had delivered-S,500 at' the men who had once formed the division
of Caraflil. Laf:,tUlla, who now held the command, landed fwm
English transports at La Uapita near Tortosa on October Q5,
and marched from thence on TUl"rtloO'Ona 3.
It is safe to say that ofthese 23,000 men transferred to Catalonia
from Aragon, Granada, and Portugal, evel'Y man ought to have
been pushed forward to help Cnstmios on the Ebro, and not
distracted to the side-issue at Barcelona. It was mad to send
them thither when the main force facing J ourdan and King Joseph
did not yet amount to 75,000 men. Catalonia, with sueh small aid
as the llalCllric Islands could give, was strong enough to defend
herself agt\inst the motley hordes of Duhesme and Reille.
. At the moment when the feeble offensive of Cnstafios and l'alafox
began, on the line of the Ebl'O, the French had some 65,000 men
ranged opposite them 4, while a I'esene of 10,000 was formed at
\ Just 14J!.l70, ueCOnlillg to the details given ill tll0 MlldrUl GazdhJ for
Od. 12 (p. 1,379). See m)' Appendix on the Spauish forces ill Oct.-Nov.
t Mlldrid GIIi::eUe, Oct. 28 (p. 1,381).
, Ibid., Nov. 1 (p. 1,407).
• The figures given by Jouroan in his M<fmoirtt seem quite accurate, and are
borne out by all t]le details in Nap. GIJrrtlp. ; the}" are :-
Corps of BcssicreJl [2nd Corps]
Corps of Mouce)' [3rd Corps] .
Corps of Ney [Gth Corps], incomplete
The Killg'S geucral reserve
Garrisous of Na\'arre aDd Biscay
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Bayolllle, and the leading columns of the' Gl'alld Army' from
Germany were only ten or twelve marches away. Napoleon had,
by a decree issued on September 7, recast the form of his o.rmy of
Spain. It 'I'M in the future to consist of seven anny corps. The
1st, 4th, and 5th were to be composed of old divisiolls from the
llhine find the Elbe. Of the forces already on the spot llessieres'
troops were to form the !lnd COl'PS, Moncey's the 3rd, the still
incomplete divisions under Ney the 6th. The a.rmy of CatAlonin,
where St. Cyr was superseding Reille, formed the 7th Corps 1•
.TulIol's arlllY from Portugal, when it once more appeared upon
the scene, made the 8th, but in September Napoleon did not yet
know of its fate, and it only received it..~ number and its place in
the host at a much later date. Many altel'ations of detail were
made in the brigades lLIld divisions that fonned the I1CW 2nd
and Srd Corps. All the batailwns de marc/u: wcre abolished,
llnd their men drafted into the old regiments. The fifteen
•provisional regiments,' which had composed the whole of Moucey's
and a considerable part of llessieres' strength, were taken into the
regular establishment of the army, and renumbered as the 114th-
HWth of the I,ine mul the SSrd Uger, two provisionul regiment,>
being told off to form each of the new bodies 2. There was a
certain amOlll1t of shifting of nnits, but in the main the brigades
aud divisions of these two corps rcmaincd inltwt.
On or about October 8-10 Bessieres lay at Mirnnda and Murguin,
guarding ngniust any possible dcscent of Blukc from VilIarcayo
upon the Upper Ebro. Ney was at lA Guard.in, facing Pignatelli's
CastiLians, who occupied his old head qua.rters at Logl'Ofio. l\1onccy
had thro\\'n back his left to guard against n possible descent of
Palafox upon Navarrc. and was behind thc linc of the rivcr Antgoll,
with his right at Estella, his centre at Falces and Tafalla, find his
left facing S::mguesa, whcrc it was opposed by the advanced division
of the army of Palafox under O'Neille. For the Captnin·General of
Aragon, pleased with a plan proposed to him by Colonel Doyle. the
English mililury attache in his camp, had rcsolved to make a long
turning movement under the roots of the !>yrenees, cxactly parallel
to that which Blake was executing at the other cnd of the line.
With this object he lIent ont from Saragossa, on September 29,
I It was originally to be called the 5tll, but tl1is titlc was taken from it, ill
order tbat J\Iortier'lI corps might keep its old number.
• For t1leir distribution £ee p. 110.
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Q'Neille with a division of Aragonesc strengthened by a few
Mureian and Valencian battalions, and numbering some 9,000
bayonets. Thi~ detachment, lllaJ."Ching in a leisurely way. reached
Sanguesa on the Upper Aragon, but there stopped short, on getting
information that Monccy's corps lay before it in some strength.
Palafox then sent up in support a second division, Saint March's
l\'!urcians and Va1cnciulIs, who advam:eo. to Egca and there halted.
There was considerable bickering aU through the second half of'
October on this line, but Sunguesa remained in the hands of the
Spaniards, Moncey being too much distracted by the movements of
Castaiio8 ill the direction of Tudela to dare to concentrate his whole
force for a blow at Snint March and O'Neille. The latter, on the
other hand, had realized that if they pressed further forward towards
Pampeluna, tl.S their commander-in-chief had originally intended,
they would leave Moncey so much in their rear that he could cut
them off both from Saragossa and from the .tU-my of the Centre.
Here then matters had come to a deadlock; but the position was all
in favour of the :Fl'cnch, who lay compactly in the centre, while
O'Neille and Saint March were separated from Castai'ios by a gap of
sixty miles, and Blakc on the other wing was about seventy (us the
crow flies) from the army of Castile.
SECTION VII: CHAPTER 11
TI-IE PRELIMINARY lo'IGHTLNG: ARRIVAL O.F NAPOLEON
By the middle of October the French and Spanish armies were
in presence of each other along the whole line of the Ebro, and it
seemed certain that one or other of them must at last take the
offensive. Both were still ill expectation of rcinforcements, but
those which the Spaniards could expect to receive within the next
few weeks were comparnthcly unimportant, while their udvcrsw:ics
knew that more than 100,000 men from Germany were due at
Bayonllc in the last days of October. Clearly it was for Castnnos
and his colleagues to make a move now or never. The wasted
months of August and September could not be recalled, but there
was still time to attack Bessieres, Ney, and Moncey, before the
arrival of the Emperor and the three veteran corps from the
Elbe.
Matters lay thus when tile Spanish generals resolved on a per-
fect~ new and wildly impracticable scheme. Castanos had come
to the conclusion-a thoroughly sound one-that his :)4,000 men
were too few to make a frontal attack on the French on the line
between Miranda and CalaholTa. He left Madrid on October 18.
deeply chagrined to find that the Central Junta had no intention
of making him commander-in-chief. Instead of being able to
issue orders to the other generals, he must meet them on equal
terms and endeavour to cajole them into adollting n. common plan
of opcmtions. Accordingly he rode to Saragossa to visit Palafox,
and after long and not very friendly converse drew out a new plan.
The Army of tile Centre was to shift itself down the Ehl'o, leaving
the troops of Pignatelli (the' Army of Castile ') and of Grimarest
(the 2nd .A.ndalusiall division) to' contain' Ney and ~icrcs. '111e
rest were to concentrate at Tudela, where they were to be joined
by as many battalions of the Arngoncsc levies at Saragossa as could
take the field. With some 25,000 or 30,000 men at the highest
estimate, Castaflos and Palafox were to fall upon Mom::cy's Hank
at the bridge of Caparrosa. Meanwhile O'Neille and Saint March,
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with the advanced divisions of the army of Aragon, were to break
up from Sanguesa, march round Pampeluna by the fuut·hills of
the PyrenC<ls, and place themselve'; across the road to :Prance.
Moncey was thus to be surrounded, and a second Baylen was to
ensue! Indeed, if Dlake could be persnaded to push forward once
more to Bilbao, and thence into Guipuzcoa, the whole army of
King Joseph (ns it was hoped) might be cut off' And made prisoners.
Eighty thousund men, aecording to this strange scheme, starting
from bases 200 miles apart, were to surround 65,000 French in a
most difficult mountain co:mt.ry. Meanwhile the enormous gap
betwccn Blake's right and Custaiiml' left was to remain wholly un-
guarded, fOl' the arm)' of Estremadura was still in the far distance;
while nothing was to be left opposite Bessicrcs and Ne)' save
l'ignatelli's disorderly' Army of C.'lstile,' nnd Grimarest's 6,000
Andalusians,
But before the scheme fm' the cutting oll' of Moncey had even
begun to be carried out, Casul.llos and Palafox had a rude
awakening, They were themselves attacked by the army whkh
they were so confldently pl"Oposing to surround, Killg Joseph,
emboldened by the long delay of his adversaries in advancing, had
several times discnsscd with Jourdan, Bcssicres, and Ney schemes
for taking the offensive, Indeed he had sketched out in September
no less than five separate plans for bringing the enemy tf) an
action, and it is probable that he might have tried one of them if
he had been nJlowcd a free hand I, Napoleon, however, having
determined to come to Spain in person, pnt an embargo on any
comprehensive scheme for an advance on Madl'id, and restricted
his brother to minor operations,
But there was nothing in the Emperor's instnlctions which
forbade a blow on a small scale, if the Spaniards should grow too
daring. There was now a good excuse for such a move, for both
Pignatelli mld Grimarest had been trespassing beyond the Ebro,
They seem to have mOl'ed forward quite contrar} to the intentions
of Castafios, who at this moment WIIS proposing to refuse battle
with his left and centre, and to draw the bulk of his anlly south-
ward to 'l'udela, But his two di~'isiollal generals pw>h(...J. so far
forward, that they at last drew upon themselves most undesired
I ]he paper containing t!lem wall captured ill Joseph's carriage at Vittoria
fh'e )'ears later, It will be found prillted ill fuU ill Napier (Appendix to \'01, i,
pp, 453, 454).
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attentions f!'Om the French marshals. Pignatelli had thrown troop's
across the Ebro to Viane.: Grimarest had pushed detachments still
further forward into Nnvurrc, to Mcndavia, Sesma, and Lerin.
Joseph and Jourdnn resolved to drive back these ontlying posts,
and to find out what was behind them. About ji!5,OOO Illen were
put in movement against the 16,000 Spaniards who had so rashly
crossed the river. MOllce)' marclu-xl ngainst Grimarest [Oct. £5-6]
with two divisions: Ney with a similar force fell upon Pignatelli,
while Bessicrcs sent a di vision down the southern bank of the Ebro
by Haro nlld llrioncs, to threaten the line of retreat of the army
of Castile across the bl'idb"e of Logruno.
Against sllch forces the Spaniards could do nothing: on the
twenty-fifth Ne)' mm-ched un Viana, and dl"O\'e in Pignutelli's
advanced b'llll.rd. On the following day he opened a fierce
canllonade upon Logrufio from AClOOSS the river, while at the same
time Bonnet's division, sent by llessicres, marched upon the town
from the hither side of the Ebro. Pignatelli WM 1\ cra,'ell, Ilnd
his Castilian levies proved to be the worst of all the material which
the Spaniards hud brought to the front. General Ilnd army
vanished in the night, without e"en stopping to blow up the great
bridge, though they had mined it and laid the train in due form.
Ney's officer;; cros...ing at dawn found all prepared, except the
sappers who should have applied the match I! Neither Ney nor
Bonnet got in touch with the flying horde: but in sheer panic
Pignatelli abandoned his guns by the roadside, and did not stop
till he had joined Castllflos at Cintrucnigo, lIear 'l'udela. His
hurried retreat was wholly unnecessary, for the l,'reneh did not
mo\'e beyond Llgrono, and Castai'iO!l was able to send out next
morning (l. brigade which picked up the deserted guns and brought
them in without molestation. Rightly illdignunt, the Commulldcr-
in-chief removed Pignatclli from his post, and distributed his
demoralized battalions alllong the divisions of Grimnrest, Ln Pcfia,
and Llamas 2, leaving in separate existence only a single brigade
of six battalions under Cartaojal, whicll mainly consisted of
the few rcgulua' Lattulions that had been lent to Pignatelli to
I For lID aCCOllnt of tl.is curious affair see t1IC /If&mQi~ of General .lloulnrt,
then an artillery officer under Ney} who discovered the flight of the CIlStiHans
and the abandoned mine below the bridge (pp, 202, 203), Oddly enougll he
gives the wrong date for thc illcillellt, Oct. 30 instead of Ot;t. 27,
t 1 call1lot find any details as to their redistribution.
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stiffen his raw levies. Thus the 'Anny of Castile' ceased to
exist 1,
On the same day that the Castilians were routed by Ney, the
fud Andalusiall division was severely handled by Moncey. When
that Marshal advanced against Leno and Sesma with the divisions
of Morlot and Maurice Mathieu, Grimarest withdrew beyond the
Ebro, abandoning by some oversight his vanguard. This force,
commanded by a resolute officer, Colonel Cruz-Murgeon, was
cnve!0JXu at Lerin by the division of MorIat 2. The colonel shut
himself up in the mediaeval castle of that town, and defended
himself for two days, in hopes that he might be succoured. But
his chief had fled beyond the ri vel', and could not be induced to
return by any appeals. On October 27 Cruz-Murgeon had to
surrender, after two-thirds of his troops had been killed or wounded.
Their obstinate defence was the more creditable because they were
aline..... levies, consisting of a single Andalusiau battalion (Tiradorea
de Cadiz) and a few Catalan volunteers. Marsbal Moncey then
occupied Lodo~a and its bridge, but made no attempt to follow
Grimarest, who was able to rejoin his chief without further loss.
Castmlos was greatly disturbed by the vigorous olTensi\·e move-
ment of Ney and Moncey. Seeing the French so strong and 50
confident, he was struck with sudden qualms as to the advisability
of the movement on Caparrosannd Pampehmn, which heand Palafox
had agreed to carry out. He proposed to his colleague that they
should drop their pInn for surrounding Moncey, and attempt no
more than an attack on his flanks at Caparrosa and Sanguesa.
Meanwhile he conceutrutcd the greater part of his army at
Calahorra and Tudela [Oct. 29]. The initiative had passed to the
French, and if Ney and MOllCCY did not seize the opportunity for
an 8.£h-ance against the Army of the Centre, it was merely because
they knew that Napoleon was now close at hand-he reach<.>O
Bayonne four days lalcr-and would not wish them to attempt
anything decisive without his orders.
Meanwhile there arrived from Madrid Lt. deputation from the
Supreme Junta, consisting of Francisco Pa-Ia-fox (the ,Younger
l See Colonel Graham's Diary, p. 275 (Oct. 30). Ho reac1led Castaiios'
camp Oil tha.t day.
I.Jourdall in his NemQi7e8 (p. 77) says that it was l\Iorlot who acted against
Lerin, and 1 follow llim rntllcr than those \Vho state that it wa.s l\Illurico
l\Illtbieu.
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brother of the Captain-General), of Collpigny, Rerling's colleague
at the Yietory of Baylen, and the intriguing Conde de Montijo.
The J uum were indignant that Castafios had not made bricks
without straw. Though they had not given him any appreciable
reinforccments, they had expected him to attack the French and
win a great yictory beyond the Ebro. Conscious that the deputies
came to him in no friendly spirit, Castaf\os nevertheles.s received
them with all respect, and laid before them the difficulties of his
situation. Joscph Palafox Cllllle up from Saragossa to join the
conference, and after a long and stormy meeting-this was the
conference which so disgusted Colonel Gmham1-it was decided to
resume offensive operations [No\'cmber 5]. The idea was a mad
one, for six days before the council of war was held two French
army corps, those of Victor and Lefebvre, had crossed the Bidassoa
and entered Spain. There were now 110,000 instead of 65,000
enemies in front of the Spanish armies. Moreo\'er, and this was
still more important, Napoleon himself had reached Bayonne on .
November 3.
Neveltheless it was resolved once more to pusb forward and fall
upon MoU<.,'ey. CastaJ10s was to leave ouc division at Calahorra,
and to bring the rest of his army over the Ebro to attack the
bridge of Caparrosa: O'Ncille and Saint March were to <''Ollle down
from Sanguesa to co-operate with him: Joseph Palafox was to
bring up the Aragonese reserves from Saragossa. The only sign
of prudence that appeared was that the coullcil of war agreed not
to commeU<.:c the attack on Monccy till they had learnt how Blake
and the army of Galicia were faring in Biscay. For that general
had, as thcy knew, colUmcll(.'(.'t1 SOIllC days before his second advance
011 Bilbao. Since the armies on the Central Ebro hung back, it
was in the distant region on the coast that the first important
collision between the Spaniards and the French reinforcements
from Germany was to take placc. For a fortnight more there was
comparative quiet in front of 1'udela and Capal'rosa. Meanwhile
Castailos, prostrated by an attack of the gout z, took to his bed,
and the Army of the Centre was abfUldolll.J. for a few days to the
tender mercies of the deputation from Madrid.
There is a strange contrast when we turn from the study of the
I Cf. p. 366 alld Graham's Dillry, p. 27(t
~ According to '1'oreiio; but Graham, who was present in the camp, calls it
rheumatism.
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rash and inconsidcratc plans of the Spanish gcllcro.ls to mark
the movements of Napoleon, The Emperor had left Erfurt on
October 14: on the nineteenth he had reached Paris,. where he
mayed for ten days, busied not anI), with the 'logisties' of moving
t,he coltmms of the 'Gmnd Army' across France, bllt with all
manner of ooministmti.,c work. Hc had also to armuge the detnils
of the conscription: though he had raised. in 1807 the enormous
mass of new levies of which wc llad to speak in all curlier chuptc,',
he now asked for 140,000 men more'. Of the.<;e, 80,000 were
to be drawll from the classes of 1806-9, which hllAl already C011-
tribllted so heavily to the army. The balance was to be taken
from the class of 1810, whose membel"S were still fifteen months
below the legal nge. From these multitudes of ),oung soldiers
every regiment of the arm)' of Spain was to be brought up to full
strength, but the llIlljority were destined to reinforce the depleted
tll'mies of Germany and Italy, which had been thinned of veteram
for the Peninsular 'Var.
011 October ~5 Bonaparte presided at the opening of the
Legislative Assembly, and made a dlaracteristic harangue to it.~
members. He paintCl:l the situation of the Empire in the most
roseate colours. 'The sight of this great French family, Ollce
torn apart by diffel'Cnces of opinion and domestic hatreds, but
now so tranquil, prosperous, and united, had sensibly touched his
soul. To be happy himself he only required thc assurance that
I'rance also' WtlS happy. Law, finance, the Church, every branch
of the state, seemed in the most flollrilihillg t:ondition. The
l~mpire WM strong in it>; alliances with Hussia, the Confederation
of the Rhine, Denmark, Swit7,erland, and Naples. Great Britain,
it was true, had landed somc troops in the Pcninsula, and stin'Cd
tlp insurrections there. But this was a blessing in disguise. The
Prm,idenc.:e which bad so constantly protected the arms of France,
had deigned to strike the English ministry with blindness, and to
induce them to present an (l.I·my 011 the Contincnt where it was
doomed to inevitAble destruction. In a few da),s the Emperor
would placc himself at the head of his troops, and, with the aid
of God, would crown in :Madrid the true King of Spain, and plant
his Cllgles on the forts of Lisbon 2.'
] See Nap. Con·up., 14,312 (xvii. 505, 506), amI compare witl1 14,6Ql
(xviii. HI. 142).
: J)itrOUI'B pronQllct le 25 oct. (Nap. CttrTe8p., Xl"iii. 20, 21).
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}i'our days later BOllaparte quitted Paris, and passing hastily
through Orleans and Bordeaux reached Bayonne at three o'clock in
the morning of November 3. The corps of Victor and Lefcbvl'c,
with two divisions of dragoons, were several days ahead of him,
und had already crusst'<l the Bidas~oa. The Impcri!d Guard nnd
the divisions destined for Ney I, as well as 1I. great mass of ClIvall")',
were just converging on the frontier. Mortier'f:I corp~ was not
very far off': Junot's army from Portugal had already landed at
Quiberon amI Rochcforl, and WIl3 beillg direcu.>d 011 Bordeaux. All
thc machincl'y for the great hlow 'I'lL" now ready.
Napoleon profoundly despiSL>U the Spanish army and the Spanish
generals. His correspondence is full of contemptuous allusions to
them: 'ever since he served at 1'oulon he knew tllem for the worst
troops in Europe.' • Nothing could be so bad IL<; the Spaniards-
they are mere rabble-6,OOO French can beat 20,000 of them.'
'The whole Spanish army could not turn 15,000 good troops out
of a position that had been properl), occupied 2.' Nevertheless he
had determilJ(~1 to fUll no risks: the 8e<:ond Peninsular campaign
must nut end like the first, in u. {iu.:sco und u humiliating retreat.
It WIl3 for this reason that the Emperor had massed more than
~50,OOO good troops ugaillst the tUlIlultuul'y levies of the Junm-
a force which, in his private opinion, was far more than enough
to sweep thc whole of his udvCl'sal'ics into the scu before thc year
1808 should have run out. Any expedition in which he himself
look part IlIllio"'t, for the sake of his prestige, be conducted fmlll
beginning to end in a series of spec.tacular triumphs. It was
better to use a lo.rb7C1' army than was absolutely ncccssary, ill order
to make his blows sufficiently heavy, and to get the Spanish
business oyer as rapidly as possible. If the whole Peninsula were
overrun in a. few months, and resistancc had been l.'ompletcly
beaten down ere the winter was o\'cr, there would be no chance
of that intervention on the part ot' Austria which was the only
clUllgcr on the political horizon a.
I ThO!ie or Marc},,'1lI1 "'101 Bisso:)lI, forming the old UtI. Corps, witll wlLich
he fouglLt at JCILU mu1 .Fricdland.
~ Napoleon to Joscph Uouaparte, to Caulaincourt, to Eugeue Deauharuais
(vola. xvii, xviii of i.Yllp. C()"rup.).
~ The clearest proof "'hich J find ill the Napokml O()rnspo1ldellce of the
Emperor's intention to sweep over the whole Peninsula, witll a single rush, is
that already ill Kovcmber he was as;;embling at llayonue naval olliool'ii who
998 THE PRELIMINARY FIGHTING (Nov. 3
Napoleon, therefore, drew out his plans not merely for a
triumphant ruhance on Mlwrid, but for the complete annihilat.ion
of the Spanish armies on the Ebro and in Biscay. From a careful
stud)' of the dispatches ofhis licutenants, he had rculized. the existence
of the great gap in the direction of Burgos between the armies of
Blakc und. of Cttstafios. His plan of campaib"ll, stated shortl}·, was
to burst in through this gap, so as to separate the Spanish armies
on his lcft and right., and then to wheel troops outwards in both
directions so R.S to surround and annihilate them. 130th Blake and
Palafox were, at this moment, playing the game that he most
desired. The further that the former pressed onward into Disca)',
the nearer that the latter drew to the roots of the Pyrenees, the
more did they expose themselves to being encompassed.. by great
masses of troops breaking out from Burgos and Llgroi'io to fall
upon their flank and rear. 1V11ClI the Emperor drew up his scheme
he knew that Blake was in front of Zorno7.fl, and that the bulk
of the army of Aragon was at Snngnesa. Meanwhile the French
advanced divisions were in possession of Mimnda, LlgroflO, and
Lodosa, the three chief passages over the Upper Ebl'o. A glance
at the map is sufficient to show tllat the moment that the Emperor
and his reserves reached Vittoria the Spanish armies were in the
most perilous position. It woUld suffi(:e to order a march on
Burgos on the one hand and on Tudela on the other, and then
the troops of Aragon and. Galicia would llot merely be cut off
from an)' possible retreat on Madrid, but rlln grave danger of
annihilation. A further aUvanee of the French would probably
thrust the onc against the Pyrenees, and roll the other into the
Bay of Biscay.
For tillS reason it was the Emperor's wish that his lieutenants
should refrain from attacking Blake and Palafox till he himself
was ready to march on Burgos. For any premature advance
against the Spaniards might force them to retreat from their
dangerous advanced positions, and fall back the one on
Reynosa the other on Saragos.~ where they would be much less
exposed.
The distribution of the' Grand Army' was to be R.S follows.
Lefcbvrc with the 4th Corps was to present himself in front of
were to t.'\ke charge of the port of Lisbon, and to reorganize tIle Portuguese
fleet. TI.is was a little premature! (Soo NlII)()leon to Dccres, i\linister of
Marille, Nap. Oon'up., 14,614, \'01. xviii.)
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Blake between Durango and Zornozn, and tu hold him fast without
pressing him. Moncey with the Srd Corps. in a similar way, was
to 'contain' Palafox and Castailus from bis posts at Lodosa,
Caparrosa, nnd 'l'afalla. Meanwhile Victor, with the newly arrived
1st Corps, was to endeavour to get into Blake's rear, by the road
Vittoria-l\1urguia-Orduna. The main body of the army, consist·
ing of the troops of :Bessieres and Ney, King Joseph's reserve, the
Imperial Guard, and four divisions of cavalry, was to march on
Burgos. Napoleon knew that there was no large body of Spaniards
in that place: he expected to find there Pignatelli's 'Army of
Castile,' but this force (as we have seen) had ceased to exist, having
been drafted with ignominy into the ranks of the army of Anda-
lusia 1. As a matter of fact Burgos was now occupied by a new
force from the second line-the long-expected army of Estrema-
dura, some 1~,OOO strong, which had at last come up from Madrid
and taken its plaee at the front. But Napoleon's reasoning stili
held good: any Spanish arlllY that might chance to bc at Burgos
must be overwhelmed by the enormous mass of troops that was
about to be hurled upon it. The moment that it was disposed of,
Ney with the 6th Corps was to wheel to the east, and march by
Aranda and Soria, so as to place himself betwL~n Cllstaiios I\lld
llalafox and Madrid. Then he would turn their Rank at'l'arazona
and Tudela, and-in conjunction with Moncey-drive them 1I0rth-
ward against the Pyrenees. In a similar way, upon the other flank,
the ~nd Corps was to wheel to the north-west and march from
Burgos on Reynosa, there to intercept make, if he had not already
been cut off' by Victor's shorter turning movement. Meanwhile the
Emperor with the rest of his army, followed by the new reserves
(l\.Iorticr'il CQrpil and other troops) which were due from Frnncc,
would march straight from Burgos on Madrid, force the defiles of
the Somosievra and Guadarrama, and sei7,c the Spanish capital.
He was well aware that there would be no serious hostile force in
front of him, since the armies of Blake, Palafox, and Castrulos were
all provided for. He does not seem to have known of the army of
EstrcmiLdum, or to have had any idea that the English forces from
I NapolCQn to llesgicres, Nol', 6: (J'ai vu vos dcpeches dll 6 novembre
sur l'existellce d'llll corps de 24,000 hommes aDurgoo. Si cela est, ca ne
peut Cire que 12,000 hommes de l'armee de Castille qui ont "'vacue Logrofio,
et qui ne sout pas Cll cas de faire tete a 3,000 ou 4,000 de VOll gena' (1\'ap.
Corrup., 14,443, xviii. 38).
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Portugal might conceivably be on their way to cover Madrid.
There is no mention of Sir John Maore and his host in the
imperial dispatches till December 5.
All being ready, Bonaparte rode out of Bayonllc 011 November 4,
having stayed there only thirty-six hours. Before leaving he had
received onc vexatious piece of news: Lcfcbvrc, in direct dis-
obedienoo to his orders, had attacked :Blake OD October 31, and
fOfl'Cd him buck beyond Bilbao. This made the plan for the
cutting off' of the army of Galicia a little more difficult, since
the Spaniards were now forty miles further back, and lIot nearly
so much exposed lIS they hud been hitherto. But it was still
not impossible that Victor might SUCt'eCd in circumventing them,
and forcing them into the Bay of' lliscay.
It is impossible to withhold our admiration from the Emperor's
simple ye~ all-embracing plan of operations. It is true that the
campaign was made more easy by the fad that he was dealing
with raw and undisciplined armies and inexpert generals. It is
also clear that he rightly reckoned on having two men :in the field
ngllillst everyone whom the Spaniards could producc. But the
exeellence of a scheme is not to be judged merely by the difficulties
in its way; and military genius can be displayed ill dealing with
an easy as well as with a dangerous problem. Half a d07.en other
plans for conducting the invasion of Spain might Iw.ve bl.'C1l drawn
up, but it is impossible to see that any better one could have been
constructed. III its main lilles it was curried out with l.-ompletc
success: the armies of the Junta were scattered to the winds, and
:Madrid fell almost without tl. blow.
It was only when the capital had been occupied, and the troops
of make and Belvedere, of Castniios and Palafox were Hying de-
yiolls over half the provinces of Spain, that the difficulties of the
Peninsular ·War bcgan to develop themselves. Napolcon had
never before had any experience of the character of guerilla
warfare, or the kind of resistance that l.'an be offered by a proud
and revengefhl nation whieh has made up its mind never to
:mbmit to the conqueror. In his complete ignorance of Spain
and the Spaniards, he imagined that he had a very simple campaign
to conduct. 'l11e subj ugation of the Peninsula was to him an
ordinary military problem, like the invasion of Lombardy or of
Prussiu, and he wellt forth in cheerful l.-onfidencc to 'plant the
eagles of France on the forts of Lisbon,' and to 'drive the Britannic
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leopard from the soil of the Peninsula, which it defiles by its
presence: But the last chapter of this story was to be told Dot at
Lisbon but at Toulouse: and I the Beneficent Providence which
had deigned to strike the British ministry with such blindJless that
they had been induced lo send an anny to the Continent 1,' had
other designs than Bonaparte supposed.
I See page 396.
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SECTION VII: CHAPTER III
THE MISFORTUNES 010' JOACHlM BLAKE: ZORNOZA AND
ESPINQSA DE LOS MQNTEROS
THE campaign of November 1808 was fought out upon three
separate theatres of wat, though e\'ery movement of the French
annies which engaged in it formed part of a single plan, and \vas
properly linked to the operatiollS which were progressing upon
other sections of the front. The working out of Napoleon's great
scheme, therefore, must be dealt with under three hends-the
destruction of Blake's 'Army of the Left' in the north-west; the
rout of the armies of Andalnsia and Arngon upon the banks of
the Ebro; and the central advam:e of the Emperor upon Burgas
and Madrid, which completed the plan.
We must first deal with the misfortunes of Blake and his Galiciall
host, both on chronological grounds-it was he who first felt the
weight of the French arms-and also because Napoleon rightly
attached more imporlance to the del!truetion of this, the moot
fonnidable of the Spanish armies, than to the other OpcratiOllS
which he was carrying out at the samc momcnt.
It will be remembered that after his first abortive expedition
~ooainst Bilbao, and lds retreat before Ney [October 51 Blake had
fallen back to Valmaceda. Finding that he wa.~ not pursued, he
drew up to that point the divisions which he hOO hitherto kept in
the upper valley of the Ebro, and prepared to advance aguin, this
time wiDl his whole army massed for a bold stroke. On October 11
he again marched into Biscay, and drove out of Bilbao the division
of General Merlin, which Ney had left behind him to hold the line
of the Net:viol1. On the twelfth this small force fell back 011
Zornoza [Utd Durango, and halted at the latter pla<.-c, nftcr having
been reinforced from King Joseph's reserve at Vittoria. Verdier
headed. the succours, which <''OllSistcd of three battalions of the
Imperial Guard, two battalions of the 118th Regiment, two batta·
lions of Joseph's own Royal Guards, and Dle 36th Regiment, which
had just come up from France. "When strengthened by these
7,000 men, Merlin con~idered himself able to make a stand, and
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took up a strong position in front of Durango, the important point
at which the roOOs from Bayonnc and from Vittoria to Bilbao meet.
When committing himself to his second expedition into BiscR)",
Blake was not wholly unaware of the dangers of the step, though
he failed to realize them at their full value, since (in common with
the other Spanish generals) he greatly underrated the strellgth
of the :French army on the Ebro. He intended to carry out his
original plan of cutting oft' Bcssicres and King Joseph from their
retreat 011 Bayollllc, by forcing the position of Durango, and seizing
the high-mad at Bcrgara; but he was aware that an advallce to
that point hnd its dangers. As long as his divisions hOO Wo in or
about Villarcayo and Vabnacedu, he had a perfectly clear line of
retreat westward in the c\'cnt of a disaster. But the moment that
he pushed forward beyond Bilbao, he could be attacked in flank
and rear by any troops whom thc King might send up from the
valley of the Ebro, by the two ll1ountain~roads which nlll from
Vittorin to the Discnyan capital. One of thesc is the main route
from Vittoria to Bilbao via :Mnrguia and Orduila. The other is
a more obscure and difficult path, which leads across the rough
watcrshl.xl from Vittoria by Villarcal and Villaro to Bilbao. Aware
of the fact that he might be assailed by cither of these two p3SSCf>,
Blakc told oil' Il strong covering fon.oe to hold them. Half of
Acevedo's Asturiall division, 4,000 strong, was placed at O.TIufia :
the other lmlf, with the whole of l\{artillcllgo's 2nd Division of
Galieia, 8,500 bayonets in all, took its post in the directioll of
Villaro. These detachments were eminently justifiable, but they
had the unfortullate result of enfeebling the main force that re·
mainoo M'll.illl.ble for the stl'Oke at the French in front of DurnnbJ'O.
l~or that operation llIake (.'Ould only count on his Ist, 3rd, and
4th Di~·isions, as well as the' Vanguard' and' Uesel've' Brigades
-a total of 18,000 men I.
1 Viz. Vanguard llrigade, Geueral i\felldizabel
1st Division, General Figueroa .
3ril Division, General R;ljuclme.
{th Divisioll, General Carbajal .
Resen'e Brigade, General i\Iaby
Tot:ll
'nle detached corps beillg-
2nd Divisiou, General Martiuengo
AsturiuJI Dj,'isiou, G\:uernl Acel'edo
Dd 2
~,88{
4,018
4,711l)
:3,531
3,025
1ll,2J7
u,OOG
7,633 .
404 THE MISFORTUNES OF JOACHIM BLAKE [0". I'
Blake had seized Bilbao on October 11: it is astonishing there-
fore to find that he made no forward movement till the twenty-
fourth. By this sluggishness he sacrificed his chance of crushing
Merlin before he could be reinforced, and-what was far worsc-
allowed the leading columns of the' Grand Army' to reach Irun.
If he bad pressed fOI'WllIU OIl the twelfth or thirteenth, they would
still have been many marches away. trailing across Guycnne and
Gascony. Having once put his hand to such El. dangerous mnllreU\TC
as that of pushing betWCCJl the French flank and the northem sea,
Blake was most unwise to leave the enemy time to divine his
object and to conccntrate against him. A rnpid stroke at Dllrango
and Bergam, so as to cut the great high-rood to France in the rear
of Bessicrcs, WtlS his only chancc. Such 1111 attempt would probn.bly
have landed him in ultimate disaster, for the cnemy (eycn before
the I Grand Army' arri\'ed) wcre far more numerous than hc
snpposed. He had valued them at 40,000 men, while they were
really 64,000 strong. But having framed th~ plan, he should ut
least have made a strcnuoUl; attempt to carry it out. It is possible
to e.xplain but not to excuse his del"y: his army was lIot equipped
for a winter campaign, and the snow was beginning to lie on the
upper slopes of the Cantabrian hills and the Pyrenees. While he
was vainly trying to obtain great-coats and shoes for his somewhat
tattered army, from the Central .funm. or the English, and while
he was accumulating stores in Bilbao, the days slipped by with
fatal rapidity.
It was not till October 24 that he at last 1lI0\'cd forward from
Uilbao, and committed himself to the now hopeless task of clearing
the way to Durango and Bcrgru:a. On that day his oomncl.:d
guard drove Merlin's outlying posl'l from their positions, and came
face to face with the French main body, drawn out on the hillsides
of Daquijano, a few miles in front of Durango. The cnemy
expected him to attack next day, but he had just received confused
notices from the peasantry to the effect that enormous reinforce-
ments had readied Iron and San Sebastian, and were within sup-
porting distance:of t1ie comparatively slllall force with which he had
hitherto been dealing. 'Ibis information threw him buck into the
condition of doubt and hesitation from which he had for a moment
emerged, and he proceeded to halt for anothcr full week in front
of the Durango. position. Yet it was clear that there were only
two rational alternatives before him: one was to attack Merlin Rnd
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Verdicr before they could draw succour from the newly arrived
corps. '111C other was to fall back at once to a position in which
he could 1I0t be ellveloped and outflanked, i. c. to retire behind
Bilbao, holding tllll.t town with nothing more than a small delach*
lllent which could easily J:,ret away if attacked. But Blake did
nothing, and waited in the supremely dangerous post of Zornoza,
in front of Durango, till the enemy fell upon him at his leisure.
The troops whose D.nival at In.lIl had been reported consisted of
the two leading divisions of the 4th Corps, that of LefebvI'Cj
and of the whole of the ht Corps, that of Victor, The former,
arriving as early as October 18, only seven days after Blake
captured Bilbao, marched westward, and replaced Merlin and
Vertlier in the Durallf:,"O pooition. The troops of these two general..
were directed by King Joseph to rejoin their proper commanders
whell relieved, so Vcrilier k>J the Gutuds back to the l:clltral
reserve, while Merlin repOlted himself to Ne~', at La Guardia.. To
compensate Lefcbvre for their departure, and for the non~arrival
of his third division, that of Valence, which still lay far to the rear,
ViUalte's division of lhe Isl Corps was sent to Durtlngo, Marshal
Victor himself, with his other two divisions, took the road to
Vittoria, and from Ulcm:c, u.t the King's orders, trallsferred himself
to Murguia, on the <..Toss-road O"er"the mountains to Bilbao. Here
he was ill u position to strike ut Dlake's rear, after driving oll' the
4,000 men of Acevooo's Asturian dh"isioll, who (as it will be
remembered) had been told oft' by the Spanish General to <..'O\"cr
this road 1.
King Joscph, inclining for ouce to a bold stroke, wished to push
Victor across the hills on to Bilbao, while Lefebvrc should advance
along the high-road t111d dl"i\'e lllake into the trap. llef;sieres at
the smne moment might mo\"c a ilivisioIl by Orduila and Oqucndo,
n.nd place himself at Valmaceda, which Blake would ha'"e to pass
if he escaped from Victor ut Bilbao. 'l1lis plull was eminenUy
sound, for there was no doubt that the two marshals, who had at
thcir disposal SOllle 35,000 men, could ensily have brushed out of
their way the two divisions under Acc\"cdo and :Martillengo which
Blake had left behind him in the passes. Nothing could have
prevented them from seil':illg Bilbao and Valmaeeda, and the
Spanish army would have been surrounded and captured. At
I 'nlcre is a clear and precise account of all these moves in U,c .Mtmoiru of
Jouruan, who was still acting as Joseph's chief of Ule staff (pp. 7D-81).
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the best some part of it might have escaped along the coast-road
to Santander, if itil commander detected ere it was too late the full
dnnger of his position.
This scheme, however, was not carried out: Bessieres, Victor, and
Ney showed themselves opposed to it: Napoleon had allnounced
that he intended ere long to appear in person, and that he did not
wish tu have matters hurried,before his arrival. His obsequious
lieutenant;; refused to concur ill any great general movement
which might not win his approval. Victor, in particular, urged
that he had been ordered to have the whole of the 1st Corps
concentrated at Vittoria, and that if he marched northward into
Biscay he would be violating his master's express command I. J oscph
and J ourdan, therefore, resolved to defer the execution of their plan
for the ftIlllihilation of Blakc, and sent ordcrs to Lefcbvrc to maiu4
tnin his defensive position at Durango, and make no forward mo\·e-
ment. In so doing they were acting exactly w; t.he Empel'ol'dcsircd.
'111ey had forgotten, however, to reckon with the personal
ambition of the old Duke of Dantzig. Lefebvre, in spite of his
many campaigns, had never before had the chance of fighting on
his own account a pitched battle of the first class. The Spanish
army had been lying before him for a week doing "nothing, its
commander being evidently afraid to attack. It'i force was not
very great-indeed it was outnumbered by that of the Marshal
whose three divisions cOlmted not less than !!l,OOO bayonets ~
Noting with the e)'e of an old soldier Blake's indecision and obvious
timidity. he could not resist the temptation of falling upon him.
Notwithstanding the King's orders, he resolved to strike, covering
his disobedience by (L futile e.-,;:cu$c to thc eflect that he had observed
preparations for taking the offensive on the part of the enemy, and
that his outposts had been attacked.
1 Jourdal1'S Mtmoirtl, p. 7!J.
2 Hc ltad Sebastiani's Dh'i~ion, 28th (tllree batts.), 32nd, 58tll
(two batts. ellch), and 76th oftbc J.iue (three haW;.) 6,808
Le\'al's Division, seven Gennan and two Dutch batta-
lion!; . 8,347
Villatte's Division, 27th, 63rd, !J4th, nud WUl of the
Line (each of three batts.) . 7,IG!)
Tot."ll 21,324
Artec!le gives twelve German battalions (Hi. 4!Jl); but the }'rankfort Regiment
had only one battalion, those of Nassau, Daden, and Darmstadt two each.
'1110 figures (Ire tl106e of the return of Octo 10.
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Blake's army lay before him, posted in three lines, with the
village of Zornoza to its rear. In fron4 on a range of oompamtivelJ
Iow hills, was the' Vanguard Brigade; drnwn up across the road
with the 1st Division of Galicia to its left on somewhat higher
ground. They were supported by the 3m and 4th Divisions,
while the' Reserve Brigade' occupied the houses of Zomow. to the
rear of all. 'l'here were only six guns with the army, as Blake had
sent the rest of his artillery to the rear, when advancing into the
mountain!!: this single battery lay with the Vanguard on the lower
heights. The whole amounted to 19,000 men, a slight rcinfo1'(,'C.
ment having just come to hand by the arrival of the 1st Catalonian
Light Infantry I, theadvRllced guard ofLa ROlllllna's army from the
Baltic. That general, having landed at SantAnder on October 11,
hud reorganized his force as the' 5th Division of the lU'Illy of Gnlieia'
and sent it forward under his senior brigadier, the Conde de San
Roman. But only the single CataIonian battalion had passed
Bilbao at the moment when Lefebvre delivered his attack.
The plan of the Marshal's advance was quite simple. The division
of Vmatte drove in the front line of the Spanish righ~ and then
spread. itself out on n long front threatening to turn Blllke's flank.
That of Sebastiani, formed in a single dellse column, marched along
the high~road at the bottolll of the vnllcy to pierce the Spanish
centre; meallwhile Leval's Germans attacked the left wing of the
enemy, the 1st Division of the lU'my of Galicia 2. A dense fog,
a common phenomenon in the Pyrenees in the late autumn, hid the
tu:hancc of thc French, so that they were close upon the front line
of Blake's army before they were observed. The first line was
easily drh'en in, but the whole army mIlied on the heights of Sun
Marlin and stood at bay. Lcfebvre cannonaded them for some
time, without meeting with any reply, for Ulake had hurried ofi-'
his single battery to the rear when his first line gavc way.
Then the Marshal sent in the ten battalions of the division of
Scbastiani, who completely cut through the Spanish centre, and
left. the two wings in isolated and dangerous positions. Without
wuiting for further developments, Blake gave wa.y and ordered
n retreat on Bilbao and Valmaceda. His intact wing-divisions
1 It eOllllted 1,066 bayonets when entering on the campaign, and was
atbelled to the Vanguanl.
I Capbin CarroU, an c}'e-witneti, gives a good account of thia actiou in his
report to General Leith, dated from Va~maceda 011 Nov. 2. .
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covered the retreat, and though badly beaten he got away with
yery small loss, no more than 300 killed and wounded, and about
the same number of prisoners. '111C French casualties were 1Jlsig-
nificant, not amounting in all to more than 200 men. The whole
combat, indeed, though 40,000 men were on the field, Wtl$ very
short and not at all costly. The fact was that Blake had been
surprised, and had given way at the nrst push, without making
a serious attempt to defend himself. His sending av.iay the guns,
at the vcry commencement of the action, makes it sufficiently clear
that he did not hope for ultimate success, and was already conlem·
plating a retreat on Bilbao. His army, if properly handled, could
have made a much more creditable fight; in fact it was to.ctically
beaten rather than defeated by force of arms. It made its retreat
in very fair order, and was irritated mther than cowed by the
check which it had received. English eye·witn~ vouch for the
steadiness and good spirit shown by the troops 1.
Immediately after giving orders for a general retreat behind the
river Nervioll, Blakc had sent dispatches to the two divisions of
Acevooo and Martinengo, which were covering his flank against a
possible turning movement from the valley of the ELro. They were
told to save themselves, by falling back at oncc to Bilbao and joining
the main army in its retreat. The part of the Asturian division which
lay at Ordmia suct.'«Xled in caITying out this ordcr. But the re·
mainder of Accvedo's men and the whole of those of Martinengo-
some 8,000 bayonets in ull-wcrc at Villaro, a point higher up in the
mountains, on a much more difficult road, and closer to the :Freneh.
They received Blake's dispatch too late, and on pushing down the
northel1l side of the pass which they had been holding, they learnt
at Miravallcs, only tell miles from Bilbao, that the latter town was
in the hands of the J;'rench. Blake had evacuated it on the early
morning of November 1, anu Lcfebvre had oceupied it on the same
night. Urging his pursuit some way beyond Bilbao in the hope
of overtaking Blake, the duke pushed as far as Valmaceda: but
even here the Galician army would make no stand, but fell back
still further westward to Nava. Seeing that he could not reach
his adversary, Lefebvre left the division of Villatte at ValmacOOa
to observe Blake, and retumed with those of Sebastial1i and uval
to Dilbao, to feed and rest his men in the towll, after four days of
marching in the mountains with very insufficient supplies. 'l1lis
l lteport of C.'ptain Carroll in papers of 1800 in the Uecord Office.
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was tl. 'Ilry dangerous step, for lllake had been oUlmanceu"red
rather than beaten, and was still far too strong to be contained by
a mere 7,000 men.
'Vhen therefore Acevedo and his column drew near to Bilbao,
they learnt that 13,000 French troops blocked their road towards
Blake [Nov. 3]. . 'They drew back a little up the pass, keeping very
quiet, und vcry fortunutely failed to uttruet the attention of
Lefebvre, who thought at the most that there were some bands of
stragglers in the mountains on his left.
Dut their sit.uation was still most uncomfortable, for their rear·
{"TUard began to report that French troops were pushing up from
Vittoria and entering the southern end of the defile in which they
were blocked. King J oscph had been much vex<..-a. to hear of
Lefebvre's disobedience to his orders at ZornoyA, but, wishing to
-draw what profit he could from the victory, scnt Victor up thc Mur-
guia-OrdUlia road, with orders to cut in upon the line of Blake's
-retreat. 'l1\is the Duke of ReIluno failed to accomplish, on &:count
.of the rapidity with which the Spanish army had retired. But
reaching Amurrio, a few miles beyond OrdUlia, he came upon the
flank of Ace\'edo's column, whose head was blocked at MiravaUcs,
tell miles furlher north, by the prescncc of Lcfebvre at Bilbao. If
either marshal had realized the situation, the 8,000 Spaniards,
caught in a defile without lateml issues, must have surrcndcrOO
en masae. But Victor had only onc division with him, the other was
far behind: and imagining that he had chanced upon the whole of
Blake's anny he callle to 11 dead stop, while LcfebvT(:, not yet aware
of VictOl"S approach, did not move at all. Acevooo wisely kept
quiet, and tried to slip across Victor's front towards Oruntitl. and
the ri\'cc SalcedOIl: meanwhile the news of his situation reached
BltLkc.
That general was never wanting in personal courage, and had
been deeply distrcssL,<1 to hear that his fhmkillg detachmcnt had
been cut off. Uealizing Acevedo's danger he resolved to make
a sudden' offCJ1si \'c return' against Lcfebvre, and to endeavour to
clear for a momcnt thc road from Miravalles to VaImacedu, by which
his subordinate could escape. On the night of Novcmber 4 he
concentrated his whole army, which had now been raised to 24,000
men by the arrival of the main bod)' of La Uomann's division from
Santander. At dawn on the fifth he fell upon the enemy in his
front, by the two romls Oil each side of the river Salcedon, sending
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onc division l and the' Valll;,>1lard Brigade' to attack Vahna,eda, and
two! and the ' Hcserve Brigade' by Orantia along the southern bank
of the stream. "illatte had been holding both these path:!; but
on seeing the hem:)' forces deployed agninst him, he withdrew from
Orantia and concentrated at Valmaceda. This left the path clear
for Acevcdo, who escaped along the hillsides without being molested
by Victor's advanced guard, and got into communication with his
chief. The inactivity of Victor is inexplicable: when he suw the
Asturian division pushing hastily across his front, he should have
attacked it at all costs; but though be heard plainly the cannonade
of Villatte's fight with Blnke at Valmnccdn, he held back, and
finally retired on Ordui'ia when Acevooo had got out of sight 3.
His only excuse was that he had heard the distant roor of battle
die down, and concluded therefore that Villatte (who as he supposed
might be supported by the whole of Lefcbvre's corps) must have
been victorious.
As a matter of fact the isolated French division had almost
suffered thc fate that should have befallen the Astllrinns. Dri\'cn
out of Valmaceda by Blake, it was falling back on Guenes when it
came across Ace\'cdo's men marching Oil the opposite side of the
Salcedon to join their comrades. Thereupon the Asturian general
threw some of his men ~ across the stream to intercept the retiring
column. Villatte formed his troops in a wlid mass and broke
through, but left behind him on~ gun (an eight~pounder), many of
his baggage-wagons, and gOO prisoners. That he escaped at all is
fl. fine testimony to his resolution and his capable handling of his
troops, for he had been most wantonly exposed to destruction by
Victor's timidity and Lefebne's carelessness [November 5].
I The 4th Division.
2 The 1st and 3rd DivisiollS. See the dispatches of Captain Carrol! from
Valmace<!a, dated Nov. 5, ill U1(' Rl.'Cortl Office.
" Napoleon, furious at the escape of the Asturiaus, administered a fiery
rebuke lQ U1C Marshal. 'He IHl.d left one of his OlVn divi.'1ions, expoaed by
Lefebvrc's imprudence, to run tlle risk of IlImihilstion. He had ne\"er gone
to the front himself to look at Acevedo, but llad allowed the recOlwoitring
to be done by an illc:1.pable subordin....te. His guess tll11t Vitlatte had been
,"ictorious and did !lot Ileed help was absurd; why should the dying down of
the lire mean tllat the .French were successful rather than beaten ~ The first
priuciplC!l of the art of war prescribe that a general SllOUld march towanl the
caunou, when he knOlVsthat his colleagues are engaged' (Nap" ()Qrretp., 14,445).
4 One battalion of Scgo\"ia and two of \'oluntcers of Galicia.
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On hearing ofVillatte's desperate situation, the Duke ofDantzig
had realized the consequcm."cs of his unjustifiable retreat to Bilbao,
find marched up in hot haste with the divisions of Sebastiani and
LcvaI. He was relieved to find that Villattc had extricated himself,
and resolved to punish lllake for his unexpected offensive move.
But he was unable to do his adversary much harm: the Galician
general had only advanced in oruel" to Sl\.ve Acevedo, and did not
intend to engage in any serious fighting. 'Vhen Lefebvre moveU
forward he found that the Spaniards would not stand. Blakc had
pushed out two flanking divisions to turn the position at Guenes,
011 to which Villattc had fallen back, and had his main body placed
in front of it. But when Lefcbvrc uclvanct.'d, the whole Galician
army fell back, only fighting two rearguard actions on November 7,
ill which they suffered small loss. On the next day there was a
Illore serious engagement of the same sort at Yalmaceda, to which
the Galicians had withdrawn on the pl'e\'ious night. The troops
with which Blake covered his retreat were hustled out of the town
with the loss of 150 killed and wounded, und 600 missing 1. In
his displltche<; the Spanish genernl explains that he retreated not
because he could not have made a better resistance, but because
he had used up all his provisions, and WM prevented by the bad
weather and the state of the roads from drawing further supplies
from Santander and lleynosn, the two nearest points at which they
could be procured. 1"01' '\Yestel'll Biscay had been eaten bare by
the large forces that had been crossing and recrossing it during
the last two months, und WQ.Ii absolutely incapable of fet..-dillg the
army for it single day. The men too were in a ....7Ctched. condition,
not only from hunger 2 but from bad equipmcnt: hnrdly nny of
them 11Ild received grent·coats, their shoes were WOMl out, and
sickness WIIS very prevalent. An npprceinble number of the raw
Galician and Asturian levies deserted during the miserable retreat
fi'orn Guencs and Yalmaccda to Espinosn de 108 Monteros, the next
POillt on tile Bilbao-Ueynosa road at which Dlakc stood at bay.
\Vhell he reached that place he was short of some 6,000 mell, less
'. This engagement, ullmcntiolled oy Xnpier, Thicl'll, and most other his-
torians, will be fouud in detail ill Carroll's dispatch and Arteche (iii. 273, 274).
, Indeed they were only 8.wed from starvation hy reeciving at F.spinosa
250 mules laden with oiscuit, frOIll English ships at Santander, which General
Leitll had pushed across the mouutains, lltake in a letter of NOI'. !) to Leitlt
(Record Office) acknowledges tll3t this kept his mell alivE'.
23,3ta
7,633
5,2!)4
1,400
40]2 THE ~USFORTUNESOF JOACHIM BLAKE (Nov. 10
from losses in battle than from wholesale straggling. Moreover
he was for the moment deprived of the aid of the greater part of
one of his divisions. This was the 4th Galieian division, that
of General Carbajal: it had formed the extreme left of the anny,
and had lain nearest to the sea during the fighting about Guelles
and Valmaceda. Cut off from the main body, It large portion of
it had retreated by the coast-road towards Santander, and only
It fraction of it had rejoined the commander-in-chief
'
. The toW
of Blake's forces would have been nearly 40,000 t, if his army hail
been still at the strength with which each corps started on the
campaign. But for its decisive battle he had no more than ~g,OOO
hI hand.
Beyond Valmaceda he had been pursued no longer by Lefebvre,
but by Victor. The latter, SQulldly rebuked by the Emperor for
his iml.Ctivity 011 November 5, hOO advanced ngain from Ordmia.,
had picked up the division of Villatte-which properly belonged
to hiil (:orps-and had Ulcn taken the lead in pressing Blake.
'Lefcbvre, reduced to his original force-the 15,000 men of Sebas·
tiani and Le\'al, foIlowoo as far as the cnd of the defile of El Bel'rQu,
and then tllmed off' by a flanking road which reaches the upper
valley of the Ebro at Medina de Pomar. He intended to strike
1 I gaUler from a comparison of the muster-rolls oC the Galician army in
October alld in De(:ember, that four battalions rejoined Blake and sh: csl:apcd
towards Santander.
• lie had originally (sce tl1C tablc on p. 403)-
Gnliciall troops (four divisious and two brigades)
TIle Asturiau Division of Ace\"edo
U. Ronmll3's trooll6 from the &.ltic (UIC infantry only)
Cavalry and artillery (4.00 and 1,000 respectively)
31,G40
.I-'rom this havc to be dcductcd-
Losses in battle and l)y desertion 6,000
'mc Cl~vlllry, all tlle artillery gal"e one battery, and
two battalions guarding UIC IIlIl11e, all still lo thc rear
towards Reynosa. • 2,400
Two battalions of regiment Del Rey Witll Malaspilla,
at Villarcayo " 1,000
Part of the 4th Division, cut off aud retreating on &0-
tallder " 2,200
n,voo
This leaves 26,040. available at Espi..uosa; tllC real figure was probably some-
wk.t smaller.
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at Villarcll.yo and Reynosa, and to intercept Blake's retreat at
onc of these two points. If he arrived there before the Galicians,
who would be delayed by the necessity of fighting continual rcar-
l:,'Unrd mious with Victor, he hoped that the whole of the Spanish
anny might be surrounded and captured.
III this e.xpt.'Ctation he was disappointed, for matters came to a
head before he was near enongh to exercise any influence on the
approaching battle. On November 10 Blake turned to bay: his
rearguard, composed of the troops from the Baltic, had been so
much harassed and detained by the im:cssant attacks of Victor's
leading division, that its commander, the Condc de San Roman,
sent to the general to ask for aid. Unless supported by more
troops he would be surrounded and cut off. Tempted by the
strong defensive position in front of the picturesque old town of
Espinosa de loo Monteros, make directed the rearguard to take
post there, and brought up the whole of the rest of his army into
line with them. At this point the high-road along the river
Truebn, after passillg through El. small plain (the Campo de Pcdrul4
va), reaches a defile almost blocked by the little town of Espinosa,
for stcep hills descending from each flank narrow the breadth of
the passage to half a mile. Here Blake occupied a semicircular
position of cOllsiderable strength. The troops of Son lloman took
post at its southern cnd, 011 a hill a,hove the high-road, and close
to the river's edge. The line was prolonged to the north of them,
across the narrow space of level ground, by the Vanguard Brigade
(Mendizabel) and the grd Division (Riquelme). Where the ground
begins to rise again lay the Ist Division (Figueroa), and 011 the
extreme left, far to the north, the Astlll;ans of' Acevedo occupied
a lofty ridge called !.as Peiiuccas. Here they were so strongly
placed that it seemed Ilnlikel)' that they could either be tllfncd or
dislodged by El. frontal attack. The rest of the lLrmy formed n
second line: the Reserve Brigade (l\fahy) was in the rear of the
centre, in the suburb of EspinoSll. The 2nd Division (.Mnrtinengo)
and the small remains of the 4th Division lay behind San Roman,
near the 'l'nteba, to support the right wing, nlong the line of the
high4road. The whole amounted to something between 22,000
and 23,000 men, but there were only six gun.<; ,\;tll the army-the
same light battery which had fought at ZornoZll. They were
posted on the right-centre, with Mcndi",abc1's brigade, in n por;,ition
From which they could sweep the le\'el ground in front of Espinosa.
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Blake also called up to his aid the onc outlying force that was
within reach, a brigade under Gencrul Malaspina, which lay ut
Villarca.yo, guarding the depot which had been there established.
But these ~500 men and the si.....: guns which they had with them
were prevcnted, as we shall sec, from rettehing the field 1.
The position of Espinosa was .most defensible: its projecting
wings wcre each strong) nnd its L'e11tre, drnwn far back, could not
prudently be 'attacked as long as the flanking heights were in the
hnnds of the Spaniards, But the pursuing French wcre lmder
the impression that the Galieian army was so thoroughly demoral·
izcd, and worn out by hunger and cold, that it would not stand.
Victor hn.d with him the infantry of his own corps, some 21,000
strong: Villatte's division) which led the pursuit, dashed at the
enemy as soon as it came upon the field. Six battalions drew up
opposite the Spanish centre, to contain any sally that it might
mak~ while the other six swcrved to thc left and made a desperate
attack Oil the division from the Baltic, which held the heights
immediately above the banks of the Trueba 2, Sail Roman's troops,
the pick of the Spanish army, made a fine defence, and after two
hours of hard fighting retained their position.
At this moment-it was about three o'clock in the short winter
afternoon-Victor himself came on the scene, bringing with him
his other two divisions, the twenty-two battalions of llnffin Jlnd
Lapisse, The Marshal was anxious to vindicate himself from the
charge of slackness which his master had made against him for
his conduct 011 November 5, and pushed his men hastily to the
front. Nine fresh battalions-a brigade of Ruffiu's and a regiment
of Lapisse's division-attacked ~rrain the heights from which ViI·
lattc hoo ~n repulsed 3. There followed a vcry fierce fight, and
Blake oBly succeeded in holding his ground by brihging up to the
aid of the regiments from the Bu.ltie the whole of his 3rd Division
and part of his 2nd. At dusk the heights were still in Spanish
hands, and Victor's corps was obliged to draw back into the woods
at the foot of' the position.
This engagement was most cn..oditable to Dlake's army: the lie
I Malaspina luul two battalions of Del Re)', and the Detanros and MOllterrey
militia. (Journal of Blnke's Opcratious iu the Vat/ghaT! Paper8.)
2 l'uthod's brigade of Villatte's division, the !:14th and !:15th of the Line.
• TIle 9th Uger and 24th of the Line from UUffill'S division, and the 54th
from that of Lnpisse, clIch tlll'CC bau.llliollS strong.
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of the ground was in their favour, but considering their fatigue
and ~mi-5tan'ation they did very well in repulsing equal numbers
of the best French troops. They were aided by the reckless
maJUlcr in which Villatte and Victor attacked: it was not con-
sonant with true military principles that the van should commit
itself to a dcspcrnte fight before the main body came up, or that
a strong position should be assailed without the least attempt at a
preliminary reconnaissance.
Next day the Marshal, taught caution by his repulse, resumed
the action in a more scientific fashion. He came to the conclusion
that lllake would have been induced by the battle of the previOlls
day, to strengthen his right, and in this he was perfectly correct.
'fhe Spaniard had shifted all his rClSCrvcs towards the high-road
and the banks of the Trueba, e.'\;pcetillg to be attacked on the
same ground as on the pre\'ious day. But Victor, making no more
than a demonstration on this point, sent the greater part of
Lapisse's division to attack the extreme left of Blake's line-the
A<lturillll troops who held the high ridge to the north of Espinosa.
Here the position was very strong, but the troops were not equal
in quality to the veteran battulions from the Bultic 1. When the
French prcs'icd up the hill covered by a thiek cloud of skinnishers,
the Asturialls fell into disorder. Their bl'Cllcral, AcevCllo, undo his
brigadiers, Quiros and Valdes, were all struck down while trying
to lead forward their waveriug troops. Finally the whole division
gave wl\Y and fled down the back of thc hill towards Espinosa.
Their rout left the cncmy in possessioll of the high ground, which
completely commanded the Spanish centre, and General Maison,
who had led the attack, fully u&:d hk; ruhantage. He fell upon
th~ Galician 1st Di\;sion from the flank, while at the same moment
Victor ordered his entire line to adv{lllee, and assailed the whole
of Blake's front. Such Ill! assault could 1I0t fail, and the Spaniards
gave way in all directions, and cscaped by fording the Tnleba and
flying over the hillsides towards Heynosa. '111CY had to abandon
their six gUllS and the whole of their baggage, which lay parked
behind Espinosa. The losses in killed und wounded were not very
heavy-indeed lllallY more were hurt in the hard fighting of
November 10 than in the rout of November 11: it is probable thut
I It is fair to the AsturiallS to menliou that cighl of their lell battalioll!!
were row lel'ies ; there were among them only oue regular and ouc milithl
battalion of old Connation.
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the whole of the Spanish casualties did not exceed 3,000 men: IlQf
were many prisoners captured, for formed troops cannot pursue
fugitives who have broken their ranks and taken to the hills. The.
main loss to Blnke's army came from straggling and desertion after
the battle, for the routed battalions, when once scattered over the
face of the c.:ountry, did not easily rally to their colours. When.
BInke reassembled his force at Reynosa he could only show some
12,000 half-starved men out of the ~,OOO who hod stood in liue
at Espinosa.. The loss in battle had fallen most heavily on the
division from the Baltic-their commander, Sail Roman, with about
1,000 of his men had fallen in their very creditable struggle on the
first day of the night 1. Victor's triumph had not been bloodless:
in the repulse of the tenth the fifteen battalions which had tried
to storm the heights had all suffered appreciable losses: the total
of French casualties on the two days cannot have fullen below
1,000 killed and wounded,
'1'0 {.'omplete the story of Blake's retreat, it is only necessary to
mention that the detached brigade under Malaspina, which he had
called up from VilIarcayo to Espinosn, was never able to rejoin,
On its way it fell in with Marshal Lefebne's corps, marching to
outflank the retreat of the Galician anny. Attacked by Sebas·
Hani's division, Mnlaspina had to turn oft' and make a hasty and
isolated retreat, sacrificing his six guns, The driving away of his
small force was the only practical wOl,k done in this part of the
campaign by the 4th Corps: its IOllg turning movement was
rendered useless by make's rapid retreat across its front to
Reynosa,
1 It is nccessary to protest against the groundless lillcl upon this corps in
which Napier indulges (i. 2,57) when he says: ' It has been said that ltomanll.'s
F.Oldiera died Spartan-like, to a man, in tlleir ranks; yet ill 1012 Captain Hill
of the Royal Navy, lIcing at Croust.'U1t to recci"c Spaniards takcn by thc
Russians during Napoleon's retreat, found the greater portion were Uomana's
men captured at Esllinosa; tlu:y had. served Napoleon for four years, passed
the ordeal of the MOSCQIV retreat, Rud were still 4,000 strong.' TIW! is
IndieroUll: the eigllt battalions of the Ualtic division landed in Spain 6,294
strong; a month after Espinosa they still figured for 3,9.53 in the muster-
rolls of tllc army of Galicia (sce tile DlonJillg state in Artechc, iv, 532). Dnly
1,300 were missing, so Victor, clearly, call1lot have taken 4,000 prisoners.
Captain Hill's (or Napier's) mistake lies in not seeing that the Russiau
prisoncrs of 1812 belonged to the 6,000 mell of In Romana's army (regiments
of Guadalajara, Asturias, and the Infante) which did not succeed in escaping
from Denmark in 1008, and remained perforee in Napoleon's ranks,
SECTION VII: CHAPTER IV
NAI'QLEON CIlOSSES THI<~ EBRQ: THE ROUT OF GAMONAL:
gaULT'S PURSUIT OF BLAKE
AYrER resting for only thirty~six hours at Ba)'onne the Emperor,
as we have already seen, pushed on to Vittoria, where he arrived
on November 6. He fonnd in and about that ancient city the
bulk of the Imperial Guard, his brother Joseph's reserves, the light
cavalry of Bcaulllont and Fmnccschi, and the heavy cavalry of
J..atour·Maubourg and Milhaud. The divisions of Marchand and
Disson, which were to complete the corps of Ney, were close behind
him, so that he had under his hand a mass of at least 40,000 men.
The ~nd Corps, which Bessicres had so long commanded, wns in
front of him at Pancorbo, jm;t beyond the Ebro. Victol' and
Lefebvre, very busy withlllnke, lay on his right hand with some
85,000 mCI!. The troops which had hitherto been under Ne)', with
!\foncey's 3rd Corps, were on his right-the former at LogroflO, the
Inttcr at Caparrosa and Lodo&!. They were in close touch with
the annies of Castanos and ralafox.
All was ready for the great stroke, and on the day of his arrival
the Emperor gave orders for the general advance, bidding Bessieres
(whose corps formed his vIUlguard) to lUru:ch at OIl(:C on Burgos
and sweep out of it whatever troops he might find in his fropt.
Napoleon imagined that the force in this section of the Spanish
line would turn out to be Pignate1li's 'Army of Castile,' but that
very untrustworthy body had ceased to exist, nnd had been drafted
into the ranks of the army of Andalusia 1. It was really with the
newly arrived army of Estrenuulnra that the 2nd Corps had to
deal.
Everything seem<.oU to promise a successful issue to the Emperol"s
plan: the enemy had only (l. trifling for<.'C ill frollt of him at Burgos.
Palafox and Castai'ios were still holding their dangerous ad,·a.nced
positions at Sangllesu aud Calahorrn. make was being pursued bJ
I Sce pp. 393--4, and Nap. Corre.tp., 14,443.
O,lilAl... I '0
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Victor, while Lefebvre W1\$ marching to intercept him. The onI)'
contretemps that had occurred was the temporary check to Villatte's
division on November 5, which had been caused by the carelessness
of the Duke of Dantzig and the unaccountable timidity of the
Duke of BcllUllO. But by the seventh their mistakes had beell
repaired, and Blake ~vas Oll~ more on the run" with both marshal~
in full cry be\llnd him. The Emperor found time to send to each
of them a letter of bitter rebuke 1, but told them to push on and
catch up the army of Galicia at all hazards. Upon Monce)', 011
the other hand, he imposed the duty of keeping absolutely quiet
in his present position: his share in the game would only begin
when Castaiios and Palafox should have been turned and enveloped
by troops detached from the central mass of the army.
The total stay of the Emperor in Vittoria oovcred parts of four
days. All this time he WAA anxiously eXpe<:ting decisive news f!"Om
'Victor and Lefeb~ but it had not yet arrived when he set forth.
He waited, also in vain, for the news that Bessieres had occupied
Burgos: but that marshal did not show the decision and dash
which Napoleon expected from him: finding that there was infantry
in the pl.a.ce, he would not risk an action without his master's
presence, and merely contented himself with pushing back the
Spanish outposts, and extending his cavalry on both flanks. It is
possible that his slueklless Wll.S du~ to chagrin 011 receiving the
intelligence that he was about to be superseded in command of the
2nd Corps by Soult, whom the Emperor had summoned out of
Gennany, and who WAA due at the front on the ninth. Bessieres
was to be compensated by being b>1vcn the command of the reserve-
cavalry of the army, five splendid divisions of dragoons, of which
four were already on the Ebro. But this post, which would always
ke€p him at the Emperor's heels, was probably less attractive to
him than the more independent position of chief of a corps com-
plete in all anns. He was probably loth to leave the divisions
with which he had won the victory of Medina de Rio Seeo. Be
this as it may. he was told to attack Burgos on the sixth, and 011
the ninth he had not yet done so. On the morning of that day
Soult arrived, alone and 011 a jaded post-horse, having outl'iddell
e\'cn his aides-de-camp 2, who did not join him till twenty-fom
I That to Victor will be found in "'''p. Co-nup.• 14,440.
2 For details of their ride ugaill.st time, see the Mfmf'iru of St. Cltamall~,
bis aeoior aide-dHamp (p. 107).
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houl'S later. He at om:e took over commtlnd of the !l!rid Corps,
find proceeded next day to etlrry out the Emperor's orders by
attacking the enemJ.
The supeI'St."Ssion of BcssiCrcs was not the ooly chan/:,I'C which
was made during the few days while the Emperor lay at Vittoria.
He I'eal"anged the internal organization of several of the corps,
altered the brigading of that of Mancey, and turned over to
other corps most of the troops which had hitherto served IDlder
Ney,leaving to that 1lI8n1hallittle more than the two newly arrived
divisions from Germany (those of Lagrange and Marchand).
The troops destined fur the march un Burgos <:ounte<! some
70,000 men, but only the ~nd Corps and the cavalry of Milhaud
alld FrallOO:iChi WCIOC in the front line. 'These 18,000 bayonets
and 6,500 sabres were amply sufficient for the task. Behind
followed fourteen battalions of the Im}X'rial Guard and the cavalry
of that corps, the two divisions of Ney's 6th Corps, the division of
Dessolles from King Joseph's re-rerve, and two and it half divisions
of reserve (~valry-an enormous mtl.~s of troops, of which nearly
~O,OOO were vetertln cavalry from Germany, a force invaluable for
the sweeping of the great plains of Old Castile '.
\Vhcll wc turn to enumerll.te the fUI"CeS opposed to the Emperor
2,000
6,000
6,000
3,WO
1,200
3,700
2,WO
2,000
2,000
6,000
4,WO
7,000
2,000
17,000}
I TIle figures here given are mainly those indicated by Napoloon in his
llispatch of Nov. 8 (NRp. (;orrlMp., ]4,4,;6), snplllcmcuted from the morning
state of the army ou Oct. 10:-
2nd COrp! (Marshal Soult):
Division Mouton (Merle)
Di"isioll lklllllct .
Division Merlc (Verdier)
Cavalry of Lasallc
6tll Corp6 (MaNhal Ney) ;
Division Marehu1Hl
Division Lagrangc (late Bisson)
Cavalry of Colbert (detached at this moment)
From King JlI6e)lh's Heserve, Division De~nes
J . I G I{fOurtccll battAlions of infantrymperm .\111." I
ca"R ry . . . . .
Cavalry Brigade (HeaulIlont) belonging to tile 1st Corp6
Lawur*i\lallUourg's Division of Dragoons (six regimcllts) .
i\lilhaud's Divisiou of Dragoons (three regiments)
Franceschi's Ligllt Caval!")· (four regimenta)
Lalloussaye's Dh';~ioll of Dl"'.JgOons (follr regirncuts).
67,400
"0 NAPOLEON CROSSES THE EBltO [Nov. 10
at Burgos, the disproportion betwccn the two armies appears
Imlicrous. Down to November 6 the only Spanish troops in that
ancient city cousisted of two battalions, onc from the reserves of
the a.rmy of Galicia, the other from the anny of Castile 1. They
Ilumbered 1,600 men, and Juu.l four gWls with thelll, If Bcssicrcs
had attacked on the sixth, he would have found no more than this
miserable detachment to oppose him. But on November 7 there
arrived from Madrid the ht Division of the anny of Estremadura
under the Collde de Belvedere, 4,000 foot and 400 hoI'SC with twelve
guns. all the next day there came up the greater part of the 2nd
Division of the same army. about 3,000 infantry and two regiments
of hussars. On the tenth,'therefore, when Soult attacked, Belvedere
-who took the command as the senior general present-had about
8,600 bayonets, 1,100 sabres, and sixteen guns under his orders.
Down to November 2 the army of Estremadura had been com-
manded by DOD JO!ieph Galuzzo, Captain-General of that province
~the officer who had given so much trouble to Dalrymple by his
refusal to desist from the futile siege of Elv&!. He had been
repeatedly ordered to bl-ing his army up to Madrid, but did not
arrive till the end of October. On the twenty-ninth of that month
he marched for Burgos, his three divisions, 18,000 men ill ·all,
following each other at intervals of a. day. But on ~ovember 2
he received orders to lay down his COllllfll.Uld alld cctUl'II to Anmjuez,
to answer some charges brought against him by the Supreme Junta.
No successor was nominated to repla{,'C him, and hence the conduct
of the army fell into the hands of the COllde de Belvedere, the
chief of the Ist Division, a rash and headstrong young aristocrat
with no military expel;ence whatever. His family influence had
made him a general at an ilb"e when he might reasonably have
cxpected to lend a company, and he found himself by chance the
interim commander of an army: hence came the a."tollishing series
of blunders that led to the combat of Gamolla!.
Belvedere's army was still incomplete, for his 8rd Division had
only reached Lcrma, thirty miles back 011 the Madrid road, when
the French cavalry came forward and begall to press in his out-
posts. Clearly a crisis WlIs at hand, and the Coun!; hud to consider
how he would face it. Isolated with 10,000 men on the edge of
the great plain of Old Castile, and with an enemy of unknown
I These battaliOllS were those of Tuy and Heuavellte, the fi.rst II militia
hattalion, the second a lIew volunteer corps.
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strength ill front of him, he should ·have been cllutions. If he
Attempted a stand, he should at least have taken advantage of the
ancient fortifications of Burgos and the broken ground near the
city. But with the most cheerful disregard of common military
precautions, the Count marched out of Burgos, advalU:ed a few
miles, and drew up his army across the high-road in /i'olll; of the
village of Gamonal. He was ill All open plain, his right flank ill
COVClW by the river ArlanY.on, which was fordable in mallY places,
his left completely' in the air; near the village of Vellimar. In
front of the line was a large wood, which the road bisects: it gave
the enemy every facihty for masking his movements till the last
moment. Belvedere had ranged his two EstremadurlUl batteries
on the (:entre: he had SLX battalions in his first line, including two
of the lloyal Guards-both vel)' weak I_with a cavalry regiment
on each flank. His Sl'<:ond line was formed of foUl' battalions-two
of them GfllicilLll: two more battalions, the four Galician guns,
alld his third ca,'alry regiment wen: coming up from the rear, Md
had not yet taken th<!ir post in the second line when the short a.nd
sudden buttl<! was fOllght and lost 11.
1,600
] ,100
260
50"
1 .Each mustered less than 400 bayouets.
t To sllow how ,strange is Napillr's statement (i. 254) tllat the anny of
Estremauura (:ollsist.ed of < the hest troops then in Spain; anu that it Wll.'l
therefore di!igrn(:eful tllat they' fought worse than the half-starved peasants
of nlake,' we may perhaps give the list of Belvedere's little force; it con-
sisted oi-
lst Division (General de Alos) :
*.Jth battalion of the Spanisll Guards
Onc bllttalion of l'rovilldnl GrClllulicrs of Estremadura
*Regiment of .Majorc.:a (two batts.)
*2nd Regiment of Catalonia (one balt.)
One compallY of Slmrll!'.llooters .
2nd Division (General Henestro8a) :
"4th battalion of the Walloon Guards
Volullteertl of Rul..joll (two battl;.)
VOIUlltcerll of Valencia de AIClluUara (onc balt.) .
Volunteers of 7..afra. (one batt.) .
Galician troops; Battaliolls of 'fu)' and llellavente .
Cavalry: 2nu, 4th, and Stlt Hu!iS3.rs (called respectively
'Lusitallia,' 'Volunteers of Spain,' and (Maria Luisa ')
Artillery; two nnd l\. Ilalf ~Itteries
Sappen : one battaliOll .
Total 10,!l6O
Onl}' the cavalry and the live battalions marked with a star were regulars.
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Soult came on the scene during the hours of the morning, with
the light-cavalry division of Lasalle deployed bl his frout. Then
followed the dragoons of Milhaud, and three infantry divisioll"!,
of the 2nd Corps-Mollton in front, then Merle, then Bonnet
bringing up the rear. "\¥lIen he came upon the Spaniards, array~
on either side of the toad, the Marshal was able with a single
glaOl:e tu rccOgni7,c the weakness of their numbers and their
position. He did not hesitate for ll. moment, and rapidly fonned
his line of battle, under coveI' of the wood which lay between the
two armies. Milhaud's division of dragoons rode southward and
formed up on the banks of the Arlanzon, facing the Spanish right:
Lasalle's four regiment'! of light cavalry composed the French
cenb'e: the tweh-e battalions of Monton's division deployed on the
left, and advanced through the wood prt.'c.:edL-u by a crowd of
timillcurs. There was no need to wait for Merle and Bonnet, who
were.still some way to the rear.
Thc engagement opened by a discharge of thc two Spanish
batteries, directed at those of Mouton's men who were advancing
across the comparativel)' open grotmd 011 each side of the high-
road. But they had hardly time to fire three or four salvos before
the cnem)' was upon them. The sc\'en regiments of cavalry which
fomled the left and centre of the E'rench amI)' had delivered a.
smashing charge at the infantry opposed to them in the plain.
The regiment of Spanish hussnrs which covered their flank was
swept away like chaff before the wind, and the unfortunate
Estremaduran and Galician battalions had not even time to throw
themselves into squares before this ton'ent of nearly 5,000 horsemen
swept over them. They received the atl:nck in line, with a wavering
ill·directed 6re which did not stop the enemy for a moment. Five
battaliuns WCl'e ridden down in the twinkling of an eye, their
colours were all taken, and half the men were hewn down or made
prisoners 1. The remnant fled in disorder towards Burgos. Then
Milhaud's dragoons continued the pursuit, while Lasallc'n chasseurs
swerved inwards and fell upon the flank of the sUl'\'iving half of
Belvedere's army. At the same moment the infantry of Monton
attacked them vigorously frow the front. 'l1lC inevitable result
was the complete rout and dispersion of the whole: only the
I As iIlluek would hal'e it four of tlle;:;e five halu.lioJls ill tile plain 'I'ere
raw levies, the Volunteers of Hadajoz (two batt8.) and ofTur and Hen8vente.
The)" had llot skill eno\.IKh el'ell to forlll square,
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battalion of '!Valloon Guards sucrecdcd in forming square and
going off the field in some order. The rest broke their ranks atid
poured into Burgos, in a stream of fugitives similar to that which
was already rushing through the streets from the other wing.
The sixt<'''C1l Spanish guns were all captw-ed on the spot, those of the
~ecolld line before they had been unlimbered or fired a single shot.
Belvedere, who was rash and incompetent but no coward, made
two desperate attempt'i to rally his troops, one at the bridge of the
Arla.llzon, the other outside the city; but his men would not halt
for a moment: their only concern was to get clear of the baggage-
tmin which was blocking the road in the transpontine suburb. A
little further on the fugitives met the belated battalions of Valencia
and Zafra, which had. been four or n\'c miles from the field when the
battle was lost. The Commander-in-chief tried to form them
across the road, and to rally the broken troops upon them: but
they cried •Treason,' pretcnded thnt their cartridge-boxes wcre
cmpty, broke their ranks, and headed the flight. Ere night they had
l-eached Lerma, thirty miles to the rear, where the grd Diyision of
EstrcmOOUl1\ had just arrh'L'<1.
Napoleon was probably using less than his cllstomary exaggeration
whcn he dL'Clarcd ill his BuUefm that he had won the combat of
Gamonal at the cost of fifteen killed and fifty wounded. It is at
any rate unlikcly that his total of CMunlties exceeded the figure of
200. The army of EstrcmadurlL on the other hand had SUffCrffI
tcni.bl)·: considering that its whole right wing had been ridden
down by cavalry, and that the pursuit had been urged across Itn
open plain for nine miles, it may well haye lost the 2,500 killed
and wounded and the 900 prisonCl'S spoken of by the more moderate
j"rench narrators of the fight I. It is certain that it left behind
twelve of the twenty·four regimental standards which it carried to
the field, and every one of its guns~.
The French army celcbrated its not yery glol'ious victory in the
I 1t is fa.ir to lSlLy, however, that Jounlan ll8iierts that tlleir lOllS WM only
about 1,500 (Mtfmoiru, p, 85). 111Crc illuo S!lanish estimate ofauy authority,
Na.poleQD in bis Bullelin claimed 3,000 killed ant! 3,000 prisonerfl, one of his
Ilsual exaggerations.
I TIlere were only sixteen field-guns witll the anny, yet NapoleQn 8IIYS that
he took twenty-live (Nap. OOrrt:8p" 14,478). If thill figure i8 correct (which
\l'e may doubt) there must have beeD some guns of positioll taken in the -city
of Rurgos. Bnt of ti,e twelve flags t11ere is no ql1el!tion: they were {orl'l'anled
to ('aris two t!ayfJ later (Nap, 0077'UP., 14,463),
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usual fashion by sacking Burgos with every attendant circumstances
of misconduct. They were so much out of hand that the house
ne."t to that in which the Emperor had taken up his quarters for
the night was pillaged and set on fire, so that he had to shift
hastily into another street I.
The night of the tenth was devoted to plunder, hut on the fol-
lowing morning Bonaparte resumed without delay the execution
of his great plan, and hurried out to the south the heavy masses of
cavalry which were to sweep the plains of Old Castile. Lasalle's
division pushed on to Lenna, from which the shattered remnanu
of the army of Bclvl..'<!.cre hastily retired. Milhaud's dragoons were
directed on Palencia, :Franeeschi's light cavalry more to the We<lt,
along the banks of the Urbel and the Odra. Nowhere, Sl!ve at
Lerma, was a single Spanish soldier seen, but it is said that some
of Milhaud's flying parties obtained vague information of the
advance of Sir John Moore's English army beyond the frontier
of Portugal. His vanguard was reported to be at Toro, an utter
mistake, for the expeditionary force hud not really passed Salu-
manca on the day when the rumour was transmitted to the
Empcl·or~. There is no sign in his dispatches of any serious
expectation of a possible Britisb diversion.
On the same day on which the cavalry poured down into the
plains of Ca.'>tile, the Emperor began also to execute the gren.t
'.flanking movements which were to circumvent the armies of Blake
and Castafios and to drive the oue into the Bay of Biscay and tile
other against the Pyrenees. On the afternoon of the eleventh
Soult, with the three divisions of :Mouton, MexIe, and Bonnet., and
Debelle's cavalry brigade 3, was directed to make forced marches
upon Reynosn, by the hilly road that passes by Urbel aud Olleros~,
1 Mimoirt* of St. ChamullS (Soult's senior uide-de-eamp), p, 110. Compare
the J01JnIOJ of Fantin des Odoards (p. 169) for the scenes of horror ill and
about the toWIl. The 8~attered oolllSeS of Spaniards, cut down as tJley lied,
(:overed the road for half-a-day's march beyond Hurgos,
I Nap, Oorrup., 14,496, contains this false report.
S This brigade did llotl1rollerly belong to the 2nd Corps, but to Frauceschi's
division of reserve cavalry. Lasalle, with the proper cavalry division of the
2nd Corps, was being employed elsewhere.
• 1llis \\'all done on No\'cmber 11, I1IUI not (as Artcebe say9) 011 the thirteenth.
The 'proof may be found ill the itinerary given by St. Chamans in his
.lUmoiru (p. nO). On the thirteenth the Marshal was already at Canduelas,
close to Reyllosa.
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It was hoped that he might reach Reynosa before Blake, whme
retreat towanls the west was being closely pressed by Victor and
Lefebvre. If he tailed to catch the anny of Gnlicia, the MnrshnJ
was to push on aCr08f! the mountains, and occupy the important
harbour-town of Santander, where it was knowll that British stores
had been landed in great quantities. Milhaud was to co-operate
ill this movement by sending from Palencia one of his brib1Ul.1cs
of drngoons, to cut the road from lleynosa to Saldaiia, by which
the Emperor considered it likely that 'Blake would send off his
heavy baggage and guus when he heard of Soult's approach 1.
Two days after dispatching Soult to the north-west, the Emperor
gave orders fiw the other great tnrning movement, which WllS
destined to cut off the army of Cast.a11os. On the thirteenth Mar-
shal Ney, with one division of his own corps (that of' :Marchand)
and with the four regiments of Dessolles from the central reservc,
together 'with the light ctwulry of :Beaumont, had marched from
'Burgo~ in the wake of Lasalle's advance. On the si."iteellth he
reached Arnnda de Duero, and, having halted there for two day~
was then diret:ted to turn off' from the high-road to Madrid, and
march by Osma and Soria so ns to fall npon the rear of Castailos,
who was still rcpoItI..-d to be ill the ncighbourhood of 'l'udela 2.
If he could succeed in placing himself at Tarazolla before the
cncmy movl..'<1, the Emperor considered that the fule of the Spanish
•Arm)' of the Centre' was sealed.
While the movements of Soult and Ney were developing, Napo-
leon remained at Burgas. He stayed there in all for ten days,
while his urmy pasSl.."'<1 by, each corps that UlTi"cd pressing forward
along the high-road to Madrid by Lerma as far as AranUa. His
advance on the Spanish capital WllS not to begin till he was certain
how Blnke and Castafios had fal't.'(], and whetller lhe..e was any
considerable body of the cnemy interposed between him and the
point at which he was about to strike. Meanwhile his corre-
spondence :;hows a feverish activity devoted to su~jects of the most
varied kind. A good many hours were devoted to drawing up
a scheme for the rt.'Stomtion of the citadel of 'Burgos: it was the
Emperor's own brain which planned thc fortifications that proved
such nn obstacle to ·Wellington fOUl' YCl\l'slater in September, 181~.
1 Nap. (J<JrN!~p., 14,407 and 14,477. Napoleon to Bessih-es, No\', 13 (at
two, midnight), and tu MilllIl.utl, NOI'. 10 (at three, midnight).
: Thl:'iie orders will be found ill N«p, Corrup., 14,48D.
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It was in these days also that Napoleon dictated the last reply
sent to Canning with regard to the pea(.'e negotiations that
bad becn started at Erfurt. At the snme moment he was com-
menting on the Code Napoleon, organizing the grand-duchy of
Bcrg, ordering the assembly of Neapolitan troops for a descent Oil
Sicily. regulating the university of Pisa, and drawing up now
on the illtenlal go\'l:~rnlllcntof Spain for the benefit of his brother
Joseph I. But the most characteristic of all his actions was a hUbte
piece of' 'commandeering' of private property. Burh"O/:l was the
great distributing centre for the wool-trade of Spain: here la~'
the warehouses of the Rock-masters, who owned the great herds
of merino sheep that feed upon the central plateaux of Castil,",
There were 20.000 bales of wool in the city, not government stores
but pllr<:ly private accumulations. The Emperor seized it all and
sold it in Ji'rance, gloating over the fact that it WM worth more
than 15,000,000 francs 2. '
Neither of the flanking expeditious which the Emperor sent out
quite fulfilled his expectations, but that of Soult was worked fur
more sllccessfully than that of Ney. The Duke of Dalmatia's corps
marched sixty miles o....er bad Spanish roads in three days-a great
feat for intillltry-and reached Canduelas close to lleynosa 011
November 13. If Blake had not already been flying for his life
before Victor, he must have been intercepted. But he had. made
such headlong speed that he had already reaclied Reynosa only
twenty~four hours after his defeat at Espinosu. He hud hoped
to refit and reorganize his army by means of the vast accumulation
of stores collected there, for he had left both Victor and Lefebnc
far behind, and calculated on getting several days' rest. His first
act was to begin to evacuate his lU1:illery, buggat:,'e, and wounded
on to Leon by the road of Aguilar del Campo and Saldafla. He
intended to follow with the infantry s, but 011 the morning of
November 14 Soult's ad\·ml(~1. cavalry came upon the flank of
the great slow-moving convoy, and captured a considerable part
of it. The Asturinn general, Accvedo, lying wowlded in his
I Nap. OQrre.sp.} 14,465, 14,4M-!)J, 14,472, 14,4132, 14,503, and 14,499
re;pe<,,'tively.
I For this barefaced roblJery see the Sixth Bufletiu of the Army Qj" Spoill,
lJUblished at Madrid OD December 14, and also Jourdall'" MimQiTU, pp. "85,
86; er. Aru..'Che, iii. 325.
, Leith, :No,.. ](;, from ValJewll de Sal (in the Hecord Office).
18Q8] SOUL'l"S PUllSUIT OF llLA'KE 427
carriage, was slain, it is said, by Dcbelle's dragoons, along with
many other unfortunates. Much of the artillery and all the
baggage was taken. The news of this disaster showed Blake that
his only road into the plain wa.'> cut: no retreat on Leon was any
longer possible. At the same moment the approach of Victor
along the Espinosa road and of Lefebvre alollg the Villarcayo road
W{MJ reported to him. It seemed as if he was doomed to destructioll
or. capture, for all the practicable roads were cut, and the ann)'.
though a little heartened up by two da)"!; of regular rations at
Ueynosa, was, in the m08t disorganized condition. But mnking a
despemte appeal to the patriotism of his men, Blake ahandollLod
fill his stores, all his wheeled "chides, c\'en his horses, and struck
up by a wild mountain trnck into the het\rt of the Asturinn hills.
He went by the gorge of Cabucl1liga, along the rocky edge of the
So,ja tommt, and finally reached the sea near Suntillana. This
forced march was accompliflhed in t.wo days of drenching rain, and
without food of any kiud Sll\'C l\ few l;:hcstnuts. and heads of maize
obtained in the villages of this remote upland. If anything Wll!!
needed to make BIake's misery complcte it wns to be met, at
Rclledo I [Nuvcmber 15], by the news that he \I'M supcr:>edl.'<1 by
La Romll.na, who came with a commission frolll the .Junta to take
l.'Olllmand of the army of Galil.-iil, After the 1'C<.'Cipt of the
intelligence of Zonl07.ll., the GoVenllncut had disgraced the Irish
general, and gi"en his place to the worthy Marquis. But the
latter did' not assume the command for some days, and it was left
to Blake to get his army out of the terrible straits in which it now
lay. On nearing the coast he obtained a little more food for his
men from the English ves.~ls that had escaped from Santander 2,
waited for his stragglers to eome up, and, when he had 7',000 men
collected, resumed his march. He sent the wrecks of the Asturian
division back to their own pl'o\'ince, but re;olvcd to retul'll with
the rest of his ann)' to the southenl side of the Cantabrian
Mountains, SO as to l.'Over the direct road from Durgos to Galicia.
He had (juite shaken off' his pursuers, and had nothing to fear save
physical difficulties in his retreat. But these \~;ere severe enough
to try the best troops, l\nd Blnke's mcn, under-fed, destitute of
great-coats and shoes, and hll.ras~cd hy cndlcr;s marching, were in a
I Not Amedo as in Napier (i. 25;),
• See lettel' of General Leith (dated from S.'1I Vinccnte de la lkarquera,
No\', 17), ill the Record Office,
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piteous sl:.o.te; although they had not thrown away their muskets,
very few had a dry cartridge left in their boxes 1. An English
officer who accompanied them described them as 'a hulf-starved
and straggling mob, without officers, and all mixed in utter con-
fusion 2.' The snow wns now lying deep on the mountains, anti
the rOfld back to the Il]ains of Leon by Potes and Pedro.'lll was
almost as bare and rough as that by which the troops had SRyed
thcmse}ycs from the snare at Rcynosa. Nevertheless make's
miserable army straggled oyer the defile across the Pellns de
Europa, reached the upper valley of the Esla, and at lnst got a
few days of rest in cantonments around Leon. Here La Romana
took up the command, and by December 4 was at the head of
15,000 men. 1.1Lis total was only reached by the junction of out-
lying troops, for there had come into Loon a few detachments
frolll the rear, and that part of thc artillery and its escort whieh
had escaped Sonlt's cavalry at Aguilar del Campo. Of Blake's
original force, e\'en after stragglers had come np, there were not
10,000 left; that so many survived is astonishing when we consider
the awful march that fhey had accomplished 3. Between November
1 and 23 they had trudged fOl' three hundred miles over some
of the roughest country in Europe, had croS&.u the watershed of
the Cantabrian MOImtains thrice" (twice by mere mule-tracks),
wading through rain and snow for the greater pad of the time,
for the weather had been abominable. For me~ physical difficulty
this retreat far exceeded Moore's celebrated march to Corunna, but
it is fair to remember that Blake hu.d shaken oft' his plll'Suers at
Rcynosa, while the English general was ehased by an active enemy
froill first to last.
While the unhappy army of Galicia was working out its salvation
1 General Leith to Sir John Moore, from Rencdo on No\·. IS (in the Record
Office).
~ It is from tlmt officer's dispatcllcs aloue that we glean some detaili; of tiJis
miserable. retreat. 1"Jlerc is nothing of tllC kind ill Toreiio, ArtecllC, or aur
other Spanish authorit}, that 1 have found.
" Of La Romalla's amIY of 15,G2G men (Dec. 4) about .5,000 belonged to
regiments wldch had not bmm I'rcscnt at Eapinosa, including the 1oat131io1l8
of Tuy, Betanws, MOllterrey, Santiago, Salamanca, tbe 3rd Vollluteen of
Galicia, and the Hatllllon de! Ge,urat, the artillery reserve, and a number of
detached comlJ3llies tbat Imu beeu left behind at ReyuOllIL, Astorga, and
Sahagull before .H1ake marched 011 Bilbao 011 October 11 .
• Once between Valmaceda and J<::Spin063., once between Ilernosa and
Renedo, once between I'otes and I'Cdroi;a.
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over these rough paths, Soult's corps had fared comparatively well.
On reaching Rcynosa on November 14 the Duke of Dalmatia hurl
come into possession of an enormous mass of plunder, the whole
of the stores and munitions of Blake's arlll)'. Among the trophies
were no less thall 15,000 new English muskets and thirty·five
unhorsed field-guns. The food secured maintained the 9lnd Corps
ful' muny days: it included, IlS all a.pprt.'Ciati\Oc French consumer
informs us, an enormous consignment of excellent Cheshire cheese,
newly landcd at Santundcr I. At u.cynoso. Soult's arrival was
followed by that of Victor and Lefebvre, who rode in at the head
of their corps the day after the place had Ocen oc'Cupied [November
15]. There was no longe.· any chance of catching Ulake, and the
tlSSCmbly of 50,000 men in thilS quarter WW> clearly U1111ccessal'Y.
The Emperor sent orders to Victor to march on Burgos and join
the main army, and to Lefcbvre to drop down into the plains as
far as Carrion, from whence he could threaten Benavente and
Leon 2. Soult, whose men were much less exhaustcJ than those
of the other two corps, was charged with the occupation of San-
tandcr and the pursuit of Blake. He marched by the high-rood
to the sea, just in time to see seventeen British ships laden with
munitions of war sailing out of the harbour 3. But he captured,
nevertheless, a large quantity of valuable stores, which were too
heavy to be removed in a htltTy [November 16].
The Marshal left Bonnet's division at Santander, with orders
to clear the surrounding district and to keep open the road to
Burgos. With the rest of his h"OOps he D1tlrchcd eastward along
the coast, trying to get information about Dlake's movements.
At Sun Vinccnte de lu Bnrc:lllclU he came llpoll thc wl"Ccks of the
A<duriall division which Blake had left behind him when he tW'ncU
south again into thc mountains. They Red in disorder the moment
that they wcre attacked, and the principality seemed ,cxposetl
without any defence to the Marshal's advance. But Soult did
Hot intend to lose touch with his mustcr, 01" to embark on allY
unauthorized expedition. '''hen he Icnrnt that the Galician ann)'
had returned to the plnins he followed their example, and crossed
the Cantabrian Mountains by a track over the Sierras Albas from
Jlotes to Cervera, almost AA impracticable as the pat'alleI defile over
I M&noiru of GCIl. St. Cllamrllls, p. HI.
1 Nap. CoTTellp., 14,496 (Napolooll to llerthier, from Burg03, Nov. 20).
~ Leith mentiolls this ill llis letter frolll Caw.tou de &.1, Noy. 16.
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which Blake had escapL'<L Coming down on to the upper valley
of the Pisucrga he reached Suldaiia. where he WlIS again in close
communication with Lefebvre.
Blakc and his IlnllY might now be considered as being out of
the game; they were so dispersed and demoralized that they
required no more attention. But there was as )'et no news of
Ncy, who had been sent to execute the tuming movement against
Castm1os, which corresponded to the one that Soult had carried
out against the Galicialls. Meanwhile more troops continued to
come up to 13l1rgos, ready fol' the Emperor's great central march
on Madrid. King Joscph and his Guards had arrived there as
early as the twelfth; Victor cnmc down fmm Reynosa on the
twenty-first 1. and on the same day appeared the division ofdragoons
commanded by Lahoussnyc 2. The belated corps of Mortier and
Junot were reported to be llearillg Ba)'OIlJle: both generals received
orders to march on Burgos, after l..'<J.uippillg their men for a serious
winter campaign. Independent of the large bodies of men which
were still kept out on the two flanks ulldcr Soult and Lefebvl'C,
Monceyand Ney, there would soon be 100,000 bayonet.. and sabre-.
ready for the decisive blow at the Spanish capital.
I Nt.p. (JoMWtp., 14,502: 011 tIle twellty-first tile 1st Corps wllsat Tardajos,
(lutside BurgOli.
SNap. Corrup., 14,501.
•
SECTION VU: CHAPTER V
'fUDRT..A
HAVIXG narrated the misfortunes of Blake and of Belvedere,
we must now tum to the eastern end ot' the Spanish line, where
Castaiios and Palafox had been enjoying a brief and treacherous
interval of safety, while their friends were being hunted over the
Cantabrian Mountains and the plains of Old Castile. From
October !6-27-the days when Ney and Mancey drove Castai'ios'
advanced troops back over the Ebl'o-down to November !t1, the
l;rench in No.varre made no further movement. We have seen
that it was essential to Napoleon's plan of campaign that the
armies of Andalusia and Aragon should be left unmolested in
thc! dangerous advanced position which they were occupyillg, till
measure::; should have been taken to cut them off from Madrid
and to drive them back against the root.~ of the })yrenees. The
Emperor had left opposite to them the whole of MOllcey's corps,
onc division of Ney's corps (that of Lagmnge). Rnd the cavalry
of Colbcrt aDd Digcon1-in a.ll ubout !;!7,OOO bayonets and 4,500
sabres. They had strict orders to act merely as a containing force:
to repel all)' attack that the Spaniards might make on the line
of the Ehro or the Arab"On, but not to advance till they should
fa'Cive the orders from head quarters.
The initiative therefore had passed back to the Spanish b'Cnerals:
it was open to them to advance once more against the enemy,
if tJ1CY chose to be so foolish. 'l1lCir troops were in very bud
order for an offensive campaign. Many of them (like Blake's men)
had never reccived grcat·coots or winter clothing, alId were facing
the November frosts and thc incessant rain with the light lincn
garments in which they had marched up from the sonth. An
English Obslill:vcr, who passed through thc camps of Palafox and
Castaiios at this moment, reports that while the regulars and
the Valcllciall troops seemed fairly well clad, the Amgunese, the
Castilians, and the Murcians were suffering terribly from exposure.
, Colllert's brigade bdollgL'<1 to NeY'H corps; Digcon'f!j dragootls were parl
or the reserve-cavalry or J..atonr-l\Iaubourg.
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The Murcians in especial were shivcring in light linen shirts and
pantaloons, with nothing bllt 11, striped poncho to cover them against
the rain I. Hen(.'E! came a terrible epidemic of dysentery, which
thinned the ranks when once the autumn began to melt into
winter. The armies of Castafios and Palafox should have counted
53,000 men at least when the fightiug at last began, [t seems
doubtful whether they achmlly could put much over 40,000 into
the field. Castafios claims that at Tudela his own • Army of the
Centre' had only !e6,OOO men in line, and the Aragonese about
16,000. It is probable that the figure:; are almost correct.
Nevertheless, the generals assumed the responsibility of ordering
a gcnel'1ll advanl:c, 'Vc have shown in an Ctlrlier chaplcr that after
the arrival of the three deputies from Madrid, and the stormy
(.'Owlcil of wIlr at Tudela on NO\"embel' 5, a new plan of offensive
operations was adopted. It was not quite so mad as the scheme
that had been drafted in October, for seizing the passes of the
l)'renees and surrounding the whole French ll.I1ny. Castaiios and
Palafox, it will be remembered, II'Cl"C to mass thc bulk of their
forces betwccn 1'udela and Caparrosa, cross the Affio<l'OU, and de-
liveL' a frontal attack upon the scattered fractions of the corps of
Moncey at Peralta, l.<~alces, and LodoStl.. Thcre would hnve ~ll
wmethillg to sa.y for this plan if it had hccn pl'Oposed in Septem-
!,)er, or early ill October; but on November 5 it W/lS hopeless, foL'
it ignored the fact that 80,000 French tl'00PS hall entered Biscay
and NavuLTc since the middle of October, and that Napoleon him-
self had reached Vittori1l.. To ndvllm:e now WM to rl1n into the
lion's mouth.
The annies of Andalusia and Aragoll were just beginning to
concentrate when, on Novembel' 8, a dispatch came ill from Blake
annonncing his disaster at Zornol'..il., and his hurried reheat beyond-
Bilbao. The. same dny thcre Itl'rivL'<l It COl"loect report of the ltl'l'ival
of the Emperor and great masses of French troops at Vittoria,
with au inaccuralc addition to the eRect that thc)' wcre being
directed on Logrono and Lodosa, a.~ if about to cross the Central
Ebro and fall upon the left flank of the army of Andu,lusia~.
Castanos, in his Vi,ldicatioll, published to explain and defend.his
I Uupublished diary of Sir Charles Vaughan, then riding with the staff of
I'alafox.
i 'tne best picture of (.'a!!tailos' hea.d quarters at this time is to be found iu
the diary of General Graham, printed in his Uft by Dellll·O)"C.
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lllovements during this campaign, stated that his first impulse was
to Illill'cll by Logroiio and Haro to mcct the enemy, or to husten
by Agl'ooa and Soria to interpose himself between the Emperor
and Madrid. But, 011 ;,iC(:olld thoughts, he 1'1..'SOlvcd that it was
more nCc<l~sar)' to endeavour to beat the :French in his immediate
front, and that it wo'uld be better to persevere in the plall, drawn
up on November 5, for fl. blow at Moncey. A sharp thrust delivered
on this point would distract the attention of the Emperor from
lllake, and draw him ofl" the direct road to Madrid. MeanwhilCt
however, Oil November 1l Castaiios fell ill, alld took to his bed at
Cilltrnenigo. 'Vhile he WI\.'l thw; disabled, the deputy Francisco
Palafox took the astounding step of issuing orders in his own name
to the divisiOllal gencmls both of the Andalllsian and the Aragonese
armies. Nothing like this had been ~'ell ~ince the days in the
:Prench ll.evolutiolllU·Y W nI', when the 'llepresentatives on Mission'
used to overl·ule the commands of the unhappy .b"Cnerals of the
llepublic. Before the c..'Oncentration of' the armies was complete,
the Deputy ordered the lISSUlIlptioll of the offensiw at all points in
the line; he directed O'Ncille, whom he incorrectly supposed to be
nlrcady at: Cupnnosa, to nttack MOllcey at once; bade GrimlU'CSt,
with the 2nd Andalllsian division, to Cl'05S the Ebro at CalaholTa;
La Peila to thrclltcll Milugro; and Cm·taojal, with a small flanking
brigade, to demonstrate against the French troops who lay at
Logl'Oiio. These oruers produt:ed utter confusion, for some of
the generals obeyed, while others !lent: the answer that they would
!lot move without the pel'lJlj!l~ioll of theil' proper chiefs, Castaiios
and Joseph Palafox. The former got his fin,;; llotiL-e of the Deputy's
presumptuous actiO!l by letteril fWIll L.t Pciia, dclivcrcJ to his lx>d~
side, ill which he was asked whether he had given his sanction to the
pl'Ojcd for crossing the Ebl'O 1. As u. matter of fact only Grimm-cst
and Cartaojal moved: the former was sharply repulsed at the fords
opposite Clllahorm; the hItter, morc fortunate, skirmished with
Lagrangc's division, in fmllt of LogrOJio, without coming to any
harm [November 13].
It was lIOW three days sincc the Empcl'Or had l'Outed Bel\'ooel'e
at Gamonal ana entered Burgos, and two days since Blake had
been l>Cllten nt Espinosa. 'l1lC <:onduct of the generals who had
1 Sec Graham's DUlry, p. 280. 'nlis is far die beet authority for tlle'chaotic
mov~ments uf the Spaniards dnring tllCSC wl'Cks. Some :allowance, perlJaps,
should be made for Graham's dislike for the Palafox brothers.
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charge of the last intact amy that Spain possessed, seems all the
more insane when we reflect Oll the general (:audition of nflairs.
For on the fourteenth the mad advance which Francisco Palafox
advocated was re'3Ulnt..>d, Castmlos on his sick bed not having had
sufl.icient energy to lay an embargo on the moving forward of his
own troops. On the fourteenth O'Ncillc arrived at Caparl'08a and
drove Qut of it Moncey's advanced posts, while Grimarest and LA
Pei'ia received new iw,tructions-to push up the Ebro amI attack
Lodosa, which O'Neille was at the same moment to assail from the
other side of the stream. Thus the great river was to be placed
between the two halves of the army. which had no communication
except by the bridge of Tudela, far to the rear of both. 'This
seems rother a hauLJ:dous undertaking,' wrote Graham in his diary,
•affording the enemy an opportunity of attacking on whichever
side of the river he chooses with superior force.' Dut the only
thing that prevented it from being attempted was the sudden
refusal of O'Neille to advance beyond Cnpo.rrosa unless he were
provided with 50,000 rations of biscuit, and reinforced at once
with 6,000 oo)'ollets from the Army of the Centre [November 18].
.As if the situation were not already sufficiently complicated,
Castaiios had on the pre<:ediug duy received unofficial illtelligellt:e \
from Madrid, to the effect that the Central Junta. had determined
to depose him, and to appoint the Marquis of La Romana general-
in-chief of the Army of the Centre as well as of the ArlllY of Galicia.
'l'his really made little differencc, as the Marquis WalIU! this moment
with Blake's corps (he had joined it at llenedo on the fifleenth), so
that he could not issue any orders for the troops on the Ebro, from
whom he was sel,arated by the whole l"rench anny. Castaiios
remained at the head of the Andalusians till he was formally
superseded, and it was he who was destined to I1ght the great
battle that was now impending. It is hard to say what might
have happened had the French held back for a few days more, for
now, at the last moment, Joseph Palafox suddenly harked back to
his old plan for un advance on Pampcluna and the roots of the
Pyrenees, and proposed to Castaf'ios that the whole of the Andalusian
army save La Peiia's division should assist him 2. Castaiios llud
I By a. letter from Lord William Bentinck,at Madrid (see Graham's Diary,
p. 281).
2 It is most llifficlIlt to unravel all these projeots and coulIoor-projocls:
Lhave followed Graham, who was 1I1ws)'!J at the side (If Castafios, supplement-
ing him with that general's own vindication, and with llutron's narrative.
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Coupigny strongly opposed this mad idea, and submitted all
entirely different scheme to the Captain-General or" Aragon,
inviting him to bring all his fort-es to CulaholTll., and to join the
Army of the Centre in taking up a defensive position behind the
Ebro. '
The two plans were being hotly debated, when news arriyed
which proved decisive. The French were at last on the move, and
their columns were pouring out of Logroiio and Lodosa along the
southern bank of the Ebro, heading for Calahon-a and Tudela
[November J<!1]. On the same day a messenger aITivcd from the
Bishop of Osma, bearing the intelligence that n' French corps (he
called it that of Dessolles, bnt it was really Ney) had marched up
the hcad~wul:crs of the Douro to Almazau, and was heading for
Soria and Agreda, with the obvious intention of falling upon the
rear of the Army of the Centre. If Castaiios remained for a momcnt
longer at Calahorra, he would clearly be caught between the two
French armies. He should have retired at once in the direction
of Sa~<7'()ssa, before Ney could reach him: but instead he took the
dangerous hnlf-mcIlSw'e of falling back only as far as the line
'l'udela-Tarawna. This was a safer position than that of Cala-
horra-Arnedo, but still sufficiently perilous, for the enveloping
corps from the south could still reach his rear by a long turning
movemcnt through Xnlon and Dorja.
Ifthe position from Tudela, on the banks of the Ebro, to Tara.:.-.ona
at the foot of the Sierra de MOI1C!l.yo was to be held, the army of
Castauos needed strong reinforcements, for the line was ten miles
long, and there were but !i26,OOO men to occupy it. The Army of
Aragol1 must be brought up also, and Castailos wrote at once to
O'Neille at Caparrosa, inviting him to hasten to cross the Ebro and
occupy Tudcla and its illlnll..-oiatc vicinity. The displttch reached
the Irish general late on the afternoon of the twenty-first, but he
refused to obey without the permission of his own commander,
,foseph Palafox. Thus the night of NO\'ember 21-22 was lost, bllt
next morning the Aragonese Cuptaitl-Gcnem.l appcan.'(l fmm Sam-
gossa., and met Castalios and Coupigny. They besought him to bid
O'Neille join the Army of the Centre, but at first he refused, evcn
when the forward march of Moncey and the flanking movement of
Ney had been cxplained to him. He still clung to his wild proposal
for a blow at l'ampeluna., 'ta.lking,' says Colonel Graham, 'such
nonsense as under the present circumstances ollght on1'y to have
'<2
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come from a madman 1.' But at the last moment he yielded, and
at lloon on tile twenty·scx:ond wrote orders to O'Neillc to bring his
two divisions to Tudela, and to form up on the right of the Arm)'
of Andalusia. When the Aragonese host at last got under weigh,
the hour wns so late that darkness was falling before the bridge of
Tudela was pussed. O'Neille then had an unhappy inspiration:
lIe ordered his men to defer the crossing of the Ebro till the
following morning, and to cook and encamp on the northern bank.
Half of the line which Castafios intended to hold next day WllS still
ullgarnished with troops when the dawn broke, and soon it was
discovered that the French wcre close at hand.
The approlWhing enemy were not, as Castafios and Palafox
supposed, umlcl· the comllland of Mom;ey and Ne),. TIIC latter
was carrying out his tnrnillg movement by Soria: tlle former wa.~
for the moment superseUl..>d. The Emperor regarded the Duke of
Concgliano as somewhat slow and overcautious, and for the sudden
and smashing blow which he had planned had chosen another
instrument. This was Marshal Lannes. who had crossed the
Pyrenees with the' Grand Army,' but had ~n detained for a
fortnight at Vittoria by an accident. His horse had fallen with
him over a precipice, and. he had been so bruised and shaken that
his life was despaired of. It appears that the cdcbmted surgeon
Laney cured him by the stra.ll~ device of sewing up his battered
frame in the skin of a newly flayed sheep 2. By November 20 he
was again fit fur ~rvk-e, and set out from Logrofio with Lagrange's
division of Ney's corps, Colbert's light cavalry, and Digeon's
dragoons. MOllce)' jOilll..'<1 him by the bridge of Lodosa, bringing
his whole corps--fom· divisions of infantry and oue of cavalry.
The protection of Na\'url'e had been handed over to General
Bissoll, the govel1lor of Pampeluna.
Launcs met with no opposition whatever in his march to Tudela,
and easily reached Alfam on the twenty-second. Here he learnt
that the Spaniards were awaiting him beyond the river Queiles,
drawn up 011 a very long front betweell l.\ldela and Tar8.7.ona. On
the morning of the twenty-third he came in sight of them, and. de-
ployed for an attack: the state of utter disorder in which the enemy
lay gave the best auguries for the success of the imperial arms.
Casuulos hlld plared the troops under his immcd.iate command.
I Grallam's ])jury, p. 284.
! See Larrer's MimtliN18 de OMrurgie Milituin.
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at 'l'aruzona and Cascantc, which WCI"C destined 1;0 form the left
and centre of his position: the remainder of it, from Casca.nte to
Tudclu, was allotted to the AragollC';C and to the Murcian division
of the Army of Andalusia, which had been across the Ebro in
O'Ncille's company, aud was now returning with him. Till they
came up Castmios had only under his hand two complete divisions
of his' Army of the Centre,' and some small fragments of two
others. The complete divisions were those of Gnmarest (No. fl)
and La Pciia (No. 4), each of which had been increased illllumbcrs
but not in cllicicnc)' by having allotted to it some of the battalions
of the' Army of Cwstilc,' which had been dissolved for its bad
conduct at Logroilo on October ~6. There had at last begun to
arrive at the £1'Ollt a cOllsidcrublc part of thc othcr two Andalusian
divisions, which had first been dctained beyond the Sierra Morena
by the Junta ot' Seville, aud then kcpt somc time in Madrid to
complete their equipment. Two battalions of these belated troops
had at last appeared on October 30, and ten mort:! had sincc come
up 1. But the bulk of the 1st and Srd Divisions was still absent,
and no more than 5,500 men from them had heeu added to
Castai\os' army. The mi..."I:ed brigade formed from these late
nrrin:l.ls seems to ha"e been under General Villariczo, of the 1st
Division. The whole forC(: amounted to about 28,000 men, of whom
3,000 were horsemen, for thCl army of Andalusia was stronger ill the
cIlvalry arm tlmn allY other of the Spanish hosts. But of thCl$Cl
the Murcian and Valencian division of u.oca (formerly that of
J..lamas) was with O'Neillc, (llld had not yet rcaehCld thCl ficld; while
five battalions, from the dissolved Castilian arlll)', were far away
on thc left ill the mountains of Soria, whither Castafios had detached
them under General Cartaojal, with ordcrs to obsen'c the French
corps which was coming up on his rear.
The other half of the Spanish army consisted of the missing
division of the Army of the Centre-that of Roca-and the two
divisions belonging to Palafox-those of O'Neille and Saint March
-the former composed mainly of Ar~l1'()ncsc2, the latter almost
cntircl.y of Valcnciall troops. None of thc Aragonese reserves f!'Olll
. 1 Of die 1st Division tllllre llCClIl to h1l\'C lll'ri"cd onc U1lttalioll each of the
regiments Ileina, Jaeu, ldamla, and Harbastro, aud the Jaell l'dilitia. Of the
31'11 Di\'isioll uuc battaliolL each of Caml}(l Mayor, Volunteers of Valencia, and
the Militia of l'lasencia, Gundix, Lorca, Toro, lIud Sc"ilIe (No, 1).
I But with one Valeucian and t"·o J\Iurciall battalions: see Appendix,
6,000
7,000
{i,600
8,000
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8,000
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the great camp at Saragossa had yet come upon the scene. But
the two divisions in the field were very strong-they must have had
at least 17,000 men in their ranks. On November 1 they were
more than 18,000 strong, and, two months after-when they had
passed through the disaster of Tlldc1u, and had endured tell
days of the murderous siege of Saragossa-they still showed 14,000
bayonet'>, We cannot calculate them at less tlllln 17,000 men for
the battle of November 23. On the other hand, there were hardly
600 cavalry in the whole corps,
It would appear then that Castafios must have hud some 45,000
men in line, between Tarawna and Tudela, when Lannes came up
against him I, The Frcnch marshul, on the othcr hand, had about
34,000. On the difference in quality between the two armies we
have no need to dilate: even the two divisions of the r..'onscripls of
1807, which served in Monccy's corps, were old soldiers compared to
I The troops should have numbered-
2nd Division of the Anny of Andalusia [Grimarest] (five
battalions of regulars, four of militia, and four of nllW
levies) about
4th Division of the Annyof Andalusia [La PeM} (seven
battalions of regulars, tlu"OO of militia, lUld three of
new levies) about
Mixed brigade of tIle 1st and 3rd Divisions (VilIarie-.to] (six
battalions of regulars and six of militia) about
.5th Division (Murcians and Valeuciaus) [Hoca] (eigilt bat-
talions of regulars, two of militia, and Beven of new
levies)
Castilian battalions distributed between the other divisions,
or deulClled on the left [Cartaojal]
O'Neille's Division of Uie Armyof Aragon (three battalions
of regulal'lll five battaliOllS of Aragonese, and three of
Valencian ami MurciuJlllCw lcl'iC!l) .
Saint March's Division of the Anny of Aragon (three bat-
talions of reglllal"Sl one of militia, alld ten of Valencian
new levies)
Cavalry (3,000 Audalusians, GOO Aragonese)
Artillery
65,900
Minus the delacllmeot of ClIrtaojal, about 3,000 3,000
Total . 62,000
nut we must make large deductioll.~ for sickness (which had fallen lleavily 011
the ill-clothed men), for 10S/; in I'revious actions, desertion, llnd detacbmenta ;
e. g. some of Roca's division were 011 the Lower Ebro.
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the armies of Aragon and Castile, or a great part of that of
Andalusia. :Moreover, as in all the earlier battles of the Peninsular
War, the Spaniards were hopelessly outmatched in the C8.vah·y
mm. There was no force that could stop the 4,500 or 5,000
horsemen of Colbert., Digeon, and Wnthicr l •
The position 'l'udela.--Tarazona, which Castanos intended to hold,
is of enormous length-about ten and a half miles in all. Clearly
45,000 men in the close order that prevailed in the early nineteenth
century were inade<luate to hold it all in proper strength. Yet if
the points on which the }--rench were about to attack could be
ascertained in good time, the distances were lIot so great but that
the army could concentrate on any portion of the line within three
hours. But to make this practicable, it was necessary firstly that
Cast8.iios should keep in close touch v.-jth the enemy by moons of
his cavalry-he had quite enough for the purpose-and seeondly
that he should have ull his men massed. at suitable points, from
which they could march out to the designated fighting-ground at
short notice. Thc Spanish troops wcre, now as always, so slow
at manreuvring that the experiment would be a dangerous one,
but this was the only way in which the chosen position could
possibly be held. The J:,'1'Ound was not unfavourable; it consisted
of a line of gentle hills along the south bank of the river Queiles,
which commanded a b~ view o\'cr the rolling plain across which
the French had to advance. On the! extreme right was the town
1 'lfie Freudl anny consisted of-
Moncey's Corps:
Maurice Mathieu's Division (twelve battalions) 7,000
Musnier's Division (eight battalions) 6,500
MorIot's Division (six battalions) . 4,000
Grandjean's (late Frere's) Division (eight battalions) 6,000
Cavalry of\l'athier (lllree regiments) 1,000
Ney's Corps:
Lagrange's Division 6,000
(;olbert's Cavalry (three regiments) 2,200
Reserve Cavalry :
Digeon's Brigade of Dragoolls (two regiments) 1,200
Artillery, &:, , ],200
Total 33,700
These figures are mainly taken from Napoleon's dispatch, No, 14,456, of
Nov. 8. 'nle)' do 1I0t include the irisll, Prussian, and \l'estphalian battalions
of i'lfoncey's corps garrisoniug Pampeluna and San Sebastiall.
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of Tudela, co\'cred by 1\ bold hill-the Ccrro de Santa Barbnm-
which overhangs the Ebro. Thence two long ridges, the hills of
Santa Quitel'ia and Cabcw Malta, extend for some two and a Jlulf
miles in a well-marked line: thi.~ section fonned the right of the
positioll. From the left of the CaOOm Mallu as far as the little
lown of CascnI1te-four miles-the ground is less favourable;
indeed, it is fairly flat, and the line is indicated mainly by the
Queilcs and its ilTigatioll-cuts, behind which' the Spanish centre
was to form 1. From Cascallte westward as fnr as TUrI\7-Ona-a
distance of four miles 01' a little over-the position is better
marked, a spur of the Sicml. de MOllcnyo coming down in a gentle
slope all along the southeMl hank of the little QueUes. The centre,
bctw~n the Cabezo Malla and Cn::;calltc, WitS obviously the weak
point in the position, as the only obstacle to the enemy's advl\llOe
Wall the river, which was fordable by allal'llls at every poillt !\lollg
this dangemus four miles.
The disastel' \I'hich Cw,1:arlos was to suffer may be uscrilx-d to
two mistakes, one of which wus entirely within his own control,
while the other was due to the stupidity of Q'Neille, 'With 3,000
cavalry in hand, the Commander~in·chiefought to have known of
every movement of the French for many hours before the)" drew
near to the posHion. It would thcn havc been ill his power to
concentrate on those part<; of the line where the attack was about
to be delivered. But instcad of sending out his hol'l:lC ten miles to
the front, Castafios kept them with the infantry 2, and the first
notice of the approach of LaIlIll..'S WIIS only given whcn, at llillC ill
the morning, a. regiment of 'Vathier's cavalry mde right up to the
town ofTudela, driving ill the outposts and Cilusing great c:.-'Oufusioll.
To the second cause of disaster wc have already had occasion to
alludc: on the night of thc twclIty-SC<.'Ond Q'Neille had (contrary
to his orders) encamped north of the Ebro. His 17,000 mcn began
I The ooWll alld the hill, unlike the rest of the positioll, are OIL the lwr/h
bank of the Queiles.
, It is imllOssible to 3.Cljuit ClIStaiios of t11e dlargc of cardessuess Oll this
point. Doyle's letter of the night of Nov. 22 is conclusive: (Not one soldier
hllS been left 00 observe the motions of the euemy, or to check the progress
of llis advancet1 guard, common pickets excepted, which are pushed l\ little
outside the 00\\'11. I confess I hal'e not a shade of doubt that the enemy will
a.ttack at daybreak, and confusion must uaturally ensue' (Doyle's corresllOn~
deuce in tllC Recort! Office). It is seldolll that a military IlroplJ()cy ill ~
ex~tly fulfilled.
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to defile over the bridge next mOl11ing in a leisllrely fashion, and
were still only milking their wu)' to their dcsi!,,"'mtcd po~itiulls wheu
unnes attacked. In fact the Spanish line of battle was never
forrnt.'<.1 as had been plunned: the vmious brigades of the Arm}" of
Aragoll were hlllTied OIlC alte]· another on to the height... south-west
of Tudela, but entirely without ~YStelll 01" order: the lower ground
to the left of the Cabe7.0 Malln was never occupied at all, and
remainoo as n gap in the centre of the line all through the battle.
Lnnnes, who was aware that the Spaniards were intending to
fight at Tudela, had marched at dawn from his cumps in frollt of
AJfaro in two cohnnns. OIlC!, compo.~C(l of MOllcey's t."Ol'pS, with
'Vatllier's cavalry at its head, caUle by the high-road Ileur the
Ebro, The other, composed of the two independent c..wnlry
brigades of Colbcrt ulld Di!."Con, und of Lagrungc's division, was
more to the west, and hcadC(] fOl' Cascante. The Marshal hnd 110
intention of attacking the left of the Spanish line in the lliredion
of'l'arazona, which he left entirely to itself, He met not a single
Spanish vt.'<iettc till 'Vathier's cavah'y ran into the pickets inllllC·
dintcly outside Tudclll..
Custaiios WllS in the town, cngnw-xl in hurrying tlle llmrch of the
Aragonese troop~ across the S1'eat bridge of' the Ebro, when the
fusillade broke out. 'l11C unexpected sound of lIlusket!"} threw
the troops into great excitement, for they were jlllllmed ill the
narrow mooiuc\'alluncs of 'l'udclu WhCll the sounds of battle came
rolling down from the Cen-o de Santa Barbara. ~l1\e Communder-
in-chief himself was caught between two regiments !md could not
push his way out to the field for some time, But the Illel] were
quite rca.d.y to fight, and hurried to the front ns fast as they were
able. Roea's Valencian division (the 5th of the Alldalusian army)
had been the first to cross the Ehro: it 'I'M pushed up to the
Cerro de Santa Barbal'R, und reached its summit just in time to
beat oft' the leading brigade, onc from Morlot's division, which Wtl.S
ascending the hill from the other side, Saint March's battalions,
who had crossed the bridge next llf'te,- Hocn, were fOl"tnllatc enough
to be able to deploy und occup)' the hill of SanLa Quitcl'iu. iJcfore
they were attacked, Bllt O'Neille's Aragonese and Mnrcians wel'e
less lucky: the)' onl} succeeded in !;Cizing the Cabezo Malla ridhI"C
after (l!-iving oft' the skirmishers of" MUUl'it."C IHathien'$ French
division, which had. come up next in su(.'eession to :Morlot, und was
just preparing to mount the slope, Blit the position wus just
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saved, and the Anny of Al'agon was by ten o'clock fonned up along
the! hills, with its right overhanging the Ebro and its left-quite
in the air-established on the Cabe.zo Malla. The front was
somewhat over two miles in length, and quite defensible; but the
troolls were in great disorder after their hurried march, and the
gcncrols were appalled to find that the Anny of the Centre had not
moved up to join them, and that there was a gap of three miles
Ixtwecn the Cabezo Malln and the nearest of the Andalllsian
divisions. Castailos perceived this fact and rode off, too late, to
bring up La Pefia from Cascante to fill the void. Palafox WtU; lIot
on the field: he had gone off' at daybreak (still in high dudgeon
that his scheme for an attack by Pampelulla had been overruled)
and was far on the road to Sal'i\,<TOSAA.
It is clear that Lannes' first attack was unpremeditated and ill·
nn1l.l1gcd: he had been tempted to strike when Iris vangun.rd only
had come up, because he saw the Spanish position half empty and
the Aragonese divisions struggling up in disolUCl' to occupy it.
Hence came his first check; but the preliminary skirmish had
revealed to him the (!.xistence of the fatal gap between the two
Spanish armies, and he was now ready to utilize it, Wbile
Cnstniios was riding for Ca.scalltc, the divisions of Musnier, Grand-
jean, and Lagrange were coming upon the field, and Lann~ was
preparing for a second and more serious attack,
Meanwhile the fortune of the day was being settled on the left.
'When the army of Lallnes appeared in the plain, La Peiia at
Cascante should have marched at once towards the Aragonese, and
Grimarest and Villariezo from Tarazona should have moved on
Cnscante to replace La Peiia's division at that place. Neither of
them stirred, though the situation was obvious, and though they
.presently received orders from Castaiios to close in to their right.
La Peiia was the most guilty, for the whole battle-field was Wider
his eye; he would not move because he had before him Digeon's
and Colberl's cavalry, and was afraid to march across their front in
the open plain, protected only by the shallow Queiles. Hc hlld
8,000 or 9,000 Andalusian and Castilian infantry, and 1,500 horse,
but allowed himself to be llcutmlizcd by two brigades of dragoons.
.All that he did in response to the summons to move eastward was
to send two batWions to occupy the hamlct of UrMlnte, a mile to
his right. There was still a space of three miles between him and
Saint l\ilUoch. 'lllis scandalous and cowardly inaction is in keeping
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with the man's later career: it was be who ill 1811 betrayed
Graham at Barossa, and fled back into safety instead of stopping
to nssist his aUie<;. On this occasion he lay fOl" four hours motion·
less, while he watched the Fl'ench forming up for a second attack
Oil the Army of ~oun. Cowed by the 3,000 dl'tl.c.NOOns in his
front, h~ made no attempt to march on the Cabezo Malla to
O'Ncillc's ussistancc. Grim6.rcst's (:anduct was almost equally
bad: he was fmiher from the scene of fighting, and could not,
like La Peiia, sce the field: but it is sufficient to suy that he
recei....ed CastaJ1os' order to march all Cascante at noon, and that
he did not ren.ch that place-four miles distant-till dusk.
The Commander-in·chief himself was most unlucky: he started
for Cascantc about nOOll, intending to force his divisional b'Cuerals
to draw near the battle-field. But as he was crossing the gap
between O'Neillc and La PClia he was sighted by some French
cavah'y, who were cautiously pushing forward through the un-
occupied ground. Hc and his staff wcre chased far to thc rear by
this reconnoitring party, and only shook them off by riding hard
nnd scattering among the olive groves. Unable to rench Cascante,
he was returning towards Tudela, when he received a hasty note
from Gcncral Uoca to the eflect that the right wing of tlte army
had been broken, and the heights of Santa Barbara lost.
When his tlu'ee belaterl divisions had appeared Lnnlles had
drawn up his army in two lines, and flung the bulk of it against
the Aragoncse, leaving only Colbert's nnd DigeOll'S dragoons and
the single division of Lagra.nge to look after La Pena and the rest
of the Army of' Andalusia.
Instead of sending forward fresh troops, I.aunes brought up to
the charge for a second time the regiments of Maunce MSl.thieu
and Morlot. Behind the latter~ Musnie.r deployerl, behind the
formcr Grnndjean, but neither of iliese divisions, as it tumed out,
was to fire a shot or to lose a man. 'While MorIot with his six
battalions once more attacked the heights above the city, Maurice
MathiCll with his twelve aUempted both to push back O'Ncille
and to turn his flank by way of the Cabew Malla. After a short
but well-contested struggle both these attacks suceeeded. Morlot,
though his leading brigade sufferw heavily, obtained a lodgement
011 top of the Cerro de Santa Bnrbara, by pushing a battalion
up a lateral ravine, which had been left ullwatched on account of
its difficulty. Others followed, and Jloca's division broke, poured
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down the hill into Tudela, and fled away by the Saragossa roaU.
Almof;t at the $lt1llC! moment O'Neille's troops were beaten oft' the
Cabczo Malla by Maurice Mathieu, who had succeeded in slipping
a battulioll Md tl. ca...alry r~gilllellt round their left Hank, on the
side of the fatal gap. Seeing the line of the AI'iloll'Onese reeling
back, General Lcfcbvrc-fulloucttes, to whom Lannes had given
the c:hief command of his cavalry, charged witb three regiments of
Wathier's division at the very centre of the hostile army. He
burst through between O'Ncille and Saint l\iarch's troops, and
then wheeling outward attacked both in flank. This assault was
decisive. The whole mus~ dispel'St.'C1 alllong the olive groves, irriga-
tion-cuts, and stone fences which cover the plain to the south of
Tudcla. A few battalions kept their ranks and formed a SOlt of
rearguard, but the main pmt of Roca's, Saint March's, and
O'Neille's levies fled straight before them till the dusk fell. and far
into the night. Some of them got to SaIU.oll'08Sa next day, though
the distance was ovel' finy miles.
Meanwhile La Pcfia's futile operations in front of Cascante had
gone on all through the afternoon, He had at first nothing but
cavalry ill front of him, but about three o'clock Lagrtln~'s divisioll,
which had been the last to arrive on the field of all the French
urmy, appettrcd in his direction. Ib leading brigade marched into
the gaP. wheeled to its right, and drove out of Urznnte the two
isolated battalionl> which La Pefill. had placecl there ill the morning.
They made a gallant re:;ist[tn~e I, but had to yicld to superior
numbers and to fall back on the main bOO.yat Cascante 2. Here
they found not only La l'Clia but also Gdmarest, and VilIarie7'.O's
mixecl brigade, for these officers had at last dciguecl to obey
Castafios' orders and to close in to the right. There was now an
imposing mass of b'oops collected in this quarter, at least 18,000
foot and 3,000 horse, but they allowed themselves to be 'contained'
by Lagrangc's single division and Dib"eon's dragoons. Colbert,
with the rest of the cavah'y. had riddcn throngh thc gap and gonc
Oft'ill pursuit of the Aragoncsc. 'l1lC remaining hour of daylight
I GmhanJ witnessed this aud reports ill ilis Diury (I), 21.15) tllat < t11e two
regiments thllt Jmd boon sent down into the plaiu belllwe(l ullcommonly
well.'
2 I ugrec with Schepelcr and the Stw,llish witnesSCl'; in llolding" that on this
side the lo"uuch did vCQ' little j their great ,~dnmce, liS SchOjloCller says, ' ist
lIur l3ulletinformel uml weiter Iliehts,'
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was spent in futile skirmishing with Lagrangc, and aftcr dark
La Peiia and Grimarest retired unmolested to Borjn, by thc road
which skirts the foot of the Sierra de Moncayo. They were only
di'iturbed by a panic caused by the blowing up of the resel'\·e
ammunition of the Army of the Centre. Some of the troops took
the explosion for a suddcn dischtl.l~ of French artillery, broke
their ranks, and werc with difficulty reassembled.
It is impossible to speak too stmngly of the shameful slacklles~
and timidity of lA. Pciia and his collcitb"Ucs. If they had been
tried for cowardice, and shot after the mnImcr of Admi,'al Byng,
they would not have recei \'(x} more than their deserts. 'D\at
20,000 men, including the greater part of the vkiors of Bnylen,
should assist, from a distance of fOllr miles only, at the rout of
their coml-ades of thc Army of' Ar~<1'()Il, was the most dcplomblc
incident of all this unhappy campaign.
From the astounding way ill whicll the Andalllsian amlY had
been mishandled, it resulted that practically no loss-~OO kilk'<1
and wOlUldcd at the most-was suflc.l'cd in this quarter, and the
troops marched off with their artillery and wagons, after blowing
up their reserve ammunition and abamloning their heavy bnggngc
ill thei,' camps 1. The Amgonese had, of course, fared vel'y dif-
ferently. They lost twenty·six gtUl!l-apparcntly all that they lwl
brought to the field-over 1,000 pl'isoncN, and at least 3,000
killed and wounded 2. That thc casualties were not more numerous
WM due to the fact that the plain to the south of Tudela was
covered with olive-groves, and irrigation-cuts, which checkcd the
French caval,'y and facilitated the flight of the fugitiYcs.
Lannes, it is clear, did not entirely fulfil Napoleon's expecmtions.
He did not take full advuntuge of the b'tl.P betW(''C1l O'Ncillc and
La Peiia, and wasted much force in frontal attacks which might
have been avoided. If he had thrust two divisions and all his
horse between the fractions of thc Spanish arm)', before ordering
thc second attack of Maurice l\1athicu lllld MOI'lot, the victory
wonld have been far more decisive, m1(1 less costly. The 10;;''' of
) '11lC 3,000 mcn of Camojal's troop!!, which had 1JeCIl detm:hed to watell
Ney in the direction of Agreu", were cut off from the rest of the Army of the
Centre, and fan great risks. But they ultimately escaped and rcjoiuoo the
main body.
2 Only Saint Marel,'" casualties arc l'~rved. 'I1'CY'lltlOUlltetl to 1,:l2B.
Roea and O'Neille must have suffered ill proportion.
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tile Srd Corps was 44 killed and 513 wounded; that of Lagronge's
division and the dragoons has not been preserved, but can have
been but small-probably less than 100 in all-though Lagl'!l.uge
himself received a severe hurt in the ann. The only regiment
that suffered heavily was the 117th, of Morlot's division, which,
in tuming lloca off the Cerro de Santa Darbara, lost 303 killed
and wounded, more than half the total casualties of the 3rd
Corps.
Lannes had calTied out indifferently well the pmt of the Em-
pel'Or's great pltm that had been entrusted to him; but this, as
we have seen, was only half of the game. \Vhen Castanos and
the Aragonese were routed, they ought to have found Marshal
Ney at their backs, intercepting their retreat on Saragossa or
Madrid. As a matter of fact lIe was more than fifty miles away
on the day of the battle, nnd fU'rived with a tArdiness which made
his flanking march entirely futile. The orders for him to march
from Aranda on Soda and Taro.zona ho.d been issued on Novem.
bel' 18', and he had been warned that Lo.nnes would deliver his
blow Oll the twenty.SC<.'Ond. But Ney did not receive his instruc-
tions till the nineteenth, and only set out on the twentieth.
When once he was upon the move he made tremendous marches,
for on the twenty-first he had renched AlmrvAn, more than sixty
miles from his starting-point: by dusk on the twenty-second he
had pushed on to Soria 2, where he halted for forty-eight hours
on account of the utter exhaustion of his troops. He had pushed
them forward no less than seventy-eight miles in three days, a rate
which cannot be kept up. Hence he was obliged to let them spend
the twenty-third and twenty-fourth in Soda: at dawn on the
twenty-£fth they set out again, and executed another terrible
march. It is thirty miles from Soria to Agredn., in the heart of
the Sierra de Moncayo, where thc 6th Corps slept on that night,
and evcry foot of the way was ovcr villainous mountain roads.
Hence Ney only reached Tarazona early on the twenty.sixth, three
days aftcr the battle; yet it cUlmot be said tlmt hc had been
slow: he had covered un miles in six and a half days, eyen when
thc halt at Soria is included. This is \'cry fair marching for
infantry, when the difficulties of the country are considered.
Napoleon ungenerously ascribed thc cscupe of Castaiios to thc fact
that' Ney had allowed himself to be imposed upon by the Spaniards,
1 Nap. Cor~Bp., 14,409. ~ Ibid., 14,604.
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and rested for the twenty-second and twenty-third at Sorin, because
he chose 1;0 imagine that the enemy had 80,000 mcn, and othCL'
follies. If he had reached Agreda on the twenty-third, according
to my orders, IlOt a man would have escapcd t.' But, as Marshal
Jourdan very truly remarks in his ftfemoircs, 'Calculating the di.~­
tance from Aranda to Tarazona via SOl'ia, one easily sees that cvcn
if Ney had given no rest to his troops, it would have been im-
possible for him to arrive before the afternoon of the twenty-fourth,
that is to say, twenty-four hours after the buttle, It is IlOt he
who should be reproached, but the Emperor, who ought to have
started him from Arnnda two days rorlier 2.'
Blind admirers of Bonaparte have endeavoured to make out a
case against Ney, by accushlg him of' having stopped at Saria for
three days in order to pillage it-which he did not, though he
made a requisition of shoes and cloth for great-coats from the
mWlieipality. If he is really to blame, it is rather for having
worked his men so hard on the twentieth to the twenty->ieCond that
they were not fit to march all the twenty-third: he had taken
them seventy-eight miles OIl those three days, with the natural
result that they were dead bent. If he hwl contented himself
with doing sixteen or eightccn miles a day, he would have reached
Soria Oil the twenty-third, but his men would have been com~
paratively fresh, and eould have moved on next morning, E\'cn
then he would havc been late for the battle, us Jourdan clearly
f>hows; the fact was that the Emperor asked an impossibility
of him when he expc<:ted him to COVCI' 121 miles in four days,
with ltl'tillery and b1l.1kooage, and a diffk..ult mountain range to
climb s,
Meanwhile the routed forces of O'Neille, Roca, and Saint March
joined at Mallen, and retreated along the high-rood to Saragossa,
accompanied for part of the way by Castaiios; while those of La
Pefla, Grimarest, and Villariem marched by BOLja to La .Almunia.
on the Xaloll, where their General-in-chicf joined them find
directed them to take the road to Madl;d, not that which led
to the Aragonese capital. 011 the night of the twenty-fifth the
1 Napoleon to Joseph Napoleon, frOlll Arallda, No,'. 27 (};(lp, (J(),.reap.,
14,518),
I Jourdall's NC11WireIfJ p. 92,
I Ney's march and its difficulties can be studied in tile Mtflloirea of Ilocca,
then a captain in the 2nd Hussars, wllo sl1ared this march with the 6th Corps.
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Army of Andalusia, minus the gt'eater part of the wrecks of Roca's
division', was concentrated at Calatayud, not much reduced in
numbers, but already suffering from hUllger-al1 their stores having
been lost at Cascante and Turazona-and inclined to be mutinous.
The hl(:rediblc mismanagement at 'L\ldcla was put dowll to treachcl)'.
und the men were much inclined to tlisobey their chiefs. It WIIS
at this nnhappy moment that CflStailos received a dispatch from
the Central Junta dated November 21, which authorized him to
incorporate the divisions of O'Ncillc und Saint March with the
army of Andalusia, leaving only the Aragonese under the control
of Palafox. This order, if given a month earlier, would have saved
an enormous amount of wrangling and mismanagement. Dut it
WIl.'t now too late: these divisions had retired on Samgossa, and
the enemy having interposed between them and Custafios, the
allthori1~'1ti0I1 remaiJ1(~d perforce a dead letter.
Lannes had directed Maurice Mathieu, with the divisions of
Llgl'ungc lUld Musnier, to follow the Andalusians by BOl:ia., while
MorIot and Grandjean pursued the Aragoncse 011 the road of
Mal1cll. '!11C chw;c does !lot seem to havc been very hotly urged,
but on each road a certain number of stragglers were picked up.
Ne)", reaching Borja 011 the twenty-sixth with the head of his
c-Olumll, fonnd himself ill the rear of Manrice Mathiell, and
committed to the pursuit of Castm10s. Their vanguard reached
Calatayud on the twenty-seventh, find lenmt that the Army of
the Centre had evacuated that city on the same morning, and was
pres.<;ing towards Madrid, with the intention of ta.king part in
the dcfenee of the capitaL
Ne)', taking with him Lugmnh"C's inf~ntry and Digeon's and CoI-
bert'!1 cavalry from the troops which fought at Tudela, and adding
them to the two divisions of Mnrehand and Dessollcs, which had
formed his turning columll, urged the pursuit as fast as he was
nble. Twice he came up with the Spanish army: on en.ch OCCl\.Sion
Castafios sacrificed his rearguard, which made a long stand and
was terribly mauled, while he pushed ahead with his main !xxIy.
At this cost the army was saved, but it arrived in New Castile
half starved and c..x}musted, and almost os much demoralized as
if it had been beaten in a pitched battle. A few days later
many of the battalions burst into open mutiny, when they were
ordered to retire into the mountains of CueueD.. But at least
• Only 1,600 of them, with Roca Ilimself, followed CastailOB.
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they had escaped from Ne)' by rapid marching. and still preserved
the form and semblmice of nn army.
Meanwhile Napoleon, all his side, had begun to operate against
Madrid with a speed and surencss of stroke that made futile
every attempt of the Spaniards to intervene between him and
hi", goal. The moment that the news of Tudem l'euched him
(November 26) he had hurled his main body upon the capital,
and within eight days it was in hi8 hands. '!1le IlIIII"ch of the
army of Andalusia to cover Madrid was (though Castaii.os could
Ilot know it) useless from the first. By hurrying to till.; aid of the
.Junta, through Sigucnztl. and Guadnlajara, he was merely exposing
himsclf for a second time to destruction. His troops were destined
to csc<'"'pe from the peril in New Castile, by a stroke of fortune
just as l10tnblc as that which hud >st:wcd thcm fmm being cut
off' on the dll-J after Tudela. lint he, meanwhile, was separated
from his troo~, for 011 arriving at SigucDm he was lllet by ulIothel'
dispatch from the Junta, which relieved him of the command of
the army of the Centre, and uade him hasten to Head. Quarter;;,
where his aid was required by the Central Committee for 'War.
Handing O\"Cl' the troops to the incapable La Peiia, Castal10s
hastened southward in search of the Junta, whose whereabouts
in those days of flight and confusion it was not easy to find.
O)JAX. I ,g
SECTION VII: CHAPTER VI
PASSAGE m' THE SQMOSIERRA: NAPOLEON AT MADRID
AFTER completing his arrangements for the two sweeping f1ank-
movements that were destined to entrap lllake and Castaiios, the
Emperor moved forward from Durgos on November ~, along the
great road to Madrid by Lcrma and Arrmda de Ducro. His
advance was completely masked by the broad screen of cavah)'
which had gone on in front of him. Lasalle was ahead, l\Iilhaud
on the right flank, and covered by them he mm'cd with e.'\se across
the plain of Old Castile. He brought with him a very substantial
force, all the Imperial Guard, horse and foo~ Victor and his
Ist Corps, and the reserve-cavalry of Latour~l\:[aubourg and La·
houss&,ye. King Joseph and his household troops were left behind
at Burgos, to preserve the line of communication with YittOl'ia and
Bayollne. The flanks were quite safe, with Ney and MOllccy lying
out upon the left, and Soult and Lefebvre upon the right. In EL
few days-supposing that the armies of Blake and Castanos fell
into the snare, or were at lenst broken and sca.tterOO-the Emperor
hoped to be able to draw in both Ney and Lefebvre to aid in his
enveloping attack upon Madrid. Nor was this nil: the corps of
Mortier and Junot were now approaching the Pyrenees, and would
soon be available ns a great central reserve. The whole force put
in motion against Madrid was enomtous: the Emperor had 45,000
men under his own hand: Nc)' and Lcfcbvre could dispose of
40,000 more: :Mortier and Jl1not were bringing up another 40,000
in the rear. Omitting the troops left behind OIl the linc of com*
munication and the outlying corps of Soult and Monce)', not less
thlUl 130,000 mcn were about to concentrate upon Madrid.
The Emperor halted at Aranda from November 23 to 28, mainly
(as it would seem) to aUow the two great flanking operations to
work themselves out. When Soult reported that Blake's much*
chased army had dissolved into a mere mob, and taken refuge in
the fastnesses of the Aflturias, and when Lannes sent in the news
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of Tudcln, t~c Emperor saw that it 'I'M time to move. On the
twenty-eighth he marched on Madrid, by the direct high.road that
crosses the long and desolate pass of the SOlllosicrra.
l\Ieam\'hile the Spaniards had been granted nineteen cIa)'s since
the rout of Gamonal in which to organize the defeIl{.'c of their
CApital-a space in which something might ha,"c been done had
thci," resources been properl)' applied and their (.'OlIluuUldcl's
capable. It is tmc that even if every available man had been
hurrkd to Madrid, the Emperor must still have prevailed: his
nnmbers were loo overwhelming to be withstood. llut this fnct
does not excuse the Junta for 110t haviug done their best to hold
him OOck. It is clear that when the news of Gamonal reached
them, all the moming of the twelfth, orders should have been sent
to Castal10s to fall b..'lck on the capital by way of Calatayud and
Siguclli",a, lctlxing Palafox and the Arah1"()IJese to 'contain' l\1un<:ey
ns long as might be possible, Nothing of the kind was done, and
the Ill'IIl)' of thc CclltrC-fu1 we have seen-was still at Tudc1a on
the twcnty.third, There WM another and t\ still more important
SOUlX:e of aid available: the English m'llly from Portugal had begun
to arrive at Salamanca on I'0\'embm'13: its rearguard had reached
that city ten dllyS later. 'Vith Sir John Moore's designs und
!)l!UlS of campaign we shall have to deal ill another chapter. It
IllLlst sulliec in this place to say that he was now within 150 miles
of Madrid by Il good high·road: the subsidiary column under
Hope, which had with it nearly the whole ot' the British artillery,
WM at Tnla"era, still lICW:Cl' to the eapital. If the Junta had
realized and fmllkly (l\'owed the pelils of the situatioll, thel'C can
be no doubt that they would huxc used cvcry effort to bring l\IOO1'C
to the defence of Madrid. Seven or eight good marches could
havc carried him thither. But the Spaniards did nothing of the
kind: refusing to l'Calize the imminence of the danger, they prc·
ferred to urge 011 i\{r. 1"I'Cl1; the newly arrived British minister, a
schcmc for the union of i\loorc's fon'Cs with Blake's broken' A.rmy
of the Left 1.' They Stl&:,<Y'(.·stcd that I-lope's division might be
I ),11', Frerc to General ,\Ioore (from Aranjllez, No\'. 25) ; compare the letter
of Martin de Gamy (seeretary of the Jllllta) to Mr. Frerc, dated Nov. 24:
• If the Eugllsh troops form 11 jl.lllctiOll with the Army of the Left, we com·
pose a fonnidablc bod)' of iO,OOO illfantr)' and U,OOO cavalry, a force witl.
Wllicll we shall be ceruli/1 of our LloI\', which II'C ne,.er could be by any
different conduct.'
,: g 2
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brought up to reinforce the capital, but tlmt Lhe rest of the British
troops should operate in the valley of the Dout'o. This proposition
was wholly inadmissible, for Hope had with him all MOOI'C'S
cavalry and most of his guns. '1'0 have separated him from his
chief would have left the latter incapable of any offensive move·
mcnt. Hope declined to listen to thc proposal, and marched via
the Escurial to join the main anny 1.
The fact wns that the Junta still persisted. in thc foolish belicf
that Napoleon had no more than 80,000 men disposable in Northem
Spain, instead of the £50,000 who were really at his command,
They looked on the French adI'anee to Bm'gm; as a mere ream·
naissance in force made by a single corps, and in this notion the
imbecile Beh'ederc did his best to confirm them, by stating in his
dispatch that the force which had routed him amounted to 110
more than 3,000 horse and 6,000 infanLry 2, Instcud of callillg ill
Castanos and making a desperate appeal for aid to MOOl'C, the
Junta cOlltellted thcmseh'cs with cndea,'ourillg to reorgunize
the wrecks of the arm)' of Estremadut'fl, and pushing forward
the belated fragments of thc 1st and Std Andalusian divisions,
which still lingered in Madrid, as well as the few Castilian levies
that were now available for service in the field. Nothing can
show their blind self-confidencc more clCllrly than thcir proclamation
of November 15, put forward to attenuate the ill effects on the
public mind of the news of the rout of Gllmonal. ''The Supremc
Junta of Government '-so nms the document-' ill order to
prevcnt any marc unhappy accidents of this kind, has already taken
the most prudent measures; it hllS nominated Don J oscph Hel'Cdia
to the command of the army of Estremadura: it has ordered all
the other generals of the Army of the Right to combine thcil'
movements; it has given s~ringent orders for the prompt reinforce-
ment of the above-named army ° , , Thcre is every hope that thc
enemy, who now boasts of having been able to admncc lIS rar as •
Bmogos, will soon be well chastised for his temerityo And if it is
certain-as the reports from the frontier llSSUre us-that the
Emperor of the French has come in person to inspeet the conduct
1 Moria used many arguments to induce Hope to direct his men ou
i\ladrid, when the English genernl rode in from Talavera to diseu.8ll the situation
witll the Spanish Ruthorities, Hope, of course, pleaded the duty of obedience
to his chief,
, Belvedere's dispatch to the Junta (Madrid G'ozetle of Nov. 15\
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of his gencrals and his troops in Spain, we may hope that the
nl.liant dcfenders of our fathcrland 111(\)' aspire to thc glory of
maldng him fly, with the same haste with which thcy forced his
brother Joseph tu aoondun the throne aud the copirol of which he
\'ainly thought that hc had taken possession l.'
SiJl(:e they systematit-ally undcl'mlued the number of Napoleon'8
host, and refused to bclie\'c that thcrc was any danger of a serious
attack 011 l\:[(\th'id during thc llC...t fcw days, it WM natural that
the Junt.'l. should waste, in the most hopeless fashion, the short time
of respite that was grunted to them bctWI..'Cll thc rout of Gamomu
and Napoleon's advancc fmm Arullda. They hurried forward
the troops that werc close at hand to hold thc passes of thc wa~r­
shed between Old and New Castile, and then resumed their usual
constitutional debates.
The forces available for the defence of Madrid appear absurdly
small when wc 1..'Ollsider tItc mighty mass of men that BOllaparte
was leading against them. Nearly half of the total was composed
of the wrecks of the Estrcmadul'llll ul'my. Belvederc, as it will be
l'clllcmbel"ixl, had brought back to Lemlll. the remains of his 1st
and !!ud Dirisions, and mUied them on his intact 3rd Division.
The approach of L.."'salle's cavalry on Novcmber 11 sCilred them
from Lcnna, und the whole body, no\\' perhaps 8,000 01' 9,000
strong, feU back all Arallda. Prom thent'C wc should ha.ve c.xpc<:ted
thut the)' would rC!tirc by thc high-road ou Madrid. and take post
in the pass of thc Somosicrm. Bnt the Estrcl1ladumn officers
decided to retreat on &gm'ia, far to the left, leaving only a hand·
ful of men ~ to co\"cr the main line of access to the capital. It
looks as if a kind of 'homing instinct' had seized the whole army.
ano 1..'Olllpclled them to retire 'along the road that led to their
OWll proyince. The only explanation given by their commandcrs
was that they hoped to pick IIp ill this direction Illany of the
fugitives who had not rallied to their main body (onc cannot say
to their colours, for most of them had been captured. by the
, l'l'ochullation of t]Le Supreme Junb, published in the lJarJrid Guzette of
NOI·. 15, 1808.
2 Arteche says that' all the intact troops; i. e. the wllOlc 3111 Estrcmadurao
,lil"ision, fell back Oil the Somogierra, But this is incorrcct, for a dispatch of
Gcneral TrillS (Muan'rJ Gazelle of NOI"em1Jcr 22) shows that he ouly took two
or three hattaliolls to the p;1ss, and CI·Cll some of these must afterwards have
gouc on to &-govia, for only olle BlrtrcmadLlran earl);;; (tile nmlajo~ Itegiment)
is fOillld hl the list of San Juan'l! little army (Arteche, iii. 400).
454 THE FALL OF MADRID ~'" 28
French) on the dar after Gamonal'. At SegO'"ia the unhappy
Delvedcrc was superseded by Heredill., whom the Junta had sent
down from Aranjuez to reorganize the arm)'.
The other troops an\ilablc for the defence of Madrid L"Ol1sisred
mainly of the belated fractions of the IlI"1l1yof AIlI.1alnsia, which
Castafios"had summoned so nmuy times to join him on the Ebl"O,
but which were still, on NO\"cm!Jer 15, in or about l\Jadrid. They
were supposed to be completing their clothing and C<juipmcnt, and
to be incorporating recruits. Dut considering the enormous space
of time that had elapsed since BayIen, it is not unfair to believe
that the true reason for their detention in the capital had been
the Jun.ta's wish to keep a considerable body of troops in its own
immediate neighbourhood. It was com"onicnt to have l'egitnents
near at hand which had not passed under the control of any of t.he
generals commanding the provincial armies. There were in l\Iaut'id
no less than nine battalions of the original division of Uedillg-aU
regulars and all corps who had distillguished themselves at Baylen 2.
Of the 31'd Division there were two regular and two old militiilo
battalions a, The remainder of the available force in the capital
consisted of four battalions of new lC\'ics mised in the capilal (the
1st and 2nd Itegiments of the' Volunteers of Madlid '), of one new
corps from .Alldalusia(the 31'<1 Voluntecl'S ofSeville), and of fragments
of four regiments of enmlry 4. The whole division, tweh-e thOllSlUld
strollg, was placed under the charge of General San JUall, a ,'etCl'un
of good reputation s, But he was only a subordinate: the supreme
I See Artc<:hc, ili. 321. 'Jbe fugitives ned so far ami wide that make
rallied 167 of tl1e regiment of Tuy at LeOll! Leith lIay fOlllul them all OH}r
the couIltry-side OIl No"ember 1.5.
, These corps were the WallOOll Guards (3rd batt.), Reina (two hatts.), Jaen
(tIVo hatts.), Corolla (two hatts.), 11'1311113(1\\'0 batts.}-llIuch t116 larger l\alf of
the original 1st Division of Andalusia, lllld all old c0'llS (sce the 1ist~ iu
Arteehe, ili. 400).
3 TIle regimellt of Cordova (two 1J:.tts,) lUlll ti,e l'rm'inci111 militia of
Alcazar and Toledo.
6 Two squadrons each of < I'rillcipe ' anti (VolUlltarios de Madrid,' one t'ach
of Akalllara and l\IOll~" 11,e wloule amOllllb.o.d to 110 mote tl,all 000
sahres.
& Napier's description of the' Army of Reserve' is "ery illcomplcte: he
says that (Belvedere's llrmy rallied llart in tI,e Somosicrnl alld part on the
side of Segovia. 'nle troops which had been detained in .\Iadrid from Cas-
t....fios' army were fonvartletl to the Somosierra; those left hel.iud from
Cuesta's levies (the Castilians) went to &govia' (i. 2(9). .But., us we Iml'e
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(:ommtmu in Madrid was at tlJis moment ill dispute between
General Egnia, who had just been appointed as head of the
whole' Army of Reserve,' and the l\Iarquis of Csstelar, Captain·
Genel'l\l of New Castile. The existence of two riml authorities
on the spot did not tend to facilitate the organii'.ation of the army,
or the formation of a regular plan of defcnce. Eguia, succeeding
at last in asserting his authority, ordered San ,Tuan with his U,OOO
mcn to defend the Somosicrra, while Hel"t.'<1i!t with the 9,000
E!>1remadlll'ftns was to hold thc pass of the Guadan'ama, the
ultcmutive road from Old Castile to l\!o.drid vin Scgovia and San
Ildefonso. Thesc 21,000 men were all that could be brought up
to resist Napoleon's attack, sincc the Junta had neglected to cn11
in its more distant resources. It is clear that from the first they
werc doomed to failure, fOl' mountain chains are not like perpen-
dicular walls: they cannot be maintained mcrely by blocking the
roads in the defiles. Small bodies of tl"Oops, entrenched across
the actual summit of the pass, can always be tumed by an cilemy
of superior numbers; for infantry call easily scramble up the
flauking heights on each side of the high-road. These heights
must be held by adequate forces, arranged in a continuous linc for
mallY miles 011 each side of the defile, if thc position is not to be
outflanked. Neither Heredia nor San Juan had the numbcr~
1IC<,'Cs:;nI'J for this purpose.
It was open to Napolcon to attack both the passes, or to
demonstrate against onc while concentrating his main force 011 the
other, 01' to completely ignore the onc tllld to turn eycry man
against the other. He chose the 1a.<rt.nal1!ed altematiyc: a few
Cllmlr)" only were told. oll'to watch the Estremadul<lns ut Scgovia,
though Lcfebne and the 4th Corps were ultimately scut in that
dil't.'(:tioll. The main mass of the arIllY marched from .Arallda
against the Somosierra, San Juan had not made the best of his
oppodunities: he had done no more t!Uln range his whole artillery
across the pass at its culminating point, with a shallow cnrthwork
to protect it. This only co\'crcd the little plateau at the head of
the defile: the flanking heights on eithcr sidc wcre not prepared
01' entrenched. They were steep, especially 011 the right side of the
road, but nowhere inaccessible to infantry moving in skirmishing
order. At the northern foot of the paSS lie!> the little town of
lleen, only onc rtgiment of lleh'euere'll men wcnt to tIle Somosierra, nuu the
C:u;tilians (i\ladriu Volullteen) marched tllitller and not to Sego\"ia.
456 '!'HE PALL Ol? MADRID [Nov. 30
Sepulvcdu, which is reached by a road that branches ofi' from the
l\'1aA:h'id cll(utsJ~e before it commences to mount the defile. To
this plul.'C SUIl Juun pushed forward a mllguard, consisting of Jive
battaliolls of veteran line troops \ a battery. and half his available
caval.ry. It is hard to sec why he risked the flower of his little
tmny in this advanced position: they were placed (it is true) so a.__
to flunk allY attempt of the French to ad.\'ullce up the high-rood.
But what use could there be in threatening the flank of Napoleon's
4,0,000 mell with a small detached brigade of 3,500 bayonets?
And how were the troops to join their main hody, if the Empel'Or
simply' contained' them with a slllall force, and pushed up the
pnss?
Napoleon left. Aranda 011 NO\'ember 28: on the twenty-ninth
he rcachctI Boceguillas, IIcltr the foot of the lIIoullhlins, where the
Sepulvcda road joins the grcat cllawi/lce, at the bottom of the pnss.
After rCColllloitrillg the Spanish position, he sent a brib"luIc of
fusiliers of the Guard, under Sa.vary. to turn the enemy out of
Scpuhcda. Meanwhile he pushed his vanguard up the defile, tu
look for the position of San Juan, Savary's battalions failed
to dislodge Sarden's detachmcnt before nightfall: behind the wnlIs
of the town the Spaniards stood finn, and after losing sixty 01"
seventy mcn Saval'y drew off. His attack wa.q not really necessary.
fOr the moment that the Emperor had seized the exit of the defile,
the force at Sepulvedu, on its cross-road, was cut off from any
possibility of rejoining its eommander-in-chief, and stood in it very
compromised position. llealizing this fact, Colonel Sm'den retreated
in the night, p..'l.Ssed cQ-utiously along the foot of the hills, lmd fell
back on the Estremaduran army at Segovia. 'DIe only result,
thcrefore, of Sail Juan's having made this detachment to threalcn
the Emperor's flank, was that he had deprh·ed himself of the
~rvi{.'eS of a quartcr of his troOPS~fllld those thc best in his army
~when it became ne<:essary to defend the actual puss. He had
now left to oppose Napoleon only six battalions of regulars, tll'O
of militia, and sevcn of raw Castilian and Estremooul'O.1l le\·ics: the
gUlls whieh he had established in line across the little plateau, at
the crest of the pass, seem to hfwe been sixteen in number. The
Emperor could bring against him about fi ....e mcn to one.
1 Que b.1.ttalion of '\'allooll Gu"rds, two cadl of tile regiments of Jacu !Lnl!
Irlanda, and three squadrous of the regiments of Montesa and Alcantara,
with six guns, all under Colonel Sarden (colonel of tile Montesa Regimeut).
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The high-road advances by a series of curves up the side of the
mountain, with the ravine of the little river Dnrnton uhvu)'s all
it!; right hand. '111e !,'Tounu on either flank is su.'Cp but not in-
accessible. Cavalry and gnns must stiek to the clWU8,get:, but
infantry can push ahead with more or less case in e,'ery direction.
Thel'C WCI'C several rough side-tracks Oil which the l~rench could
hu\'e turned San Juan's position, hy making It long circling movc-
ment. But Bonaparte disdained to use eautious measures: he
knew that he had ill front of him a very small force, and he had
an exaggerated eontempt for the Spanish IC"ics. Accordingly, at
dawn 011 the thirtieth, he pushed up the main deflle, merely taking
the pl'Cet\Utioll of kcepjllg strong pickets of infantry out upon
the flanking heights.
,"Vhen, after a march of about se\'Clltcell llliles up the defile, the
French reached the front of S:;.n Juan's position, the moming
was \'ery far spent. It wus It dull ~o\'ember day with occasional
showers of rain, and fogs and mists hung c1o~ to the slopes of
the mountains. No genernl dew of the ground could be obtained,
but the Emperur made out the Spanish gUllS placed aero~ the
high-rosul, and conld sce that the heights for some little WA)' on
either lmnu were occupied. He at once dcpluyed thc division of
lluffin, belonging to Victor's corps, which headed his line of Ilw,rch.
'111e four batLnliulls of tlle U6th moved tip the roud towurds the
battery: the 9th I..cgcr sprc:\d out in skirmishing order to the
right, the 24th of th!! Line to the left. They pressed fOl'\l"llrd up
the steep slopcs, taking eOl'cr behind rocks and ill undulations
of the ground: their progress was in no small degree helped by
the mist, which prevented tIle Spllniard!! frolU gelling uny full
\'iew of their assailant<;. Presently, for half 1\ mile on each Rank
of the high~road, the mOllnwin-side II'ns alive with the cl'ackling
fire of the long lines of til·ailleul'S. The tell French battalion.s
\\'el'e making their way slmrly but s\llocly townrds the crest, when
the Empel'Or rode to the fl'Ont. He brought up with him a
battery of artillery of the Guard, which he directed ngainst the
Spanish line of guns, but with slllall eflCct, fOl' the enemy had
the advantage in numbers and position. BOllnparte grew im~
patient: if he had waited a little longer UurIin':; division would
ha\'c cleared the Ranking heights without asking for aid. But
he WllS tlllxio:Js to press the combat to u tlL'Cision, uml had the
greatest eonte:llpt fOl.. the fort.'CS in front of him, His main idea
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at the moment seemfl to have been to give his army and his
generals a sample of the libeIties that might be taken with Spanish
ledes. After noting that Victor's infantry wel'(! dmwing llear
the summit of the crest, and seemed able to roll back all that
lay in front of them, he suddenly took a strange and UIlCXpected
step. He turned to the squadron of Polish Light Horse, which
formed his escort for the day, and bade U1ClII prepare to eharge
the Spanish battery at the top of the pa....<;. It l\ppeared a per.
fectly insanc order, for the Poles wcre not 100 strong 1: they could
only ad"an~ alOllg the road foul' abreast, lmd then they would
be exposed for some 400 yards to the collwrging fire of sixteen
guns. Clearly the head of the ehiLl'ging .eolumn would be vowoo
to destruction, and not a man would escape if thc infantry supports
of the buttery stood firm. But Bonaparte cared nothing for thc
liyes of the llnfort1ll1ll.te troopers who would form the fOl·lo111 hope,
if only he could delirer onc of those theatrical strokes with which
he loyed to ~dorn a Bulletin. It would be tame and common-
place to allow Victor's infantry to ch:ar tile heights on either side,
and to compel the retreat of the Spanish gUlls by mere outflanking.
On the other hand, it was certain that the ellemy must be growing
very uncomfortable at the sight of the steady pmgress of llllmn's
battaliolls up the heights: the Emperor calculated that Snn
Juan's artillerymell must already be looking oreI' their shoulders
and expecting the order to retire, when the crests above them
should be lost. If enollgh of the Poles struggled thwugh tu the
guns to silence the battery for a moment, there was a loo'ge chance
that the whole Spanish line would break and fly down hill to
Btlitrago and Madrid. To suppoIi the escort-squndroll he ordered
up the rest of the Polish regiment and the clwSs£lIrs a t:lumal of
the Guard: if the devoted \'l\ugunI'd could once I'each the guns
],000 sabres would support thcm find sweep along the mad. If,
Oil the other hand, the Poles were cxtennillatcd, the GU[u'l1 cavalry
would be held back, and nothing would htL\'C been lost, Sll.\'C the
lh·cs of the forlorn hope.
I Sel'cn officcrs aUl] eigllty men, to 110 e,~act (~ee Scgur, J/.ilJII)irc8, iii. 2!12).
It does 1I0t seem to be generally known that the 1'01e3 were llot rct lancers.
The}' "'ere only annoo with tile lance three months later (see .,yl/)>. (/()/'TtJ//I.,
14,8W, giving tile order to that effect), and were at this llloment properly
8t)'led ChtlJUu.r-Liger$ Po/QUI/it only. Almost e\'(!ry narratiHl of the SOI::O-
sierra tlmt 1 hal'C rend ();Ills lhem lancers; NaJlier is an C:I"CCptiOIl,
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Gentml.l Montbnm led the Polish squadron forward for about
half the distance that separated them from the !,I"UIIS: so lllany
saddle!> were emptied that the men hesitated, and sought refuge
in a dip of the ground where some rocks gave them more or less
cm-cl' fi'OIll the Sptlllish balls. This sight exasperated the Emperor:
when "'aIther, the generAl commanding the Imperial Guard, rode
up to him, aud suggested that he should wait n moment lOIl&"C1"
till Victor's timillcurs should have carried the heights on each side
of the rond, he smote the pommel of his saddle and shouted, 'My
Guard must not be stopped by peasants, mere armed banditti I:
Then he sent forward his aide-de-camp, Philippc de SCgur, to tell
the Poles that they must quit their {:oyer and clUll'b"C home.
SlogUl' galloped on and gave his messnge to the cliff cl'e8cad'"OIt
KOIjietubki: the Emperor's eye was upon thcm, and the Polish
nfficers did not shrink. Placing themselves at the hcad of thc
~1Il'\·ivors of their devoted band they broke out of their covet" and
('ht\rged in upon the gtlll8, S(.gur riding two horses' lengths in
front of the rest. ~1lCre were only ~oo yards to cross, but the
task wns impossible; one b1n.sting dischltl'ge of the Spanish gUllS,
aided by the fire of infalltr)' skirmishers from the fhUlks, pl'llctically
extCl'Ininated the Ilnhappy squadron. Of the eight~··eight who
charged four officers and forty mcn wcre killed, four offit.'Cl'S (onc
of them wns SL:gur) and twelve men wounded 2. The foremost
of these bold riders &'"Ot within thirty YUl'ds of the guus bcf01'C
he fell.
Badng thm sncrifked in vain this little hruu! of heroes, Bona-
parte fOlllld himself fort.w, after all, to wait for the infulltry.
General llal'l"Ois with the 96th Regiment, following in the wake
of the lost squadron, seized the line of rocks behind which the
l'oles had taken refuge before their charge, aud begall to exchange
a lh'ely musketry fire with the Spanish bnttnliolls which flanked
and gllurc:k--d the gUllS, Meanwhile the 9th ami 24th Uegiments
Oil either side had nend)' l'Cllehed the crc!'\t of the heights. The
I All this narrnti,'e comes from l'hilippe lIe ~~gllr, who Illust be followed
ill preference to tl10 13th Bulldin ami :111 tile witncsslll' 1"100 ,,\lege that t1!.e
l'oles ,Jid readl tllC 1~lltcry. He, if ;lny onc, kncw what really hQl'I){lllcd
(Jr':lIIoil'/!.I', iii, 281~6). His accoullt of the wholc ousiue$9 is iu c1o.;e llecord
with tllat of De l'rmlt, who was also an e}'e-witness.
, The frightrull'rollOrtioll of killed to wOllnded came, of course, from tile
Ihd that the casuaLties were caused br artillery lire.
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enemy were already wavering, and falling back before the advance
of Ullrrois' brigade, whose skil'lnishers had struggled to the fmmmit
just to the right of the grand battery on the high-road, when the
Emperor ordered fI. second I..'lwulry churge. r111is time he sent up
Montbrun with the remaining squadrons of the l)olish regiment,
supported. by the cllO.$8CUrS it dU.-"lJ{ll of the Guard. 'TIIC conditions
wel'C completely changed, and this second attack was delivered at
the right moment: tile Spaniards, all along the line, were lIOW
heavily engaged with Victor's infantry. When, therefore, the
horsemen roUe furiously in upon the gUllS, it is not wonderful that
they sllcceedec:l in closing with Ulcm, I\lId seil.cd the whole battery
with small loss. The defenders of the pass gave wfLy so suddenly,
und scattered among the rocks with such speed, that only 200 or
them were cnught and ridden down. The Poles pursued those
of them who retin.'<1 down the road as far as Buitrago, at the
southem foot of the defile, bllt without inflicting on them UIl)'
very sc\-ere loss; for the fugith-cs swened otl' the path, and could
not be hUllted dowll by mounted men among the steep slopes
wbereon they sought refuge, '11le larger part of the Spaniards,
being posted to the left of the cllllll8S{-e, lIed westward along the
side of the monntain and arrived at Segovia, where they joined the
army of Estrcnuuluffi, 'iVith them went San Juan, who Imd
minly tried to make his reserve stn.nd firm behind the guns, and
had received two swonl-cul:.s 011 the head from fl Polish ollit:er.
Only a small part of the army tied to the direct rear and entered
Madrid,
The story of the passage of the Somosicn-a has often been told
as if it was un example of the successful frontal attack of cavah'y
on guns, and as jf the Polcs had aetuall~- defeated the whole
Spanish army. Nothing of the kind occurred: Napoleon, as wc
have scen, ill a 1ll00Ilcnt of impa.tiellcc and 1'l\,"'C ettlled lll>Oll the
lending squadron to perfol'1ll an illlpo&~ibilit)', and caused thcm tn
be exterminated. The sc(.'O;ld chHrf,te was tjuitc a diflcrellt lIlatter:
here the horsemen fell ul>on shaken troops nlree.dy closely engaged
with iufallb'y, and broke thl'Ough thelll. But if they had not
charged at all, the pas_<; would have heen fOl'eoo nOlle the Ie:.s, ancl
ouly n\-c minutes later than was actually the case 1. In short, it
1 'nJC rCII] course of CI-cnt.!l is best given by l:lfgur (Hi. 295), who writes us
follows: 'j'Clldallt que not!'e clmrgc :I\-ait attire sur ellc les fcull: ue l'euliemi,
le gcncralllarrois nn,it profite uc ccuc ui"crsioll_ 1I s'ctait nl-;U1ce jusqn';l
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was Unffin's division, find not the cumlry. which really did the
work. ~apoleol1, with his habitual love of the theatrical and his
customary disregard of h"uth, wrote in the 13th Bulletin that
the charge of the Polish Light Horse decided the action, and
that they hm] lost only eight killed and sixteen wounded! This
1~<J'Clld has slipped into histor,Y, and traces of its inAucllcc will be
found eVen ill Napicr l und other serious author.,;.
The combat of the Somosicrra, in short, is only:m c.'i:umplc of
the well-known fnet that defilCil with (l.Ceessiblc flank-slopes call1lot
be held by a small army against fourfold numhers. To state the
mattel" ShOI"tly, fiftccn batt.u1ions of Spauiards ({h-c of them
regular battalions which had been present at Baylcn) were turned
oil' the heights by the tell bul:talions of Ruflin: the cuvlIIl"y
uction was only a spectacular interlude. The Spanish infantry,
considering that there were so mall)' Ycternn eOl'ps among thcm,
might have behaved bettel', But they did not suffer the disgrucc
of being routed by a single squadron of horse as Napoleon asserted;
amI if they fought feebly their discouragement was due, we cannot
doubt, to the fact that they saw the pass packed fO!' miles to the
real" with the advancing columns of the ll'ench, and knew that
Huffin'~ cli"ision was only the skirmishing line (so to speak) of
a great army.
On the night of November SO, Napoleon descended the pass
and fixed his head quarters at Buitrago, Ou the aftcmooll of
Deccmber 1 the advanced parties of I..atolll'-i\lallbollrg's and
Lasttlle's cavalry rode up to the llol'thcrn suburbs of Mudl'id: ou
10 rocher, Ilotro poiut de Mpart. La, poUSSC8 en (l.\"llnt llar l'empcrcul' pour
recommeucer IlllI cllllrgC, trcize de I;CI;grcwltliers ll\'uicllt de 11l/o1.ttus par le fell
do la redoute, Alors, rctrogrndant derriere le roe, i1 ~1I'ait eUI'oye quclque~
compagnics it l'csc:lI:llie des !t:l.Utellr6 llnotre droitc, puis Ini-ml-me, ala tHo
de S.1. bl'igado, )' o!"bJit Illonto!", , , , Lcs }o:~I~igllols, se I'oyant pres d'etre
llOOrdo!"S, anlient dcchnrgc leurs :Irmcs, et, se dCOOlld:lllt 3llssitot, ils s'tituiellt
mis a fuir A toutes jambes, An ml-me moment 11 sa gauche le bruit lie 1.1.
eauOlltladll avait ces;;c, C'o!"to1.it alnrs llue le regiment entier de Irmciers
l'olollais, recommen~'allt la ch:lrge prcm:ltllrce de notre CSClllirQn detruit, amit
achel'c, S<11lS autre perte, (1'enlel'er la position, Les canous, quelques officiers
et 150 it 200 Espagnols lOCulemellt VlIrent .Hre atteiuts, taut la dispersion
de l'urmee dUl'ltllt lcs ljllatre balllillOllS de Banois ll\':lit etC sllbitc et
rapide,'
I Ho describes it as if 'a position llearly impregtmIJle, :I1ll1 defended by
J2,000 men, had been abl'lllllOllell to the wild charge of n few squadron8,
whom two companies of steady illfalltr)' could have stopped' (i. 263),
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the second the French appeared ill force, and the attack Oll the
city began.
The Spanish capital was, and is, a place incapable of any regular
defence. It had not even, like Valencia and Saragossa, the
remains of a mediaeval wall: its dc\'elopment had taken place in
the sixteclllh century, when serious fortifications had gOlle out of
date. Its streets were broad and regular, unlike the tortuous lancs
which !Loo been the real strell/:,rth of SaraJ:,'OSsa. Nothing scpnmtcs .
the city from its sublll'bs save OMmmclltal gates, whose onl,Y use was
for the levy of octroi duties. Madrid is built in a leyel upland, but
there is a l'ishlg grouml which dominates the whole place: it lies just
outside the eastern limit of the city. On it stood the palaL"C of the
Buen Retiro (which ghres its name to the height), and several othcr
public buildillf,lS, llmong them the ObserYatoryand the lUj'ul por<-'C-
lain manufactOl'Y, knolVn as La China. The lattcr occupied the
more cOlllmalldillg and important SI.'Ction of the summit of the hill.
Between the Uetim and the eastern side of the city lies the publie
park known as the Pl-ado, a low-lying open space laid out with
foulltAinSt statues, llJld IOJlg ayenucs of trees. Three broad and
hllJldsome streets I 1'un eastward and tcnninate in the Pnulo, just
opposite the Hetim, 80 that canllon planted either by the palace
or by La China call search them from end to cnd. '111is was so
obdous that Mural, dm'ing his ~lIpo.tion of Madrid ill Aprilllnd
May, had built three redoubts. one large and two small, facing
down into the city and armed wi~h guns of position. The in-
habitants of Madrid had partly dismantled them after the depar-
ture of the French-and did thclllsch·cs 110 harm thereby, for
these earthworks were useless for defence against an ellclllY from
without: they <-uuld be employed to ovcmwe the city but not to
protect it 2.
Evcr sincc thc 1'out of GamonaJ, those mcmbers of the Junta
who were gifted with ordinary foresight must ha\'e realized that
it was plubable that .thc Emperor would appear ere IOllg before
the gates of the capital. But to amid alarming the excitable
populace, the fuel was concealed as long US possible, and it was
ghcn out that Madrid would be defended at the impl'Cgnable
Somosierrn. It '1'(\$ not till No\'cmber 525 that an)' public measurcs
for the fortification of the capital were spoken of. On that day the
1 11H~ QJle tle AlcaIn, Calle dc Atocl,a, autl Carrcra tle San Gcronimo.
2 This d~criptioll is maiuly from Vaughau's uupublishetl diary (11. 2:30).
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Junta issued 0. proclamation placing the chUl'gC of the capital in
the hands of the Marquis of Castelar, Captain-General of New
Castile, and of DOll Tonul.s de MorIa, the officer who hud won
a name by bombarding and capturing the French fleet at Cadiz
ill June, Under their directions, preparations were begun for
putting the cit~, in 0. stntc of defence. Dut the military Tllen had
a strong and well-founded belief that the place was indefensible,
and that all efforts made to fortify it were labour thrown awa)':
the fight must be made at the Somosicna, not at the gatcs of
Madrid. It 'I'M not till the news of the ront of San Juan's army
Oll the thirtieth callle to huud, that allY \'c1'y serious work was
executed. Blit when this disaster was known there was a sudden
and splendid outburst of energy. 111e populace, full of vindictiye
memories of Mn.y 2, were ready and willing to fight, and had no
conceptiou of the military weakness of their situation. If Saragossa
had defended itself street by street, why, they nsked, should llot
Maurid do the same? Their spirits were so high and their temper
so ferocious, that the authorities reali;r.oo that they must place
themselvcs ut the head of the multituuc, or be torn to pieces us
traitors. On December 1 a Junta of Defen'-"C was formed, under the
presidency of the Duke of Infuntado, in which Moria l1nd Castelar
were given a large and heterogeneous ml\.<;S of colleagues-magis·
trutes, offieers, and prominent citizens forming un ullwieldy body
vel)' unfit to act as an executive council of war. The military
resources at their disposal were insignificant: there WHS a handful
of the fugitives from the Somosierra-Castelar estimated them as
not more than 500 or 400 in aliI-and two battalions of new levies
from the south, which had arrived only ou the morning of
De<:cmbcr 1. 'I'he orgl1nizcd forces then werc not more than 2,500
or 3,000 in all. Dut thel"C was a vast and unruly mob of citizens
of Madrid and of peasants, who had flocked iuto the city to aid
in its defence. ""Veapons rather than men were wanting, for when
8,000 muskets from the Arsenal had been sCl'\'ed out, the supply
ran short. All pd"ate persons owning firearms of any description
were invited to hand them in to the Junta: but this resource soon
failed, and finally pikes were served out, and even media€val
weapons from the royal armoury and the family collections of
certain grandees. How mmlY men, armed in one way or another,
1 This must have been all IIlltler-estimatc. More than 1,000 of the Somo-
sierra troops had joined the arm)' of Illfantado by the Ne\\' Year.
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took part in the defence of Madrid will ne\'CI' be known-it cau-
not luwc been less than 20,000, and ma)' have amounted to much
more.
Not merely the combatants, but the whole population of both
sexes lUl1loo themseh'cs with absolute frenzy to the work of
fodification. In the two days which they had at their disposal
they carried Qut an enormous and iU~compactcd scheme for sUt"-
rounding the whole city WiUI lines. III front of each of the gates
a battery was established, formed of earth l'cveled with paving-
stoncs: to conncct these a continuous wtdl was made, by joining
together all the e.,;;terior houses of the town with earthworks, or
with piles of stOlles and bricks pulled down from buildings in the
sublll'bs. On scvcml fronts ditches were e.,(Clwated; the more
important strc<:ts weI'C blocked with barricades, and the windows
nnd doors of exposed buildings were built lip. There WCI'(! very
few engineers at the disposal of the Junta of Defence, and the
populace in lIluny placcs worked not under skilled guidance but
by the light of nature, executing enormous but perfectly useless
work,S. 'The halterics,' wrole a prominent Spanish wilness, 'were
all too small: they were so low that they did not prevent the
gates und streets which they defended fl'OlU being ellfiludl.:d: the
guns being placed en barbetle were nlllch exposed, and were
dominated by the artillery which the enemy aftcl'Il'urds placed
on the high grollnd [i, e. the IleUro heights]. The low parapets
and thc wallt of pl'Opurtion between them und thcir banquettes
left the infantry unsheltel'ed: indeed they were harmed rather
than helped by the works, for the splinters of the puving-stones
which formed the parapets proved more deadly to the garrison
than did the encmy's cannon-balls. The hattel'ies were too low
at the flanks, and plnccd so close to the buildings in their rear
that the guns could not ea.~ily be worked 1101' the infantry supports
move freely. The gates behind being all of hewn stone, every ball
that struck them sent sllch a sholl'er of fragments tIying that the
effect was like gl'11.pe: it forced the defendcrs to lie flat, nnd e\·en
then cnused terrible loss 1.' It mny be added that 110t anI)· were
the works unscientifically executed, but tho.t the most tiresome
results were produl'Cd by the misguidt.'<1 energy of persons who
threw up barricades, 01' dug cnttings, behind them, so that it Wll.$
1 ncpor~ 011 tilC dcfences of i\1'Idrill, by tl:c Dukc of 11IfulIt"do, quoted ill
Artechc (Hi. 400,401).
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very hard to send up reinforcements, and quite impossible to
withdraw the guns from one battery for use in allother.
It was natural that these self-taught engineers should neglect
the onc most important point in the defences of MaUrid. The
Retiro heights were the key of the city: if they were lost, the
whole place lay open to bombardment from the dominating
ground. But nothing was done here, save that the old French
works round the factory of La China were repaired, the buildings
of the palace, barracks, und hospital in the vicinity barricaded,
lLnd ll. low continuous earthwork constructed round the swnmit
of the hill. It should have been turned' into EL regular entrenched
camp, if the city was really to be defended.
.The Junta of Defence did its best to presen'c order and
introduce discipline: all the nrmed men were paraded in the.
Prado, told off into bands, and allotted their posts around the
circumference of the city. Dut there were many idle hands, and
much confusion: it was inevitable that mobs should collect, with
the usual consequences. Cries Of'TrcasOll' were raised, some houses
were sacked, and at least one atrocious murder was committed.
The Marquis of Perales was president of the sub-committee which
the Junta had appointed to superintend the manufacture and
distribution of ammunition. Among the cartridges given out
to the people some were found in which sand had been substituted
for powder-probably they were relics of some petty piece of
peculation dating back to the times of Godoy. Wl1cn this was
discovered, a furious mob ran to the house of the nmrquis, beal;
him to death, and dr~"Cd his corpse through the streets on a
hurdle t.
If the populace of Madrid was full of blind self-confidence, and
imagined that it had the power to beat oH' the assault of Napoleon,
its leaders were in a much more despondent frame of mind. MorIa
was one of those who had joined the patriotic party merely
1 Napier calls Perales' a respectable old geucral' ; hut as 1'ore60 remarks
(i. 305), he was ncither old, nor a military officer of !llly Tank, uor respect-
ahle. He was a man of fashion noted for his licentious life, and the mob
which murdered llim is said to have been heade<1 by his di>;C3rdet1 mislress.
Artcche suggests that the SIlud-enrlridges were constmcted for the purpose of
ruiniug him, aud tht the whole business was a piece of private vengeance.
TIle marquis bad ouce heen a very popular character among tile lower
classes, but had lost credit by showing politeuess to MunIt.
O)fAN. I JI 11
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be<:ause he thought it was the winning side: he was deeply
disgusted with himself, and was already contemplating the
traitorous deseltioll to the enemy which has covered his name
with eternal .disgra.ce. Castelar seems to have been weak and
downhearted. The Duke of Infantado was enough of a soldier to
sec the hopeless inefficiency of the lUCUSUJ:es of defence which had
been adopted. The only chance of saving Madrid was to hurry up
to its aid the two -field-annies which were within touch-the old
Andalusian divisions (now under La Pena), which, by orders of the
Supreme Junta, "(ere marching from Calatayud on the capital,
and the routed bands of Heredia and San J nan at Segovia. Urgent
appeals were sent to both of these hosts to press forward without
delay: Infantado himself rode out to meet the army of the Centre,
which on this day [Dec. 1] had not long pussed Sib'llen.w. in its
rctxeut, und was still nearly eighty miles from the capital. He
met it at Guadalajara on the next day, in very bad condition, and
much reduced by long matches and starvation: with the colours
there were only 9,<JPO foot and ~,OOO horse, and these were in
a state ofhalf~dcvelopcdmutiny. The rest of thc ~O,OOO men who
had E'SCaped from Tude1a were ranging in smaU bands over the
l:ountry-sidc, in search of food, and were not rallied for many day:;.
-There was not much to be hoped for from the arm)' of the Centre,
and it was evidcnt that it could not reach Madrid till Decelll-
ber 3 or 4. The troops of San Juan and Hcrcdia were not so far
distant, but even they had -fifty-five miles to march from SCf,"O"ia,
nnd-as it turned out-thc capital had fallcn before eithcr of the
field-armies could possibly come to its aid. Still more fruitless
were the attempts made at the last momcnt to induce Sir John
Moore to bring up the British expeditionary force from Salanmnca
-he was 150 miles away, and could not have arrived before
December 7, three days after the capitulation had been signed.
Napoleon dealt with the insurgents of Madrid in a very :;umIllary
manner. On December I-as we have already seen-his vedettcs
appeared before tile city: 011 the morning of the second thc
dragoons of Lahoussaye and Latour-Maubourg came llP in force
Md invested the northern and castel"l fronts of the city. At noon
the Emperor himself appeared, and late in the afternoon the
infantry columns of Victor's corps. December!! was one of Buna-
parte's lucky days, being the anniversary of Austerlib., and he
bad indulged in a faint hope that an open town like the Spanish
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capital might do him the CO\lrtesy of sUlTendering without a blow,
like Vienna in 1805, or Berlin ill 1806. Accordingly he sent a
summons to the Junta. in the aftemoon; but the Spaniards were
in no mood for yielding. General l\Iontbrun, who rode up to the
gates with the white flug, was nearly mobbed by enraged peasants,
alld the aide-de-camp who took the dispatch into the city was only
saved from certain death by the cxertious of some Spanish officers
of the line. The Junta sent him back with the haughty reply that
• the people of Madrid were resolved to bury themselves under the
ruins of their houses rather than to permit the French troops to
enter their city.'
Since the' SUIl of Allstel'litz' was not destined to set upon the
triumphal entry of the Emperor into the Spanish capital, it became
necessary to prepare for the llse of force. As a preliminary for an
attack on the following morning, Lapisse's division of Victor's corps
was sent fonvard to turn the Spaniards out of many isolated houses
in front of thch· line of entrenchments, which were being held as
advallced posts. The ground being clelU'ed, preparations could be
made for the assault. The momcnt that Bonaparte cast eyes on
the place, he realized that the heights of the Uetiro were the key of
the position. Under cover of the night, therefore, thirty guns were
ranged in line opposite the weak earlhworks which crowned theemin-
encc. .Artillery in slUl\ller force was placed in front of several. of
the northern and eastern gates of the city, to distract the attention
of the garrison from the critical point. .Before dawn the Emperor
sent in another summons to surrender, by the .hands of an artillery
officer who had been captured at thc Somosicl'rtl. It is clear that
he wished, if possible, to enter Madrid without being obliged to
deliver up the city to fire and sword: it would be unfortunate if his
brother's second reign were to begin under such unhappy conditions.
Uut it is hard to uuderstand how he could suppose that the warlike
frenzy of the Spaniards would have died down between the afternoon
of December 2 and the dawn of December 3. AIl the reply that he
obtained Wag a proposal from the Captain.GeneraI Castelar, that
there should be a suspension of arms for twelve hours. The sole
object of this delay was to allow the Spanish field·armies time to
drew nearer to Madrid. Uecognizillg the fact-which was obvious
enough-the Emperor gave orders for an immediate a.WlU]t. A
cannonade was opcnl..'(} against the gates of Los Pows, the Recoletos,
Fuencarral, and several others on the northern and eastern sides of
llh2
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the city. Considerable damage was done to the Spanish defences.,
but these attacks were all subsidiary. The real assault W/lS delivered
8.f:,»aillst the futiro heights. The heavy cannonade which was
directed against the Spanish works soon opened SC\'crnl breaches.
Then Villatte's division of Victor's corps was sent in to storm the
positioll) a feat which it nccomplished with the greatest ease. The
garrison of this all-important section of the defence'! consisted of
a single battalion of new levies-the Regiment of MazzaredO-Rlld
a mass of armed citizens. They were swept out of their works,
and pursued downhill into the Prado. Pressing onward among
the avenues and fountains, Villa.tte's division took in the rear the
defenders of the three neighbouring gates, and then, pushing in
among the houses of the city, made a lodgement in tlle pll.lace of the
Duke of Medina Celi, and several other large buildings. There was
now nothing between the French army Ilnd the heart of Madrid
save the street·barricades, \vhich the populace had thrown up behind
the original lines of defence.
If Napoleon had chosen to send into the fight the rest of Victor's
corps, and had pushed forward the whole of his artillery to the
edge of the captured heights, \dth orders to shell the city, there
can be little doubt that Madrid might ha,'c been stonned ere
nightfall. Its brolill streets did not give the facilities of defence
that Saragossa had possessed, and the Emperor had at his disposal
not n weak and heterogeneous army, such as Vcnlier had eom·
manded, but more than 40,000 veteran troops. His artillery, too,
had 011 the lletiro a vantage-ground such as did not exist outside
the lu-agonese capital. Nevel'theless the Emperor did not press
the attack, nud oncc morc sent in a dcmand for the surrender of the
place, at about eleven in the morning of December 3.
The popu1ncc of Madrid did not yet recognize its own forlorn
state, and was keeping up a vigorous fusillade at the gates and
behind the barricades. It had suflered severe loss from the French
artillery, owing to the unscientific construction of the defences, but
was not yet ready to yield. But the Junta wus in a very different
frame of mind: the military men thoroughly understood the
situation, and were expecting to sce a hWldrcd guns open from
the crest of the Retiro within the next few minutes. Their civilian
colleagues, the magistrates, and local notables were looking for-
ward with no enviable feelings to the conflagration and "the general
sack that seemed to be at haud. In short the idea of rh'alling
"08] THE SURRENDER OF MAnRID 469
Saragossa was far from their thoughts. When Napoleon's letter.
offering' pardon to the city of Madrid, protection and security for
the peaceful inhabitants, respect for the churches and the clergy,
oblivion for the past,' was delivered to the Junta, the majority
decided to treat with him. They sent out as negotiators General
MorIa, representing the military element, and Don Bernardo lriarte I,
on behalf of the civil authorities. Napoleon treated these delegates
to onc of those scencs of simulated rage which he was such an adept
at producing-his harangue was quite in the style of the famous
allocutiOllS to Lord Wbitworth and to Metternich. It was neces-
sary, he thought, to terrify the delegates. Accordingly he let loose
OIl MorIa II storm of largely irrelevant abuse, stringing together
accusations concerning the bombardment of the French fleet at
Cadh·., the violation of the Convention of Baylen, the escape of
La. Romana's troops from the Baltic, and (strangest of all!) the
misconduct of thc Spanish troops in Roussillon during thc war of
1793-5. He ended by declaring that unless the city had been
surrendered by si" o'clock 011 Ule following morning, every man
taken in arms should be put to the sword.
MorIa wns a vC!'y timid ffiall ll, moreover he wllS'already meditat-
ing submission to King J oseph: he returned to the Junta in a state
of absolute collapse, and gave such a highly coloured account of
the Emperor's wrath, and of the number of thc l"rcnch army, that
thcre Wlls no further talk of resistance. The main difficulty was
to stop the promiscuous firing which was still going on at the
outposts, and to induce the more exasperated section of the mob
to quit the city or to lay down their arms. Many 01 them took
the fonner altel1lntive: the Marquis of Castclar, resolved to avoid
captivity, got together his handful of regular troops, and fled in
haste by the road towards Estremadura: he was followed by some
thousnnds of peasants, and by a considerable number of persons
who thought themselves too much compromised to be able to
remain behind. Having got rid of the recalcitrants, the Junta
drew up a form of capitulation in eleven articles, and sent it out
to the French camp. Napoleon, anxious above all things to get
possession of the city as soon as possible, accepted it almost
without discussion, though it contained many clauses entirely in·
1 Not <another military officer,' as Napicr EayS.
I 'Hombre de coraZOD pusiUinime, aunque de fiera yafricaua figum,' sa.yf1
Torefio (i. 307).
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appropriate to such a document. As he did not intend to observe
UllY of the inconvenient stipulations, he did not care to waste
time in discussing them 1, 'MorIa and Fernando de Vera, governor
of the city, came back with the capitulation duly ratified by
Uerthier, and next morning the gates were opened, a division under
General Belliard marched in, and the Spaniards gave up their
artillery and laid down their muskets witbout further trouble.
After the spasmodic blU'St of energy which they ht~ displayed
during the last four days, the citizens showed a melancholy apathy
which surprised the conquerors. There was no riot or confusion,
nor were any isolated attempts at resistance made. Hence the
occupation of Madrid took place without any scenes of bloodshed
or pillage, the Emperor for his part keeping a vcry stern hand
upon the soldiery, and sending in as small a garrison as could
sl\fely be allotted to the task.
Madrid having fallen after no more than two days of resistance,
the two Spanish field-armies which were marching to its aid were
far too late to be of any use. The army of the Centre under
La Pena had reuchcd. Guadalajara at nightfnll on December!!:
there it was met by the 'Duke of Infantado, who had come out
from Madrid to hurry on the troops. At his solieit.ation the
wearied and disorgani7.ed host, "..ith Ney's corps pressing hard on
its beds, lDarched for Suu Torcaz and Arganda, thus placing
itself in a most dangerous position between the Emperor and the
corps that wos in pUl'Suit. Fortullately La Pefia got early news
of the capitulation, and swerving oouthward from Arganda, made
for the pusSUb"C of the Ta.:,nus at Aranjuez. But Bonaparte had
sent ont part of Victor's corps to seize that place, and when the
anny of the Centre drew near, it found Frencb troops in possession
[December 6]. With Ney behind, Victor in fi'ont, and Bessieres'
cavalry ranging all over thc plain of New Castile, the Spaniards
were in grave danger. Dut they escaped by way of Estremera,
crossed the ferries on the Upper Tagus, and finally rallied-in a
. I The first clause of the Capitulation was to the effect that IlO religion leave
tIle Catholic AllOStolic Roman faitll shonld be tolerated! 'nH~ secoud pro-
vided that all government officials should be continued in the teuure of their
offices. Clearly such articles wete absurd in a military capitulation, and the
second was impossible to execute, as tl16 conqueror must 1lecess.1.rily place in
office sucll!MltsOns as 110 could trllllt. But the IImu0!3ty article!! (Nos. 4 nud 11)
could have beeu observed, aud were not.
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most miserable and disorgani..ed condition-at Cuenctt. The
artillery, unable to leave the high-road, had been sent off three
days before, from Guadalajara. towards the kingdom of Murcia,
almost without an escort: by a piece of extraordinary luck it
escaped without SCdllg nn enemy.
The doings of the disorganized divisions of San Juan and
Heredia, which had marched from Sego"jli on December Q, were much
more discreditable. Late on the third they reached the Escurial,
some thirty miles from Madrid, and were met by fugitives from
the capital. who reported that the Retiro had been stormed, and that
the JWJta of Defence wn.s debating about a surrender. The two
commanders were doubting whether they ought not to turn back,
when their troops broke out into mutiny, insisting that the march
on l\fadrid must be continued. After a scene of great disorder
the generals gave in, and l'CSumcd their advance on the morning
of the fourth, just at the moment when MorIa was opening the
gates to Napoleon. They had only gone a few miles when certain'
news of the capitulation was received. There followed a disgraceful
scene; the cry of treason rnn down the ranks: some battalions
disbanded themselves, others attacked their o"m officers, and the
whole lllass dissolved and went off in panic to Talo.vern, leaving its
artillery abandoned by the wayside. They had not even seen
fl. French vedette, or fired fl. single shot, yet they fled in utter
rout for sixty miles, and only halted when they could run DO
further. Seven or eight thousand men out of the two armies were
!,'Ot together at Talavcrn, all the sixth; but when, next morning,
San Juan attempted to take up the command again, they raised
the idiotic cry that he wished to lead them forward into the midst
of Napoleon's armies in order to force them to surrender! The
unfortunate general W/lS hunted down, shot as he was trying to
escape from a window, and hung from a large elm-tree just out-
side the town. 'l11is was the most disgraceful scene of the whole
campaign in 1808. It was not for some days later that the rem-
nants of this miserable nrmy were reduced to some shadow of
discipline, and consented to march under the command of new
generals.
It is clear that even if Madrid had held out for a day or two
more, by dint of desperate street-fighting, it would have got no
effective aid from the armies in the field. We cannot therefore
88.)" that the Junta of' Defence did much harm by its tame sut'-
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render. From the military point of view Madrid was indefensible:
on the other hand it was eminently desirable. from the political
point of ....iew, that Napoleon should not enter the place unopposed,
to 'Ix! received, as at Vicuna or Berlin, by obsequious deputations
mouthing compliments, and bearing the keys of the city on silver
sal....ers. It was far better, in the long rWl, for Spain and for
Europe that he should be received with cannon-balls, and forced
to fight his way ill. This simple fact madc all his fit:tions to tbe
effect that he was only opposed by the rabble, the monks, and the
8.o"'Cnts of England appear absurd. He could not, after this, pre-
tend to introduce his brotJler Joseph as a legitimate sovereign
quietly returning to his loy~ capital. So much was secured by
the two days' resistance of Madrid; on the other hand, when once
the French were inside the city, and further resistance would have
ended !!,crcly in gencm! pillage and conflagmtion, it would have
required more than Spartan resolution for the Junta to go on
fighting. If Madrid had been bumt like Moscow, thc moral etrL'Ct
on Spain and on Europe would, no doubt., have been enormous.'
But the heterogeneous council of war, composed of dispirited officers
and local notables trembling for theil' homes, could hardly be
expected to see this. Thcy yielded, considering that they liRd
already done enough by way of protest-and even with Saragossa
in oUI mind we should be loth to say that their capitulation was
culpable. The one shameful thing Ilbout the surrender \l'a.." that
within a few days both MorIa, the military beruJ of the defellL'e,
and several of the chief civil officials, swore allegiance to Joseph
Bonaparte, and took service under him. Such treason on the part
of prominent men did more to encourage the invader and to dis-
hearten Spain and her allies t1Ian thc loss of half a d07£n battles.
For, when once desertion begins, no one knows where it will stop,
and every man distrusts his neighbour as a possible traitor.
Madrid, as we have already said, was not a hue national capital,
nor wus ibi loss a fatal blow; but that its chief defenders should
shamelessly throw over the cause of their country, and join the
enemy, waS a symptom of the most dire and dcadly sort. But,
fortunatcly, the fate of the country was not in the hands of its
corrupt bureaucracy, but in those of its much-ellduring people.
SECTION VIn
THE CAMPAIGN OF SIR JOHN ~100RE
CHAPTER I
NAPOLEON AT MADRID
FROM December 4 to December 22 the Emperor remained fixed
in the neighbourhood of Madrid. He did not settle down in the
royal. palace, and it would seem that he macJe no morc than onc or
two hurried visits of inspection to the city!, He established him·
self outside the gates, at Chamartin, a desolate and uncomfortable
country house of the Duke of Infantado, and devoted himself to
incessant desk-work 2. It was here that he drew up his projects
for the reorgani7Ation of the kingdom of Spain, and at the same
time set himself to the task of eonstrueting his plans of campaign
against those parts of the Peninsula which still remained unsubdued.
In seventeen days, unintcn'upted by the cares of travel, Donaparte
could get through an enonnous amount of business. His woms
and deeds at this period are well worth ~tudying, for the light that
they throw alike on his own character and on his conceptions of
the state and the nc«l.s of Spain.
His first act was to annul the capitulation whieh he had granted
to the inhabitants of Madrid. Having served its purpose in
inducing the Junta to yield, it was promptly violated. 'The
Spaniards have failed to carry it out,' he wTote, 'and I consider
1 Not, ail tllO Spallianls whispered, \.N..~ause Iu} feared t.he st.ilet.to of solue
fauat.ical monk, but because he wished to leave the place clear for his brother
Joseph. For the curious story of his 'isit to the royal palace, and long study
ofU,c portrait of Pllilip 11, see 'forefio, i. 309.
J .For: the discomforts of Chamartin see the Mbnuires SUT la fleoo/ut/QII
d'Lpagne of De Pradt. Though belonging to oue of tllo richest llobles of
Spain, it liad not a single fireplace, and tIle imperial courtiers ami niJes-de-
camp had to shiver in the ante-rooms over misernble I1raul'08.
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the whole thing void 1.' Looking at the preposterous clauses
which he had allowed to be inserted in the document, there can
be no doubt that this WI\S his intention at the very moment whell
he ratified it. It was a. small thing that he should break en~O'(l.
ments, such as those in which he had promised not to quarter
troops in the monasteries (Article 7), or to maintain all e..xisting
officials in their places (Article ~). But having guaranteed security
for their life and property, freedom from arrest, and free exit at
their plellEmrc, to such persons as chose to remain behind in the
city, it was shameless to commence his procccd.ings with n proscrip-
tion and a long series of arrests. The list of persons declared
traitors and condemned to loss of life and goods was not very
long: only ten persons were named, and seven of these were absent
from Madrid. But the three others, the Prince of Castelfranco,
the Marquis of Santa Crnz, and the Count of Altamira, were seized
and dispatched into France, seutenced to imprisonment for life.
'l'he arrestJ; were a much more serious matter. In flagrant con-
travention of the terms of surrender, Bonaparte put under lock
and key all the members of the Council of the Inquisition on
whom he <.'ould lay hands, ~ective of what their conduct had
been during the reign of the Supreme Junta. He also declared
all thc supcrior officers of the army resident in Madrid, even
retired veterans, to be prisoners of war, and liable to answer with
their necks for the sufety of the captives of Dupont's COlpS.
Among them was discovered an old French emigre, the :Marquis
de Saint·Simon, who had cntcred the service of Charles IV as far
back as 1793, and bad takcn part in the last campaign. The
Emperor refused to consider him as a Spaniard, declared that he
was one of his own subjects, had him trit...J by court-martial, and
condemned him to death. All this was to lead up to one of
those odious comedics of mngnlUlimity which Bonaparte sometimes
practised for the benefit of the editor of the .ilfoniteur. Saint·
Simon's daughter WlIS admitted to the imperial presencc to beg
for her father's life, and the master of the world deigned. to corn·
I • La C3llitulation, n'ayant pas ete teoue par les habitants de Madrid, est
nulle; Napoleon to Belliard, Dec. (, (Nap. OorrlMp., 14,o:w). He soolds
Belliaru for havillg allowed the uocument to be Ilrilltcd IIUU VlllCllrued 011 the
walls. Ever)' copy was to be torn down at ol,lce. In what respect the
Spauiards had broken tlle treaty he does 1I0t state. He may have referred to
the CVllSion of Castelar's troops.
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mute the punishment of the 'traitor' to imprisonment for life
in the mOUlltain~fortl'css of Joux 1, This WtlS a repetition of the
Hatzfeldt affairs at Berlin, and Saint~Simoll was treated even worse
than the unfortunate Prussian nobleman of 1806. Truly the
tendcr mercies of the wicked are cnlel!
Among other persons who were arrested were Don Arias Mon,
president of the Council of Castile, the Duke of Sotomayor, and
about thirty other notables: sOlIle were ultimately sent away to
France, others allowed to go free after swearing allegiance to
Joseph Bonaparte.
All these measures were designed to strike terror into the hearts
of the Spaninrds. But at the same time the Emperor issued a
series of decrees-in his own name and not in that of his brother,
the titular king-which were intended to conciliate them by
bestowing upon them certain tangible benefits. He knew that
there existed the nucleus of a Liberal party in Spain, and hoped
to draw it O\'er to his aide by introducing (.'ertain much-needed
reforms in the administration of the country. ·With this object
he removed the tiresome inter-provincial octroi duties, abolislu.:d
all feudal dues and all rights of private jurisdiction, declared that
nll monopolies should be annulled, and forbade all assignments
of public revenues to individuals. Such measures would have
seemed excellent to many good Spaniards, if they had been intro-
duced by a legitimate ruler: but coming from the hand of a foreign
conqneror they were without effect. Moreover there was hardly
a square mile of Spanish territory, outside Madrid and the other
towns held by the :French, where Napoleon's writs could mn.
Every village which was unoccupk>d was passively or actively dis-
obedient. The reforms, tllerefore, were but on paper. Anothel'
SCl·jes of dcx:rces, which appeared at the same time, were in them-
selves quite as justifiable as those which were conCeliled with
administrative chan,gcs, but were certain to offend nine-tenths of
the Spanish nation. They dealt with the Chureh and its ministers.
The most important was onc which declared (with perfect truth)
that there were far too many monasteries and nunneries in Spain, and
that it was necessary to cut them down to onc-third of their existing
number. The names of those which were destined to survive were
published: to them t.he inmates of the remaining instituliollS were
1 Cf. Nap. Oorrelfp., 14,708, with De I'rndt (p. 205-6) anu ArtccllC (iii. 432).
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to be trnnsfelTCd, as vacancies arose. The suppressed convents
were to become the property of the state. Part of their revenues
was to be devoted to raising the salaries of the sC(,war clergy,
so that every" parish priest should have an income of 2,400 ream
(about £25). Monks or nuns who might choose to leavc thc
monastic life were to be granted a small pension l • At the same
time the Inquisition W1!S abolished •as dangerous to the crown
and to eivil authority,' and all its property confiscated. In l\fadrid
thCl'e was sciZL'<l2,453,97~ reals in hard CllSh~about £25,000; the
smallness of the amount much surprised the French, who had
vague ideas oonc.:eming the fabulous wealth. of the institution 2.
The only rcsults of these mCf\Sures were that every Spaniard
was confirmed in his belief that Napoleon was a concealed atheist
and an in'CConcilable enemy of all religion. Could anything else be
expected of one who (in spite of his C01l1:ardata and Te Deuma) was
after ull a child of the Revolutioll? The man who bud persecuted
the Pope in .January, 1808, would naturally persecute the monks of
Spain in December. M to the Inquisition, its fate inspired nO re-
joicing; it had been effete for many years: there was not a prisoner
in any of' its dungeons. Indeed it had. enjoyed a feeble popularity
of late, for having refused to lend itself as a tool to GOOoy. The
only l'CSlut of Napoleon's decree for its abolition was that it
acquired (grotesque as the idea may seem) considerable credit in
the eyes of the mnjority of the Spanish people, as one of the.
usurper's victims. Never was work more wasted than that which
the Emperor spent Oil his reforms of December, 1808. They
actually tended to make old abuses popular with the masses, merely
because he had attempted to remove them. As to the possibility
of conciliating the comparatively small body of Liberals, he was
equally in error: they agreed with the views of .JoveUanos; re-
forms were necessary, but thcy must COIllC from within, and not
be imposed by force from without. They were Spaniards first
and reformers afterwards. 'l1lC only rccruits whom Bonaparte suc·
ceeded in enrolling for his brother's court were the purely selfish
burcauCl·ats who would uct:ept any governmel1t~who would servc
Godoy, Ferdinand, Joseph, a red republic, or the Sultan of 'Turkey
I For details see the decree in Nap. C<Jrrt8p., 14,628, The last--named
clause curiously resembles a provision of Henry VIU of England, at the
Di!l6Olution of 1636.
t Cf. Nap. OorrefJp., 14,.563, and De Pradt, jUmoirn, &c., p. 2().5.
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with equal equanimity, so long as they could ke.:p their places or
gain better ones.
The Emperor had a curious belief in the power of Oilths and
phrases over other men, though he was entirely free himself from
any feebleness of the kind. He took considerable pains to get
up CL semblance of national acceptance of his brother's authority,
now that his second reign was about to begin. Joseph had ap-
pea.re<1 at Chamartin on December 2: I: bllt he was not allowed ~to
re-enter Madrid for mallY days. The Emperor told him to stay
outside, at the royal palace of the Pardo, till things were ready
for his reception. This was 1I0t at all to the mind of the King,
who took his position seriously, and was deeply wounded at being
ordered about in such an arbitrary fashion. He sent in it formal
protest llorrainst the publication of t~e decrees of December 4; his
own name, he complained, not that of his brother, ought to have
appeared at the bottom of all these projects of reform. He had
never coveted any crown, and least of all that of Spain: but
having once accepted the position he could not consent to be rele-
gated into ll. corner, while all the nets of sovereignty were being
exercised by his brother. He was r<>..ady to resign his crown into
the hands from which he had received it; but if he was not allowed
to abdicate, he must be allowed to reign in the true sense of the
word. It made him blush with sha.me before his subjects 2 when
he saw them invited to obey laws which he had never seen, much
less sanctioned. Napoleon refused to accept this abdication; he
looked at matters from an entirely difierent point of view. He
was master of Spain, as he considered, not merely by the cession
made at BaYOIlUe, but by the new title of conquest. He intended
to rertOl'e Joseph to the throne, but till he had done so he saw no
reason why he should not exercise all the rights of sovereignty
at Madrid. If, in a moment of pique, he said that his brother
might exchange the crown of Spain for that of Italy, or for the
position of lieutenant of the Emperor in France during his own
numerous absences, there is clear evidence that these were empty
words. His dispatches show IlOt the lenst sign of any project for
, Napier (L 273) makes a curious blunder in saying that he remained at
Burgos.
~ This odd phrase is nsed by Joseph llimself in !Jis letter of Dec. 8, sent
from tl.e Pardo, after lie had received the decrees issued on Dec. 4 by his
brother.
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the future of Spain other than the restoration of Joscph; and
while the latter was at the Pardo he was continually receiving
notes concerning the reorganization of the Spanish army and
finances, which presuppose his confirmation on the throne within
the next few days 1.
It would seem that Napoleon's real object in keeping his brother
off the scene, and acting as if he intended to annex Spain to France
as a vas.w province, wa.~ merely to frighten the inhabitants of
Madrid into a proper frame of mind. If they remained recalci-
trant, and refused to come befOl'e him with petitions for pardon,
they were to be threatened with a purely French military govem·
ment. If they bowed the knee, they should have back King
Joseph and the mockery of liberal and constitutional monarchy
which he represented. So much we gather from the Emperor's
celebrated proclamation of December 7, and his allocution to the
Col'l'cgidor and magistrates of Madrid two da.fS later.. Both of
these addresses are in the true Napoleonesque vein. In the first
we read that if the people of Spain prefer' the poisons which the
English have ministered to them' to the wholesome regime intro-
duced from France, they shall be treated lIS a conquered province,
and Joseph shall be removed to another throne. 'I will place the
crown of Spain on my own brow, and I will make it respected by
evil-doers, for God has given me the strength and the force of
will necessary to surmount all obstacles.' In the second, which
is "Titten in a mood of less rigour, the inhabitants of Madrid
are told that nothing could be easier than to cut up Spain into
provinces, each governed by a separate viceroy. But if the clergy,
nobles, merchants, and magistrates of the capital will swear a
solemn oath upon the Blessed Sacrament to be true and loyal for
the future to King Joseph, he shall be restored to them and the
Emperor will make over to him all his rights of conquest. We
I TIlcrc is n complete ~'ale1Ul of letter8 and' dispatdlea from Dec. 4 to
Dee. 22, ill which the retentioll of Joseph as king is presupposed: (1) 14,531
[Dec. 5J advises him to raise a Spanish anny; (2) 14,537 [Dec. 7J advises the
Spaniards to <make tllcir King certain of t1lCir love and confidcllce'; (3)
14,.543 [DLOC. l)J, thc 1l11ocution to the Corregidor, bids the Madrilefios swear
fidelity on the Sacrament to their King; (4) 14,S58 [Dec. 13] speaks of the
knitting up agaiu of tlle bonds which attach Joseph's subjects to tlleir
sovereign; (S) 14,503 [Dec. 18J gives tlle Killg advice as to the roorgani1.ation
of his finances. None of them could have been written if there had been an}'
real intention of ousting Joseph from the throne.
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canDot stop to linger over the other details of these addresses:
one of the most astounding statements in them is that the qutU'rel
between King Charles and King Ferdinand had been hatche<;l by
the English ministry 1, and that the Duke of Infanmdo, acting
as their tool, was plotting to make Spain England's vassal, 'all
insensate project which would have made blood run in tOl1Xmts'!
But this mattered little, as within a few weeks every English
soldier would have been cast out of the Peninsula, and Lisbon
no less than Saragossa, Valencia, and Seville would be flying the
French flag 2.
In accordance with the Emperor's command, the notables of
Madrid, civil and ecclesiastical, were compelled to go through the
ceremony of swearing allegiance to King Joseph on the Holy
Sacrament, which was exposed for several days in every chm"Ch
for this purpose. Apparently a very large number of persons
were induced, by terror or despair, to give in their formal sub-
mission to the intrusive King. Three pages of the Madrid Gazette
for Deccmber 15 arc filled with the llames of the deputies of the
ten quarters and sixty-four barrios of the city, who joined in the
fonoal petition for the restoration to them of 'that sovcreign
who unites so much kindncss of heart with such an interest in the
welfare of his su~jecls, and whose presencc will be their joy.'
Satisfied with this declaration, and pretending to take it as the
expression of the wishes of every Spaniard who was not thc paid
agent of England or the slave of the Inquisition, the Emperor
was graciously pleased to rooore Joseph to all his right<>. Great
preparations were made for his solemn entry, which was celebrated
with considerable sta~ in the month of January.
But his plans for the reorhranizatioll of Spain only formed El. part
of the Emperor's work at Chamartin. He 'was also busied in the
rcconccntrotioll of his armies, for the purpose of overrunning those
parts of the Peninsula which still remained unconquered. On the
vcry morrow of the fall of Madrid he had pushed out detachment<>
, NI'}!, (JQ7'rl!JI7/., 14,.547, p. lOfl.
~ Napillr (i. 273) prints Bonaparte's allocution in full, with the astonishing
comment that it I was an exposition of the principles upon which Spain was to
be governed, and it forces reflection upon tIlll passionate violence with which
men resist positive good, to seek danger, misery, and death rather than
resign tlleir prejudices.' Is tlle desire for national independence a preju-
dice? And should it be easily resigned for 'positivc good,' e. g. ndmillistrati,·c
reform?
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in all directions, to cover all the approaches to the capital, and to
hunt down any remnants of the Spanish armies which might still
be within reach I. He WllS particularly hopeful thathe might catch
the army of the Centre, which, ,dth Ney and Maurice Mathieu at
its heels, wus coming in from the direction ofSiguenza and Calatayud.
To intercept it the fusiliers of the Guard marched for Alcal~ one of
Victor's divisions for Guadalajarn, and another for Aranjucz; while
Bessieres with the Guard ca,·alry. and one of Latour-Maubourg's
brigades of dl't\.uoons, swept all the country arolUld the Tajuna and
the Tagus. But, as: we have already seen, LaPel1a's farnishing men
ultimately got away in the direction of CuCIlCR. 'Vhen it was
certain that they had escaped from the net, Napoleon rearranged
his forccs 011 the eastern side of :Madrid. Bcssicres, with Latour-
Maubourg's whole division of dragoons 2, occupied cantonment;;
facing at onec towards Cuenca and towards La Mancba: the
Marshal's head quarters, on December 11, wem at Tarancon. Of
Victor's infantry, one division (Ruffill) marched On Toledo, which
opened its gates v.'ithout resistance; another, that of VilIatte, re-
mained at Aranjuez v.'ith an advanced guard at Ocaiia, a few miles
further south. The third division of the 1st Corps, that of Lapisse,
remained at Madrid. Ney's troops wc.rc also at hand ill this
quarter: when La Pena had finally escaped from him, he was told
to leave tile division of Dessolles at Gulldalajara and Siguenza.
These forces were destined to keep open the communications between
Madrid and Aragon, where the siege of Saragossa was just about
to begin. 'With his other two divisions, those of Marchand and
Mauricc Mathieu 3, Ncy Wa3 directed to march into Madrid: be
was to form part of the mass of troops which the Emperor was
l.'ollecting, in ODd about the capital, for new ol'fensivc operations.
1.'01' this same purpose the 4th Corps, that of Lefebvre, was brought
up from Old Castile; the l\JIarsho.l with his two leading divisions,
those of Sebastiani and Leval, arrived in Madrid on December 9:
his third division, that of Valence, composed of Poles, was some
way to the rear, having only reached Burgos on December 1. But
I Nap. OI'JrI"Up., 14,525.
t J Call1lot SIICo"lk for ccrlaill as to the moment at which DigetJll'9 brigado of
dragoons, which had been lent to Lanoes for the Tudela campaign, rejoined
Latour-Maubourg. But probably it came across Ivith Ney, as it was with its
llivisioll lIy Dec. 28 (,Jollnlan's Mbnoi'rCS, p. 138).
• Tbe latter had taken over Lagrnnge's division after Tudela.
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by Ule thirteenth the whole corps was concentrated a.t Madrid.
A few dap later the divisions of Sebastialli and Valence were
pushed on to Tal/wern, as if to foml the advanced guard of an
expedition against Estremadura, while that of Leyal remained in
Madrid 1. 'l'alo.vero had becn al.'eupied, before the Duke ofDnntzig's
arrival, by the cavalry of Lasalle a.nd Milhaud, who drove out of
it without difficulty Um dcmoralized troops that had murdered
San Juan. TIlis mob, now under the orders of Ga.lluzzo, the
Captain-General of Estrcmndw'u, fled behind the Togus and htuTi-
caded the bridges of Arzobispo and Almaraz, to cover its front.
It will thus be seen that the troops of Victor, Lefcbvre, and
Dessolles, with the cavah)' of Latour-Maubourg, Lasalle, and
Milllaud thrown out in front ot' them, formed a semicircle pro-
tecting Madrid to the east, the south, and the south-west. Ou the
north-west, in the direction of the Gundarramn and the roods
towa.rth the kingdom of Leon, the circle was completed by a
brigade of LahouSStl)'e's diyision of dragoons, who lay in and
about Avila 2. In the centre, available for a blow in an)' direction,
were the whole of the Imperial Guard (horse and foot), Ne)"s corps,
Lapisse's division of Victor's corps, and Leval's division of Lcfcbvrc's
corps, besides King Joseph's Guards-a toW of at least 40,000 men.
U ouly ncroed the word to be given, and these troops (after dt..-a.uct-
ing a. garrison for Madrid) could march forward, either to join
Lcfebvrc for a blow at Lisbon, or Victor for a blow at Seville.
Meanwhile there were still reinforcements coming up from the
real'; the belated corps of Mortier, the lost great instalment of the
army of Germany, had at last reached Vittoria, accompanied by
the division of dragoons of Lorges. The Marshal was directed to
take his corps to Sarllorrossa, in order to assist Lannes and Moncey
in the siege of that city; but the dragoons were sent to Durgos on
the road to Madrid. Moreover Junot's corps, after having been
refitted and reorganized since its rcturn fmm Portugal, was also
Ilvllilable. Its leading division, that of Dclabordc, had Cl'ossed thc
Bidassoa on December 4, and had 110W reached llurgos. The other
two divisions, those of Loiwn amI Hcude1et (who had replaced
Travot at the head of the Srd Division) wcre not far behind. They
I This division was incomplete, llaving left behind in lliscar two Dutch
aud oue Genuao battaliOllS.
~ TIle other brigade was astray near Toledo, contrary to tIle Emperor's
intention; XUl" COI'rt!$p., 14,6W, orders it to march 011 Talavera.
O:UA~. I 1 i
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could all be brought up to l\..£adrid by the first day of January.
The last division of reserve cavalry, Millet's foul' regiments of
dragoons, was due a little later, and had not yet crossed the
frontier.
That the Emperor believed that there was no serious danger to
be apprehended from the side of Lean and Old Castile, is shown
by the fact that he allotted to these regions only the single corps
of Soult. Nor had the Duke of Dalmatia e"'en the whole of his
troops in hand, for the dh'ision of Bonnet was immobilized in
Santander, and only those of Merle and Mermet were near his
hend quarters at CnniOll. The cavalry that propcl'ly belonged to
his corps were detached, under Lasalle, in New Castile. Instead of
them he had been assigned the four regiments forming the division
of :Franceschi I, He was promised the aid of M.iIlet's dragoons
when they should arrive, but this would not·be for some three
weeks at the least. Nevertheless, with the 15,000 foot and 1,800
or ~,OOO light cavalry at his disposal, Soult was told that he
commanded everything from the Douro to the Bay of Biscay, find
that he might advance at once into Loon, as there was nothing ill
his way that could withstand him 2. As far as the Emperor knew,
the only hostile force in this direction was the miserable wreck of
Blake's anny, which had been rallied by La Romana on the Esla.
In making this supposition he was gravely mistaken, and if Soult
had obeyed his orders without delay, and advanced westward from
Carrion, he would have found himself in serious trouble; for, as we
shall presently see, the English fmm Salamanca were in full nmrch
against him at the moment when the Emperor dispatched these
instmctions. It was in the valley of the Douro, and not (as Bona-
parte intended) in that of the Tagus that the next developments
of the winter campaign of 1808 were to take place,
It remains only to speak of the north-east. The Emperor was
determined that Snragossa should pay dearly for the renown that
13th Drdgoons, 22nd Chas;;eul"lJ, 1st Supplementary regiment ofChasseurs,
and IIauoI'erian Chasseurs.
! Cf. Nllp. CQ,.n>rp., 14,,581 (of Dec. 10, J808, hut wrongly datoo Dec. 17
ill the collection), the rough draft of the dispatch to be sent to Soult, Witll
t1le full doeument, which was fortunatel}" captured on its IV8}" to CIlrrioll J :md
fell into the hands of Sir John Moore. It is printed in the original French
ill James 1\I00re's account of his brotller's campaign (London, 1809). 'J1le
tloouments tall}" a.ec:uratcl}", hut Rertllicr lill8 expanded, as Ims llis wOllt,
l'''l'oloon's short phrast.'S.
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it had won during its first siege. He directed against it not only.
Moncey's force, the troops which had won Tudela, but the whole
of Morticr's 5th Corps. One of its divisions was to take post at
Calatayud, relie,'ing ?I'lnsnicr\ eight battalions at that point, and
to keep open (with the uid of Deswlles) the road from Saragossa to
Madrid: but the rcst would be Iwailable to aid in the siege. .More
than 40,000 men -irere to be tumed against Palafox and the stub-
hom Aragonese. 'Vith Catalonia we need not deal in this pla<:e:
the operations in the principality had little or no connexion with
those in the l"Cst of Spain. St. Cyr and Dllhesme, with thc 7th
Corps, had to wOl·k out theil' own salmtion. They wcre not to
expect help from the Emperor, nor 011 the other hand were they
expected to assist him for the present, though it was hoped thtlt
some day they might invade Ara",""01l from the sidc of Lerida.
Looking ut the 'disposition of the French troops on Dt'Cember
15-20, we can see that the Emperor had it in his power to push
the central mass at Madrid, supported by the oncoming reserves
under Junot and Lorgcs, either to support Lefeb\Te on the road to
Lisbon, or Victor on thc wad to Seville. As a matter of fact there
can be no doubt that the former was his intention. He was fully
under the impression that the English army wus at this momcnt
executing a hasty retreat upon Portugal, and he had announced that
his next move was to hurl them into the sea.. 'Tout porte it pellscr
que les Anglais sont en plcille lUarche retrograde,' he wrote to Soult
on December 10. On December 12 he i;;.<;ued in his Bullet-in the
statement that the' English are in full flight towards Lisbon) and
if they do not make good speed the French army ma.y enter that
capital before them 1.' If anything was wanted to confirm the
Emperor ill his idea that the English were not likely to be heard
of in the north, it was the capture by Lasallc's cavalry of eight
stragglers belonging to the King's German Legion near Talavera.
'lVhcn wc ca.tch Hanovcrialls thc English cannot be fal' oft~' he
obsCl'n.-d 2, and made all his arrangements on the hypothesis that
I Scc the statcmcnt in the Madrid Oa~ette for Dcc. 12 (p. 1576). It is !Jot
III tbe Oo,.mptJndall~ de Nap()leon, and contains ill\"aluable details as to the
]llacing oftlle Frencll anny 011 tllat dar.
2 'Le giSucrnl L"ISa11c a Ilris llUit Hailo\'TiclJ~ .. ]'uisqu'il a prig des
Hanovriens, cela sent la proximitc des Anglais' (Nap. (Jqyrtsp., ]4,5.'H,
Dec. 12). 11lcse must Ilave been stragglers from Hope's division, which Ilad
Il:lSSCU Talayera at least a fortlligltt ht'forc. 'ne Germans with it were tllC
3rd Light Dragoons, K.G.L.
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Moore would be met in the mlley of the Tngus, and not in that of
the Douro. In so doing he was breaking one of his own precepts,
that censuring generals' qui se font des tableaux" concerning their
enemy's position and intentions, before they have sufficient data
upon which to form a sound conclusion. All that he really knew
about Moore and his army was that they had reached Salamanca
in the middle of November, nnd had been joined towards the cnd
of the month by Hope's column that marched-as we shall pl'CSently
relate-via Bndajoz and the Escurial. Of the existence of this Inst
division we have clear proof that Bonaparte was aware, for he
illSClted a silly taunt in the Bulletin of December 5 to the effect
that 'the conduct of the British had been dishonourable. Six
thousand of them were at the Escurial on November 20: the
Spaniards hoped that they would aid in the defence of the capital
of their allies. But they did not know the English: as soon as the
latter heard that the Emperor was at the Somosierm they beat
tJ, retreat, joined the division at SnlamancfI, andl"etirt,,'d towurds the
sea-coast.' There is also no doubt that the Emperor had received
intelligence of a more or less definite sort concerning the landing
of Baird's division at Corunna. It is vaguely alluded to in the
lOth Bulletin, and cleaJ:1y spoken of in the Madrid GazeUe of
December 17 J. But though aware of the existence of all the three
frnctions of the Britilill army, Bonaparte could drllw no other
deductiQn from the f&Lis at his disposal than that the whole of
them would promptly relrcat to Portugal, whcn the passage of the
Somosierra and the fall of Madrid became known to their com~
mander-in-chicf. Lisbon, he thought, must be their base of
operations, and on it they must retire: he had forgotten that one
of the advantages of scn-powel' is that the combatant who possesses
it can transfer his base to any port that he may choose. So f8.l'
from being tied to Lisbon was Moore, that he at one moment
contemplated making Cadiz his base, and finally moved it to
Carunna.
I Napoleon seems to Imvc got the knoll'ledge of llaird's arrival from the
London newspllllCTS. All English brigantine, called the Ferret, rail iuto
Sauta.llder, under the impression tlmt it was still in Spanish hands. all
hoard were many journals, with details about the Cilltrn. Court of Inquiry,
:111.1 aoout the reiurorcemellts ror SIHlin. Lollg extracts rrom tltem were
reprinted in the Madrid Gazette for the second half of December. 11le
d.:lnger of the press already existed!
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With preconceived ideas of this sort in his head, the Emperor
was preparing to push on his main body in support of the advanced
troops under Lcfcbvrc and Lasnllc on the road to Estremadnrtl.
and Portugal. Victor meanwhile was to guard against the unlikely
chance of any move being made 011 Madrid by the shattered' Army
of the Centre' from Cucnea, or by llew Andalusillll levies. Already
I.a.wle's horsemen were pushing Oil to 'l'ruxillo and Plasencia,
almost to the gates of Badajoz and to the Portuguese frontier,
when unexpected news arrived, and the whole plan of campaign
was upset.
Instead of retiring on Lisbon, Sir John Moore had pushed for-
wcuu into the plains of Old Castile, and was advancing by forced
marches to attack the iwlated corps of Marshal Soult. :Bonaparte
was keenly alive, now as always, to the danger of a defeat in the
valley of the Douro. Moreover the sight of a British army in
the field, and within striking distallce, acted on him as the red rag
nets upon the bull. No toil 01' trouble would be too great that
ended in its destruction, and looking at his maps the Emperor
thought that he saw the way to sunound and annihilate Moore's
host. Throwing up without a moment's delay the whole plan for
'the invasion of Portugal, he marched for the passes of the Gnadal'·
rama with every man that was disposable at Madrid. His spil'its
were high, and the event seemed to him certain. He sent back to
his bl"Othcr Joscph the cOlIlllland to put in the Madrid newspapers
and circulate everywhere the news that 36,000 English hOOps were
surrounded and doomed to destruction 1. Meanwhile, with 50,000
men at his back, he was marching hard for Arevalo and Bena\"ente.
1 1 know 110 hotter way of f1isplaying the Napoleonesque method than tile
priutillg 0!'Posite each other of his dispatcllCS 14,620 and 14,62u, both
addressed to Joseph Bonaparte. For the benefit of the newspaperj the
English amlY was to be ol'erstated by 10,000 or 12,000 men!
14,620. 14,020,
!,'aites mcttre duus lu journaux et Leur force ,.ft/If: est de 20,000 ,I
repaudre partout que 36,000 AlIglais 21,000 infanterie, et de 4,000 it 0,000
sont eernes, Je Euis sur leurs der- de ca"alerie al'ec line quaralltaiue do
,.icres tandis que le marccll1l1 Sonlt I,ic\:cs de cunOll.
est de\'ant eu:t.
SECTION VIII: CHAPTER 11
MOOlU: AT SALAMANCA
IT will be remembered that 011 October 6, 1808, the command
of the "British forces in Portugal had passed into the hand.. of
Sir John :Moorc, to the entire satisfaction of'Vcllcsley and the
other officers who had seTYed under those slow and cautious generals
Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Buerard. The moment that
the news of Vimiero was received, and long before the details of
the Coll\'cntion of Cintrn {''Quld come to hand, the GontrmllClIl hat/.
detcnnined to send on the victorious British army into Spain, and
to assist it with heavy reinforcements from home. Dlllrymplc WM
even infonned that he might cross the frontier at once, if he chose,
without waiting for any detailed instructions from the'Val' Oflh:c1•
'Vellesley, as we have seen, thought that his chief should have
done so without delay, and observed that if 1u: had charge of aflidrs
the army would be at Madrid by October 1 2•
Yet when Moore took over the <''OlIulland, he found that little
or nothing had been done to carry out this design. The dela.y
was partly occasioned by the tardy evacuation of Portugal by
JUllot's troops: the last of them, as we have seen 3. did not leave
tile 'l'agus till the month of October had begun. But it was still
more due to the leisurely and feeble management of Dalrymple,
who would not march without detailed and denllite orders from
home. He might well have begun to moye his brigades eastward
I Castlereagh to Ualrymllle, Sellt. 2,1800: 'As drcUlllstallCCiI lm.y come
to your knowledge which might render tlle immediate employment of your
dis~1.b1e forces ill the north of Slmin of tlle utmost importallce to the
common cause, witl,out waitillg for order!! from hellce, llun to inform you
that you sllould not consider the present instructiollS as depriving you of
the latitude of discretion which )'Oll now possess, without waitiug for express
orders from hence.'
~ See [I. 274.
~ See p. 283, dealing with the gnrrison of Elms.
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long before the last small detachments of the French had dis-
appeared. But when on October 6 Dalrymple's successor looked
around him, he found that the wllolc army WM still concentrated
in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, save Hope's two brigades, and
these had been sent forward to the fronticr not so much for the
purpose of entering Spain, as for that of bringing moral force to
bear Oil General Galluzzo, and compclliug him to abandon his
ridiculous siege ofElvM. Two things had been especially neglected
by Dnlrymple-thc e..~ploration of the roads that lead frolD Por-
tugal into Spain, and the pressing 011 of the formation of a proper
divisional and regimental transport for the army. It is strnub,tC
to find that he had remembered the existence of both of these
needs: his dispatches speak of his intention to send officers both
towards Bauajo:l and into Beira, und he ru;serts that I the army
is in high order and fit to move when required I.' Yet his
successor had to state that as a matter of fllCt no hody of informn.
tion about the routes and resources of Portugal and Spain had
been·collected, and that the scheme for moving and feeding tile
army had not been drawn up. I W"hen I shall pass the frontier
of PorlllbTU1,' wrote Moore to Castlercagh, 'it is impossible for me
at this instant to say; it depends on a knowledge of the country
which I am still without, and on commissariat arrangemel\ts yet
unmade 2.' ,Ve may grant that Dalrymple had been somewhat
halldicnppro by the fnet that his army had been landed, in the
old haphazard British fashion, without any proper military train.
lVe may also concede that no one could have foreseen that the
Portuguese and Spanish governments would be unable to supply
any useful information concerning the main roads and the resources
of their own countries. But the whole month of September had
been at the disposal of the late commander-in-chief, and he, with
his quartcrmaster-general, Murray, must take the blame of having
failed to accomplish in it all that might havc bL~n done. 'Within
fL fortnight after the COIl\"ention of tintra had been signed, British
offit'Crs ought to have explored every road to the frontier, and to
have reported on their facilities. Yet on October 6 Moore could
not find anyone who could tell him whether the roads Lisbon-
Sabugal-Almcida, and Lisbon-Abrantes--Castello Braneo were
or wcre not practit'able for artillery! And this was in spite of the
I DlIlrymplc to ClIStlcrcllg11, &111. 27,
~ Moore to CasUereagh from Lisbon, Oct. I), 1808.
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fact that a British detachment had actually marched from Lisbon
to Almdda, in order to receive the surrender of the garrison of
that fortress. The fact would seem to be that DaJrymple had
placed his confidcm:e in the native IJovernmenls of the Peninsula.
He YainIy imagined that the Portuguese engineers could suppl>'
him with accurate details eOlwcrning the roads and rcsour<.'Cs of
Deira and the Alemtejo. He sent a ycry cnpable officer-Lord
William Bcntinck-lo Madrid, and entered into communication
with the Spanish government. From them he hoped that he
'might get some acCOWlt of the plan of campaign ill which his
mmy was to join. a list of the routes which it would be convenient
for him to use, and details as to the way in which he could collect
and carry provisions. As a matter of fact he could only obtain
a quantity of vague and generally useless suggestions, some of
which argued an astonishing ignorance of military affairs in those
who made them. If there had been a Spanish commander-in-chief,
Dalrymple might have extracted from him his views about the
campaign that must shortly begin. But the Junta had steadfastly
refused to unite the charge of their many armies in the hands of
·iL single general: they told Lord 'Villiam that he might make
inquiries from CastaIios: but the Andalusiall general could only
speak for himself. It was 110t he, but SI. council of war, that would
settle the plan of operations: he could only give Bentinek the
·conclusions that had been arrived at after the aborth-e meeting
,of generals that had taken place 011 September 6. In answer to
a string of questions administered to him by Dalrymple's emissary,
as to the routes that the British llrmy had better follow, and the
methods of supply that it had better adopt, he could only reply
that he was at present without good maps, and could not give
the necessary infonnation in detail, He could only refer Bentinck
to the newly formed Commissariat Board (Junta de J'fvercs), which
ought to be able to designate the best routes with reference to the
feeding of the ilrmy and the establishment of magazincs I, Of
course this hoard turned out to know e\'cn less than CastaJ10s
himself. Nothing whatever WllS done for the British army, with
the cxeeption that a certain Colonel Lopez was sent to its head
quarters to act as the representative of the Jllllia (le V(veres, It
does Dot seem that he was able to do anything for the expeditionary
1 '111C very interesting (,allll somctimcs vcry sensiblc) rCjJlies of Cust..,lios to
Bcntinck will be fOUlld ill the latter's letter to Dalryrnplc (Oet. 2).
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force that they could not have done for themseh·es. In this Wtl)'
the whole time that DalrY1l1ple had at his disposal had been wasted
in the long correspondence with Madrid, and Ilot a soldier had
pill>soo the frontier when Moore took up the command.
Meanwhile, it ought at least to have been possible to make
preparations ill Portugal, even jf nothing could be done in SpaiJl;
But the question of transport and commissarial was a very difficult
one. The British army had stmggled fmm i\1ondcgo Bay to
Li~boll with the aid of the smoll ox-wagons of the counlry-side,
requisitioned and dismissed from village to yillage. But clearly
a long campaign in Spain could not be llll.UlUgcd on these lines.
A permanent provision of draught and pack animals was required,
and natives must be hired to drive them. The few regular enlisted
men of the Royal 'Vagon 'l'raill who had reached Portugal were
only enough to take care of the more importnnt military stores.
Morcovel' their wagons turned out to be much loo heavy for the
roads of the Peninsula, and had to be gradually replaced b)'
country carts t. TIle great mass of U1C t·egimentu.l baggage find
the food had always to be transported on mules, or vehicles bought
or hired from the peasantry. The !lodugue>e did not can:! to
contract to take their animals over the froutier, and it was most
difficult to collect tra.nsport of any kind, even with the :lid of the
local authorities. \Vhcll once l\Ioorc's dreadful retreat begun, hb
dri vers and muleteers deserted their wagons and beasts, and fled
home, resolved that if they must lose their property they would
not lose their lives also 2,
In later years WellillgtOI1 gm.dufllly sllc<.,'ecded in collecting n !3.1'ge
and invaluable army of Spanish and Portuguese cmployes, who-in
their own fashion-wcrc as good campaigners as his soldiery, and
sel'\'ed him with exemplary fidelity even when their pay was many
months in UITellr. But in 1808 this body of trained camp-followers
did not cxist, and Moore had thc greatest difficulty in scraping
together the tmnsport that took him forwurd to Salamanca. Ai
to commiSSfLrint nl1'nngements, hc found that e\"Cll though hc
1 :\Joore to Castlereagll from Salalllallca, Dec, 10,1808.
2 A good account of tile tlifficultics of transport ill i\loore's llnny will be
found in Quarterllluster Surtees's Tu:cll(!J-jive )'t(jr8 ill the Rijfe Brigade. PlllCe.;]
ill charge of the baggage and beasts of tile 2/!lSth, lIe found it absolutelr
impossible to keep ti,e nati\'e drivers from absconding, c,'en when they l1al1
to sacrifice their beasts to do SO (pages 81-82).
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divided his army into several small columns, and utilized as many
sepamte routes as possible, it was not easy fOl' the troops to Ihe.
111c commissariat officers, scnt Oll to collcct m~O"flZincs at the
variolls halting-places, were so inexperienced and so uniformly
ignorant of the Portuguese tongue, that even where they were
energetic they had the grcate;t difficulty in catering for the army.
,"Vclblcy, as wc have already seen l , had been complaining bitterly
of their inefficiency dnl"ing the short Vimiero campaign. Maore,
morc gracious in his phrases, wrote that' we have a Commissariat
extremely zealous, but quite new and incxJXrienced in the important
duties which it falls to their lot to perform.' This was but one
of the many penalties which England had to pay for her long
abstention from continental warfare on a large scale. It is easy
to blmne the ministry, the permanent officials in London, or the
executive officials on the spot 1. But in reality mere want of
knowledge of the needs of a great land-war aocounts tor most
of the mistakes that were committed. To lavish llllbrry criticism
011 individuals, as did the Opposition papers in England at the
time, was almost as unjust as it was useless. The art of war, in
this as in its other brunches, had to be learnt; it was not possible
to pick it up by intuition. Nothing can be more interesting than
to look through the long series of orders and directions drawn
up by the quartennaster-general's department between 1800 and
]813, in which the gradual evolution of order out of chaos by
diut of practical experience can be traced. But in October, 1808.
the process was yet in its infancy.
It was with the greatest difficulty, therefore, that :Moore got his
army under weigh. He found it, lIS he wrote to Castlereagh,
• without equipment of any kind, either for the carriage of the
light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores,
or any other appendage of an army, and without a magazine formed
on any of the routes py which we are to march 2.' '''ithin ten
days, howe,-er, the whole force was on the move. The heavy
impedimentA were pluccd in store in Lisbon: it Wl\S a thousand
piti66 that the troops did not leRye behind their womcn and childrcn,
whose presence with the regil\lcmts was destined to cause so many
harrowing sccnes duriug the fon.-ed marches of the ensuing winter.
'l'H~y were offered a IJas."nge to Ellgland, but the greater part
1 See p. 231. ~ i\Ioore to Castlereagh, Oct. 9,1806.
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refused it. and the colonels (from mistaken kindncS$) generally
allowed them to march with their corps.
The direction in which the army \I'M to move had been settled
in a general way by the dispatches sent from Castlereagh to
Dtdrymplc in September I. It was to be held together in 0. single
mass and sent forward to the Ebro, there to be put in line with
BIake and CuswilOs. An attempt Oil the part of the Junta to
distract p.'\rt of it to Catalonia had been 6rmly and ~·ery wisely
rejected. 'l1lC :Fl'Cnch were still all the defensive when the pInn
was drawn out, and Burgos had been named as the point at which
the British troops might aim. It was vcry close to the enemy,
but in September neither English nor Spanish statesmen were
laking into consideration the probability of the advent of the
Emperor, and his immediate assumption of the offcnsive. They
were rather dreaming of an advance towards the ]Jyrenees by the
allied annics. If the lnrgc rdnfo.rcemcnts which were promised
to Moore were destined to land at Corllllllil, rather than at Gihon
Ol' Sllllw.neler, it was merely becausc these hltter porh were known
to be small and destitute of resources, not because they were con-
sidcred to be dangerously ncar to the French. La. Romana's
division, it will be remembered, was actually put ashore at Sau-
tllnder: it is quite possible that Sir David llnird's troops might
have been sent to the same destination, but for the fortunate fact
that it was believed that it would be impossible to supply him
with trilllsport from the bare mut rugged region of lhe MontuiJa.
Corunna was selected as the landing-place for all the regiments
that were to join Moore, partly on account of its safc and spacious
port, partl)' because it was belie,'cd that food and draught animals
could be collected with comparati,'c case from Gnlicia.
More thanl~OOOmen, including three regimcnts of cavalry (the
arm in which the force in Portugal was most deficient) and a
hrigade of lhe Guards, had been dmwll fWIll the home b'lll'risolls.
'111e charge of this fine division had been given to Sir David Baird 2,
an officer with it great Indian reputation, but compnrathcly un-
I Ca~tlcrc..~ll to DalrYlIll'lc, Sep!. 2, 1808.
~ 1t is fair to this t1iSliugllishctl officer to state that his disllalches alllI
letters show no trace wllate"cr of the irascible alld impracticable tcmpcr that
has been attributed to him. l1Lcyare most sensible, cautious, and prurient,
am! not at all what might llaw,l beelt eXIlCCtctl from tlie hero oftho slory of' thc
111<1 that was chained to our Ulltie.·
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practised in European warfare. They were embarked at Harwich;
Portsmouth, Ramsgate, and Cork at various dates during Sep'"
tember and October, and on the thirteenth of the latter month'
the maiu body of the force l'cach<..od Corullllu. By some stupid
mismanflgement at home the cavalry, the most important part
of the cX{Xtlition, were shipped ofl' the last, and did not arrh'c
till three weeks t after the rest of the troops bad reached Spain.
By October 18 :Maore reported that the /:,'TeIl.tcr purt of his
troops were already in motion, and l\S Baird's infantry had reached
Corunna. on the thirteenth, it might have been expected that the
junction of their forces would have tll.ken place in time to enable
them to play a part in the defensive campaign against Napoleon
which ended in the fall of Madrid on December 4. ]f the troops
had marched promptly, and by the. best and shortest routes, thcy
might hmc cnsil)· concentrated at Salamunca by the middle of
November: Napier suggests the thirteenth 2 as a probable day, and
l..'Ollsidcring the distances the date SC(lms a very rClLSOllable OIlC.
At that moment Gamonal and Espinosa had only just ocen fought
and lost: 'l'udc1a was yet ten days in the future: sixteen days
were to elapse before the Somosierra was forced. It is clear that
thc British anny, which at Salamanca would have 'bc!:m only sevcn
marches (150 miles) from Madrid, and four marches (eighty miles)
from Valladolid, might hll.\"c intervened in Ule stmgglc: whether
its intervention might not have ended in disaster, considering the
cnonnOllS forces of the French~, is another matter. But the British
Government intended that !\foore and Baird should take part in
the campaign: the Junta hnd been told to expect their help: and
for the consolidatioll of the alliance between the two nations it
was desirable that the help should be given in the most prompt
" and effective fashion.
There is no possibility of' asserting that this was done. Moore
and Bairn did not join till December flO: no British soldier fired
n. single shot at a FrenclunfLn before December 12 4. The whole
I l11c jtJl IUld 10th Hussars aI11J.'1l'cutly (Ill No\'. i, the l,'ith Huss.'Ir!! on
No\'. 12. t;ee Hainl to Castlereagh, !\Ol'. 8 and 13, 1808.
~ Napier, i. 347.
, It is to he rcmemheral that IJ;lil-u'l! <::ll.\"alry would not have been lip till
i'\o\". 20-2.5, owillg to its tardy start from Ellglaud. Nothing eould hal"e
been lIlore ulllllCky•
• :\ttJle s.ki11l1ish at Rueda 011 that Uate.
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army was so much ont of the campaign that Donapllrtc ne\,et·
could learn what had become of it, and formed the most errolleoll~
hypotheses concerning its position and intentions. We may frankly
say that not one of his movement.", down to the fall of Madrid,
was in the leust infl.uenccd by the fact that tbere was n British
foree in Spain.
That this circumstance was most unfortunate from the political
point of view it would be childhh to dcny. It guvc discontented
Spaniards the opportwlity of asserting that thcy had been deserted
Hnd betrayed by their allies 1. It afforded Bonaparte the ehaJwc,
which he did not fail to take, of enlarging upon the invariable
IlClfishness and timidity of the British 2. It furnished the critics of
the ministry in London with a text for declamations against the
imbecility of its arrangements. It is true that after the fall of
Madrid Moore was enabled, by the new situation of affairs, to
make that demonstration against thc French lines of comUlwli~
cation in Castile which wrecked Napoleon's original plan of cam-
paign, and saved Lisbon and Sc\'ille. But this tardy though
effective intervcntion in the struggle was it mere afterthought.
Moore's original plan had been to make n tame retreat on Lisbon,
when he discovered that he was too late to sa\'e Madrid. It was
(l, mere chance that an interccpted dispatch and un unfounded
rumour caused him to throw up the idea of retiring into Portugal,
and to strike at the Emperor's flank and rear by his famous march
011 Sahagull. 'Without this piece of good fortune he would llCVCL'
have repaired the mischief caused by the lateness of his original
U1Tival on the scene. How that late arrival came to I>US::> it is
now our duty to investigate.
.AJs fur as 1\:[oorc's own anny was com:crned, thc loss of time
may be ascribed to a single cause-a mistake made in the choice
of the roads by which the advance into Spain was collduc~. It
WIIS the original intention of the British general to march on
Almeidn and Ciudad Uodrigo by three parallel routes, those by
Coimbm and Cclorico, by Abmntcs, Custcllo Drall(,-o, and Guardu,
and by Elvas, Alcantara, and Coria 3. Hc was compelled to utilize
1 Sce the letters from Sl1.1nislL officers ill the Madrid Guzelte for Dec. 10,1808.
, See the Dec. {, Bulletill, aud the inspired articles in the j[adrid Guzette
{or Dec. 14.
S i\!oore to Custlereagll~ Oct. !l: "nUl mureh from tlLis will be b}' the
three roads C:oimbra, Gnarda, and Alcrmtarn.'
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the last-named road, which was rather circuitous and notoriously
bad, by the fact that Dall'YUlple had left Hope's two brigades at
Elvas, and that any advance from that place into the kingdom
of Lean could only be direck>d !lcrOSS the bridge of AlcRlltarn.
If Moore had stuck to this original resolve, and used 110lle but
these three roads, his Ul'1lI)' might have been l..'oneentrated at
5..'l.lamo.nca on or abont November 13. This could have been done
with ca:;e if all the reserve artillery and heavy baggage had taken
the Coimbra-CelOlico road, the easiest of the three, and nothing
but an irreducible minimum had been allowed to follow the columns
which went by the other routes. It would have been necessn.r)'
also to move the troops in masses of not less than a brigade, and
to keep them wdl closed up.
l\·loore had the best intentions: he cut down the baggage to
what he considered the smallest practicable bulk, and started off
the leading regiments on the CoimbrR route as easily as October ll,
two days after he had taken O\'cr the command 1. 'I am sufficiently
aware,' he wrote, 'of the importance of even the name of a Bl'itish
army in Spain, and I am hurrying as much as possible 2.' Then
followed an irreparable mistake; it was all-important to find out
which of the roads was most suitable for artillery and heavy
baggage. Moore consulted the available officcl'S of the old POl·tu-
guese army, and received from them the almost incredibly erroneous
information that ncither the Coimbm-Cdorico-Almcida rond nor
the Abrantcs-Guarda-Almeida l'oad was practicable for artillery.
It would seem that he also sought information from the offieel'S
whom Dalrymple had sent out into the province of Beira, amI
that their answers tallied with those of the Portuguese 3, for he
wrote to Castlereagh that' e\'c,'Y information agreed that neithcr
of them was fit for artillery 01' could be recommended for cuvah·y.'
General Anstruther, then in command at Almcida, must take a
considerable sharc in the blmnc that has to be distributed to those
who failed to give the Commander-ill-chicf accurate infonnatioll,
l ]\foore to Castlercagh, Oct. D.
2 Ibid., Oct. 11.
~ Moore also consulted Colouel LoI'CZ, the Sl'aUiS}1 officer who llad been
1>ent to llis head quarters by tile Junta, 3l! being ~pecially skilled ill roads and
topography. But LoIIC~ disclaimed all}' kllowlt.-dgc, alld (:ou1.1 only say that
., 11ll0t'S artillery had been nearly ruined by the roads betw«n Ciudad Rodrigo
and Abrantes.
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for he more thlUl nllY one else had been given the chance of horing
these roads. But whatever may be the proportion in which the
censure must be cOstributed, a ccrtnill amount must be rescrved
for Moore himself. He ought on first pl"inciples to have refused
to believe the strange news that Wall brought tu him. It might
have occurred to him to ask how hea,'y gUllS of position had found
their way to the rampatts of Almcidn, the second fortress of"
POltugal, if there was 110 practicable rood leading to it. A few
minutes spent ill consulting any book dcnlillg with Portuguese
history would have shown that in the great wars of the Spanish
Succc:>sioll. nnd ngnill in that of 1762 1, forces of ull arms had
moved freely up and down the Spanish frontier, in the direction
of Cclorica, Gllllrda, Sabugal, and Custello Dranco. Even a glullce
at DUlllouriez's Aecol/nt of tlie Kingdom of Portugal, the onc
modern military book on the subject then available, would ha,'e
enabk-d Moore to correct the ignorant reports of the nati n~8.
Strangest of all, there seems to have been no one to tell him that,
only four months before, Loison, in his campaign against the
insurgents of Bcirn, had takcn guns first from Lisbon to Almeida,
then from .Almcidu. to pczo dc RagOI\ and Vizeli, and finally from
Almeida to Abrantes 3. It is simply astounding that no one scems
to have rcmembered this simple fnct. In short, it was not easily
l)ardonable in any competent general that he should accept as
possible the statement that there was no road for artillery con-
necting the capil:al of Portugal and the main sh'ollghold of its
llorth-<!astern frontier. Moore did so, and in a fortnight was
bitterly regretting his credulity. 'If anything adverse happens,'
he wrote to his subordinate Hope, , I have not neeessity to plead:
the rood we are now travelling [Abrautes-Villa Velha-Guarda]
is practicable for artillery: the bl"igade undel' 'VillUot has ah"Cudy
reached Guardn, and as far as I have a\read.y seen the road pre-
sent.,; few obstacles, and those easily surmounted. This knowledge
W!lS only uL'quired by our own offi<.:ers: when the brigade was at
Caste1lo Bl'anco, it was still not certain that it could proce<!d~"
I e.g. ill 1700 Lord G'IIway took o,-er (orty gUllS, twelve of wl.ich were
llCIlVY sicge--pic<:es, (rom l':h'~LS hy Alcant'lra and Coria to Ciudad Rodrigll.
III 1762 the Spaniards took liD less tlUlll ninety gUllS from Ciudnd Itodrigo by
<.:c1orico and Sabugal to Castello llrallCO, alld t1lellce back into Spain.
, Napicr does not seem to kuow this, alld distinctly statcs (i. 102) tllat
l.oison had uo guus.
, "loore to Hope, from Almeida, :\'01·. O.
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''Yhat made the case worse was that another of the three roads, the
one by Coimbra and Ce!orico, was far easier than that by Guarda..
Both ,"Vellesley and l\:Iasscna took enormous trains of artillery and
ooggnge ovC!r it in 1810, without any particular difficulty!.
Misled by the erroneous reports as to the impracticability of the
Portuguese roads, l\Iooro took the unhappy step of sending six. of
the seven butteries of his corps, his only two cavalr)' regiments,
and four battalions of infantry to net as escort 2, by the circuitous
high·road from El"as to Madrid. III order to reach Salamanc.'\
they were to adnulL'c utmost to the gutcs of the Spanish capital,
only tuming off' at Talaycra, in order to take the route by the
Escurial, Espillar, und .Arevalo. To show the result of this lament-
able divagation, it is only necessary to remark that from Lisbon
to Salamanca via Coimbra is about 250 miles: from Lisbon to
Salamanca vin Eh'as, 'l'alavcxo., llnd Arevalo is about 380 miles:
i. e. it was certain that the column containing all Moore's cavalry
and nearly all his guns would be at least seven or eight days late
at the rendezvous, in a crisis when every moment was of vital
importam:e. M a matter of fad the head of the main column
reached Salamanca on November 13: the cavalry and guns turned
up on December 4. It would not be fair, howcvel', to say that
the absence of Hope's column delayed the ach'ance of the whole
army for so much as three weeks. It was only the leading
regiments from Lisbon that appeared on November 13. Howe\'er
carefully the march of the rest had been arntnged, the rear could
llOt have come in till several days later: indeed the last brigade
did not appear till the twcnt),-third: this dclay, howevcr, was
owing to bad arrangements and preventable accidents. But it can·
1I0t be denied that the tweh'c dn)'s Nov. 23-Dec. 4 were com~
pletely sacrificed by the non-arrival of the cavalry and guns, without
which Moore \'cry wisely l'efu~oo to move forward. If the army
had been concentrated-Baird could easily have arrived from,
Corunna ere this-it would havc been able to advance 011 Noyclll-
ber ~3, and the campaign would undoubtedly have been modified
I III endeavouring to excllSC lIIoorc, Napicr takes the straJJg6 course of
making out that tbe Guarda road, though usable, as experience showed, was
'in a military sen.'>fl·, non-practicable' from it!! difficulties. 'I1lis will not
sland ill face of Moortl's words 'Iuoted above. Of the Coimbm-Celorico road
he omits nU mention (i. 345).
• These .....ere the 2nd, 3OtlI, ilst, and 92nd Foot.
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in its character, for the Emperor would have leamt of the arrival
of Moore upon the scene some days before he crossed the Somo-
sicrra and started on his march for Madrid. There Clln l..xl no
doubt that he would have changed his plans on receiving such
news, for the sight of a British army within striking distance
would have caused him to turn aside at once ....;th a large part
of his army. Very probably hc might htwC directed Lcfebvrc,
Victor, Itnd the Imperial Guard-all the disposable forces under
his hand-against Moorc, llnd haxe -lcft Madrid alone for the
present aq a mere secondary object. It is impossible to deny that
disaster to the British arms might have followed: Oil the other
hand Moore was it cautious general, as his operations in De<:ember
showoo. He would probably have retired at once to the mountains,
and left the Emperor a fruitless stern-chasc, such as that which
actually took place a month later. Dut whether he would M\·C
fallen back on the route to Portugal, or 011 tilt: route to Glllicin,
it is impossible to say; cverything would lliwe depended on the
exact development of Napoleon's advum,:c. but the first-named
altenlative is the more probable1,
I Napier has a long note, in justification of Moore j to the effect that if the
cOllcentration point of tlle British army had been Burgos iustead of Salamanca,
Hope's detour would have cost no waste of time, aud would llave been rather
profitAble thau otllcrwisc. But i\Ioon"l distinctly lookctl upou thc mOI·emcut
as a deplorable lleeessity, not as a proper strategical proceeding. 'It is a
great round; lie wrote to Ulstlereagh ou October 27, when alUlouncing this
modificatioll of Ilis original plan, <and will separ;lle tIle corps, for a timc,
from tlle rest of the arlll)" ; but there jlJ 110 help fm· it.' l\IOTCOl'cr he stated,
in this sa~le letter, that he would not move forward al\ inch from Salamrlllca
till Hope should have reached Espillar, on t110 nortllcrn side of the Guadar-
rama. Pass. At a later elate lie announced that lIe shoultl llOt advance till
Hope had got oven uearor to Ilim, Dnd made llis way as fil! as Atomlo [letter
of NOI'. 24]. He was too good a general to dream of a. cOllcentration at
llurgos, when once he had ascertained the relatil'e llOSitions of the Spanish
and tile Freucll armies, for that place was .within a couple of marches of the
enemy's outposts at i\Jirnntln i\ull Logrofio. 'fllero is, in short, 110 way of
justifying Hope's circular march, wlleo ollce it is granted that the roads
of Northern l'ortugal were not impracticable for artillery. i\loore knew this
perfectly well, as his letter to Hope, which we lla\'e quoted on p. 495 lilIOWS.
No argumeuts are worth auything in his justification when hc himself II'ritCii
< if anything adverse happ6llS, 1 have not necessity to plead.' 'J1Il.s i! the
language of an honest man, conscious that he has made :J. mistake, and
prepared to takc the responsibility. Napier's :J.llOlog}· for him (i. :HS-1) ~
but ingenious and eloquent casuistry.
oWJ.N". I K k
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The erroneous direction given to Moore's cavalry and guns,
however, was not the only reason for the late appearance of the
British army upon. the theatre of war. Almost as much delay
was caused by 11 piece of egregious folly find procrastination, for
which the Spaniards were wholly responsible. When Sir David
Baird and the bulk of his great convoy arrived in the harbour
of Conmna on October 13, he was astonished to find that the
Junta of Galicia nUscd serious objections to allowing him to land.
Their real reason for so doing was that they wished the British
troops to disembark further cast, at Giben or Santander. They
did not reali7.e the military danger of throwing them ashore ill
places so close to the French army. nor did it affect them in 'the
least when they were told that the equipment of Baird's force
in those barren regions would be almost impossible. All that
they cared for was to preserve Galicia. from the strain of having
to make provisions for the feeding and transport of a. second anny,
when all its resources had bc<!n sorely tried in supplying (and
supplying most indifferently) the troops of Blake. They did not,
however, make mention of their real objections to Baird's dis-
embarkation in their correspondence with him, but assumed an
attitude of very suspicious humility, stating that they considered
their functions to hnve come to an end now that the Central Junta
had met, and that they thought it beyond their competence to
!,tive consent to the landing of such a large body of men without
explicit directions from Aranjuez. Baird could not offer to land
by force, in face of this opposition. He did not, however, move
off to Santander (as the Galicians had hoped), but insisted that
an officer should be promptly dispatched to the Supreme Junta.
This was done, but the delay in receiving an answer was so great
that thirteen days were wasted: the Galician officer bearing the
consent of the central government travelled (so Moore complained)
with the greatest deliberation, as if he were carrying an unimportant
message in full time of peace 1. The first regiments, therefore, only
landed on October 26, and it was not till November 4 that all the
infantry were ashore. Thus they were certain to be late at the
rendezvous in the plains of Leon. Nor was this all: the Supreme
Junta had suggested that, in order to facilitate the feeding of the
division, Baird should send it forward lIot in large masses but
in bodies of 2,000 men, with a considerable interval between them.
I Moore to Bentinck from Salamanca, Nov. 13, laoo.
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The advice wt\S taken, and ill consequence the troops were soon
spread out over the whole length of road between Corunna and
Astorga. The greatest difficulty was found in equipping them
for the march: Galicia, always a poor country, had been almost
stripped of mules and carts to supply Blake. It was absolutely
impossible to procure El. sufficient train for the transport of Daird's
food and baggage. He was only able to gather enough beasts
to carry his lighter impedimenta from stage to stage, by the oiler
of exorbitant rates of hire. He vainly hoped to complete his
equipment when he should have reached the plains. Part of his
difficulties was caused by lack of money: the Government at
home had not realized that only hard cash would circulate in
Spain: dollars in abulldam:e were to come out in the Tigre
frigate in a few weeks: meanwhile it was expected that the
Spaniards would gladly accept British Government bills. But so
little was paper liked in the Peninsula. that only £5,000 or £6,000
in dollars could be raised at Cortlnna. 1: without further resources
it would have been impossible to begin to push the a.rmy forward.
The feat was only accomplished by borrowing 92,000 dollars from
the Galician Junta, Fm' this act, carefully ignored by Napier,
they deserve a propel' rC<.-ognitioll: it shows a much better spirit
than might have been expected after their foolish behaviour about
the disembarkation, Shortly after, Baird suex.'ccded in gct1\illg
£40,000 from Mr. Frere, the new minister to Madrid, who chanced
to arrive at Corunna witll £410,000 in cash destined for the Spanish
government. Finally on November 9 the expected ship came in
wiUt the 500,000 dollars that had been originttlly intended to be
divided between Corunna and Lisbon, and llaird had as much
money as he could possibly require, even when mules and draught·
oxen had riscu to famine prices in Galicia 11, If'he still- found it
hard to move, it WlIS because this poor and desolate prO\1nCe WIlS
really drained dry of l'esonrces 3•
I Rairl1 W CasUerc.'lgh, Oct. 14, 1808.
, X"pier kllew tlle correspondence of Baird by lleart. It is tllercfore most
unfa.ir ill 11im W SUPllrCSS the loan nlllue by the Galiciall Junta, which appearS
in Sir David's letters of Oct. 22, 2D, a.nu NOI'. 13, as also the receipt of the
600,000 dol1a.rs scut by lI1C British Go\'crmneut in lIle Tigre, whi('h is acknow-
ledged iu Ole lctter of Nov. 9. He implies lllll.t the only sums receivcd were
£40,000 from »fr. lo'rere auu £8,000 from Sir JOllU l'Iloore. The simple fact
is that no good act dOlle by a Spanish Junta or a Tory minister is cI'cr
acklJowledged by N"pier.
J After reading Sir ClilU'lcs ""ughan's diar}', showiug ItOW Imro hc and
K k 2
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But what between the Junta's folly in hindering the landing
of the troops, alld the unfortunate lack of money .in the second
half of October, all-important time was lost. Baird ought to have
been near Salamanca by November 13: as a matter of fact he had
only reached Astorga with three brigades of infantry and some
artillery, hut without a single mounted man to ,-'Oyer his march,
on November 22. There he received, to his infinite dismay, the
. news that Blakc hud been routed at Espinosa all November 11,
and Belvedere at Gamonal on November 10. There was now 110
Spanish anny between him and the French: the latter might be
advancing, for nil he knew, Upoll Lcon. He heard of Soult being
at Reynosa, and Lefebvre at CalTiOIl: if they continued their
advance westward, they would catch him, with the 9,000 infantry
of the Corunna column, marching across their front on the way
to Salamanca. Appalled at the prospect, he halted at Astorga,
and, after sending news of his situation to Moore, began to prepare
to retreat on Corunna, if thc marshals should continue their movc-
mcnt in his direction. This, as we have already seen, they did
not: Napoleon had no knowledge of the position of the British
troops, and instead of ordering the dukes of Dalmatia and Dantzig
to push westward, moved them both in a southerly direction.
Soult came down to Sahugun and Carrion: Lefebvre, on being
relieved by the ~nd Corps, moved on Madrid by way of Segovia.
Thus BaW, left entirely unmolested, was in the cnd ablc to join
Moore.
It is time to turn to thc movcments of that gencral. After
sending off Sir John Hope on his unhappy circular march by
Badajoz and the Escurial, he set out from Lisbon on October 26.
He took with him the whole force in Portugal, save a single
division which was left behind to protect Lisbon, Elvas, and
Almeida. while a new native army was being reorganized. This
detachment was to be commanded by Sir John Cradock, who was
just due from England: it comprised four battalions of the
German Legion, a battalion each of the 9th, 27tll, 29th, S1st, 40th,
45th, 'and 97th Foot, the "TCCks of the 20th Light Dragoons, and
six batteries of iUtiller~r-about 9,000 men in all. The rest,
Mr. Stuart found it to procure enough draught animals to take their small
party from Corunna to Madrid, in September, 1803, I cannot doubt that by
October the collecting of t1le transport for a whole anuy was au 31most
impossible task in Galici3.
1808] ~IOORE'S MARCH FRml LISBON 501
twenty-five battalions of infantry, two cavalry regiments and seven
batteries, marched for Spain. '1\'0 bl'ibrades under Bcresford took
the good road by Coimbrn and Cclorico to AJmeida: three under
Fraser went by Ahralltcs and Gua.rda, taking with them the single
battery which Maore had retained with his main body, in order
to try whether the roads of Eastem Portugal were as bad as his
adviscrs had reported. '1'wo brigades lUlder General Paget, st.nrt-
ing from Elvas, not from Lisbon, separated themselves from Hope
and marched on Ciudad Rodrigo by Alcantaru. and Coria. The
general himself followed ill the track of Fraser, whom he overtook
and passed in the neighbourhood of Castello Broneo 1,
The march was a most unpleasant one, for the autumn rains
surprised the troops in their passage through the mountains.
Moreover some of the regiments were badly fed, as Sataro, the
Portuguese contractor who had undertakcn to supply thcm with
meat, went bankrupt at this moment and failed to fulfil his
obligations. Nevertheless the oo,'mlcc was can'ied out with com-
plete success: the men were in good heart, marched well, and
generally maintained their~ discipline, On November 13 the leading
1 It may perhaps be ,,.orth while to gi\'e tile composition and brigading of
Moore's anny on tlle march from Lisbon amI Elms to &1lam:;mca,
TIlere marc]ted by Cuimbra (lilt! Almckla, Bercsfortl [1/91h, 2/43rtl, 2/62nd1
and Fane [1/30th, 1/79th, 2/!J6th], By Abrantes and Guarda went Bentiuck
{l/4tll, l/28t1l, 1/42nd, and four companies 5/00th] and Hill [1{5t1l, 1/32nd,
1/!nst]: tltis colnmn took witlt it ouc battery: it was followed by two
isolated regiments, t111~ I/Gt11 lIud l/60tll. The corps which marched from
Elvas by Alcantara, under l'aget, was composed of the brigades of Alten (ht
and 2nd Light BnUaliolls oftile K. G. L.) and Austrutlwr 20tll, 1/62ml, 1/05th.
The 3rd Regiment joined the anny from Almeida, where it was in garrisou,
and ,the 1/02nd came up late from Lisbon. It was origiually intended that
Bentiuck aud BereliCord should form a division uuder Fraser, Anstruther and
Alten a division umIer Pagct. Of the troops wltich re.1ched Salamanca tIle
3rd ano 6/0Oth were sent back to l'ortuglll.
'ne original brigading of Baird's force was :-Cavalry Brigade (Lord }'aget)
7th, 10th, allu l.5th HU5SaI'8. 1st Brigade (Wartle) 1st and 3rd batt/;, of the
1st Foot Guards. 21111 Brigade (i'lralluillglmm) 3/18t, ]/26t1l, 2/81st. :3rd
Brigade (Leith) Inst, 2/S0th, 76th. Light Brigade (H. Grawfurd) 2/43rd,
1/9Sth, 2/9.5t1l (detachments). 'nle 2/14t1l aud 2/23rd were also present,
llCr1taltS lIS a brigade uuder Mackenzie.
All these arrangements were temporary, and at Sa.haguu, ll.!I we shall sce,
the whole anny was recast. A complete table of Moore's amlY" with its tinal
organization, force, and losses, will be foulld iu the Appendix.
~ Moore IIIllllCS OIlC regilllcnt 0111)' as all cxception,
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regiments began to file into Salamanca, whither the Commander·
in-chief had already preceded them. The concentration would ha\'e
been a. little more rapid bllt for a strange mistake of General
Anstruther, commanding at Almeidn, who detained some of the
troops for a few days, contrary to UIC ordcrs which had been sent
him. But by the twenty-third the three columns had all joined at
Salamanca 1, where Moore now had 15,000 infantry and the solitary
battery that had marched with Fmscr's division. The guns had
!pet with some tiresome obstacles, but had surmounted them with
no great difficulty, and Moore now saw (as we have already shown)
that he might have brought the whole of his artillery with him, if
only he had been given correct information as to the state of the
roads.
On November 23, then, the British commander-in-chief lay at
Salamanca, with six infantry brigades and onc hattery. Baird
lay at Astorga, with fout' brigades and three batteries: a few of his
battalions were still on the march from Galicia. Hope, with Moore's
cavalry and gUllS, was nClLr the Escurial. Lord Paget with Daird's
equally belated cavalry, which had left Corunna on the fifteenth,
was betwccn Lugo and Astorga. The situation was deplorable, for
it was clear that the anny would require ten days more to con·
centrate and get into full fighting order, and it was by no means
certain that those ten days would be granted to it. Such were the
unhappy results of the false direction given to Hope's column,
and of the enforced delay of Baird at COl'unna, owing to the
folly of the Galician Junta.
It may easily be guessed that Moon~'s state of mind at this
moment was most unenviable. He had received. much at the same
time as did Daird, the news of Gamollnl and Espinosa. He was
aware that no screen of Spanish troops now lay between him and
the enemy. He had heard of the arrival of Milhaud's dragoons at
Valladolid, and of Lefebvre's corps at Carrion, and he expected
every moment to hear that they were marching forward against
himself. Yd he could not possibly advance without cavalry or
guns, and if attacked he must fly at oll<:e towards Portugal, for it
would be mad to attempt to fight in the plains with no force at
his disposition save a mass of foot-soldiery. If the French moved
forward from Valladolid to Zamortl. on the onc side, or to Avilll on
the other, he would inevitably be cut off from Baird and Hope.
I Save two stray battalions, which had started last (rom Lisbon.
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There was no serious danger that anyone of the three columns
might be caught by the enemy, if they halted at once, for each had
a clear and safe line of retreat, on Lisbon, CoruUllU, and Talo.\'crn
respectively. liut if they continued their movement ofconcentration
the cnsc was otherwise. To anyone unacquainted with Bonaparte's
nctnal design of throwing all his forces on Madrid by the Soma-
sierra road, it looked not only possible, but probable, that the enemy
would advance westward as well as southward from his present
positions, and if he did so the game was up. The British army,
utterly unable to concentrate, must fly in three separate directions.
Maore and Hope might ultimately unite in front of Lisbon: Raird
might he shipped round from Corunna to the same point. Dut
this movement would take many WC<lks, and its moral effect would
be deplorable. What would be thought of the general who
marched forward till he wos within eighty miles of the French, and
then ordered a precipitate retreat, without even succeeding in con·
centrnting his army or firing a single shot? The thought filled
l\Ioore's heart with bitterness: must he, with all his ability and
with his well-earned reputation, swell the list of the failures, and
be reckoned with the Duke of York, Dalryrnple, and Hutehinson
nmong the generals who were ~ late-who had their chance of
fame, and lost it by being an hour, or a week, or u month behind
the decisive moment? But on one point he was clear: he must
run no unnecessary risk with tile forces committed to him: they
were, as was once remarked, not a British field-army, but the only
British field-army. Supposing they WCI'e destroyed, no such second
host existed: it would take yean! to make another. There were
still many regiments on home service, but those which now lay at
Snlamanca and Astorga were the pick of the whole, the corps
chosen for foreign service because they were the fittest for it.
The question, then, which Moore had to put to himself wllS
whether he should persist in attempting to complete the concen·
tration of his ann}', and in case of sU(.:ccss take (Ill (lctivc part in the
campaign, or whether he should simply order each fraction of the
British forces to retreat at once towards some safe base. The way
in which the question should be answered depended mainly on two
points - what would be the movements of the French during
the next few days, and what Spanish troops existed to co.operate
with the British army, in case it were determined to commence acti\·e
opcmtions. For clearly the 30,000 men of Moon: and Baird could
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not hope to struggle unaided against the whole French army in
.Spain.
To explain l\o(oore's action. it is necessary to remember that he
started with a strong prejudice against trusting the British army
to the mercy of Spanish co-operation. He had been receiving vcry
gloomy reports both from :Mr. Stumt, the tempornryrepresentlltivc
of the British Government at Aranjuc7., and from Lord William
Bclltinck, the military agent whom Dalrymplc had sent to Madrid.
The latter was one of the few British officers who (like Wellesley)
foresaw from the first a catastrophe whenever the French reinforce-
ment.'! should cross the Ebro I, Moreover the character of Moorc's
correspondence with the Central Junta, before and during \lis
advance, bad conspired with the reports of Stunrt und Bentinck to
give him a very unfavourable idea of the energy and administrative
capacity of OUl' allies. He had been vexed that the Junta refuSl.>U
to put him in direct communication with the Spanish generals 2•
He complaill~d that he got from them tardy, unfrequent, and
inaccurate news of the enemy's movements. He was disgusted
that Lope7., the officer sent to ·aid him in moving his troops, turned
out to know even less about the roads of the Spanish frontier than
he did himself. But abo,'c all he professed that he was terrified by
the apathy which he found both among the officials and the people
of the kingdom of Leon and Old Castile. He had been politely
received by the authorities both at Ciudud. Rodrigo and at Sala-
manca, but he complained that he got little but empty compli-
ments from them.
There was some truth in this allegation, though certain facts
can be quoted against it 3, even from :Moore's own correspolldcm.'C.
1 TIlCre is an ulluertone of gloom in most of Bclltinck's very capable lettCl'S,
which contrasts sharply with the "cry optimistic views expressed by Doyle
and most of the other military agents. On Oct. 2 he 'feels the danger
forcibly' of thc W311t of a single commander for tllC Splmisll armies. On
Sept. 30 he remarks that < the Spanish troops consider tllemsel"es invincible,
but that tIle Spanish Go,·ernment ought not to be deluded by the same
opinion.' On Nov. 14 'Ilc must not disguise tllat lie t1>iUKS very unfavour-
ably of tile affairs of Spain: the Spaniards have not the meanS to repel tlle
danger that tllreatens': most of his letteI1!l are in more or less the same
strain.
~ Except Witll C:IStailOS, froIn whom some sensible hut rather vaguc auvice
was proCllred.
~ e.g. iu llis letter of Nov. 19 Moore Spe.:1k8 of the town of Salamanca as
doing its best for him: tIle clergy were Cllcrting themseh-CfI, amI a convent
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Loon and Old Castile had, as wc have already had occasion to
remark, been far less energclic than other parts of the Peninsula
in mising new troops and coming forward with contributions to
the national exchequer. They had done no more than furnish the
10,000 men of Cuesta's disorderly' Army of Castile,' a contingent
utterly Qut of proJlQrtion with their population and resources.
Nor did they seem to reali?c the scandal of their own sloth and
procrastination. Maore had expected to sce every town full of new
levies undergoing drill before marching to the Ebro, to di~over
magazines acculIlulated in important places like Ciudad Rodrigo
and Salamanca, to find the military and civil officials working
busily for the armies at the front. Instead he found Rn lIIlUCCOllnt·
able apathy. Even aJ"ter the reports of Espinosa and Gamonal
had come to hand, the people and the authorities alike seemed to
be living in a sort of fool'!' paradise, disbelieving the gloomy news
that lln'ived, or (Lt least refusing to recognize that the war was now
llt their own doors. l\Ioore feared that this came from want of
patriotism or of courage.
As a matter of fact, the people's hearts were sound cnough1, but
they had still got 'Ba)'lcn on the brain': thc)' simply failed to
of nuns had promised Ilim £5,000. Tn 11is Journal lie has 3 testimonial w
tllC fidelity with w)lich the people of Tonlcsillas protected au English officer
from a raiding party of .French cavalry. 'l1lere are some similar notes in British
memoirs: e. g. 'T. S.' of the 7Ist expresses much gratitude for the kindness
of the people of Pcilnranrla, WllO, wllCu Hope's division arrived in a drenched
and frozen condition, rolled out barrels of spirits into the strects and ga\'C
cI'cry mau a good dram before the regimellbl m'lrcJuffi. 011. Some WW1\S,
c.g. Zamora and Albn de Tormes, bellavcd. wcU ill 01'posiug (Ulougli Witllout
any hope of succcss) tIle French, whell t1\cy did appear.
1 As to the cOlltluct of tI,e Spaniards I tIlink tllat tl,o best commentary
Oil it is that of LcitIJ Hay (i. SO-I), wllo was riding all m'er Castile rmd Loon
hi thesc unhappy weeks. "l1ms terminated a journey of about 900 miles, ill
which a considerable portion of the country had beell traversed, under circum-
stances which ellllblet1 me to ascermin the I;.illoore feeling of the people. ]t
is but justice w say that I met with but olle 9Cntimcllt as to the war: that
I was everywhere treated Witll kindness. I mention this as a creditable
circumsmnce to tI,e inl18himnls of the Peninsula, ann in eontradiclion W
tIle atatemenbl often reconled, unjustly in my opinion, as to tI,e want of
faith, supineness, and perfidy of the Spanish people... , 'nleir conduct
was tllrougl1out distinguished I)y good fait]), if it was al tl16 same time
Tendered apparently equivocal from characteristic negligence, want of energy,
and the deficiency of that moral power that can alone be derived from free
institutions and an enlightened arist.oorncy.'
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recognize the full horror of the situation. That their armies
were not merely beaten but dispersed, that the way to Madrid was
open to Bonaparte, escaped them. This attitude of mind enraged
Moore. 'In these provinces; he wrote, 'no armed force whatever
c.."dsts, either for immediate protection or to reinforce the armies.
The French cavalry from Burgos, in small detachments, are over-
l'unning the province of Lean, and raising contributions to which
the inhabitants submit without the least resistance; the enthusiasm
of which wc heard so much nowhere appears. Whatever good.will
there is (and among the lower orders I believe there is a good deal)
is taken no advantage of. I am at this moment in no communica-
tion with any of their generals. I am ignorant of their plans, or
those of their government t.' And again, he adds in despair, 'I hope
a better spirit exists in the southern provinces: here no one stirs-
and yet they are well inclined 2.' While Leon and Old Castile
WCl'C in this state of apathy, it was maddening to Moore to re<:eive
constant appeals from the Supreme J unts, begging that the British
army might mO\'e forward at once. Their dispatches were ncrom-
panied by representations, which Moore knew to be inaccurate,
concerning the numbers and enthusiasm of the Spanish armies
still in the field, and by misrepresentations of the force of the
French. They were also backed by urgent letters from Mr. Frere,
the new ambassador at Madrid, urging him to give help at all
costs.
These appeals were intolerable to n man who dared not ad"ance
because his army (partly by his own fault, partly owing to ch-cum-
stances that had not been under his control) was not concentrated.
From the point of view of policy, :Moore knew that it was all-im-
portant that he should take tile field: but, from the point of view
of strategy, he saw that an advance with the 15,000 men that he
had at Salamanca might very probably lead to instant and complete
disaster. He refused to move, but all the time he knew that his
refusal was ha,'ing the worst effect, and would certainly be repre-
sented by his critics as the result of timidity and selfishness. It
was this consciousness that caused him to fill his dispatches with
the bitterest comments on the Spanish government and people.
He had been induced to advance to Salamanca, he said, by false
pretences. He had been told that there was a large anny in front
of him, ready to cover his concentration. He had been informed
I Moore to Ca'stlereagh from Salamauca, Nov. 24. I Ibid,. Dec. 8.
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that the whole (.'Ountry-side was full of enthusiasm, that he might
look for ready help from every official, that when once he had
crossed the frontier transport and food would be readily provided
for him. Instead, be fOWld nothing but apathy arid disasters.
'Had the real strength and composition of the Spanish armies
been known, and the defcm:eless state of the country, I concch'c
that Cadi7.. not Conmnn, would have been chosen for the disem-
barkation of the troops from England: and Seville or CordonL, not
Salamanca, would have been selected as the proper place for the
assembling of this army!: Thus he wrote to Ctl.SUcrcagh: to
Frere, in response to constant invitations to strike a blow of some
sort in behalf of Spain, he replied in more. vigorous terms 2.
'i\fadrid is threatened; the French have destroyed onc army
(BJake's), ha"e passed the Ebro, and are ad\'ancing in superior
numbers Ilooainst another (Castafios'), which from its composition
promises no resistRll(.'C, but must retire or be overwhelmed. No
other armed force exists in this country: 1 perceive no enthusiasm
or determined spi.rit among the people. This is a state of affairs
quite different from that conceived by the British Government,
wBen they determined to send troops to the assistance of Spain.
[t was not expected that these were to cope alone with the whole
force of Prance: as auxiliaries they were to aid a people who were
bclie\'ed to be entbusiastic, determined, and prepared for :resistance.
It becomes therefore a question whether the British army should
remain to be attacked in it!> turn, or shoul<l retire from n couutry
where the contest, from whate\'er circumstances, is become un-
t.'qual.'
All that Moore wrote was true: yet, granting the accuracy of
every premise, his conclusion that he ought to retire to Portugal
was not necessarily correct. The British Government had un-
doubtedlyover-estimated tile power and resources of Spain: the
Supreme Junta had shown no capacity for organization or com-
mand: most of the Spanish generals had committed gross military
blunders. But none of these facts were enough to justify Moore
in washing his hands of the whole business, and mal'Ching out of
Spain without firing a shot. He had not been sent to help the
patriots only if they were powerful and victoriO\lS, to desert them
if they proved weak and unlucky. If these had been the orders
1 Moore to Castlereagll from Salam:l1lc:J, NOI'. 2-1.
'I Moore to Frere from Salamll1lca, No\". 2].
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issued to him by Castlcrcagh, allllonaparte's taunts about the selfish·
ness and timidity of the British Goyernment would. have been
justifkil. It was true t.hat 011 his arrival at Salumancu be found
the aspect of the war very different from what he had expected at.
the moment of his quitting Lisbon. Instead of aiding the victorious
Spanish armies to press up to the Pyrenees, he would have to cover
their retreat and gain time for the reorganization of the scattered
remnants of their first line of defence. To reject this task because
the Supreme Junta had been incapable, or Blake aud Palafox rash
and nllskilful, would have been unworthy of a mall of l\Ioore's
talents and cournge.
Yet in a moment of irritation at the mismanagement that he
saw before him, und of anger al the continual importunities that.
he was recehing from the Central Junta and from :l\Ir. Frere,
l\Ioore nearly committed this fault. 11lC last piece of ncws which
broke down his resolution and drove him to order a retreat was the
. account of tlle battle of 'l.'udcla. If hc had becn forced to wait for
the notification of this disaster through Spanish official sources, he
might have remained ignorant of it for many days. But Charles
Vaughan, the secretary of Mr. Stuart., had been in the camp ·of
Palafox, and had ridden straight from Tudela to Madrid, and from
Mndrid to Salammlca-476 miles in six days 1. Hc brought the
intelligence of Castailos' defeat to the English commander-in-chief
011 the night. of November Qa. MOOl'e lost not ll. momcnt in
dictating orders of retreat to the whole army. In the few hoUl'S
that elapsed before midnight hc ga.vc his own troops directions lo
l '1116 lIotes and diaries of this ancient member of my own College have
becn of enormous use to me for side~lighl<l on Sp.11lisl1 politics during 1808.
His summary of his great ride from Caparrosa ill Na\'arre to Corunna, between
November 21 and December 2, is perhaps worth quoting. • From Caparrosa
to Madrid and from i\Jndrid to Salamanca, with tlm dispalches for Sir .rolm
l\Ioore, containing the defeat of the army commanded by General Castaiios,
I rode IKlSt. I st:lyed tIle nigbt at Salamanca, and at two o'clock on the
follo..... ing day (No\·. 29) I set out for Astorga with dispatcl16S for Sir D. Haird,
and with Sir J. Moore's dispatches for England. 1 was detained only si,.
IIODr'8 at Astorga, all,l flfter riding two days :md two Iligllts on cnd arrived
at CorUlllla the (wcniug of Dec. 2. '1116 post-horses at every rclay in Spain
werc at this time so over.....orked that the jounJey was tiresome and painful.
Iliad ridden 700 miles from Caparrosa to Coruuna in ele\·ell days (Nov. 21 to
Dec. 2). J l,ad a night's rest at Agreda, Cetilla, aud Salamanca, aud two at
Madrid.' Dcductiug two days ill Madrid, the ride ....-as really onll of iOO milCfl
in niue da}'s.
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prepare to retire on Portugal, sent I-lope a di"Jpatch bidding him
tUn! off on to cross-roads and move by Peiiaranda 011 Ciudad
Rodrigo and Almeida, and wrote to Baird that he must return
to Corunna, re-embark his army, and bring it round by sea to
Lisbon.
The spirit in which MODre acted is shown by the wording of his
lcttcl' to Hope :-'1 have determined to gi\'c the thing up. and
to retire. It was my wish to have run great risks to fulfil what
I concei vc to be the wishes of the people of England, and to gi \'(!
every aid to the Spanish cause. But they have shown themselves
equal to do so little for themselves, that it would only be sacrificing
this army. without doing allY good to Spain, to oppose it to such
numbers us must now be brought against us. A junction with
Baird is out of the question, and with you, perhaps, problematical.
... This is n cruel determination for mc to makc-I mcall to
retreat: but I hope you will think the circumstances such as
demand it I.'
To Moore, weighed down by the burden of responsibility, and
wOl'ricd by the constant pressure of the SpfUliards at Madrid, 'who
expected everyone to fly but themselvcs,' this rcsolve to retreat
sccmed rcnsonablc, and even inevitablc. But it WIIS clearly wrong:
when he gave the order he was overwrought by irritatioll and
despondency. He W(l.S sent to aid the Spaniards, and till he was
sure that he could do absolutely nothing in their behalf, it was
his duty not to abandon them. The British army was intended
to be used freely in their cause, not to be laid up-like the talent
in the no.pkill-lest anything might happen to it. Its mere
presence at Salamanca was valuable as an encouragement to the
Spaniards, and a check on the free movement of the French.
Above all, it was not yet proved that the concentration with Baird
and Hope was impossible: indeed, the events of the last few days
were rendering it more and more likely that the junction might,
afteJ' all, take place. The French cavalry which had appeared at
Valladolid had gone ofl'southwUlU, without any attempt to move
in the direction of Salamanca. Soult and Lefebvre were also
moving in a direction which would not bring them tUlywhere near
the British army. Hope had crossed the Guadarrnma unhindered,
and was now near Villacastin, only seventy miles from Moorc's
head quarters. Under these circumstances it was I110St impolitic
I l\Ioore to Hope from Salamallca, NOI', 28.
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to order an instant l'ctreat.· What would have been thought of
Maore if this movement had been carried out, and if atter the
British columns had reached Corunll& and Almeida the news had
come that no French infantry had. ever been nearer than fifty
miles to them, that their couC€ntration had been perfectly feasible,
and that Napoleon had possessed no knowledge of their WhCl'C.
abouts? All these facts chanced to be true-as we have seen.
The Emperor's advance on Madrid was made without any reference
to the British army. by roads that took him very far from Sala-
manca: he was marching past Moore's front in serene unconscious-
ness of his proximity. If, at the same moment, the British had
been hurrying back to Portugal, pursued only by phantoms hatched
in their general's imagination, it is easy to guess what military
critics would have said, and what historians would havc written.
Moore would have been pronounced a selfish and timid officer,
who in a momcnt of piquc and despondency deliberately abandoned
his unhappy allies.
Fortunately for his own reputation and for that of England,
his original intentions of the night of November 28 were not fully
carried out. Only Baird's column actually commenced its retrograde
movement. That general received Moorc's letter from Vaughllll
on the thirtieth, and immediately began to retire on Galicia.
Leaving his cavalry and his light brigade at Astorga, to co"er his
retreat, he fell back with the rest of his division to ViIlafranca,
fifty miles on the rood to\I'ards Corunna. Here (as we shall sec)
he received on Deeember 6 a complete new set of orders, counter-
manding his retreat and bidding him return to the plains of Lean.
Hope also had heard from Moore on the thirtieth, had been
informed that the army was to retire on Portugal, and was told
to make forced marches by Peiillrnnda. and Ciudad Rodrigo to
join his chief-unless indeed he were forced to go back by the
way that he had come, owing to the appearance of Freneh troops
in his path. l?ortunately no such danger occurred: Hope arranged
his two cavalry regiments as a screen in front of his right, in the
direction of Arcvalo and Madrigal. He hunied his infantry and
guns by Fontivcl'OS and Pefilu:anda, along thc road that had been
pointed out to him. The cavalry obtained news that patrols of
French dragoons coming from the north had pushed as fro: as
Olmedo and La Nava-some sixteen or eighteen miles from their
outpost-,;-but did not actually see a single hostile vedettc. This
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was lucky, as, if Napoleon had heard of a British force hovering
on the 'flank of his advancing columns, he would certainly have
turned against it the troops that were covering the right flank
of his advance 011 Madrid-Lefcbvrc's corps and the dragoons of
l\Iilhaud. But, as it chanced, Hope was entirely unmolested: he
moved, as was right, with his troops dosed up and ready for
a fight: on the night of the thirtieth his infantry actually slept
in square without piling arIns: during the ensuing thirty-six
hours they marched forty·scvcn miles before they were allowed to
encamp at Penaranda. There they were practically in safety:
slackening the pace for the exhausted infant-°Y and for the over-
driven oxen of the <.'Ol1voy, Hope drew ill to Alba de Tonnes, where
he was only fifteen miles fi..om Salamanca 1. Here he received
orders not to push for Ciudad Rodrigo, but to turn northward
and join the main body of the army, which was still-as it turned
out-in its old po~itions. Thus on December 3 :Moore t:ould
at last dispose of his long-lost cavalry and guns, and possessed
an army of ~O,OOO men complete in all arms. This very JIluch
changed the aspect of affairs for him, and removed one of his
main justifications for th~ projected retreat on Portub>'B.1. Hope
also brought information as to the movements of the l'Tench which
was of the highest importance. He reported that their t:olumns
were all trending southward, none of them to the west of Segovia.
He had also heard of the infantry of the 4th Corps, and t.:ould
report that it had marched by Valladolid and Olmedo on Segovia,
evidently with the intcntion of driving Hercdia's Estrcmadurall
troops out of the last-named city, and of opening the Guadarrama
Pass 2. There was no sign whatever of any movcment of the
I There is a good, but short, accouut of this forced march, ill bitter cold, to
be found in the memoir of 'T. S.' of the 71st, one of Hope's four infantry
regiments. He sllCaks of a curious fact tllat I ha\'e lIowller6 else seen
mentioned, viz. that at Pefiarauda the artillery horses were so done up that
Hope huried six guns, and turned their teams to help the otber batteries.
Apparently they were dug up a few tlays nfter by troopg sent out from
SalaDlauca, os the mIe of batteries is CODllllcte when Moore resumed his
march.
t J think tllat Napier (i. 287-8) somewhat exaggerates tlle danger which
Hope ran in his march from VilltlCllStin to Alba de Tormes. Of course if
Lefebvre llad been marching on Salamanca, the situation would ha\''6 been
dangerous: but 3S a matter or fact he \VllS marching on the GlUwnrraDlo,
which Hope had safely passed on tile twenty-eighth. Every mile that the
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French in this quarter towards Salamanca. Thus the Emperor's
plan for a concenlration of his whole army on Madrid became
clear to Moore's discerning c)"es.
British mO'·ed took them further from Lefebvre'll route: hig infantry Wa3
oe'·er within fifty miles of Hope'll convoy: and supposing llis brigade of
c&''a1ry had got in touch 'With the British. it could have done nothing serious
against a force of all amls in the hands of a ,·ery capable general. The
'4,000 cavalry' of which Napier speaks were in reality only 1,500,
•SECTION VIII: CHAPTER III
1\IOORE'S ADYAr.'WE TO SAHAGUN
MOORE'S determination to retreat on Portugal lasted just seven
days. It was at midnight on November ~-~W that he wrote his
orders to Baird and Hope, bidding the one to fall back on Conmllll.
and the other On Ciudnd Rodrigo. On the aftCl"lIoon of December 5
he abandoned his scheme, and wrote to recall Baird from Galicia:
011 the tenth he set out on a very different sort of enterprise, and
advanced into the plains of Old Castile with the object of striking
at the communications of the French anny. '"Vc have lIOW to
investigate the curious mixture of motives which led him to make
such a complete and dramatic change in his plan of cmnpaigll.
Having sent off his dispatches to Hope and Baird, the Com·
mander·in·chief had (LIlUounced next morning to the generals who
commanded his diYisions and brigades his intention of retreating
to Portugal. The news evoked manifestations of surprise and
ll11b"Cr that could not be eom:ealed. Even MOOIOC'S own staff did
not succeed in disguising their dismay and regret I. The army
was looking forward with eagerness to another campaign against
the French under a general of such well-earned reputation as their
present chief: a sudden order to retrcat, whcn the enemy had not
even been seen, and when his nearest cavahy vedettes were still
UU"CC or four marchcs away, seemed astounding. There would
have been remonstrances, had not Moore curtly infonned his sub-
ordinates that 'he had not ealled them together to request their
counsel, or to induce them to commit themselycs to giving any
opinion on the subject, I-le was taking the whole responsibility
entirely upon himself: and he only required that they would
immediately prepare to carry it into elteet.' In face of this
speech there could be 110 argument or opposition: but there was
I See James l\loorc's memoir of his brother/po 72; compare Napicr, i. 292,
and !.onl Londonderry's aCCOWlt of Ilis Oll"n obscnationa at Salamanca, ill his
lli8fory of/he Penillrolar War, i. 220,221.
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murmuring in every quarler: of all the officers of the anny of
Portugal Hope is said to have been the only one who approved
of the Commander~in-chief's resolve. The consciousness of the
criticism that he was undergoing from his own subordinates did
not tend to soften MODre's temper, which was ah-eady sufficiently
tried by the existing situation of affairs.
After announcing this dctcnnillation, it might have been ex-
pected that Maore would fall back at once on Almeida. But
while beginning to send back his stores and his sick 1, he did !lot
move his fighting-men: the reason (a<; he wrote to Castlerea.gh J)
'.I'M that he still hoped that he might succeed in picking up Hope's
division, if the French did not press him. Accordingly he lingered
on, waiting for that general's approach, and much surprised that
the enemy was making lIO advance in his direction. It was owing
to the fact that he delayed his departure for five days, on the
chance that his lost cavalry and guns might after all come in, that
Moore finally gained the opportunity of' striking his great blow and
saving his reputation.
During this period of waiting and of preparation to depart,
appeals from many quarters came pouring in upon Moore, begging
him to advance at all costs and make his presence felt by the
French. The first dispatehes which he received were written before
his determination to retreat was known: after it was divulged, his
correspondents only bccnme the more importunate and clamorous,
Simultaneous pressure was brought to bear upon him by the British
ambassador at Amnjucz, by the Supreme Junta, by the genernl
who now commanded the wrecks of the Spanish army of Galicia,
and by the military authorities at Madrid, Each onc of them
had many and serious considerations to set before the harassed
Commander·in·chief.
Moorc had been so constantly asserting that Blake's old' Anny of
the Left' had been completely dispersed and ruined, that it must
have been somewhat of a surprise to him when the Marquis of
La Romana wrote from Leon, on No,·ember 30, to say that he was
now at the head of a considerable foI'C(), and hoped to co-operate in
the oncoming campaign. The Galicians had rallied in much greater
1 The heavy ammunition and all the sick who could be moved were sent off
on Dec. 6, under the escort. of the 6jOOth. See Moore'lI 'General Onlel'll' (or
that day, and Ormsby, ii. M.
~ Moon to CasUereagb, (rom ~lamanca, Nov. 29.
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numbers than had been expected: their losses in battle had not
been very great, and the men had dispersed from sheer want of food
mther than from a desire to desert their colours. Their equipment
was in the most wretched condition, and their shoes worn out:
but their spirit was not broken, Qud if they could get food :md
clothing, they were quite prepared to do their duty. La Romana
enclosed a dispatch of Soult'$ which had been intercepted, and
remarked that the news in it (apparently a statement of the
marshal's intention to move westward) made it advisable that
the ]~l1g1ish and Spanish armies ~hollld at once concert measures
for n j ullction l•
All that the Marqnis stated wns perfectl)' true: his army was
growing rapidly, for his muster-rolls of December 4 showed that
he had already 15,600 men with the colours, exclusive of sick and
wounded; ten days later the lIumber luul gone up to ~2,800 2.
This was a force that could 110t be entirely neglected, e\'en though
the mcn were in a dire state of nakedness, and were only just
recovering from the efl-ects of their dreadful march from Reynosa
(l.Cl'OSS the Callwbriun hills. Mool'c had nlways stated, in his
dispatches to Castlcreagh, that there was no Spanish army with
which he could co-operalc. He was now offered the aid of 15,000
men, under a veteran officer of high reputation and undoubted
patriotism. The propostll to retreat on Portugal seemed even less
honourable than before, when it involved the desertion of the
Mnrquis and his much-tried hosl
Not long after the moment at which La Romana's dispatch
came to hand, there mrived at Salnmanca two officers deputed
by the Central Junta to make a final appeal to Moore. These
were Don Vcntura Escalant.c, Captain-General of the kingdom
of- Granada, and the Brigadier-General Augustin Bueno. They
had started from Amnjucz on November ~8, and seem to have
arrived at the British head quarters Oil December g or 4;. They
brought a letter from Don Martin de Gamy, the secretary to the
Junta, stating that they were nuthoriZl.>d to treat with Moore
for the drawing up of a plan of campaign, 'by which the troops of
his Britannic Majesty may act in concert with those of Spain,
accelerating a combined movement, and ayoidillg the delays that
I La llomaDa to Moore, from LeOll, Nov. 30.
2 See the 'llIomiug states' for the army of Galicia 011 Dec. 4 alld Dec. 14,
in Arteche (iv. .532,533). .
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are so prejudicial to the noble enterprise ill which the two nations
are engaged 1,' The proposal that the two generals made would
appear to have been that Moore should march on Madrid by
the Guadarrama Pass, picking up Hope's division on the way. and
ordering Baird to follow as best he could. They wished. to
demonstrate to their despondent ally that it was possible to· con-
centrate for the defence of Madrid a force sufficient to hold the
Emperor at bay. If the British cwne up, they hoped even to
be able to repulse him with decisive effect. They alleged that
Cnstaiios had escaped from Tudela with the Andalusian dhisions
almost intact, and must now be at Guadalajara, quite close to the
'capital, with 25,000 !,"OOd troops. Heredia, with the rallied
Estremaduran nnny, was at Scgovia, and had 10,000 bayonets: San
Juan ,vith 12,000 men was occupying the impregnable Somosierra.
Andalusian and Castilian levies were coming in to Madrid every
day-they believed that 10,000 men must already be collected.
This would constitute when united a mass of nearly 60,000 men:
if Moore brought up 20,000 British troops all must go well, for
Napoleon had only 80,000 men in the north of Spain. After
deducting the army sent against Saragossa, and the detachments
at Burges and in Biscay, as also the corps of Soult, he could not
have much more than 20,000 men concentrated for the attack
on Madrid. All this ingenious calculation was based on the
fundamental misconception that the French armies were only
one-third of their actual strength-which far exceeded 200,000
men. But on this point Moore was as ill informed as the Spaniards
themselves, and the causes which he alleged for refusing to march
on Madrid had nothing to do with statistics. He informed them
that his reasons for proposing to retreat on Portugal were that
the Spanish armies were too much demoralized to offer successful
resistance to the Emperor, and that the road. to the capital was
now in the possession of the French. He then introduced
Colonel Graham, who had just returned from a meeting with
San J uall, and hud hen.rd from him the story of the forcing of the
Somosierra on November 29. Of this disaster Escalante and
Bueno were still ignorn.nt: they had to learn from English lips
that the French were actually before the gates of Madrid, that
Heredia and San Juan were in flight. and that their junction with
Castallos (wherever that general might now be) had become
I l\lartin de Garay to Moore, from Aranjuez, No\'. 28, 1808.
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impossible. This appalling Ilews deeply affected Escalante and
Bueno, but they then turned to urging Moore to unite with
La Romana, and march to the relief of Madrid. The British
general replied that he did 110t believe that the :Marquis had
5,000 men fit to take the field along with the Dritish 1, and that
any such scheme would be chimerical. His whole bearing towards
the emissaries of the Junta seems to have been frigid to the verge
ofdiscourtesy. How much they irritated him may be gathered from
the account of the interview which he sent to Mr. Frere two days
later. In language that seems ycry inappropriate in an official
dispatch-destined ere long to be printed as a 'Parliamentary
Paper'-hc wrote: 'The two generals seemed to me to be two weak
old men, or rather women, with whom it was impossible for me to
concert any military operntions, even had I been so inclined. Their
conferences with me consisted in questions, and in assertions with
regard to the strength of different Spanish corps, all of which
I knew to be erroneous. They neither knew that Segovia or the
Somosicrru were in the hands of the enemy. I shall be obliged
to you to save me from such visits, which are very painful 2.'
It is clear that thc mission of Esculunte and Bueno had no great
share in determining Sir John to abandon his projected retreat on
Portugal, though it may possibly have had some cumulative eH'ect
when taken in conjunction with other appeals that were coming
in to him at the same moment. It was quite otherwise with the
dispatches which he received from the authorities at Madrid, and
from the Dritish ambassador at Aranjuez: in them we may find
the chief causes of his changed attitude. The ~Iadrid dispatch
was written by MorIa and the Prince of Cnstelfranco-the two
militAry heads of the Junta of Defence which had been created
on December I-in behalf of themselves and their colleagues. ]t
was scnt off early on December 2, before Napoleon had begun to
press in upon the suburbs, for it spenks of the city as menaced,
not as actually attacked by the enemy. It amowltoo to an appeal
to Moore to do something to help Madrid-not necessarily (as has
been often stated) to throw himself into the city, but, if he judged
1 This answer is recorded in the despairing appeal which Escalante wrote
to i\Ioore from Calzada de R:lfios on Nov. 7, lIfter IlO.I'illg started back to join
the Junta. The rest of Moore's arguments can be gathered from hig own
dispatchea.
t Moore to FrereJ from Salamanc.1., Dec. G,1808.
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it best, to ll1auomvrc on the flank and rear of the Emperor's armr.
so as to distract him from his pre;;ent design. The writers stated,
in Illllch the same terms that Escalallte and BUCllO had used, that
Castmlos with 25,000 men from Tudelo. and San Juan with
10,000 men from the Somosierra were converging on the capital,
find added that the Jtmtn had got together 40,000 men for its
defence. 'Vith this mass of new levies they thought that they
could hold off for the IllOlltent the forces that Napoleon had dis-
pl~red in front of them; but when his reserves and reinforcements
came up the situation would be more dangerous. Wherefore they
made no doubt that the British general would move with the
rapidity that was required in the interests of the allied nations.
They supposed it probable that 1\1oore hntl already uuill....J. with
La Romann.'s arm)". and that the two forces would be able to act
together.
There is no reason to think, with Napier and with Maore's
biographer 1, that this dispatch was written by Moria with the
treacherous intent of involving the British army in the catastrophe
that was impending over the capital. MorIa ultimately betrayed his
country and joined King Joseph, but there is no real proof that
he contemplated doing so before the fall of Madrid. The lettel'
was signed not only by him but by Caste1franco. of whose loyalty
there is no doubt, and who was aetualIYa.ITeStcd and imprisoned
by Bonaparte. Moreoyer, if it hnd been designed to draw Moore
into the Emperor's clutches, it would not have given him the
perfectly sound advice to fall upon the communications of the
French army after uniting with La Romana-the precise move
that the British general made ten days later with such effect.
It would have begged him to enter :Madrid, without suggesting
allY other alternative.
Moore had always stated that his reluctance to advance into
Spain had been due, in no small degree, to the apathy which he
had found there; but now the capital, as it seemed, was about
to imitate Saragossa and to stand at bay behind its barricades.
Hc had no great confidence in its power to hold out, 'I own,'
he wrote to Castlereagh, 'that I cannot derive much hope from
the resistance of onc town ~oninst forces so formidable, unless the
1 Sec James Moore (p. 00-7), wllerc lie vilely nlistrallslates the letter-el'en
rcudcring IJorle by , country' ; :lUll Napicr (i. :">111), where the l>:lJlIC aCCllsation
is formulated.
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spark catches and the Rame becomes pretty generaP.' But he
could realize the dishonour that would rest upon his own head if,
as lIOW seemed possible, Madrid were to make a desperate resistan~J
and at the same moment the British anny were to be seen executing
unmolested 0. tame retreat on Portugal. The letter of MorIa and
Castelfranco he might perhaps have disregarded, suspecting the
usual Spanish cxnggcrntions, if it had stood alone. But it was
backed up by an appeal from the most important British sources.
Mr. Stunt!;, whose forecasts Moore hnd always respected 'becnl1se
they were far from optimistic 2, had written him to the effect t~t
'the retrograde movement'! of the British divisions were likely to
produce an effect not less serious than the most decisive victory on
the part of the enemy.' F'rere, the newly arrived ambassador to
the Central JWlta, launched out into language of the strongest
kind. He had already discovered that his opinions were funda-
mentally opposed to those of Moore: this was but natural, as the
general looked upon the' problem that lay before him from a
military point of view, while the ambassador could only regard
its political aspect. Any impartial observer can now sce that the
advance of the British army into Spain was likely to be a hazardous
matter, evcn if' Hope and Baird succeeded in joining the main body
at Salamanca. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the Spanish
government would have every reason to regard itself as having
been abandoned and betroycd, if that advance were not made.
Balancing the one danger against the other, it seems evident that
Frcre WtlS right, and that it wtlS Moore's dut)· to make a diversion
of some sort against the French. Executed all any day before
Madrid fell, such a movcment would have disturbed Bonapartc and
distracted him from his main plan of operations. Nor would the
operation have been so hazurdous ns Moore supposed, since his
jlUlction with Hope had become certain when that general reached
lleiiaranda, while Baird had never had any French troops in his
neighbourhood. The retreat on Galicia WIIS always open: that on
Portugal was equally available till the moment when the capitu-
lation of Madrid set free great mnsscs of Bonaparte's central
reserve.
In his earlier epistles to Moore Frerc had deprecated the idea of
a retreat, and had suggested that if for military reasons an advance
I l\foore to Castlereagll, from SalllIlulllca, Dec. 6.
2 Stuart to MOOI1l, from Madrid, Nov. 30.
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should be impracticable, it would at least be possible that the
British army might remain 011 Spanish ground. He had soon
learnt that the general entertained ycry different views, and his
penultimate letter, that of November 30, shows signs of pique
at the small impression that his arguments had made upon his
correspondent 1. Now on De":ember 3 he wrote from Talavera,
whither he had followed the Supreme Junta in their flight, to try
his last effort. To his previous arguments he had only one more
to add, the fact that on December 1-2 the people of Madrid were
showing that spirit of fanatical patriotism which Maore had sought
in vain hitherto among the Spaniards. The populace, us he had
learnt, was barricading the streets and throwing up batteries:
30,000 citizens and peasants were now under arms. Consi·
dering their spirit, he had no hesitation in taking upon himself
the responsibility of representing the propriety, not to say the
necessity, of doing something in their behalf. The fate of Spain
depended absolutely, for the moment, on some help being given by
the British army. Frere had first-hand evidence of the enthusiasm
which was reigning in Madrid on the first day of December, having
spoken to several persons who had just left the capital, including
a French hnigre colonel, one Charmilly, to whose care he entnlsted
his last letter to the COllllllander~in-ehief. But so convinced
was he that no argument of his would affect Sir John Moore,
that he took a most improper step, and endeavoured to appeal to
the public opinion of the army over the head of its general. He
entrusted Charmilly with a second letter, which he was only to
deliver if Moore refused to countermlUld his retreat after reading
the first. This document was a request that in case Sir John
remained fixed in his original determinAtion, he would allow the
bearer of these letters to be examined before a Council of'Var.
Frcre thought that Charmilly's account of what was going 011 in
Madrid would appeal to the Brigadiers, if it had no effe<.t on the
Lieutenant-General-und probably he was not far wrong. Such
a plan struck at the roots of all military obedience: it could only
have occurred to a civilian. If ll.llyUling could have made the
matter worse, it was that the document should be entrusted not
I • I do Dot know Umt I Clln iD all)' way express with less offence the entire
difference of OUr opinions on this snbjed, than by forwarding what I had
already written, in igllorance of the detemlillatioll [to retreat] which you had
already taken' (Aralljuoo, Nov. 30).
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to a British officer but to a foreign adventurer, a kind of person to
whom the breach between the civil and military representatives
of Great Britain ought never to have been divulged. Moreover
eharmilly (thOllgh Frere was not aware of this fact) chanced to be
personally known to l\Ioore, who had a very bad opinion of him J.
The emigre W!lS said to hiwe l:tcen implicated ill the San Domingo
massacres of 1794, and to have been engaged of late in doubtful
financial speculations in London. To se.lld him to Salamanca with
such an errand seemed like a deliberate insult to the Commander-
in-chief. Frere was innocent of this intention, but the whole
business, even without this aggravation, was most unwise and
improper.
Charmilly handed in his first document on the evening of
December 5, a few hours after MorIa's messenger had dclivc~ed
the appeal from Madrid. :Moore received him in the most formal
way, dismissed him, and began to compare Frerc's information with
that of the Junta of Defence, of the emissaries from Aranjuez, and
of his other English correspondents. Putting all together, he fclt
his determination much shaken: Madrid., as it seemed, was really
about to defend itself: the preparations which were reported to
him bore out the words of Moria and C!lStelfranco. His own
army was seething with discontent at the projected retreat; Hope
being now only onc march away, at Alba de Tormes, hc could no
longer plead that he was unable to advance because he was destitute
of cavalry and guns. Moreover, he was now so far informed as to
the position-though not as to the numbers-of the French, that
he wus aware that there was no very serious forcc in front of hilfl~
self or of Baird: everything had been turned on to Madrid. Even
the 4th Corps, of whicll Hope had hen.rd during his march, was
evidently moving on Segovia and the Guadarrama.
Contemplating the situation, Moore's resolution broke down; he
knew what his army was saying about him at the present moment;
he guessed what his government would say, if it should chance that
Madrid made n heroic defence while he was retreating unpursu<.-d.
on Lisbon and Almeida. A man of keen ambition and soldierly
feeling, he could not bear to think thtlt he might be sacrificing
1 He had called 011 Sir Jolm a few days before, Wllile Oll his way to Madrid
to solicit a militllry post from tlle JUIlta. Moore wrote 011 Nov. 27 to
1\1r. Stuart, to sa}' that he had seen Mm aud that (lie never could help having
a dislike to people of this descriptiou.'
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his life's work and reputation to an over-conscientious caution.
SomewhCl'C betwccn eight o'clock and midnight on the night of
December 5 he made up his mind to countermand the retreat. He
dashed off' a short note to Castlereagh, and a dispatch to Haird,
and the thing waS done. To the war-minister he wrote that
'considerable hopes. were entertained from the enthusiastic manner
in which the people of Madrid resist the French.' This hope he
did not share himself, but' in consequence of the general opinion,
which is also 1\11'. Flocre's, I have ordered Sir David Baird to
suspend his march [to Corunna] and shall myself continue at this
place until I see further, and shall be guided by circulUstaIl:ccs.'
To Madrid he would not go till he was QCrtain that the toWll was
making a finn defence, and that the spirit of resistance was spreading
all over Spuin: but the plan of instant retreat on Portugal was
definitely abandoned 1. The dispatch to Haird shows even more
of the Generytl's mind, for he and his subordinate were personal
fdcnds, find spoke out freely to each other. '111e pcople of Mndrid,
Moore wrote, had takcn up arms, refused to capitulate, and were
barricading their streets-they snid that they would suffer any·
thing rather than snbmit. Probably all this came too late, and
Bonaparte was too strong to be resisted. 'There is, however, no
saying, and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial,
as Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received
this cvcning. All this appears very stranb"e and unsteady-but if
the spirit of enthusia.<JJn does arise in Spain, find the people will be
martyrs, there is no saying what our force may do.' Haird therefore
was to stay his march on Corunna, to make arrangel.nellts to return
to Astorga, and to send off'at once to join the main army one of
his three regiments of hussars 2. All this wns written ere midnight:
at early dawn Moore's mind was still further made up. He sent
to Sir David orders to push his' ca\'ulry to Zamora, his infantry,
brigade by brigade, to Bena\"ente, in the plains of Leon. 'What
is passing at Madrid llIay be dceish'e of the fate of Spain, and wc
must be at hand to take advantage of whatevel" happens. The
wishes of our l.:ount1'Y and our duty demand it of us, with whatever
risk it may be attended.... But if the bubble bursts, and Madrid
faUs, we shall have a run fOl" it. ... Both you and mc, though we
may look big, and determine to get e\'erything forward, )'et we must
1 i\foore toCastlereagJl, from Salamanca, Dec. li.
1 i\fooro to llaird, froUl Sa!amauc3, Dec. .5.
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never lose sight of this, that at ullY moment affairs may take the
tunl that will render it necessary to retreat 1.'
If only Moore had discovered on November 13, instead of 011
December 5, that events at Mw:lrid were importnnt, and that his
country's wishes and his duty required him to take a practical
interest in thcm, Ule winter cmnpaign of 1808 would have taken
-for good or evil-a "ery different shape from that which it
actnally assumed. Meanwhile his resolvc came too late. Madrid
had actually capitulated thirty-six hours before he received the
letters of Morla and of Frcrc. Moreover the offensh'e could not
be assumed till Baird should have retraced his steps from ViIla-
frallcn., and returned to the position at Astorga from whieh his
wholly unnecessary retreat had removed him.
A painful and rather grotesque scene had to be gOlle through on
the morning of Deccmber 6. Colonel Charlllilly had been l'C(:eived
by Moore on the previous night in such a dry and formal manner,
that it ne\'er occurred to him that the letter which he had delivered
was likely to have had any effect. Accordingly he presented
himself for Ule s<:(,'olld time ncxt morning, with Frcrc's supple-
mentary epistle, taking it for granted that retreat was still the
order of the day, and making the demand for the assembly of a
Council of ¥lar. Moore, fresh from the severe mental struggle
which attended the reversal of all his plans, was in no mood for
politeness. Righteously indignant at what seemed to him both
a deliberate personal insult, and an intrigue to undermine his
authority with his subordinates, he burst out into words of angel'
and contempt, and told his provost-marshal to expel Chal'lllill)'
from the camp without a moment's dc1ay~. "rhen Uds had beeu
done, he SH.t down to write a dispatch to F'rere, in which his
conscientious dcsil'C to avoid hard wonls with a British minister
struggled in vain with his natllral resentment. He began by
justifying his original resolve to retrcat; and then informed his
correspondcllt that 'I should never have thought of asking your
opinion or advice, as the detenninatioll was founded on circum-
stances with which you could not be acquainted, and was a question
1 i\Ioorc to Baird, from SnhLlU3L1ca, Dec. 6. The straLlge grammar would
seem to show that the letter was dashed off iu a hurry, and never revised.
I Clmrmilly, greatly indignant, published n. narrative of tl,e whole, ill
which he justified himself aud his chaI'".lCtcr. It does not alter the "miD facts
of the case.
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purely military, of which I thought myself the best judge.' When
he mndc up his mind, the army had been hopelessly divided into
fractions, and there was good reason at that moment to fear
that the French would prevent their (.'OllccntrntiOll. But as the
resistance made by the people of l\.o[adrid had deterred Bonaparte
from detaching any corps against him, alld the junction of the
British divisions now seemed possible, the situation was changed.
"Vithout being able to say exactly in what manner, everything
shall be done for the tlSsisLmcc of Madrid, and the Spanish cause,
that can be expected from an anny such as I command.' But
Moore would not move till Baird affie up. and even then, he said,
he would ollly have g6,OOO men fit fol' duty!. Delieving that
Frere's conduct had been inspired by a rC1:,'1lrd for the public
welfare, he should abstnin from any comment on the two letters
brought by Colonel Channill)'. But he must confess that he
both felt and expressed much indignation at t1 person of that s.ort
being made the channel of communication between them. 'I h[we
prejudk-es against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put
any trust in him. I shall therefore thank you not to employ him
in an)' cummunirotion with me 'to'
Moore had kept his temper more in hand than might have been
expected, considering the provocation that he had received: the
same cannot be said for Frere, whose next letter, written from
Tru.~no on December 9, ended by informing the general that· if
the British army had OC'Cll sent abroad for the express o~ject of
doing the utmost possible mi~ehief to the cause of Spain, short
of actually firing upon the Spanish troops, thc)' would have most
completely fulfilled their purpose by carrying out exactly the
measures which they have takcn 3,' This was unpardonablc lo.n-
gu~<:re from one official "Titing a state paper to another, and it is
regrettable to find that Frcrc made no formal apology for it ill
his later dispatches. Even when he discovered that Moore was
actually executing a diversion against the communications of the
French army, he only wrotc that he WftS 'highly gratified' to find
that they were at last agreed on the advisability of such a
J His muster-I"ol\g 8110W 33,000 troops in all, with 29,000 actually present
with the colours, but Lcith's brigade Rnd the 1:I2nd, 2,53!3 men, were not up.
2 Moore to Frcre, I>ec. G. 'fhe version presellted to Parliament has been
somewhat expurgated: I quote from that given by James Moore.
, Frere to Moore, from Truxillo, Dec. 9.
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move 1. Frere's uncontrolled expressions showed that he was entirely
tmfit for a diplomatic post, and cannot be too strongly rcprobated.
At the same time we are forced to concede that his main thesis
wus pcrf<.'Ctly true: nothing could have been more w1hllPPY than
that the aid of a British army of 3S,000 men should have been
promised to Spain: that the arllly SliOuld have marched late, in
isolated divisions and by the wrong roads: that after its van had
reached Salamanca on November IS. it should lIot have taken onc
step in advance up to December 5: that just as Madrid was
attacked it should tamely begin to retreat 011 Coruuna and Li~bon.
Moore was only partly responsible for all this; but it is certain
that the whole series of movements had in truth beeu calculated
to do the utmost possible mischief to the cause of Spain and of
Englund. If Moore had died or been superseded 011 December 4,
1808, he would have been written dO\\'l as wellnigh the worst
failure in all the long list of incompetent British (,'ommanders since
the commencement of the Revolutionary V{ar.
It is, therefore, with all the greater satisfaction that wc now·
pass on to the second part of the campaign of the British army in
Spain, wherein Moore showed himself as resourceful, rapid. and
enterprising as he had hitherto appeared slow and hesitating.
H(wing once got rid of the overcaution which had hitherto
governed his movements, and having made up his mind that it
was right to run risks, he showed that the high reputation which
he enjoyed in the British anny was well deserved.
Moore's first intention, as is shown b)' his orders to llaird and
his letters to Castlereagh, was merely to disturb the :French corn·
. mUllications by a sudden raid ou Valladolid, 01' even on Burgos,
If Madrid was really holding out, the Emperor would not be a.ble
to send any large detachment against him, unless he mude up his
mind to raise the siege of the capital. It was probable that
Bonaparte would consider the destruction of all English army of
even more importance than the prosecution of the siege, and that
he would come rushing northward with all his amly, In that
case, as :Maore wrote to Baird, 'wc ~hnll havc a run for it,' Lut
Madrid would be saved. In short, Napoleon wa.'; to be treated
like the bull in the o.renu, who is lured away from a fallell M\'crsnry
by having a red cloak dangled before his c}'es. Supposing that
the main force of thc French were turned upon him, Moore was
1 .lo'rcrc to 1\1oore, from l'oIcrida, Dee. 14.
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perfectly well llWn.rc that his line of retreat on l'ortugal would
be cut, for troops marching from the neighbourhood of :Madrid,
via the Guadarrama Pass, might easily sei7.c Salamanca. But it
is onc of the privileges of the possessor of sea-power that he can
change his base whenever he chooses, and Moore wrote to Castle-
reagh to IOCqucst tlll1t transport!> might be massoo at Corunna
for the reception of his army. If forced to fall back on that
place he intended to sail round to Lisbon or to Cadiz, as cit'cum-
stances might dictate.
In the unlikely event of Bonaparte's persisting in the siege of
Madrid, and sending only small detachments against the British
army, Moore thought that he would be strong enough to make
matters verr unpleasallt for the enemy ill Old Cnstilc. If he beat
the forces immediately opposed to him, and seized Valladolid and
Burgos, the Emperor would be compelled to come north, whether
he wished it or no:
All these plans werc perfectly rcasonable and well concerted,
'Considering the information that was at Moore's disposition on
December 6. But that information was based on two false
premises: the one was that Madrid was likely to hold out for
some little time-Moore never supposed that it (:ould be for very
long, for he remained fi.xed in his distrust of Spanish civic virtues :
thc second was that the French army in the north of Spain did
not amount to more than 80,000 or 100,000 men, an estimate
which had been repeated to him by every Spaniard with whom
he had communicated, and which had been confirmed, not only
by Frere, but by Stuart and other English correspondents in whom
he had some confidence. If he had known that the French had
entered Madrid on December 4, and that they numbered more
than ~50,OOO bayonets and Silbrcs, his plans would have been
profoundly modified 1.
1 Moore's plans between Dec. G and 10, the day on wllicll 11e got news of
tile faU of .Madrid, must be gathered from his rather meagre dispat.elles to
<':astlereagh of midlligllt, D~. 5, alld of Dec. 0; from his much more explicit
letters to l~rore on Dec. {; and 10; from that to La ltomana on Dec. 8; and
most of ull from the very interesting Hnd t:onfidential letters to Bain! on
Dec. 6 and 8.
His doubts as to the permanence of the outburst of enthusiasm in Madrid
"1'''' plainly expressed ill neuly every ooe of thC!lC ellistlcs. The terrible
Ululer-estimate of NapolCQu's disposable forces is to be found in that to
Castlereagh Oil Dec. 12, where he writes that' the Freueh force in Spaio
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Maore's original intention was to move on Valladolid, It great
centre of roads, and a sort of halfway-house between Burgos and
Madrid. Meanwhile, Baird was to come down from Astorga via
Benavente, and to converge on the same point. A cavalry screen
in front of the combined force was formed, by pushing the two regi-
ments which belonged to Moore's own corps towards Alaejos and
Tordesillas., on the south bank of the Douro; while Bait-d's cavalry
brigade, under Lord Pngct, made a forced march fmm Astorgn.
to Toro, and extended itself north of the river. Moore's infantry
was not to move till the tenth, but that of Buil'd was already
returning as fast as it could manage from Villafranca to Astorga.
The unfortunate orders of retreat, issued on November 29, had
cost Sir David six marches, three from Astorga to Villafranca and
three from Villo.franen to ..Astorgn-time lost ill the most miserable
and unnecessary fashion. One of his brigades, that of General
Leith I, Wll..!lUOW so far ofi' that it never managed Lo overtake Lhe
army, and was out of the game for something like a fortnight.
But the rest., which had only to reLurn from Villafranca 2, sue~
cecded in joining the main body in much better time than might
have ~n expected. The fact was that the nev."S of an advance
had restored the high spirits of the whole army, and the men
'stepped out splcndidly through the cold aud rainy winter days,
and easily accomplished their twenty miles between dawn and dusk.
Maore, meallwhilc, was occupied aL Salamanca. in making the
last preparations for his advance. He had already sent back into
POltngal one htrge convoy on December 5, escorted by the fifth
battalion of the 60th Regiment. He now dispatched another which
marched by Ciudad Uodrigo, where it picked up the grd Foot, who
guarded it back to Portugn.l3. The two between them contained
all his henvy ooggage, and all the sick from his base hospital who
could bear transport-probably more than 1,500 invalids: for the
total number of the sick of UIC army was very nearly 4,000, and
the larger half of them mnst have belonged to M001'e'S own corps,
may fairly be set down at 80,000 men, be6ides what is ill Catalonia.' Acting
0llOn this llypothesili, it is no wonder that lie was con\'inced that Bonaparte
could Qot both besiege Madrid and hunt the British army.
I Consisting ofthe 51st Regiment, 59th (2nd batt.), and 70tl1.
, Except the' Light Brigade' of Bainl's army which had nCl'er left Astorga,
havillg been intended to act with the cavalry as a rearguard.
3 'nle 3rd lLad been atCiuJad Rodrigo liince Oct. 2!:lguardingcommuuicatiollS.
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which was in worse trim than that of Baird. The loss of the
regiments sent off 011 escOlt duty WM partly made up Il felV days
later by the arriml of the 8~nd, which came up by forced marches
from Oporto, and reached Bemwente on De(:ember 26. It was
the leading battalion of a brigade which the government had
resolved to add to Moore's force from the slender di\-ision of
Cnu:lock: the other two battalions of the brigade were too far
behind, and ne\'er succeeded in joining the field-army 1. Allowing
for these final changes wc find that Moore and Baird started forth
with 29,946 effective sabrcs and bayonets-in which are included
1,681 men on detachmcnt: they left behind them nearly 4,000
sick 2. If we deduct 2,539 for Leith's brigade, which was still far
beyond Villafranca, and for the belated 82nd, the actual force which
carried out the great raid into the plain of Old Castile must have
been just over 25,000 strong: of these 2,450 were cavalry, and
there. were 1,297 artillery gunners and drivers with sixty-six guns.
I\Ioore had, of eoutsC, given noti(."e to La Romana of his ehange
of plan: in response to his letter of December 6 the Marquis
expressed his pleasure at the prospect of the union of the allied
armies, and his wish to co-operate to the best of his power 3. He
had now collected 20,000 men-& formidable army on paper-and
wn.s certain to do his best, but what that might amount to was
very doubtful. It was well known that a great part of his troops
were not fit to move: but it was not till a few days later that
Moore received definite intelligence as to the exact amount of
military aid that might be furnished by the army of the Left,
The British troO!)S were fully committed to their new plan of
campaign-Duird was hastening back to Astorga, the sick and the
convoys had started for Portugal, the cavalry had pushed well
to the front-when Moorc suddenly received a piece of intelligence
which profoundly modified the situation. Madrid had fallen into
1 'Ibey were the 4&11 (1st hatt.) and the 97t11.
I Soo t1le tables in the Appendix. It seems to result that the gross total
W110 marched from Corunna and Lisbon lI"as 33,B84, that the deduction of
3,938 sick lea,'cs 29,9,HJ. .Leith's battalions and ti,e 82ud were 2,539 slrong.
the mOll on Iletaelllllellt 1,687: this leavcs 25,720 for the actual marching
force.
~ As J\,.rteche very truly obser\"l~, the letter of Lt!. Romana cannot be Il3fe1y
"1uoted (after tllo fashion of .fmneg Moore Oil his p. 122) as apIJroving of the
retreat Oil Portugal. He is ans"'ering the dispatch of Dec. 6, 1I0t that of
NOI'.28.
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the hands of Bonaparte: the news was brought by Colonel Graham,
who had been sent off with the reply to Morlo. and Castelfranco.
F9rced to make a long detour, because all the direct roads were
known to be in the hands of the French, he had fallen in at
'l'alavera with the fugitive army from the Escurial, and had almost
witnessed the murder of San Juan. From information given him
by various persons, and especially by two belated members of the
Central Junta, he learnt that Napoleon had stormed the Retiro
and the Prado, and that Morm ho.d signed a capitulation. The
populace were said to be still in possession of their arms, and it
was supposed that there would be much trouble in pacifying the
city; but there was no doubt that, from a military point of view, it
was in the Emperor's power I,
Considering Moore's carlier doubts and hesitations, we should
almost hnvc expected that this news would have induced him to
throw up his whole plan for an advance into Old CasWe, and once
more to order a retreat on Almeida. But he evidcntly considered
that he was now committed to the raid on Bonaparte's lines of
communicatioll, and thought thut, even if he could not Sll.\'C Madrid,
he could at least distract the enemy from an attempt to push
further south, and gi\'c the Spanish armies time to rally. Therc
was a chance, as he \\Tote to Castlereagh 2, that he might effect
something, and hc should take it, committing himself to Fortune:
•If she smiles we may do some good: if not, we shall still I hope
have the merit of baving done all that we could. The army, for
its numbers, is excellent, and is (I am confident) quite determined
to do its duty.'
On December 11 the infantry at last began to move forward
from Salamanca-a month all hut two days had elapsed since its
vanguard reached that city. On that day the reserve division,
nnder General E. Paget, and Bercsford's brigade of F'raser's
division marched for Toro, where they found Lord Paget with
Baird's cavalry, rco.dy to cover their advance. These troops wcre
to form the left-hand column of the advance on Valladolid. On the
Ilext day Hope's detachment from Alba de Tormes, and the brigades
of Bentinck, Fane, Hill, and Charles Alten from Salamanca, which
formed the right-hand column, marched for Alaejos and Torde-
sillas. In front of them was Charles Stewart's cavalry bribraUC,
1 Grnlmm to l\fOOtC, from Talavera, Dec. 7--8.
~ i\1oore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dee. 10.
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which, on the same evening (December 12), fell upon a French
cavalry patrol at Rucdn and cnptured it whole, only one mnn
escaping. The prisoners turned out to belong to the 2flnd Chasseqrs
of Franceschi's cavalry division, which, as it was discovered, Liy
at Valladolid without any infantry supports I. They e.'Xpressed
the greatest surprise at finding themselves assailed by English
cavalry, as they were under the impression that Maore had
retired on Lisbon some days before. This side-light on the
general ignorance prevailing in the French army as to the position
and designs of the British was "ery "aluable: the first meeting
with the encmy, trifling as was the Sll(:CCSs, promised well for the
future.
On the thirteenth Maore himself came up from Salamanca to
Alaejos, where he overlook the infantry. Stewart's cavalry mean-
while pushed on to Tordesillas and Medina del Campo, without
coming across any traces of the French. At Tordesillas they found
themselves ill touch with Lord Pllf:,"Ct's horsemen on the other side
of the Douro, who had also met with no opposition whatever. On
the fifteenth the whole army would have converged on Valladolid,
if "Moore's originnl intention had been carried ant. But a fortunate
lU:cident intervened to prevent this march, which would have placed
thc British troops nearer to Madrid aud to the Emperor than did
the route which they finally adopted.
1.11ere was brought to Moore at Alaejo$ an intercepted dispatch
from Berthier to Soult, containing the most valuable information.
1.11e officer bearing it had been sent off from Madrid without an
escort, according to the Emperor's usual habit-a habit that cost·
thc lives of somc scores of unfOltunate aidcs·dc-cump during the
first year of the Peninsular War. It was only by experience that
Napoleon and his marshals learnt that isolated officers travelling in
this fashion were devoted in Spain to probable death and possible
torture, as Marbot (after a pel"SOual experience of the kind) bitterly
obscrved. The bearer of this particular dispatch had been
murdered by peasants at the post.house of Valdestillos, neat'
Segovia.
The document was full of invaluable facts and details. It
informed Soult that with his existing force-the two infantry
divisions of Merle and Monton, and the four cavalry regiments of
I '11lere were tllirty of these dragoons; witll tllem were fifty infantry,
31lparcntly a belated dctail or for-..gillg I);lrty frUllI Lcfohvro'a corps.
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Franceschi's division I_he was strong enough to march straight be·
fore him from Saldana, and to overrun the whole kingdom of Lean.
He was to seize the towns of Loon, Zamora, and Bcnavcllte, and to
sweep the debris of the army of Gulicia into its native mountains.
He would find nothing else to oppose him; for the English, as all
accounts agreed. were in full retreat 011 Lisbon. They hnd last been
heard of at Salamanca and the Escurial. A knowledge of thi>l
plan was valuable to Moore, but still more so was what followed
-a sketch of the position of the French army at the moment when
the dispatch was written. The advanced guard of the 'Grand Army'
(Lefcbvrc's corps) was at Talavera, and would shortly be at Dadajos:
Bessicres was chasing Castnilos beyond the Upper Tagus, on the
rood to Valencia. MorHer's and Junot's corps had roochcd Spain:
the former had been ordered off to aid in the siege of Saragossa :
the latter was on the march to Burgos,lLnd its leading division had
reached Vittoria. The chief omission was that Berthier did not
mention the Imperial Guard or the corps of Ney, which werc in or
about Madrid when he wrote, and were probably destined to follow
Lcfebvrc's march on Badujos und Lisbon. The dispatch ends with
the curious note that· His Majesty is in the best of health. The
city of Mudrid is quite tranquil; the shops are open, theatricul
amusements have been resumed, and you would never suppose that
our first uddresscs to the place had been emphasized by 4,000
cannon-balls 2.'
Moore was thus placed in possession of the EmPeror's plan of
campaign, and of the dislocation of the greater part of his anny.
Most important of all, he discovered that his own position and
designs were wholly unsuspected. His mind was soon made up;
Soult, as it sccmetl, with his 15,000 or 16,000 men at Saldroia and
Canion, was about to move forward into Leon. He would thus
be plau..'<1 ut an enormous distunce fl"Om the Emperor, and would
have no solid supports save the leading division of Junot's corps,
which must now be drawing near to Burgos. If he wlvlUlced, the
whole British army, aided by whatever troops La Romana could
produce, might be hurled upon him. The results could not be
I llenhier speaks as if Mouton were still commanding one of Soult·s
divisions, but he was 1l0lV gOlle, and Mennct's name ougllt to appear.
I This dispatch, though often published, 113S beell deliberately omitted
(like son.le others) in the C(Jrre6jJQnd(lllce de 1\Tap<J/&m, vo!. xviii, probably
bccause it shows the EllljlCror iu onc of his least Olllnisdcut llIoods.
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doubtfu4 and a severe defeat inflicted on the 2nd Corps would
shake the hold of the French on Northern Spain, and ruin all the
Emperor's plans. Moreover the region where Soult might be
looked for, about Carrion, Sahagtm, nnd Mayorgn, was far more
remote from Madrid than the Valladolid country, where Moore
was originally intending to strike his blow, so that several days
would be gained before the Emperor could interfere.
Accordingly, on December 15, the whole army suddenly changed
its direction from eastward to northward. The left·hand column
of the infantry crossed the Douro at Zamora, the right·hand
column at Toro. The cavalry, screening the march of both, went
northward from Torc:lesillas to the banks of the Sequillo, pushing
its advanced parties right up to Valladolid, and driving back the
dragoons of Franceschi, several of whose detachments they cut off,
capturing a colonel and more than 1\ hundred men. They inter-
cepted the communications between Burgos and Madrid to such
effect that Bonaparte believed that the whole British imny was
moving on Valladolid, and drew up his first plan of operations
under that hypothesis 1•
Meanwhile four good marches [December 16-20] carried Moore's
infantry from Zamora and Toro by the route Villalpalldo-Valderas
to Mayorga. The weather was bitterly cold, which in onc way
favoured the movement, for the frost hardened the country ronds,
which would otherwise have been mere sloughs of mud. A little
snow fell trom time to time, but not enough to incommode the
troops. They marched well, kept their discipline, and left few
sick or stragglers behind. This was the result of l:,'OOd spirits, for
they qad been told that they would meet the French before the
wcek was out. At Mayorgn the junction with Baird's column was
safely effected.
'Vhen the army had thus completed its concentration, Sir John
Moore, for reasons which it is not quite eusy to understand, re-
arranged all its units. He formed it into four divisions and two
I It is dear from Nap. Corregp., 14,614, 14,616-7, that Franceschi actuaU)'
evacnated Vlllladolitl and retired noTtlllvarl1s. Nllpolcoll at tirst beliel'ed
tbat Moore bad occupied the place: but 14,620 mentions that no more
happened than that 100 hussars swooped down on it ou Dec. 19, and carried
off" the intcndant of the province and 300,000 real8 (£3,000) from the treasury.
This cxploit is omitted b)' nearly every English writer. Only Vivio.n mcntiOllS
it in his diary, and says that the lucky captors belonged to the 18th Hus..oaf8
(Mbuoirg, p. !J.!). What ~ame of the money?
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independent light brigades. The 1st Division was given to Sir
David Baird, the 2nd to Sir John Hope. the 3rd to General Fraser,
the 4th (or Reserve) to General E. P~t. The two light brigades
were under Charles Alten and Robert Crawfurd (now as always
to be carefully distinguished from Catlin Crnwfurd, who commanded
a brigade of Hope's division). All the old arrangements of the
army of Portugal were broken up: Baird was given three regiments
which had come from Lisbon: ou the other hand he had to make
over four of his Corunna battalions to Hope and two to Fraser.
Apparently the idea of the Commander-ill-chief wus to mix the
corps who had already had experience of the French in Portugal
with the comparatively raw troops who had landed ill Gnlicill.
Otherwise it is impossible to understand the gratuitous divorce of
regiments which had been for somc time accustomed to act together.
The cavalry was formed as a division of two brigades under Lord
Paget: the three hussar regiments from CorwUla formed one, under
General Slade; the two corps from Lisbon the other, under Charles
Stewart, the brother of Lord Castlcreagh. Of the wholc army
only the 82nd and Leith's brigade were still missing: the former
had not yet reached Bcnavcntc. The belated regiments of the latter
were still on the further side of Astorga, and never took any part
in the advance.
During this march Moore at last got full information as to the
state of La Romana's troops, and the aid that might be expected
fi'Om them. The Marquis himself, writing to contradict a false
l"CptHt that he was retiring on Galieia, (,'Onfessoo that two-thirds of
his 20,000 me]) wanted reclothing from head to foot, and that
there was a terrible want of haversacks, cartridge-boxes, and shoes.
He complained bitterly that the provinces (i. e. Asturias and
Galicia) were slack and tardy in forwarding him supplies, and laid
much of the blame all them 1. But he would move forward the
moment he could be assisted by Baird's troops in pressing the
l"rench in his fl'Ont. Hc reported that Soult had 10,000 infillltry
t Torefio, being 1111 Aaturian, is rather illlliglJlmt at Ronmnu's reflectioll 00
the Junta of his province, and observes! (i. 324) that the MarquiS did not
take tJle trouble to ask for help from them, only writing them a single letter
during his stay at Leou. But they seut him some tents, and took in some
of his sick. From Galicia there was coming for him an eoormoll'l convoy
with 100 wagons of English boot<:! and clothes; but it was three weeks too
late, allt! had only fClI.Clwu Lugo by Jun. L
534 MOORE'S ADVANCE TO SAHAGUN [Du. 20
at Saldana, Carrion, and Almanza, with cavalry out in advance at
Snhllgun: he dared not move across their front southward, for to
do so would uncover the high-road throngh Leon to the Asturias.
But the appearance of Baird on the Benavente-Palencia road
should be the signal for him to advance llo<Y3.inst the French in con·
junction with his allies I,
Romana's description of his army did not sound vcry promising.
But a confidential report from an English officer who had visited
his cantonments gave an even less fa\'ourablc account of the
Galicians. Colonel Symes had seen four of the seven divisions
which formed the' Army of the Left.' Hc wrote that the soldiers
were 'in general, stout young men, 'without order or discipline, but
not at all turbulent or ferocious. Their clothing was motley, and
some were half-nnkcd. Their manrellvres were very confusedly
periOl'med, and the officers were comparati\'ely inferior to the men.
The equipment Wtl8 miserablc : of sixtcclll1lCn of Gcncral Figucroo'::l
guard only six had bayonets. The springs and locks of the muskets
often did not <:orrespond. A portion of them-at least one-third
-would not explode, and a li'rench soldier could load and fire his
pie<.-e with precision thrice, before a Spaniard could fire his twice,'
Of the three divisions which he saw reviewed at Loon, one (the 5th,
the old troops from the Baltic) seemed superior to the rest, and was
armed with good English flrelocks: there was also a corps of light
troops, 1,000 men in uniform, who might be called respectable 2•
. . . '1,1Vithoul; undc,rvaluing the spirit of patriotism of the Spaniards,
which might in the end effect their de1ivernnce, the writer of the
reporl; could only say that they were not, and for a very long time
could not be, sufficiently improved in the art of war to be coadjutors
in a general action with the Britisll: if any reliance were placed
on Spanish aid in the field, tenible disappointment mu.<;t result:
• we must stand or fall through our own means 3.' Colonel Symes
doubted whether La Romans. would even dare to tnke his troops
into the field at all-wherein he did the Marquis grave injustice :
he had every intention of doing his best-though that best tunled
l Romana to Moore, from Leon, Dec. 14.
$ Possibly the two light infantry battalions (Catalonia and Barcelona) of
the Baltic division.
$ Syme!l to Raird, from Leon, Dec. 14. Baird, of COlU'S6J forwarded the
letter to Moore. I have cut down the report to one-third of its bulk, by
omitting the less important parts.
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out to be merely. the bringing to the front of the 7,000 or 8,000
men out of his 22,000, who were more or less armed and equipped,
while the rest were left behind as wholly WlScrviccablc.
With this document before him, Moore must have found a certain
grim humour in the perusal of a letter from the Supreme Junta.,
which reached him at Toro on December 16, informing him that
La Romnna would join him with 14,000 'picked men,' and that
within a month 30,000 more Asturian und Galician levies should
be at his disposal. This communication was brought to him by
Francisco Xavicr Caro, the brother of the Marquis, who was him·
self a member of the Junta. With him CAme Mr. Stuart, as an
emissary from the British minister, bringing the last of those
unhappy epistles which Frere had written before he knew that the
plnn of retreating on Portugal had been given up. We have
already quoted one of its insulting phrases on pflarte 524; the rest
was in the same strain. Fortunately, it could be disregarded, as
Moore was actuolly advancing on the enemy, with ll. definite
promise of help from La. Romana. Caro professed to be much
delighted that the JWltll.'S hopes were at last obtaining fruition.
Stum expressed surprise and grief at the tone of Frere's l~tters,
and 'seclllLxlnot much pleased at his mission 1.' This was the
last of the many troubles with the British and Spanish civil
authorities which were destined to harass the Commander-in-chief.
For the future it was only military cares that were to weigh upon
his mind.
On December 20 the army had concentrated at Mayorga. Some-
what to his disappointment Moore discovered that Soult had not
begun the advance on Leon which Bcrthier's intercepted dispatch
had ordered. Either no duplicate of it had been l'e<:eived by the
:Marshal, or he had been disconcerted by the report that the English
were on the move for Vnlladolid. That they were coming against
his own fon.'C he can as yet hardly have gu~. He was still in
his old position, one infantry division at Saldaiia, the other at
Carrion. Debelle's light-cavalry brigade lay in front as a screen,
with it'i head qnarters at Sahagnn, only nine miles from the English
advanced pkkets, which had reached the abbe)' of Melgar Abaxo.
The proximity of the enemy led Lord }Jaget, who showed him~
self throughout the campaign a most admirable and enterprising
cavalry commander, to attempt a surprise. Marching long ere
I Moore's diary, ,!uoted in Ili!l brother'1i memoir ofllim, pp. 141,142,
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dawn with the 10th and 15th Hussars, he reached the vicinity of
Sahagun without being discovered. Debelle had no outlying
vedettcs, and his main-guttrd on the high-road wns suddenly sur-
rounded and captured before it was aware that an enemy was near.
Only a single trooper escaped, but he aroused the town, and Pab"ct,
hearing the French tmmpets sounding in the streets, saw that he
must lose 110 time. He sent General Slade with the 10th Hussars
by the straight road into Sahagun, while he himself galloped
around it with the 15th to cut off the enemy's retreat. As he
reached the suburb he found Debclle forming up his two regiments
-the 8th Dragoons and the Ist Provisional Chasseurs-among
the snow~covered stumps of a vineyard. Nothing could be se<m of
the lOth, which was scouring the town, but 'Paget formed up the
15th for a charge. His fIrst movement was checked by an Wl-
expected ditch; but moving rapidly down it he crossed at a place
where it was practicable, and found Debelle changing front to meet
him. Catching the French before they had begun to move-their
new formation was not yet quite complcted-Pagct charged into
them ....'ithout hesitation, though the)' outnumbered him by nearly
two to onc. He completely rode down the front regiment, the
provisional chasselll'S, and flung it back on to the dragoons, who
broke and fled. The chasseurs, who were commanded by Colonel
Tascher, a cousin of the Empress Josephinc, were half destroyed :
two lieutenant-colonels, eleven other officers, and 157 men were
taken prisoners, twenty were killed, many were wounded I. The
regiment indt.w was so mauled that Bonaparte dissolved it soon
after, and replaced it in Ft-ancescru's division by the 1st Hussnrs,
which had just arrived from France.
This was perhaps the most brilliant exploit of the British cavalry
during the whole six years of the war. When the Peninsular
medals were distributed, llClLrly forty YClLrs after, a special clasp
was very rightly given for it, though many combats ill which a.
much larger number of mcn were engaged received no such notice.
While reading the records of later stages of the war the historian
must often regret thnt Vlellington never, till "Vatcrloo, had the
services of PI1bYet as commander of his light cavalry. 'l'here were
unfortunate personal reasons· which rendered the presence of the
I Compare Lord Londonderry (a participator in the charge), Vivian, Adam
Neale, and on the .French side, Colonel St. Cbamans, Soult's aide-dJXamp.
The Britjgl\ lost only 14 men (Vivian, p. !)7).
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victor of Sahagt:J.ll and Benavente impossible in the camp of the
victor of Vimiero 1.
The scared surviyors of Debelle's brigade rode back to gi....e Soult
notice that the enemy was upon him, and might close in on the
very next day. Meanwhile Moore's infantry, following in the wake
ofP~ret's horse, reached Sahagun on the evening of the twenty-first.
It wus to be almost their Inst step in advance. The general
allowed one day's rest to enable the renr divisions to close up to the
van, so that all might advance on Saldrula und Carrion in a compact
mass. He intended to deli"er his much-desired blow at Soult upon
the twenty·third.
The Duke of Dalmatia, though he had heard nothing as yet of
the British infantry, made the right inference from the vigorous
way in which his ca....alry had been driven ill, and concluded that
Moore was not far oft: Hc drew down his second infantry division
from Saldru1a to Carrion, thus concentrating his corps, and sent
aides-de·camp to Burgos and Palencia to hutTy up to his support
every regiment that could be found. The disposable troops tumed
out to be Lorges's division of drogoons, and Delahorde's division
of the 8th Corps, which were both on their way from Burgoo to
Madrid. The rest of JUllot's infantry was two days off; on the
road from Vittoria to Burbl'09. The brigade of Franeeschi's cavalry
which had evacuated Valladolid, was also heard of on the Palencia
road. No news or orden; had been 1"C<;eivcd fWIll Madrid, with
which place communication was now only poSSible by the route of
Aranda, that by Valludolid being closed.
If Moore, allowing his lllfantry the night of the twenty-first
and the morning of the twenty-second to recruit their strength, had
marched on Carrion on the afternoon of the latter day, he would
have caught Soult at a disadvrultagc at dawn 011 the twenty-tlIird,
for none of the supporting forces had yet got into touch with the
Mnrshnl. If the latter had dared to make lL stand, he would have
been crushed: but it is more probable that-being a prudent
genernl-he would have fallen back a march in the direction of
Burgos. But, as it chanced, Moore resolved to give his men forty·
eight hours instead of thirty-six at Sahagun-ffild twelve hours
I After his return from Spain in January, l8O'J, l)aget eloped with the wife
of Henry Welles1ey, the younger brother of Wellington. Naturally they
coulU not be placed together for many years, aud l'aget lost his chance of
seeing any more of the war. But at Waterloo he gloriotUlly viudicated his
reputation as the best living British eavalry-offieer.
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often suffice to change the whole situation. The army was told
to rest as long us dllyligl'lt lusted on the twellty~third,and to march
at nightfall, so as to appear in front of the bridge of Carrion at
dawn Oil the twcnty~fourth. Attacked at daybreak, the Marshal
would, as Moore hoped, find no time to organize his retreat and
would thus be forced to 6ght.
'While waiting at Sahagun for the sun to set, Moore received
u dispatch from La Uomnlla to sn.y that, in accordnncc with his
promise, he had marched from Leon to aid his allies. But he
could only put iuto the field some 8,000 men and a single battery
-with which he had advanced to Mansilla, with his vanguard at
Villurmillio, on the road to Saldm1a. He was thus but eighteen
miles from Sahagun, llnd though he had only brought a third of
his army "dth him, could be utilized in the oncoming operations.
But tllls was not the only news whieh reached Moore on the
afternoon of the twent)'~third. Only two short hours before he
received the dispatch from Mamilla, another note from La
Romana had come in, with infonnation of very much greater·
importance. A confidential agent of the Marquis, beyond the
Douro, had sent him a messenger with news that all the French
forccs in the direction of the Escurial wcre turning nortll\vard and
crossing the Guadarrama. rutting this intelligence side by side
with rumours brought in by peasants, to the effect that &rreat
l.]uantities of food and forage hud been ordered to be collected
in the villages west of Palencia, Moore drew the right inference.
What he hnd always expected had come to pass. Napoleon had
turned north from Madrid, and WilS hastening across the mountains
to overv.'helm thc British army 1.
'\\rithout losing a moment, Monre countermanded his advance on
Carrion, The orders went out at nine o'clock, when the leading
brigades had alreadJ started. As tlle men were tramping over the
frozen snow, in full expectation of a fight at dawn, they were
suddenly told to halt. A moment later came the command to turn
back by the road that they had come, and to retire to their
bivouaes of the previous cIa)" Utterly puzzled and much disgusted
the troops returned to Sahaglln.
I From :Moore's disl'atcll to La. UOmRtla, written 011 the twenty-third, we
gather that the letter with the news about the .French movements came in about
sixp.m.,and the second one with the report tliat the Spaniards had reached Man·
silla about eight. 'nle latter is acknowledged in a postscript to Moore's reply
tu tlH:l former. 'l1,c resohe to relrC:!lt was lll:llle betweell si" and eight o'clock.
SECTION VIII: CHAPTER IV
NAPOLEON'S PURSUIT Olo' .MODRE: SAHAGUN TO ASTORGA
WE have lUlluy times had occasion in this narrative to woncler
at the extreme tardiness with which news reached the Spanish and
the English generols. It is now at the inefficiency of Napoleon's
intelligence department that we must express our surprise. Con-
sidering that Moore had moved forward from SalamnnCll. as far
back as December 12, and had made his existence manifest to the
French on that same day by the successful skirmish at Ruooa, it
is astonishing to find that the Emperor did not grasp the situation
for nine days. Under the inB.uence of his prc-conccived idea that
the British must be retiring on Lisbon, he was looking for them in
every other quarter rather than the banks of the Upper Doum.
On the seventeenth he was ordering reconnaissances to be made in
the direction of Pluscncia I ill Estrcmndura (of all places in the
world) to get news of Moore, and was still pushing troops towards
Talavera. on the road to Portugal. The general tendency of all
his movements was in this dire<:tion, and there can be no doubt
that in n few days his great central reserve would have followed
in the wake of malle and Lcfebvre, and started for Badajoz and
Elvns. On the nineteenth he reviewed outside Madrid the troops
that were available for instant movement-the Imperial Guard,
the corps of Ncy, the divisions of Leval and Lapis.se-about
40,000 men with 150 guns, all in excellent order, and with fiftccn
days' biscuit stored in their wagons 2. Of the direction they were
to take we can have no doubt, when wc 1'Cad. ill the imperial
I Nap. Corrt8p., 14,577 [Dee. 17], orders Lasalle's cavalry to push for
Plasencia in order to get news of the Briti8h anny.
2 Napicr (i. 3(4) says that there were 00,000 mCll prcseot, but it is bard to
see how such a number could have been collected on that day at Madrid;
and tile official account of the review ill the Jfadrid GaztUe for Dec. 23 saYll
tllat 4O,0lXl mon appenrccl, 'all in bcautiful order, and testifying thcir
enthusiasm by their shouts as His Majesty rode past the frout of each
regiment.' The Emperor never understated his forces all such OCC38ions:
the tendency was the oilier way.
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correspondence orders for naval officers to be hurried up to re-
organize the arsenal of Lisbon 1, and tL private note to Bessieres-
the commander-in~chiefof the cavalry-bidding him start his spare
horses and his personal baggage for Talavern 2.
The Emperor's obstinate refusal to look in the right direction
is veri' curious when wc remember that Moore's cavalry was
sweeping the plains as far as Valladolid from December U to 16,
and thl\t on the eighteenth Franceschi had abandoned that im-
portant city. while Soult had got news of Moore's being on the
move two days earlier. Clearly either there was grave neglect in
sending information on the part of the French cavalry generals
in Old Castile, or else the Emperor had. so convinced himself that
the British were somewhere on the road to Lisbon, that he did
not read the true meaning of the disp..'\tches from the north. Be
this as it may. it is. evident that there was a serious failure in the
imperial intelligence department, Md that a week or more was
wasted. Bonaparte ought to have been astir two or three da)'S
after Stewart and Pngct drove in Fl'aIl(''eschi's screen of vedettes.
A" a matter of fact it was nine days before My move was made
a.t the French head quarters: yet Rueda is only ninety-five miles
from Madrid.
The first definite intelligence as to the English being on the
move in Old Castile reached the Emperor on the evening of
December 19. Yet it was only on the twenty-first that he really
awokc to thc fllll meaning of the reports that reached him from
Smut and 1"mnccschi 3. But whcn he did at last realize the
situation, he acted with a sudden and spasmodic energy which
was never surpassed in mlY of his earlier campaigns. He hurled
on to Moore's track not only the central reserve at Madrid, but
troops t::,rathcl-ed ill from all directions, till he hud set at lell.'lt
80,000 Illen on the march, to encompass the British corps which
had so hardily thrown itself upon his communications. l\Ioore
had been perfeetly right when he stated his belief that the sight
of the redcoats within reach would stir the Emperor up to such
wrath, that he would abandon every othel' enterprise and rush
upon them with every available mall.
On the evening of the twenty-first the French troops from every
1 Nap. COrrelp., 14,614, to Admiral Decr6s. Cf. De l'radt, p. 211.
~ Nap. Corretp., 14,6.53, to llessihes, Dec. 12.
S In NlIp. Corre.rp. there is no tr3ce of mo\'ement till the twenty-second.
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camp around Madrid were pouring out towards the Escurial and
the two passes over the Guadarrama. The cavalry of Ney's carp!!
and of the Imperial Guard was in front, then came the musses
of their infantry. Lnpissc's divisiou fell in behind: an express
was sent to Dessolles, who was guarding the road to Calatayud
and Saragossu, to leave only two battalions and a battery behind,
and to make forced marches on the Escurial with the rest' of his
men. Another aide-de-camp rode to set Lahoussaye's division
of dragoons on the move from Avila 1• Finally messengers rode
north to hid Lorges's dragoon~ and all the fractions of Junot's
corps, to place themselves under the orders of Soult. :Millet's
belated division of drah"Oons was to do the same, if it hud yet
crossed the Ebro.
The Emperor, once more committing the en1)r of arguing from
insufficient data, had made up his mind that the English were at
Valladolid 2, He had no news from that plit-e since Franceschi
had abandoned it, and chose to assume that Moore, or at any rate
some portion of the British army, was there established. Under
this hypothesis it would be eaBy to cut oft' the raiders from a
retreat 011 Portugal, or even on Galicia, by calTying troops with
extreme speed to 'l'ordesillas and !\{edina de Rio Seco. '111is com~
paratively easy task was all that Napoleon aimed at in his first
directions. Vi1lacastin, Arevalo, Olmedo, and ]\:(edilla del Campo
are the points to which his orders of Dc<.'Cmber ~1 and 22 require
that the advancing columns should be pushed.
For the maintenance of Madrid, and the 'containing' of the
Spanish armies at Cuenca and Almaraz, the Emperor left nothing
behind but the corps of Lefebvrc, two-thirds of the corps of Victor,
and the three cavalry divisions of Lasalle, Milhaud, and Latour~
Maubourg-S,OOO horse alld 28,000 foot in all, with ninety guuss.
I All tliis call be stullied in Nap. ~., 14,000, 14,011, 14,014. The
march out towards the Escurial is fixed, by the Madrid Gazette of Dec. 2:3, as
having begun late 011 the tweDty~first.
2 This error appears in Nap. Corrup., 14,014 [Dec. 22], 'si les Anglais
veulcnt tcnir 11 VulladoliJ'; 14,010 [Dec. 23J says,' Les Auglais paraissent cUe it
Valladolid, probablement avec une avant-garde.' It is only on Dec. ftl that
he writes to King Joseph t11at t11ey had never been tllerc at all, lla\'C will,
a flying party of 100 ligllt cavalry.
a This is Napoleon's 01\'11 estimate (Nap. O<!rrup., 14,G15). .Marshal
Jonrdan, who was more or less in charge of tlle whole, aB c11ief of the staff
to King Joseph, says tJJll.t tllCre wcre iu reality ouly 30,000 mc" iu nil
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King Joseph was left in nominal command of the whole. Such a
force was amply sufficient to hold back the disorganized troops of
Galluzzo and Infantado, hut not to advance on Seville or on Lisbon.
It was impossible that any blow should be dealt to the west or
the south, till the Emperor should send back some of the enormous
masses of men that he had hurled upon MaDre. Thus the English
general's intention was fully carried out: his raid into Old Castile
had completely disarranged all Bonaparte's plans. It gave the
Spaniards at least two months in which to rally and recover their
spirits, and it drew the -f1e1d-armyof the Emperor into a remote and
desolate corner of Spain, so that the main '-'entres of resistance
were left unmolested.
Napoleon had guessed part, but by no means all, of Moore's
design. 'Tl!e rna,noouvre of the English is very stran~' he wrote
to his brother Joseph; 'it is proved that they have evacuated
Salamanca. Probably they have brought their transports round
to Ferrol, because they think that the retreat on Lisbon is no
longer safe, ill! wc could push on from Talaveru. by the left bank of
the Tagus and shut the mouth of the river.... Probably they have
evacuated Portugal and transferred their base to Ferrol, because it
offers advan~aes for a safe embarkation. Dut while retreating,
they might hope to inflict a check on the corps of Soult, and may
not have made up their mind to try it till they had got upon thei~
new line of retreat, and moved to the right bank of the Douro.
They may have argued llS follows: "If the French commit them-
selves to a march on Lisbon, we can evacuate all Oporto, and
while doing so ro:e still on our line of communications with FerroL
Or, possibly, they may be expecting fresh reinforcements. But
whatever their plall may be, their move will have a great influence
on the end of this whole business.'"
The Emperor thought therefore that Moore's main object Md
been to change an unsafe base at Lisbon for a safe one in Galicia, and
that the demonstration against Soult was int:i.dental und secondary.
It does not seem to have struck him that the real design was to
(Mlmoim Militaire8, p. 130). Not only was Victor's corps short of the
dil'isioll of Lapissc (which the EllllKlTor lmd carried off), but LcfcbvnJ's was
also incomplete, as tlVO Dutch and one German battalions of !.e1'aI's divisioil
were bellilld in Biscay, garrisoning Bilbao and other points. King Joseph's
GU:lnls had "Iso left some detacbmcnts hehiml, :\1111 up w fullstrenglh (Nil]>.
CQrn:~]>., 14,615).
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lure the central ficld-El1my of the l'rench from Madrid, and to
postpone the invasion of the south. Many of his apologists and
admirers have excused his blindness, by saying that Maore's plan
was so rash and ha:r.ardous that no sensible man could have guessed
it. But this is a complete mistake: the plan, if properly carried
out, was perfectly sound. Sir John knew precisely what he was
doing, and was prepared to tUIn on his heel and go back at full
speed, the instant that he saw the least movement on the side of
Madrid. It was in no tllSh spirit that he acted, but rather the
reverse: 'I mean to proceed' bridle in hand,' he said; 'and if the
bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it,' And on this principle
he acted: three hours after he got notice that Napoleon was on
the march, he started to 'make a rUll for it' to Astorb~ and his
promptness was such that llis main body was never in the slightest
danger from the Emperor's rush on Bcnuvente, nCl'<.'e awl suddcn
though it was. The disasters of the second part of the retreat
were not in the least caused by Napoleon's intercepting mO\'emellt,
which Pl"Oved an absolute and complete failure.
But to proceed; Ncy's corps, which led the advam.'e against
Moore, crossed the Guadarrama on the night of December 21, and
had arrivcU safely utVillucustin, Oil the northcrn sidc of thc passes, on
the morning of the twenty-second. As ifto contradict the Emperor's
statement-made as he was setting out-that' the weather could
not be better,' a dreadful tempest arose that day. 1¥llen Bonaparte
rode up from Challlarlin, to pllLC(! himself at the head of his GUUl'd,
whieh was to cross the mountains on the twenty-second, he foulld
the wholc column stopped by u howling blizzurd, which swept down
the pass with irresistible strength and piled the snow in large drifts
at evcry inconvenicnt corner of tile defile. It is said that several horse-
men were flung over precipices by the mere force of the wind. The
whole train of ca.l1n01l alld caissons stuck halfwll)' up the ascent,
and could neither udvaIl<X! nol' retreat. Violcntly irritatL.J. at the
long delay, Napoleon turned on every pioneer that conld be found to
clear alVay the drifts, !;et masscs of mell to trumple down thc SIlOW
into a beaten track, forced the officers and all the cavalry to dis-
mount and lead their horses, and unhllITlessed half tile artillery
so as to give double teams to the rest. In this way the Guard,
with the Emperor walking 011 foot ill its midst:, lluccced<..'<1 at lust
in crawling through to Villacastin by the night of December 23.
1 i\loorc to Rain!, from S;llnmauClI, u..'C. G.
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A considerable number of men died of cold and fatigue, and the
passage ho.d. occupied some sixteen hours mote than had been
calculated by the Emperor. The troops which followed him had
less trouble in their passage, the tempest having abated its fury,
and the path cleared by the Guard being available for their use.
At the very moment at which Moore was countermanding the
advance on Sahagun-about seven o'clock on the evening of the
twenty-third - Napoleon WM throwing himself on his couch at
Villacastin, after a day of fatigue which had tried even his iron
frame. For the next week the two armies were contending with
their feet and not their arms, in the competition which the French
officers enlled the 'race to Bcnavclltc 1.' Napoleon WfUl at Inst
beginning to understand that he had not before him the corn·
paratively simple task of cutting the road between Valladolid and
Astorgo., but the llluch harder one of intercepting that between
Sahagun and Astorga. For the first three days of his march he
was still under somc hopes of catching the English before they
could cross the Esla-and if any of them had been at Valladolid
this wouId certainly have been possible. On December:!4 he was
at ArcvaIo; on Christmas Day he reached Tordesillas, where he
wrok'tl twenty-four hours to allow his infantry to come up with his
cavalry. On the twenty-seventh he at last understood-mainly
through n. letter from SouIt-that the English wcre much further
north than he had at first believed. Dut he was still in high
spirits; he did uot think it probable that Moore also might have
been making forced marches, and having sei7.ed Medina de Rio
8L"(.'O with Ney's L'Orps, hc imagined that he was close on the flank
of the retreating enemy. ''1'<Hlay or to-morrow,' he wrote to his
brother Joseph 011 that morning, 'it is probable that great events
will take place. If the English have not already retreated they
are lost; even if they have already moved they shall be pursued to
the water'scrlgc, und not haIf of them shall re-embark. Put in your
newspapers that 36,000 English are surrounded, that I am at
Bcnllvelltc in their rear, while Soult is in their front 2: The an-
nmmcement wa.~ duly made in the .J.lIadrid Gazette, hut the Emperor
had been dC(...eived as to thc condition of affairs, which never in
actual fact resembled the pietnre that he had drawn for himself3.
1 The phrnse will he found in De l'radt, p. 211.
~ Nap. CQrretp'J 14,G2Q (Napoleoll to King Joseph, Dec. 27).
3 Oddly enough Josepll had anticipated his brotller's orders, by putting in
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Sir John had commenced his retreat from SahI\,OUll on the
twenty-fourth, with the intention of retiring to Astorga, and of
taking up a position on the mountains behind it that might cover
Galicia. He did not intend to retire any further unless he were
obliged 1. If Soult should follow him closely. while the Emperor
was still two or three marches away, he announced his intention
of turning upon the Marshal and offering him battle. He wrote
to La llomana asking him to hold the bridge of Mamilla (the
most northerly passage over the Esla) as long as might be prudent,
and then to retire on the Asturias, leaving the road to Galicia
clear for the English army 2,
At noon all the twenty~fourth l\Ioore started off in two columns:
Baird's division marched by the northenl road to Valencia de Don
Juan, where the Esla is passable by a ford and a ferry: Hope and
Fraser took the more southern route by Mayorga and the bridge
of Castro Gonzalo. The reserve division under E. Pagct. (lnd the
two light brigades, remained behind at Sahagun for twentyMfour
hours to cover the retreat. The five clwalr)' regiments were
ordered to press in closely upon Soult, and to keep him as long
as possible in doubt as to whether he was not himself about to be
attacked.
This demonstration seems to have served its purpose, for the
Marshal made no move either on the twentyMfourth or the twenty·
fifth. Yet by the latter day his army was growing very formidable,
as all the corps from Burgos and Palellcia were reporting themselves
to him: Lorgcs's dragoons had rcnchcd Frcchilla, and Dclaborde
with the head of the infantry of Junot's corps was at l}aredes, only
thirtccn miles from Smut's llcad quarters at Carrion. Loison and
Heudelet were not far behind. Yet the English columns marched
for two days wholly unmolested.
On the twentyMsbi:th Baird crossed the Esla at Valencia: the
ford was dangerous, for the river WtlS rising; a sudden thaw on
the twentyMfourth had tumed the roads into mud, and loosened
the snows. But the gnns and baggage crossed without loss, as did
the Madrid Grv:eUe of that very day a notice that a British corps Wall in the
mOllt critical position, fhll.t its retrcnt was cut off, lInd tll8t' London, 80 long
insensible to the woes of Spain, will soon grieve ol'er a disaster that is her
own and not that of another.'
Moore to La Romana, from SaI13gun, uight of Dec. 23-4.
~ Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, Dec. 24.
OllAN. I I'll
•
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also some of the infantry, the rest using the two ferry-boats 1,
Hope and Fra.ser, on the l\fayorga road, had nothing but the
badness of their route to contend against. The soil of this part
of the kingdom of Leon is a soft rich loam, aud the cross-roads
were knee-deep in clay: for the whole of the twenty-sixth it
rained without intermission: the troops plodded on in very surly
mood, but I\S yet there WllS no straggling. It was still believed
that Maore would fight at Astorga, and, though the men grumbled
thtt.t 'the Gcnernl intended to march them to death first and to
fight after 2,' they still kept together.
But already signs were beginning to be visible that their dis-
cipline wp.s about to break down. A good deal of wanton damage
and a certain amount of plunder took place at the halting-places
for the night-Mayorga, Valderas, and Bcnavente. A voice from
the ranks explains the situation. 'Oui- sufferings were so great
that many of the men lost their natural activity and spirits, and
became savage in their dispositions. The idea of running away,
without even firing a shot, from the enemy we had beaten so
easily at Vimiero, wus too galling to their feelings. Each spoke
to his fellow, even in common conversation, with bitterness: rage
Bashed out on the most triBing occasion of disagreement. The
poor Spaniards had little to expect from such men as thcsc, who
blamed them for their inactivity. Every man found at home was
looked upon as a traitor to his country. "'Why is not every
Spaniard under arms and fighting? The cause is not ours: are
we to be the only suffetcrS?'li Such was the common language,
and from these feelings pillage and outrage: naturally arose 3:
The mcn began to seize food in the towns and villages without
waiting for the regular distribution, forced their way into houses,
and (the country being sinb'tl1arly destitute of wood) tore down
sheds and doors to build up their bivouac fires. The most de-
plorable mischief took place at Benavente, where the regiment
quartered in the picturesque old castle oclonging to the Duchess of
Ossuna burnt much of the mediaeval furniture, tore down the
sixteenth-century tapestry to make bed-clothes, and lighted fires
J There is a good account of this dangerous passage in Adam Neale's
Spllni8h (J«mpaiy,t qf 1808.
I Memoir of' T. 8.' of the 71st Highlanders, p. 63.
• I am again quoting from the admirable narrative of' T. S.·, the private ill
the 7ht. Compure Onnsby's !.etter8, ii. 92-3, for the wanton plundering.
1008] EXPLOITS OF PAGET'S CAVALRY 547
on the floors of the rooms, to the destruction of the porcelain
friezes and alcoves t. Moore issued a strongly-worded proclama-
tion against these excesses on December 27, blo.ming the offiocrs
(or not keeping an eye upon the men, and pointing out that' not
bravery alone, but pnticllc(! and constancy under fatigue and hard·
ship were military virtues~.' Unfortunately, such arguments had
little efiect on the tired and surly mnk and file. Things were ere
long to grow much worse.
The infantry, as wc have seen, accomplished their march to
Bcnavente without molestation, and all, including the rearguard,
were across the Esla by the twenty-seventh. Paget's cavalry,
however, had a much more exciting time on the last two days.
Finding that he WtlS not alrockcd, Soult began to bestir himself
on the twenty-sixth: he sent Lorges's dragoons after the British
army, in the dircction of Mayorgu, while with Frnncesehi's cavalry
and the whole of his infantry he marched by the direct road on
Astorgn, via. the bridge of :Mnnsilla.
Lorges's four regiments were in touch with the rearguard of
Paget's hussars on the twcnty-sixth and twcnty·scvcnth, but they
were not the only or the most important enemies who were now
striving to drive in Moon"J's cavalry screen. The advanced guard
of the Emperor's army had just come up, and first Colbert's
brigade of Ney's eorps and thcn the cavalry of the Guard began
to press in upon Paget: Lahoussaye's dragoons arrived on the
scene a little later. It is a splendid testimonial to the way in
which the British hOI'1icmen were handled, that they held their
o...m for three days against nearly triple forces on a front of thirty
miles 3. No better certificate could be given to them than the
fact that the Emperor estimated the'lll, when the fighting was
over, at 4,000 or 5,000 sabres, their real force being only ~,400.
He wrote, too, in (l. moment of chagrin when Moore's army had
just escaped from him, so that he was not at all inclined to
1 The French did worse, as they burnt the whole castle when they occupied
it during the first days of the new year, But that is no justification for the
conduct of the Dritish. For a descriptiou of the damage doue see Ormsby,
H. 102, loa.
, General Order, issued at Benavente on Dec. 27.
I Five regiments (7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars,lSUl Ligllt Dragoons,3rd
K. G. L.) were being pre:;sed by thirteen French regiments-four each of
Lorges's and Lah0USS3re'8, two of Colberl'8, and three of the Guard,
I'n2
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exaggerate their numbers, and as a matter of fact rated the
infantry too low. .
But under the admirable leading of Paget the British cavalry
held its own in every direction. Moore was not exaggerating
when he wrote on the twenty-eighth thnt 'they have obtained
by their spirit and enterprise an ascendency over the French which
nothing but &"l'eat superiority of numbers on their part can get the
better oP.' The 18th Light Dragoons turned back to clear their
rear six times 011 De<.'ember 27, and on each occasion drove in the
leading squadrons of their pursuers witll such effect that the)'
secured themselves an unmolested retreat for the next few miles.
At onc chnrb"C, near Valencia de Don Juan, a troop of thirty·cight
sabres of this regiment charged a French squadron ofl05 men, and
broke through them, killing twelve amI capturing twenty. The
10th Hussars, while fending off Lorges's dragoons neat' Mayorgn,
found that a. regiment of the light cavalry of Ne)' had got into
their rear Md had drown itself up on a rising ground flanking
the high~road, Charging up the slope, and over soil deep in the
slush of half~melted snow, they broke through the enemy's line,
and got oH' in safety with 100 prisoners. Every one of Paget's
five regiments had it~ full share of fighting on the twenty-sixth
and twenty-seventh, yet they closed in OD to Benavente in perfect
order, with insignificant losses, and exulting in a complete con-
sciousness of their superiority to the enemy's horse. Since the
start from Salamanca they had i.n twelve days taken no less than
500 prisoners, besides infliding considerable losses in killed and
wounded on the French, They had still one more sm.'CCss before
them, ere they found themselves condemned to comparative use-
lessness among the mOWltains of Galleia.
On the twenty-eighth Hobert Crawfurd's brigade had waited
behind in the mud and rain, drawn up in front of the bridge of
Castro Gonzalo, 'standing for many hours with arms posted, and
staring the French cavalry in the face, while the water actually ran
out of the muzzles of their muskets ~,' At last our hussars retired,
and Crawfurd blew up two arehes of the bridge when P~t had
passed over, and moved back on Bcnavente, after som~ trifting
skirmishing with the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, who ·had
come· up in force and tried to interrupt his work. rnle inde-
1 Moore to Castlereagh, Crom Benaveote,:o«. 28.
r Recollections of Ri.Rtman lIaTri" p. In.
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fatigable British horsemen left pickets all along the river on' each
side of the broken bridgc:, ready to report and oppose any attempt
to cross.
After resting for a day in Bcnavcntc Moorc had sent on the divi.
sinus of Fraser and Hope to Astorga, by the highway through La
Baneza. The division of Bainl, marching from Valencia by villainous
cross·ronds, converged on the same point, where the three corps
. .
met upon December 29. Their march was wholly unmolested by
the French, who were being successfully held back by Moore's rear·
guard under the two Pagets-the cavalry general and the commander
of the reserve division-and by Crawfurd and Alten's light brigades.
On the same morning that the main body reached Astorga, the
infantry of the rearguard marched out of Bcnavcnte, leaving
behind only the horsemen, who were watching all the fords, with
t.heir supports three miles behind in t.he town of llena\"entc. Seeing
that all the infantry had disappeared, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who
{:ommandcd the cavalry of the Guard, thought it high time to
press beyond the Esla: it was absurd, he thought, that the mass
of French horsemen, now gathered opposite the broken bridge of
Castro Gonr.alo, should allow themselvCll to be kept in check by a
mere chain of vedettes unsupported by infantry or gunS. Accord~
ingly he searched for fords, and when one was found a few hundred
yards from the bridb'C' crossed it at the head of the four squadrons
of the chasseurs of the Guard, between 500 and 600 sabres 1. The
rest of his troops, after vainly seeking for other passages, wcre
(l,oout to follow him. The moment that he had got over the
water Lefebvre found himself withstood by the pickets, mainly
belonging to the 18th Light Dragoons, who came riding in
from their posts along the river to mass themselves opposite to
him. When about 130 men were collected, under Colonel Obm)',
they ventured to charge the leading squadrons of the chas-
.<;eurs, of course with indiflcrcnt success. After retiring a few
hundred yards more, they were joined by 0. troop of the 3rd
Dragoons of the King's German Legion, under Major llurgwedel,
and agnin turned to fight. At this second clnsh the front line of
the pnrsuers was broken for a moment, and the dragoons who had
burst through the gap had a narrow escape of being surrounded
I Napoloon (Nop. CorrcqJ., 14,623) 8.1.ys tll8t the regiment of c!IIlSS(lurs 1'0'113
only 300 strong, and their loss only sixty. But the splendid regiments of the
Guard ca\·a.lry llad not yet fallen to this small number of sabres.
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and cnpturcd by the second line, but finally fought their way out
of the melee with no great loss. Charle.'l Stewart, their brigadier,
now came up and rallied them for the second time: he retired
towards the town in good order, without allowing himself to be
cowed by Lefebvre's rapid advance, for he knew that supports.were
at hand. Lord PB.e,O'et, warned in good time, had drn.wn out the
10th Hussars under cover of the houses of the southern suburb of
Benavcnte. He waited till the chasscurs drew quite nCRr to him,
and were too remote from the ford they had crossed to be able to
retire with ease: then he suddenly sallied out from his cover and
swooped down upon them. The pickets ut the sa.me moment
wheeled about, cheered, and charged. The enemy, now slightly
outnumbered-for lhc 10th were fully 450 snbres strong, nnd the
pickets at least ~OO-made a good fight. A British witness
observes that these' nne big fellows in fur caps and long green
coats' were far better than the line regiments with which the
hussars had hitherto been engaged. But hi a few minutes they
were broken, and chased for two miles right back to the ford
by which they had crossed. Lefcbvre himself was captured by a
private of the 10th named Grisdale, his w01111ded horse having
refused to swim the rh'er 1. ,"Vith him thel"C were taken two
captains and seventy unwounded prisoners. The chflSScurs left
fifty-five men dead or hurt upon the field, and many of those who
got away were. much cut about 2. The British casualties wel"C
fifty, almost all from the men who had furnished the pickets, for
the 10th snffered little: Burgwedel, who had led the Germans of
the Srd K. G. L., was the only officer hurt 3.
The remnant of the chnsseurs crossed the ri,'cr, and were imme-
diately supported by other regiments, who (after failing to find
another ford) had come down to that which Lefebne had used.
, He was sent to England, aud long lived on parole at Cheltenham.
While he was tllcre Charles Vaughan called on him, and got from him some
valunble information about the first siege of Saragossa, whose Jlistory 1lC Will!
then writing, In 1011 Lefeb\Te broke his parole and escaped to .....rance,
where Napoleon welcomed him and restored him to command, •
~ L1rrey, the Emperor's surgeon, commenting 011 sabre-wounds, says tl1at
no less tllall llCventy wOll1ltled of the c1msseurs came under his care 011 tl.is
occasion.
, In James l\Ioore's book this gallant officer apJlears under the English
disguise of Major lll1gwcll, under which 1 did not at first recognize llim
(p. 101). Oddly enough Adam Neale makes the same mistake (p, 170).
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They showed some signs of att.empting a second passage, but Lord
Paget turned upon them the guns of Downma'1's horse-battery,
which had just galloped up from Benavente. After two rounds
the enemy rode off" lmstily from the river, and fell back inland.
They had received such a sharp lesson that they allowed the British
cavalry to retreat without molestation in the afternoon. Napoleon
consoled himself with writing that the British were' flying in panic'
-6. statement which the circumstances hardly seemed to justify l_
and gave an exaggerated account of the disorders which they had
committed Ilt Valdcras and Bcnavcnte, to which he added an
imaginary outrage at Lean 2, But there is no more talk of MOorc's
corps being surrounded-wherefore it suddenly shrinks in the
Emperor's estimation, being no longer 36,000 strong, but only
, 21,000 infantry, with 4,000 or 5,000 horse.' Lefebvrc's aflail' he
frankly owned, when writing to King Joseph, was disgusting: 'by
evening I had 8,000 horse on the spot, but the enemy was gone 3.'
Paget indeed was so effectively gone, that though French cavalry
by the thousand crossed the ford that night they could do nothing.
And Crawfurd had so thoroughly destroyed the bridge of Castro
Gonzalo-he had blown up the eentral pier, and not merely cut the
crowns of the arches-that infantry and guns could not cross till
the thirtieth. It was only on that day that the heads of Ney's
corps and of the Imperial Guard came up: Lapisse's division was
still far behind, at Toro. All that the l'llpid forced marches of the
Emperor had brought him was the privilege of assisting at P~rret's
departure, and of picking up in llenavente some abandoned carts,
which Moore had caused to be broken after burning their c<mtcnts,
Napoleon still consoled himself ",i.th the idea. that it was possible
that Soult might have been more fortunate than himself, and might
perhaps already be attacking the English at Astorga. This was
not the cuse: after learning that Moorc had disappeared from his
front, the Duke of Dalmatia had taken the road Sahagun-Mansilla,
as the shortest line which would bring him to Astorga, the place
1 Nap. Ooml!p., 14,623 (Napoleon to Josephine, from Benavente, Dec. 31),
, Les Anglais fuiellt epouyantes.'
2 Nap. (JOTrelfp., 14,626 (Napoleon to King Josel)}l). Joseph is to insert in
the Madrid papers letters written from these three places with descriptions
of tlle brigandage practised hy the Engliah-' a Leon ils out ehasse les
lllOines.· No English troops l18d ever been witbin thirty miles of Leou !
3 'Cette affaire m'a couta une 60ixantaille de mes chasseurs. \'OU8 seutez
combien cela m'a ete ues,"l£"reable' (ibid.).
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where any army intending to defend Galicia would make its first
stand. This choice brought him upon the tracks of La Uomana's
army, not of the British. 'l1lC :Marquis, when l\:Ioore retired, had
moved back on Leon, but had sent to his ally a message to the
effect that he could not accept the suggestion to make the Asturias
his base, and would be forced, when the enemy advanced, to join
the British at Astorga. It was absolutely impossible, he said, to
repair to the Asturias, for the pass of Pajarcs, the only coach-road
thither, was impassable on account of the snow 1. La Romana left
as a rearguard at the all-important bridge of Mansilla, his 2nd
Division, 3,000 strong. with two guns. Contrary to Maore's advice.
he would not blow up the bridge, ghing as his reason, that the
Esla was fordable in several places in it..s immediate neighbourhood.
This was a blunder; but the officer in command of the ~lId Division
committed a greatcr onc, by drawing up his main body in front of
thc bridge and not behind it-·a repetition of Cuesta's old error
at CabeZOll. Soult did not c:ome in contact with the Spanish rear-
guard till four da)'s after he had lcft Carrion; so ,heavy had been.
the rain, and so vile the road, that it took him from the twenty·
sixth to the twenty-ninth to cover the forty-five miles betwcen
Carrion and Mansilla. But on the morning of December 30 he
delivcred his attack; a tremendous cuvalry-chargc by the chas;,curs
and dragoons of Franceschi broke "the Spanish line, and pursuers
lUlc.l pursued went pell-mell over the brid&"e, which was not defended
for a moment. The :Freneh caphmxll,500 men-who were cut oil'
from re-crossing thc rivcr-two guns, and two standards. Hearing
of this disaster La llomana at once eVllcuat.cd Leon, which Soult
seized on the thirty-first. The place had been hastily fortified,
and there had. been much l;n1k of the pos-;ibility of defending it ~;
hut at the first sUlllmons it opened its gates without firing a shot.
Thc Marquis-leaving 2,000 sick ill the hospitals, and u. cOllsidcrublc
accumulation of food in his magazines-fell back on Astorga, much
to the discontent of Mool'c, who had not desired to see him ill
that direction. Soult at Loon was only twenty-fivc miles from
Astorga: he was now but onc march from Moore's rearguard,
and in close touch with the Emperor, who coming up from the
south reached La Balleza on the same clay-the last of thc old
year, 180S.
1 Srmes to l\Ioore, from La Homana's camp at Mansilla, Dec. 25.
, Ibid.
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The divisions of Baird, Hope, and Fraser, as we have already
seen, had reached Astorga on the twenty~ninth,the rescn'c division
and the light brigades (after a most fatiguing march from Bena"cnte)
on the thirtieth, while the Cllvo.lry was, as always, to the rear, koop.
iug back the advancing squadrons of Bessieres. Thus on the
thirtieth the English and Spanish armies were conccntrated at
Astol'ga with every available man present-the British still 25,000
strong; for tiley had suflcroo JitUe in the fighting. and had not )'ct
begun to straggle-but Roman£\. with no more than 9,000 or
10,000 of the nominal !!~.OOO which had been shown in his rctUnlS
of ten days before. His Qnd Division had been practically dc~
stroyed at Mo.nsilla: he had left 2,000 sick at Leon, and mally
more had fallen out of the ranks in the march from that place-
some because the)' wished to desert their eololu-s, but more from
cold, disease, and misery; for the army was not mcrely half naked,
but infected with a malif,'1lMt typhus fc\'c1' which was making
terrible ravages in its ranks I,
l\10OL"C had told La Romana on the twenty-fourth that he hoped
to make a stand at Astorga. The same statement had been passed
round thc m'my, and had kept up the :spirits of the lllell to somc
extent, though many had begun to belie\'e that 'Moore wonld
nevcr fight 2.' Tbere were magazines of food ut Astorga, and much
more considerable ones of military equipment·: a large convoy of
shoes, blankets, and muskets had lately come in from Corunua, and
lhird's heavy baggage had been stacked in the place before he!
marched for Sahagun. The town itself was surrounded with
ancient walls, and had some possibilities of defence: jnst behind it
rises the first range of the Galician mountains, a steep and for-
bidding chain pierced only by the two passes which contain the old
• All witnesses agree that the a~my of Galicia was in a most distressing
condition. "Olis army was literally half naked and half starved; says Adam
Neale. 'A malign:lnt fevcr was rflging among tllem, and long fatigues,
privation, an(l this mortal di.stemper made them appear like spectres issuing
from a hOllPital rather than all army' (p. 181). 'T. S.' describes them as
'looking more like a largc botly of lJoeasants dril'ell from tlu~ir homes, and ill
want of everything, than a regular army' (p, 56). The llleo fit for sen-ice
are described as being 00 more than 5,000 strOllg.
: "Ve 1111 wished it, but nOlle believed it; writes' T. S.· ,,,re l.ad been
told the same at Benaveote, but our mO\'cment llad uo appearauce of a retreat
in which wc were to face about and makc a stand: it was more like a shameful
flight' (p, 56), This undoubtedly was the pre\'ailiog view in the Tanb.
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Md the llew higlHoads to Corunnn. The formcr~the shorter,
but by far the more rugged-is called the defile of l?oncebadon;
the latter-longer and easier-is the defile of ~1anzanal.
The question was at once raised as to whether the position in
rear of Astorga should not be seriously defended. The town itself
would naturally have to be given up. if the French chose to press
on in force; but the two dcfiles might be fortified and held against
vcry superior numbers. To turn ~5,OOO British troops out of them
would have been a vcry serious task, and the Spaniards meanwhile
could have been used for diversions on the cnemy's flank and rear.
La Romana called upon Moore, at the moment of the latter's
nnival at Astorb'1l, and proposed that they should join in defending
the passes. '1'0 give them up meant, he said, to give up also the
great upland valley behind them-the Vicrzo-where lay his own
depots and his park of m;'tillery at PonfelTada, and where Moore
also had considerable stores and magazines at Villafrallca. The
proposnl Ws.& well worthy of being taken into 'account, and was far
from being-as Napier calls it_I wilder than the dreams of Don
Quixote!' for the positions were very strong, and there was no
convenient route by which they could be turned. The only other
way into Galicia, that by Puebla de Senabria, is not only far away,
but almost impassable at mid.winter from the bndness of the road
and the deep snow. Moreoyer it leads not into the main valley
of the Millho, but into that of the Tamega on the rortuguese
frontier, from which another series of difficult defiles have to be
crossed in order to get into the healt of Galicia. La llomllM
tllought that this road might practically be disregarded as an
element of danger in a January campaign.
The suggestion of the Marquis deserved serious consideration.
Moore's reasons for a summary rejection of the proposal are not
stated by him at any length 1. He wrote to CastIereagh merely
that there was only two days' bread at Astorgn, that his means of
carriage were melting away by thQ death of draught beasts and the
desertion of drh'ers, and that he feared that the enemy might use
the road upon his flank-i. e. the Puebla de Senabria route-to tUMl
his position. He purposed therefore to fall back at once to the
coast as fast lIS he could, and trusted that the French, for want
of food, would not be able to follow him further than Villafranca.
To these reasons may be added another, which Moorc cited in hig~
1 Moore to CastlerC3gh, f!om Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.
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conversation with La. Romana, that the troops required rest, and
could not get it in the bleak positions above Astorbl'l1 1.
Some of thelle reasons are not quite. convincing: though there
were only two days' rations at Astorga, there were fourteen days'
at Villafranea, and large depots had also been gathered 0.1; Lugo
and Conmna. These could be rendered a,'ailable with no great
trouble, if real energy were displayed, for there WM still (ns the
disasters of the retreat were to show) a good deal of wheeled trans-
port with the army. The flanking rood by Puebla de Scnabria was
(as wc have said) so difficult and so remote that any turning corps
that tried it would be hoord of long .before it became Uallboerous.
There would be great political advantage in checking Bonnpnrle at
the passes, even if it were only for a week or ten days. Moreover,
to show a bold front would raise the spirIts of the army, whose
growing disordCI'S were the marks of discontent at the retreat, and
whose one wish was to fight the French as soon ns possiblc. As to
the rest which Moon:: declared to be nccessary for the troops, this
could surely have been better givcn by halting them and offering
to. defend the passes, than by taking them over the long and
desolate road that separated them from Corunna. The experiences
of the next elevcn days can hardly be called • rest.'
Though clearly possible, a stand behind Astorga may not have
been the best policy. Napoleon had a vast force in hand after his
junction with Soult, and he was a dangerous foe to brave, even in
such a formidable position as that which the British occupied. Dut
it is doubtful whether this fact was the cause of Moore's deter-
mination to retreat to the sea. If wc may judge from the tone of
his dispatches, his thought was merely that he had promised to
make a diversion, under strong pressure from :Frere and the rest;
that hc had successfully carried out his engagement, and lured the
Emperor and the bulk of the French forces away from Madrid; and
that he considered his tn.sk complcted. In his letter of December 31
to Castlereagh, he harks back once more to his old depreciation of
the Spaniards-they had takcn no admnt:age of thc chance he had
given them, they were as apathetic as ever, his exertions had been
wasted, and so forth 2. In so writing he made a mistake: his
I This plea is not to be found in any of Moore's dispatches, hut only in
La. Romana's account of tile interview whieh lIe sent to tile Junta.
S , Abandoned from the beginning by everything Spa-nisll, we were equal
to nothing by ourselves. From a desire to do what I CQuld, 1 made the
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campaign was so far from being wasted that he had actually saved
Spain. He had caused the Emperor to lose the psychological
moment for striking at Seville and Lisbon, when the spirits of the
patriots were at their lowest, and had !>ri \'CII thelll three months to
rally. By the time that the southward move from Madrid wus'
once morc possible to the French, Spain had again got armies in the
field, and the awful disasters of November and Decembert 1808,
had been half forgotten.
It seems improbable, from Moorc's tone in his dispatch of
December 31, that he ever had any serious intention of standing
behind Astorga. He had fallen back upon his old desponding'
views of the last days of November, and was simply set on bringing
off the British army in safety, without much care for the fate of
the Spaniards whom he so much disliked and contemned. Thc
only sign of his ever having studied the intermediate positions'
between ~t\.storgu and Corunna lies in a rcport addressed to him Oll'
Dcct!mber fl6, by Carmichael Smith of the Ro)"al Engineers. This
:speaks of the MSllznnal-Rodrigatos position a.s prescnting an
appearance of strong ground, but haying the defect of l)ossessing
a down-slopc to the rear for six miles, so that if the line were
forced, a long retreat downhill would be necessary in face of the
pursuing enemy_ The engineer then proceeded to recommend the
position of Caeabellos, tl. ICtlguc in front of ViUafranca', as being
very strong and safe from any turning moyemellt. But Moore, as
we shall see, refused to stand at the one pl~ as much as at the
other, only halting a rearguard at Cacabellos to keep. off the
pursuing horse for a few hours, and never offering a pitched battle
upon that ground. It is probable that nothing would haxe in·
duced him to fight at either positioll, after he had onct! resolved
that a straight march to the sea was the best policy.
So little time did Moore take in making up his mind as to the
desirability of holding the passes above Astorga, that he pushed
on Baird's, Fraser's, and Hope's divisions towards Villafraoca on
movement against Soult. As Il. diversioil it has answered completely: but ag
there is nothing to t3ke advantage of it, 1 have risked the 10Si of an army to
no purpose. I find 110 option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as
I am ablc.... TIlC army would, Ulcrc CllUllot 00 a doubt, rul\"e distinguished
itself, had tbe Spaniards been able to offer any resist3nce. But from the
first it was placed in situatioiUI in w}llc}l, without the possihility of doing any
good, it was itself COllst:llltly risked' (Mooro to Castlereagh, from Astorga,
Dca. 31).
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the thirtieth, while Paget's reserve with the two light brigades
followed on the thirty-first. The whole British army was on the
other side of Astorga, and across the passes, when Sou1t and
Bonaparte's columns converged on La. Bane7.8.. Their infantry did
not enter Astorga till the iil"St day of the new year, thirty-six hours
,after Moore's main body had evacuated the place.
But this easy escape from the Emperor's clutches had been
bought at considerable sacrifices. Astorgo. was crnmmcd with
stores of all kinds, tu! we have already had occasion to mention:
food was the only thing that was at all short. Dut there was
not sufficient transport in the place, and the retreating army was
already losing wagons and beasts so fast that it could not carry off
much of the accumulated material that lay before it. A hasty
attempt was made to serTc Qut to the troops the things that could
be immediately utilized. La llomalla's Spaniards rcecivoo scveral
thousand new English muskets to replace their dilapidated weapons,
and a quantity of blankets. Some of the Dritish regiments had
shoes issued to them; but out of mere hurry and mismanagement
several thousand pairs more were destroyed instead of distributed,
though many men were already almost barefoot. There were
abandoned all the hcavy bnggo.gc of Dail'd's division (which had
been stacked at Astorga before the march to Sahagun), an entire
depOt of entrcnching tools, several hundred barrels of rum, and
many scores of carts and wagons for which draught animals were
wanting. A quantity of small-arms ammunition was blown up.
But the most distressing thing of all was that those of the sick
of the army who could not bear to be tnken on through the January
cold in open wagons had to be left behind: somc four hundred
invalids, it would seem, were abandoned in the hospital llnd fell
into the hanch; of the French 1.
The most deplorable thing about these losses was that all the
evacuation llIld destruction was carricd out undcr difficulties, owing
to the gross state of disorder and illdiscipline into which the army
Wll$ falling. The news that they were to retreat once more with-
out fighting had exasperated the men to the last degree. Thousands
of them got loose in the streets, breaking into houses, maltreating
the inhabitants, and pillaging the stores, which were to be aban-
I Compare l\Ioore to Castlereagh (from Aslorga, Dec. 31) with Nap. CfJrreIJp.,
14,637, and with James Moore's memoir (p. 184), and ''1'. S.'s autobiography
(p. '7).
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doned, for their private profit. The rum was naturally a great
attraction, and many stragglers were left behind dcud drunk, to be
beaten out of the place by the cavalry when they left it on the
night of the thirty-first. La Romana had to make formal corn·
plaint to Moore of the misbehaviour of the troops, who had even
tried to steal his artillery mules and insulted his officers. There can
be no doubt that if the rank and file had been kept in haud many
valuable stores could have been distributed instead of destroyed,
and the straggling which WflS to prove so fatal might have been
nipped in the bud. But the officers were as discontented as the
men, and in many regiments seem to have made little or no effort
to keep things together. Already several battalions were beginning
to march with an advanced guard of marauders and a rearguard
of limping stragglers, the sure signs of impending trouble.
By the thirty-first, however, Astol'ga was clear of British and
Spanish troops. Moore marched by the new high-road, the route
of l\fanzanal: La Romana took the shorter but more rugged defile
of Foncebadon. Dut he sent his guns along with the Dritish, in
order to spare the beasts the steeper ascents of the old ChaU88U.
The terrible min of the last week was just passing into snow as
the two columns, every man desperately out of heart, began their
long uphill climb across the ridge of the Monte Telcno, tow81'ds
the uplands of the Vierzo.
NOTE
TillS acconnt of tllC retreat from Sahagun is constructed from a c.\ref111
comparisou of the official documents with the memoirs and monographs of
the following British eye-witnesses :-Uobert lllakeney (ofthe 28th), lUfleman
Harris nml Sergeant Surtee.s (of the 2j05th), Lord Londouderry, and Lord
Vivian of the Cavalry Brigade, Leith Hay (Aide-de-Camp to General Leith),
Charles and William Napier, T,S. of the 7lst, Steevens of the 20th, the
Surgeon Adam Ncale, and the Chaplain Ormsby. Bnulford, another chap-
lain, has left a series of admirable water-eolour drawings of the chiefpoint!l
011 the road as far as Lugo, made under such diffieulties as can be well
imagined. Of French e}'e-witnesses J 11.\V6 used the accounu; of St. Chamans,
Fantin des OUOllrds, Naylies, De Gonnel'Ule, Lejeune, and the detestably
inaccurate.Le Noble,
SECTION VIII: CHAPTER V
SaULT'S punSUIT OF i\100ltE: ASTORGA TO CORUNNA
'VHt:N he found that Maore had escaped from him, Napoleon
slackened down from the high speed with which he had ~ll
moving for the last ten days. He stayed at Benavente for two
nights, occupying himself with desk-work of all kinds, and noon·
doning the pursuit of the British to Bessieres and Soult. The
great et:mp had failed: instead of capturing the expeditionary force
he could but harass it on its way to the sea. Such a task was
beneath his own dignity: it would compromise the imperial
reputation for infallibility, if a campaign that had opened with
blows like Espinosa, Tudeln, and the capture of :Madrid ended
in a long and ineffectual stern-chase. If Bonaparte had continued
the hunt himself, with the mere result of arriving in time to see
Moore embark and depart, he would have felt that his prestige
had been lowered. He tacitly confessed.ilS much himself long
'years after, when, in one of his lucubratiOlls at St. Helenn, he
remarked that he would have conducted the pursuit in person,
if he had but known that contrary winds had prevented the fleet
of British transports from reaching Corunna. But of this he was
unaware at the time; and since he calculated that Moore could be
ha.rasscd perhaps, but not destroyed or captured, he resolved
to halt and turn back. Soult should have the duty of escorting
the British to the sea: they were to be pres.~ed vigorously and,
with luck, the Emperor la'usted that half of them might Ilever
sce England again. But no complete success could be expe<.:ted,
and he did not wish to appeal' personally in any enterprise that
was but partially successful.
Other reasons were nssigned both by Napoleon himself and by
his admirers for his abandonment of the pursuit of Moore. He
stated that Galicia was too much in a corner of the world for him
to adventure himself in its mountains-he would be twenty days
journey from Paris and the heart of affilirs. If Austria began to
move again in the spring, there would be an intolerable delay
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before he could receive news or transmit orders 1, He wished to
take in hand the reorganization of his armies in Italy, on the
Rhine, and be)'ond the Adriatic. All this was plausible enough,
hut the real reason of his rctUMl was that he would not be present
at a fiasco or a half-success. It would seem, however, that there
lUay have been another opcrntillg cause, which the Emperor never
chose to mention; the evidence for it has only cropped up of
late years 2, It appears that he was somewhat disquieted by secret
intelligence from Paris, ns to obscure intrigucs among his own
ministers and cauniers. The Spanish W'a1' had given new occasions
to the malcontents who were always criticizillg the Empire. Not
much could be leaM1t by the French public about the affair of
Bayonne, but all that had got abroad was well calculated to
disgust even loyal supporters of the Empire. The talk of the
Barons, which Napoleon always affected to despise, but which he
never disregarded, was more bitter than ever. It is quite possible
that some hint of the conspiracy of the I Philndelphes,' which fonr
mouths later showed its hand in the mysterious affair of D'ArbfCu-
tean, may ha"e reached him. Dut it is certain that he had di~­
quieting reports concerning the intrigues of Fouche and Talleyrand.
Both of those veteran plotters were at this moment in more or
less marked disgrn.cc. For once in a way. therefore, they were
acting in concert. They were relieving their injured feelings by
making secret overtures in all directions, in search of allies against
their master. Incredible as it may appear, they had found a ready
hearer in Mural, who was much disgusted with his brother-in-law
for throwing upon him the blame for the disasters of the first
Spanish campaign. Other notable personages were being drawn
into the cave of malcontents, and discourses of lIlore than doubtful
loyalty were being delivered. Like many other cabals of the
period, this one was destined to shrink into nothingness at the
reappe..'\rance of the master at Paris s. But while he was away
I These reasons will be found set forth at length ill Nap. (JQmtp., 14,684.
(to King Josepli, Jan. 11), and 14,602 (to Clarke, Jail. 13).
! 'I1lere is a distinct allllsion to the matter, JlolVcvcr, in Fouelufs MemQireA
(i. 386).
I For a long account of all this intrigue see the MemQiret of Chancellor
Pasquier (i. 3.55, &c.). He says that it was discovered by Lavalette, the P06t-
master-General, who sc.nt infonnation to the Viceroy of Italy, in consequence
of which a compromising letter from Caroline Bonaparte (at Naples) to TaJley~
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his agents were troubled and terrified: they seem to have sent
him alarming hints. which hu.d far more to do with his return to
France than any fear as to the intentions of Austria 1.
An oft-repeated story says that the Emperor received a packet
of letters from Pans while riding from llenavente to Astorga on
January 1, 1809, and, after reading them by the wayside with
every sign of anger, dClClaroo that he must return to France. If
the tale be true, we may be sure that the papers which so moved
his wmtb had no reference to armaments on the Danube, but
were concerned with the intrigues in Paris. There was absolutely
nothing in the state of European affairs to make an instant
departure from Spain necessary. On the othel' hand, rnmours of
domestic plots always touched the Emperor to the quick, nnd
it must have been as irritating as it was unexpected to discover
that his own sister and brother-in-law were dabbling in such
intrigues, even though ostensibly they were but discussing what
should be done if something should lutppen in Spain to their
august relati vc.
Already ere leaving BenlLvente the Emperor had issued orders
which showed that he had abandoned his hope of surrounding Md
crushing Moore. He had begun to send ofl~ to the right and to
the left, part of the great mass of troops which he had brought
with him. On December 31 he wrote to Dessolles, and ordered him
to give his division a short rest at Villacastin, and then to return to
Madrid, where the garrison W/lS too weak. On January 1, the whole
of the Imperial Guard W/lS dircdcd to halt and return to Bcllavente,
from whence it W/lS soon after told to march back to Valladolid.
Lapisse's division of Victor's corps, which had got no further than
Benavente in it!; advance, was turned off to. subdue the southern
parts of the kingdom of Leon. To the same cnd wcre diverted
D'Avenay's 2 and Maupetit's 3 brigades of CAvalry. Quite contrary
rand was seized. '11le reproaches-which he puts into Napoleon's mouth must,
I fancy, be taken as about as authentic as an oration in Thucydidea.
1 111cre was a180 at this moment a sligltt recrudescence of the oM agitation
of the chouuns in the west of France. Movable columns had to be sent
out in t110 departmcnt.s of tIle ::\Ja}'cnne and 5.ut1Ie. Sce Nall. CON'eJ!lI"
14,87]-2.
I 'This was a temporary brigade, made up of tIle 3rd Dutch Hussars and
a provisional regimcnt of dragoons.
, 6th Dragoons and pllrt of tlle regiment of'VestplLaliall OheoolJ$-Ugerl;
they belonged to the corps-cavalry of Lefebvre.
OMAN, I 00
\
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to Moore's expectations and prophecies, the people of this part
of Spain displayed a frantic patriotism, when once the enemy was
upon them. Toro, an open town I, had to be stormed: Zamol'8.
made a still better resistance, repulsed a first attack, and had to
be breached and assaulted by t\ brigade of Ln.pisse's division. The
villagers of Penilla distinguished themselves by falling upou and
capturing it battery of the Imperial Guard, which was pussing by
with an insufficient escort. Of course the guns were recovered,
and the pm burnt, within a few days of the exploit 2.
I-Iaving sent off' the Guards. Lapisse, Dessolles, and Maupctit's
and D'Avcnay's cavalry, the Emperor had still a large force left
in hand for the pursuit of Moore. There remained Soult's and
Ney's oor~ the horsemen of Lahoussaye, Lorges, and Franceschi,
and the greater part of Juuot's 8th Corps. Thc Emperor' had
resolved to break up this last·named unit: it contained many
third-battalions belonging to regiments which were already in
Spain: they were directed to rejoin their respective head quarters.
'When this wns done, there remained only enough to make up two
mther weak divisions of 5,000 men each. These were given to
Delaborde and Heudelet, and incorporated with Soult's 2nd
Corps. Loison's division, the third of the original 8th Corps,
wns suppressed 3. Jlffiot himself was sent off to take a command
under Lannes at the siege of Saragossa. When joined by Dela-
borde and Heudelet, Soult had a eol'PS of exceptional strcngtb-
five divisions and nearly :30,000 bayonets. He could not use for
the pursuit of Moorc BOlluefs di\ision, which had been left to
gSITison Santander. Hut ....-jth the remainder, 25,000 strong, he
pressed forward from AstOl'b"tl. in pursuant'e of his 1118.'lter's orders.
His cavalry force was very large in proportion: it consisted of
6,000 sabres, for not only were three t'Omplete divisions of drilf,"Oons
with him, but Ncy's corps-cll.Yalry (the brigade of Coll>ert) WllS lip
at the front and leading the pursuit. Ney himself, with his two
infantry divisions, those of Mauricc Mathieu and MtlXJ,:llUud, was
a march or two to the rear, some 16,000 bayonets strong. If Soult
I The defence of Toro was headed by a stra}' English officer. 'nle place
was taken b)' D'Avenay, not by Maupetit as Arteche says. See the Mlmuire8
of De Gonneville, i. 2('IJ.
~ for infonnatiou on these rather obscure operations consult the MbnQiTe.>'
of De Gonneville (of 0'Avenay's brigade) and Nup. Oorreap., 14,685.
~ There were only two battalioll6 remaining with Loison by Jail. 10.
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should suffer any check, he was sure of prompt support within
three days. 'lllUs the whole force sent in chase of :Maore mustered
some 47,000 men'.
The head of the pursuing column was formed by LahollSSaye's
dragoons und Colbert's light cavalry; in support of these, but
always some miles to the rear, came Merle's infantry. 'lllis formed
the French van; the rest of Soult's troops were a march behind,
with Helldelet's division for rearguard. All the ~nd Corps followed
the English on the Mamr.anal road: only Franceschi's four rebriments
of cavalry turned aside, to follow the rugged pass of Foncebadon,
by which La Romana's dilapidated host had retired. The exhausted
Spo.niards were making bllt sJow progress throngh the snow and
the moulltnill torrents. Franccschi caught them up on January ~.
nnd scattered their rearguard under General Reugel, taking a
couple of flR!,1'i:! and some 1,500 men: the prisoners are described
us being in the last e.xtremity of misery and fatiguc, and many
of them werc infected with the typhus fever, which had been
hanging about this unfortunate corps ever since its awful experience
in the Cantabriall hills during the month of November~.
Moore's anny. us we ha\,(! already sren, Imd marchoo out from
Astorga-the main body on December 30, the rearguard on the
thirty-first. After determining that he would not defend the passes
of Manzanal and Foncebud.on, the general had doubted whether
he should make his retreat on Caronna by the great c1talI8sf!e.
or on Vigo, by the minor road which goes via Orense and the
valley of lhe Si!. It is strange that he did not sec that his mind
must be promptly made up, and that when once he had passed the
mounlAins he must commit himself to one 01' the other route.
But his dispatches to Castlereagh show that it was not till he had
1 A month after the pursuit of Moore hlld ended. and the liattle of Coruuna
had been fought, tile four infantry divisions of Soult's corps which wcre in
Galicia had lilill H),OOO effective bayollet8 for the imasion of Portugal. '11le
three cav~.lry divisiolL':l were some 6,300 stroug. Ney's corllS, which had
hardly been engaged. had 16,000 illfautry and 1,000 cavalry, TIlere were
still, tllerefore, 41;300 men in hand of the two corps. It is iml}()!!.'!iMc to
make tllC 10SSCl! from the long l'ur~uit in tllC SIlOW and the battle of Corullnll
less thau 4,500 or 5,000 men, Il'hen we reflect that i\Ioore lost G,OOO,of wlwm
only 2,000 wcre prisoners, and tllat Soult suffered at least 1,500 casualtie& in
the C:orunna lightiug.
2 No-1'. OorrMp., 14,662. 'Les hommes pris sur La ROmll1l3 ~taiellt hor.
riMes it "oir; says Napoleon, who SOIW them at Astorga.
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reached Lugo that he finally decided in favour of the main
road 1, He must have formed the erroneous <:onclusioll that the
French would not pursue him far beyond Astorga z: he thought
that they would be stopped by want of provisions and by fatigue.
Having fanned this unsound hypothesis) he put off the flnal deci·
sion as to his route till he should reach Lugo. Meanwhile, to protect
the side-road to Vigo he detached 8,500 of his best troops, Robcrt
Crawfurd's light brigade [the 43rd (Ist batt.), 5!tnd (2nd ball),
and 95th (2nd batt.)], and Altcll's brigade of the German Legion.
They diverged from the main TOad after leaving Astorga, and
marched, by Ponferrada and La Rna, on Orense. How much they
suffered on the miserable bypaths of the valley of the Si} may
be gathered in the interesting diaries of Surtees and Harris: but
it was only with the snow and the want of food that they hud to
contend. They never saw a Frenchman, embarked unmolested at
Vigo, and were absolutely useless to Moore during the rest of the
campaign. It is impossible to lmderstand how it came that they
were sent away in this fashion, and nothing can be said in favour
of the move. Unless the whole army were going by the Orense
road, no one should have been sent along it: and the difficulties
of the tro.ek were such that to have taken the main body over it
would have been practically impossible. As it was, 3,500 fine
soldiers were wasted for all fighting purposes. The duty of covering
the rear of the army, which had hitherto fallen to the lot of
Crawfurd, was now transferred to General Paget and the 'Reserve
Diyision 3: One regiment of hussnrs [the 15th] was left with
them: the other four cavalry corps pushed on to the front, as there
was no great opportunity for using them, now that the army had
plunged into the mountains.
I This is malle absolutely certain by his letter of Jan. 13, in which he says
that' at Lugo r became sensible of the imIlOSSibility of rcac1ling Vigo, which
is at too great a distance.' On starting from Astorga, then, he still tllOugbt
tlmt lIe might he ablc to embark at Ulat llor!. A glallce at the IMII shows
that the march Astorga-Lugo-Vigo is two sides of 11 triangle. If the Vigo
route was to be taken, the only rational places to turn on to it are Astorg'd
and ]'onferrada.
~ 'Afl.cr n tilDe the 8lllJIe difficulties which affect us must sffect him (Soult];
therefore the rear ouce past Villafranca, 1 do 1I0t exp~t to be molested'
(Moore to Castlereagll, from Astorga, Dec. 31).
a Consisting of tllC 20tll Foot, !lILd tllC tirst It:.Ulllions of t11c 28t11, 62nd,
9lst, and !:l5th.
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Colbert and Lahoussayc took some little time, after leaving.
Astorga, before they came upon the rear of Maore's anny. But
they had no difficulty in ascertaining the route that the English
had taken; the steep uphill road from Astorga into the Vierzo Wt'tS
strewn with wreckRoO'e of all kinds, which had been abandoned by
the retreating troops. The long twelve-mile incline, deeply covered
with snow, had proved fatal to a vast number of draught animals,
und wagon aftcl' wugon had to be abandoned to the pursuers, for
want of sufficient oxen and mules to drag them further forward.
Among the derelict baggu{,"C were lying no small number of
exhtu:lsted stragglers, dead or dying from cold or dysentery.
The whole 11loralc of Maore's army lmd suffered a dreadful
deterioration from the moment that the order to evacuate Astorga
was issued. .Ai; long us there wus any prospect of lighting, the
men-though surly and discontented-had stuck to their colours.
Some regiments had begun to marnud, but the majority WCl"C still
in good order. But from Astorgn onward the discipline of the
greater part of the corps begun to relax. There were about a dozen
regiments 1 which behayed thoroughly well, and came through the
retreat with insignificant losses: on the other hand there were
many others which left from thirty to forty per cent. of their men
behind them. It cannot be disguised that the enormous difference
betwL-'Cn the proportion of (missing' in battalions of the same
brigade, which went through exactly identical experiences, was
simply due to the varyhlg degrees of 7.etU and energy with which
the officers kept their men to!:,"Cthcr. Where there was a strong
controllillg will the stragglers were few, and no onc fell bebind
save those who were absolutely dying. The iron band of Robert
CraY.1'urd brought the 43rd and 95th through their troubles with
a loss of eighty or ninety men each. The splendid discipline of
the Guards brigade carried them to Corunna with even smaller
proportional losses. Thcre is no mistaking the coincidence when
we find that the battalion which Moore denounced at Salamanca
as being the worst commanded and the worst disciplined in his
force, was also the one which left a higher percentage of stragglers
behind than any other corps. The fact was that the toils of thc
I The reader should note, ill the Appendix dealing with the numbers of
i\loore's army, tIle \'cry Iim31l1lroportiollall06Scs suffered by UIO two battalions
of the Guards, the 43rd (1st hatt.), 4th, 421ld, 7lst, 79th, 92ud, 95th (2ud
hatt.), and UIC cavalry.
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retreat tried the machinery of the regiments to the utmost, and
that where the management was weak or incompetent discipline
broke down, It was not the troops who had the IOllb"Cst marches
or the most fighting that suffered the heaviest losses: those of
Paget's division, the rearguard of the whole army. which was
constantly in touch with the French advance, compare favourably
with those of some corps which Ile\'er fired a shot between Benavente
and Corunna. It is sad to have to confess that half the hol'l'ors of
the retreat were due to purely preventible causes, and thilt if the
badly-managed regiments had been up to the disciplinary standard
of the Guards or the Light Brigade, the whole march would have
been remembered as toilsome but not disastrous. MaDre himself
""fote, in the last dispatch to which he ever set his hand, that
I he would not have believed, had he 1I0t witnessed it, that a British
mm)' would in so short a time have been so completelydemorali7,oo.
Its conduct during the late marches WM infamous beyond belief.
He could sny nothing in its favour but that when there was a
prospect of fighting the men wel'C at Ollt'e steady, and seemed"
pleased Md determined to do their duty!.' This denunciation
was far too sweeping, for many corps kept goOO order throughout.
the whole campaign: hut there was only too much to justify
Moore's anger.
The serious trouble began at Bembibre, the first place beyond
thc pass of Manzanal, where Hopc's, Baird's, and FrilSCl"s divisions
had encamped on the night of the thirty-tirst. The village was
unfortunately a large local. depot for WUIC: slinking off from their
companies, many hundreds of marauderi'l made their way into the
vaults and cellars. ''\Then the divisions marched next morning
they left nearly a thousand men, in various stages of intoxication,
lying about the houses and streets. The officers of Paget's Reserve,
who came up that afternoon, describe Bembibre as looking like
a battle-tield, so thickly were the prostrate redcoats strewn in
every corner. Vigorous endeavours were made to rouse these bad
soldiers, and to start them upon their way; but even next morning
there were multitudes who could not or would not march 2. When
I I quote from the original in the ll.eeord Office, not from the mutilated
'"ersiOll printed in the Pllrliatl/fmiwl't! PalJCl'lI and cloowllcro.
I Blakeney, of the 28th, says; , We employed the greater part of Jan. 1 iu
turning or dragging the drunken men out of the houses iuto the streets, and
scndillg forward liS many :l.'!'could be moved.. Yet little could be effected
with men incapable of standing, much less of marching' (,J. ,50).
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the Reserve evacuated the place on Januury 2, it wus still full of
torpid stragglers. Suddenly there appeared on the scene the
lending brigade of Ln.houssaye's dragoons, pushing down from the
pass of Manzanal, and driving before them the last hussar picket
which P~O'Ct had left behind. The noise of the horsemen roused
the lingerers, who began at last to stagger away, but it was
too late: 'the cavalry rode tlu·ough tile long line of these
lame defenceless wretches, slashing among them as a schoolboy
does among thistles 1.' l\fost of the stragglers, it is said. were
still so insensible from liquor that they made no resistance, and
did not even get out of the road 2. A few, with dreadful cuts
about their hrods and shoulders, sueceeded in overtaking the
lleserve. Moore had the poor bleeding wretches paraded along
the front of the regimcnts, ns a warning to drwlkards und
malingerers.
Meanwhile Haird and Hope's divisions had reachcd Villafranca
on the first, and scenes almost as disgraceful as those of Bcmbibre
were occurring. The town wns Moore's most important depOt: it
contained fourteen days'rations of biscuit for the whole army, an
immenf>e amount of suit-beef and pork, and some hundreds of
barrels of rum. TI1Cl'C was no transport to carry off all this
valuable provender, and :\10ore ordered it to be given to the
flames. Hearing of this the troops bl"Oke into the magazines,
and began to load themr>clves with all and more than they could
(:arry, ill·guing, not unnatumlly, that so much good food should
not be burnt, Moore ordered one man-who was caught breaking
into the rum store-to be shot ill the square. But it wns no use;
the soldiers burst loose, though many of their offieers cut and
slnshed at them to koep them in the mnks, and snatched all that
the)' could from the fires. Some forced open private houscs and
plundered, and in a few cases maltreated, or even murdered, the
tow1Jsfolk who would not give them drink. A great many got
at the rum, and were left behind when the divisions marched on
January 3 3•
While these orgies were going Oil at ViIlafranea, Paget and
the Rcscl'\'e hnd been halted six miles away, at CucabclloS, where
leT. S.· of the 71st (JOUTllIU, 11. .58).
2 Adam Neale. p. Hill. Both he awl' T. So' mention the parading of the
wounded mon along tILe lilies.
S Cf. Blakelley, Neale, Londonderry, and James Moore.
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the high.rood passes over the little river Cun 1• There was here
a position in which a whole anny could stand at bay, and Moore's
engineers hud pointed it out to him as the post between Astorga
and Lugo where there was the most favourable 6ghting-ground.
It is certain that if he had chosen to oriel' battle to Soult Oil thig
front, the Marshal would have been checked for many days-he
could not have got forward without calling up Ncy from Astorga,
and there is no good road by which the British could have been
outflanked. Dut Maore had no intention at' making fl serious
defence: he was fighting a rearguard action merely to allow time
for the sWn."8 at Villafranca to be destroyed.
The forces which were halted at Cacabellos consisted of the five
battalions of the Reserve (under Pagd), the 15th Hussars, and
a horse-artillery battery. A squadron of the cavalry and half of
the 95th Rifles were left beyond the river, in obscn'ation along the
road towards Bcmbibre; the gnns were placed on the westem side
of the Cua, commanding the road up from the bridge. The 28th
formed their escort, while the other three battalions of the division
were hidden behind a line of vineyards and stone walls parallel with
the winding stream 2.
About one o'clock in the afternoon the French appeared, pushing
cautiously fonvard from Bembibre with Colbert's cavalry brigade
of Ney's corps now at their head, while Lahoussaye's division of
dragoons was in support. The infantry were not yet in sight.
Colbert, a young and very dashing officer, currently reputed to be
the most handsome ma.n in the whole E'rench army, was burning
to distinguish himself. He had never before met the British,
and had formed l\ poor opinion of them from the numerous
stragglers and drwlkards whom he had seen upon the road. He
thought that the rearguard might be pushed, and the defile
forced. with little loss. Ac<.:ordingly he rode forward at the head
of his two regiments 3, and fell upon the squadron of the 15th
Hussars which was observing him. They had to fly in hot haste,
and, coming in suddenly to the bridge, rode into and over the last
two companies of the 95th Rifles, who had not yet crossed the
1 Not the Guia, ns the English gcuemlly call it.
t 1 take my account of the skirmish mainly from Blakeney, whose narrative
is admimlole. TIlOse of Londonderry, Napier, and Ncale do not gh'e so mauy
details.
S They were the 15th Clms.seurs aud the 3rd HUSilIll'S.
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stream. eoll-.ert, sweeping down close to their heels, came upon
the disordered infantry and took some forty or fifty prisoners before
the riflemen could escape across the water 1. But, seeing the 28th
and the guns holding the slope abO"c, he halted for a moment
before attempting to proceed further.
Judging however, from a. hasty survc,}'. that there were no very
great numbers opposed to him, the young French general resolved
to attempt to carry the bridge of Cacabe]]os by a furious charge,
just as Franceschi had forced that of Mansilla five days before.
This was a most hazardous and ill-advised move: it could only
succeed against demoralized troops, and was bound to fail when
tried ilhtUillSt the steady bnttuliOllS of the Reserve division. But
ranging his leading regiment four abreast, CollJert charged for the
bridge: the six: guns opposite him tore the head of the column
to pieces, but the majority of the troopers got across and tried to
dash uphill and capture the position. They had fallen into n
dreadful trap, for the 28th blocked the road just beyond the
bridge, while tile 95th and 52nd poureJ. in a hot flanking fu'e from
behind the vineyard walls on either side. There was no getting
. forward: Colbert himsclfwas shot as he tried to urf,'C on his men 2,
and his aide-de-camp Latour~Maubourg fell at his side. After
staying for no more than a few minutes on the fhrther side of the
water, the brigade turned rein and plunged back across the bridge,
leaving many scores of dead and wounded behind them.
Lahoussnye's dmgoons now came to the front: several squadrons
of them forded the river at different points, but, unable to charge
among the rocks and vines, they were forced to dismount· and to
act as skirmishers, a capacity in which they competed to no great
advantage against the 5~nd, with whom they found themselves
engnged. It was not till the lending infant!'y of Merle's division
came up, not long before dusk, that the French were enabled to
make any head against the defcnders. Their voltigeurs bickered
with the 95th and 59::!nd for an hour, hut when the formed columns
tried to cross the bridge, they were so raked by the six gWIS
opposite them that they gave back in disorder. After dark the
firing ceased, and Moore, who had come up in person from Villa~
I Forty-eight is the number given in Cope's excellent Hislory of the Rifle
Brigade.
1 He was shot by Tom Pluukct, a 1I0too eharneter iu tbe 95111, from a rauge
that seemed extraordinary to the riflemen of that day.
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franca at the sound of the cannOIl, had no difficulty in withdrawing
his men under cover of the night. In this sharp skirmish each
side lost some 9100 men: the French ci\suaItics were mainly in
Colbert's Cfimlry, the British were distributed unequaUy between
the 95th (who suffered most), the 28th, and 5211d: the other two
regiments present (the 20th and 91st) were hardly engaged 1.
:Murchillg all through the night of Srd-4th of Junuary the
Ueserve dh,jsion passed through Villafranca, where stores of all
kinds were! still blazing in huge bonfires, and did not hUlt till they
reached Nogales, eighteen miles flllther on. They found the road
before them strewn with one continuous line of wrcckRf:,"C from
the regiments of the main body. The country beyond Villnfmnca
was far more hare and desolate than the eastern half of the Vierzo :
discipline grew worse each day, and the surviving animals of the
baggage.train were dying oft' wholesale from cold and want of
fOl1lf,1'C. The cavalry horses wC1~ also beginning to perish "ery
fast, mainly from losing their shoes on the rough and stony
rooo. As 50011 as a horse was unable to keep up with the regi-
ment, he was (by Lord Paget's orders) shot by his rider, in order
tu prevent him from rolling into the hands of the French. Many
witnesses of the retreat state that the incessant cracking of the
hussars' pistols, as the unfortuDate chll1'brers were shot, was the
thing that lingered longest in their memories of all the sounds of
these unhappy days.
neyond Villafranea the COrlllllltl mad passes through the pictur-
esque! defile of Picdru6ta, by which it reaches the head waters of
thc Nava river, and then elimbing the spurs ofl\1onte Cebrero come.<;
out into the bleak upland plain of Lugo. This fifty miles con-
tailled the most difficult and desolate colmtry in the whole of
Moore's march, and was the scene of more helpless and undcserved
misery than allY other section of the retreat. It was not merely
drunkards and mamuders who now began to fall to the rear, but
steady old soldiers who could not fUl.."C the cold, the scmi-sturvation,
andj the forced marches. Moore hurried his troops forward at a
pace that, ovcr such roads, could only Ix kept up by the strongest
I Napoleon's Dot ,-cry cOllvincillg account of t'H~ C011l1J.1.t (N(/p_ Om-rup.,
14,647) TUIl9 a9 follows: < Trois mille Ecossais, voulallt dCfClldre le!! gorgcR
de l'icros pres de ViUafranca, POUT dODner le tcmps a. beaucoup de choses A
liler, Ollt eM culbuttfs. :\bis le gelH~ral CoI1)l'lrt petillant de faire avancer
SR ,:a,"nlcrie, lmc 1II.11c I'u frnp}JC Illl front, et I'll. tlle_'
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men. On January 5 he compelled the whole army to execute
II forced march of no less than thirty-six continuous hours, which
WIJS almost as deadly as a bntllc. 'TIlis haste seems all the less
justifiable because the dirdriet abounded with positions at which
the enemy <'1)~ld be held back for ma.ny hOUl"s, whenevel" the rear-
guard was told to stand at bay. At Nogales and Constantino,
where opposition was offCr<''il, the French were easily checked, and
there were many other points where similar stands could have
been made. It would seem that ,l\1oore, shocked at the state of
indiscipline into which his regiments were falling, thought only
of getting to the sea as quickly as possible. Certainly, the pursuit
was not so vigorolls as to make such fmntic haste necessary.
'Whenever the Reserve dh'isioll halted and offered battle, the
li'rench drngoons held off; and waited, ofl.en for many hours, for
their infantry to come up.
'All that hnd hitherto been suffered by our troops was but a
prelude to this time of horrors,' wrote one British eye-witness.
'It had still been attempted lo carry forward our sick and wounded;
here (on Monte Ccbrero) the beasts which dragged them failed,
llnd they were left in theu' wagons, to perish nmong the snow.
As we looked round 011 gaining the highest point of these slippery
pl'ccipiees, and observed the I'Cur of the army winding along the
narrow road, we conld sce the whole track marked out by our
own \\Tclchcd people, who lay expiring from fatigue Md the
seveJ.-ityof the cold-while their uniforms reddened in spots the
white surfu<.'C of the ground. OUI" men had now becollle quite
mad with despair; ·excessive fatigne and the consciousness of dis-
grace, in thus flying before an enemy whom they despised, excited
in them a spirit which was quite mutinous. A few hours' pause
was all they asked, an opportunity C!f confronting the foe, lmd
the certainty of making the pursuers atone for all the miseries
that they had ~u1fcred. Not allowed to fight, lhey en:;t themselves
down to perish by the wayside, giving utteran<.'e to feelings of
shame, anger, and grief. But too frequently their dying groans
were mingled with imprecations upon the Gcneral, who chose
rather to let thcm die like beasts than to take their chance 011
the field of battlc. That no dcgree of' hOl'1'Or might be wanting,
this unfortunate army wa.o; accompanied by many women and
children, of whom some were frozen to death 011 the !\bandonoo
baggage-wagons, some died of fatigue llnd cold, while their
•
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infants were seen vainly sucking at Ulcir clay-cold breasts I.' It
is shocking to have to add that the miserable survivors of these
poor women of the camp were abominably maltreated by the
!''rcnch 2.
Not only was the greater part of the baggagc.traill of the army
lost between Villafranca and Lugo, but other thinfr-l of more
importance. A battery of Spanish guns was left behind on the
crest of Monte Oribio for want of dmught animals. and the
military chest of the army WWl abandoned between Nogales and
Cere7,a1. It contained about £25,000 in dollars, and WlIS drawn in .
two ox-wagons, which gradually fell behind the main body as the
beasts wore out. General PIlo"'et refused to fight a rearguard
action to cover its slow progress, and ordered the 28th lkgiment
to burl the small kegs containing the money over a precipice. 'The
silver shower la,Y scattered among the rocks at the bottom: part
was gathered up by Lahoussaye's dragoons, but the bulk fell
next spring, when the snow melted, into the hands of the local
peasnntry [Jan. 4].
On the further side of the mountains, between Cerezal and
Constllntino, the army was astounded to meet a long train of
fifty bullock-earls moving southward. It contained clothing and
stores for La Romalla's army, which the Junta of Galicia, with
incredible carelessness, had sent forward from Lugo, though it had
heard that the British were retreating. A few miles of further
advance would have taken it into the hands of the French. Vcr)'
nntumlly, the soldiery stripped the wagons a.nd requisitioned the
beasts for their own baggage. The shoes and garments were a
godsend to those of the ram,red battalions who could lay hands on
them, and next day at Constantino mallY of the Reserve fought in
whole- or half-Spanish wliforms.
The skirmish at Constantino, on the atl:ernooll of Jannary 5, was
the most important engagement, save tha.t of Cacabellos, during
the whole retreat. It was a typical rearguard action to cover a
1 From Allam Neale's Sprmi81l. Cumpai!l" qf1808, pp. 100, Ull.
~ .For Frel.lch midence of this see the journal of .Fantin delO Odoards of the
31st .Leger: 'Plusieurs jeunes Anglaises devennes la proie de nos cavalien
etaicllt mi8ell a I'ollcan ell meme temps quo les cllovaux prilO avec olles. J'ai
vu, a mon gram! sca.nllalc, qu'clles n'lLI'aicllt pas toujours.la prllfcTellce'
(p. 19G). (.'f. the miserable story of l'dn. IJullcll in the Reco&etifmg of
Rifleman /lam'g, p. 142.
•
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bridge: the British engineers having failed in their endeavour to
blow up the ccntrnl arch, Paget placed his gUllS so 88 to command
the passage, extended the 28th and the 95th along the nearer bank
of the deep-sunk river, and held out with ease till nightfall. La-
houssaye's dragoons refused, very wisely, to attempt the position.
Merle's infantry tried to force the passage by sending forward a
regiment in dense colwnll, whidl suffered heavily from the guns,
was much mauled by the British light troops ranged along the
watel"s edge, and finally desisted from the attack, allowing Paget
to withdraw unmolested after dark. The French were supposed to
have lost about SOD men-a figure which was probably exaggerated:
the British casualties were insignificant.
On January 6 Paget und the rearguard reached Lugo. where they
found the main body of the army drawn Qut in battle order on a
fllvourablc position three mik'S outside the towu. The fcarfulamoullt
of straggling which had taken place during the forced marches of the
fourth and fifth had induced Moore to halt on his march to the sea,
in order to rest his men, restore discipline, and nllow the laggards to
come up. A tiresome conwetemps had made him still more anxious
to allow the army time to recruit itself. He had made up his mind
at Herrcrias (ncar Villafranca) that the wild idea of retiring 011
Vigo must be given up. The reports of the engineer officers whom
be had sent to survey that port, as well us Fcn-ol and Coruulla, were
all in favour of the last-named phtce. Accordingly he had scnt
. orders to the admiral at Vigo, bidding him bring the fleet of tnms·
ports round to Corunna. At the same time llaird was directed to
halt at Lugo, and not to take the side·road to Vigo via Compostella.
Baird duly received the dispatch, and should hu\'e seen that it was
scnt on to his (:olleagues, Hope and PraseI'. He gave the letter
for Fraser to a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the
important document. Heuce the 3rt! Division started off OIl the
Compostella road, a bad bypath, and went many miles across the
snow before it was found and recalled. Baird's negligence cost
Fraser's battalions 400 men in stragglers, and having marched and
countermarched more than twenty miles, they I'ctumcd to Lugo
so thoroughly worn out that they could not possibly have resumed
their retreat on the sixth I.
Moore had found in Lugo a depot containing four or five days'
I '111e whole of this story may be found in Londonderry (i. 272), Orm.sby
(ii. 140), James Moore (p. 190), as well as in Napier.
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provisions for the whole fOl'{.:e t as well as a weleome reinforcement
-Leith':; brigade of Hope':; division, which had never marched to
Astorga, and had been preceding the army by easy s~n-es in its
retreat. Including these 1,800 fresh bayonets, the army now
mustered about 19,000 t'ombatuJlts. Since it left Benavente it
hud been diminished by the strength of the two Light Brigades
detached to Vigo (3,500 men), by 1,000 dismounted cavalry
who hud been sent on to Conmna, by 500 or 600 sick too ill
to be moved, who had been left in the hospitals of Astorga and
Villafranca, and by about 2,000 men lost by the way betwccn'
Astorga and Lugo. Moore imagined that the loss under the
last-named head had been even greater: but the moment that
the army holted and the news of approaching battle Hew round,
hundreds of stragglers and marauders flocked ill to the colours,
sick men pulled themselves togethcr, and the regimcnts appeared
far stronger than had heen anticipated. The Commander-in-chief
issued a scathing 'General Order' lo the officers commanding
corps with regard to this point. 'They must be as sensible a.'i
himself of the (.'Omplete disorganization of tlle army. If they
wished to give the troops a fair chance of success, they lUust e;"ert
tbemselves to restore order and discipline. The Commander of
the Forces was tired of giving orders which were neveL" attended
to: he therefore appealed to the honour and feelings of the army:
if those were not sufficient to induce them to do their dut,Y. he
must despair of suceeeding by any other means. He had been
obliged to order military executions, but there would have becn
no need for them if only officers did their duty. It was ehiefly
from tllCir negligence, und from the wnnt of proper regulutions ill
the regiments, that crimes and irregularities were committed 1.'
The Lugo position was very strong: on the right it touched the
l1nfordable river Minho, 011 the len it rested 011 rocky and in-
uccessible hills. All along the front there wns a linc of low stone
walls, the boundaries of fields and vineyards. Below it there was
a gentle down·slope of a mile, up which thc cnemy would have to
march in order to attack. The army and the general alike were
pleased with the outlook: they hoped that SouJt would fight,
and knew that they could give a good. account of him.
The Marshal turned out to be far too circumspect to run his
head a,;,rainst such n fOl'midable line. He came up on the sixth,
I General Orders (Lugo, Jail. 6,1800).
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with the dragoons of Lahoussaye and Franccschi and Merle'::l
infantry. On the next morning Mennet's and Delaborde's divisions
and Lorges's cavalry appeared. But the fon.:L'<1 marches had. triL-'d
them 110 less than they had tried the British. }~rench accounts
sn.y that the three infantry divisions had only 13,000 bayonets
Willl the eagles, iustcad of the £0,000 whom they should have
shown, and that the cavalry instCad of 6,000 sabres mu"tered only
4,000. Some men hud fnllCIl by the way in the snow, others were
limping along the road many milC!l to the real': many were
'marauding OIl tIle flanks, like the British who had gone before
them. Heudelet's whole dh·isioll was more than two marches to
the rear, at VillafrlUlcn. ----
On the seventh, therefore, Soult did no more than feel the British
position. He hud not at first been sure that MOOl'C'S whole iU'IlIY
was in front of him, and imagined that hc might have to deal with
no morc than Pa,get's Reserve division, with which he ~ad bickered
liO much dm1ng the last four days. Be was soon undeceived;
when he brought forward a battery against Moore's centre, it was
immediately silenced by the fire of fifteen guns. A feint opposite
the British right, near t.he rivcr, was promptly opposed by the
Brigade of Gllard.~. A ffiOl'C sel10llS attack by Merlc'f> division,
on the hill to the left, was beaten back by Leith's brigade, who
drovc back the 2nd UgcI' and 36th of the Line by a bayonet-charge
downhill, and inflicted on them a loss of 300 men.
On the eighth many of Soult's stragglers came up, but he still
considered himself too weak t.o atl:.ack, and sent hack to hurry up
Heudelet's di\,jsion, and to request Ney to push forward his corps
to Villafl'ancu. He rcmained quies<:ellt all day, to the great
disappointment of Moore, who had issued orders to his army
warning them that a battle was at hand, alld bidding thcm not to
waste their fire on the tirailleurs, but reserve it for the supporting
columns. .Ai; the day wore Oil, without any sign of movement
on the part of the French, the British commaJlder began to grow
anxious and deprcsse<l. If Soult would not mo\'c, it must mcau
that he had resolved to draw up heavy reinforcements from the
real'. It would be Illud to wait till they should come up: either the
Marshal must be attacked at once, before he could be strengthened,
or else the army must resume its retrcat OD Corwma beforc Soult
was ready. '1'0 take the offensive Moorc considered very doubtful
policy-the French had about his own numbers; or perhaps even
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more, and lliey were established in n commanding position almost
as strong as his own. Even if he beat them, they could fall back
on Heudelet and Ney, and fuee him aga.in, in or tthout Villa-
franca. To win a second battle would be hard work, and, even
if all went well, the army would be so reduced in numbers that
practically nothing would remain for a descent into the plains of
u@. ~
Aecordingly Moore resolved lleither to attack nor to wait to be
attacked, but to resume his retreat towards the sea. It was not
a very enterprising course; but it was at least a safe one; and since
the troops were now somewhat rested, and (as he hoped) restored
to good spirits, by seeing that the enemy dared not face them, he
considered that he might withdmw without evil results. Aecord-
ingly the evening of the eighth was spent in destroying impedimenta
and making preparations for retreat. Five hundred foundcroo.
cavalry Md artillery horses were shot, a number of caissons knocked
to pieces, and llie remainder of the storeli of food destroyed so far
as was possible. At midnight on January 8-9 the army silently
slipped out of its lines. leaving its bivouac fires bW'ning, so as to
delude the enemy with the idea that it still lay before him.
Elaborate precautions had been taken to guide each division to
the point from which it could fall with the greatest ease into the
CorWlna road. But it is not easy to evacuate by night a long
position intersected with wo.lls, enclosures, alld suburban bypaths.
More(wer the fates wC!'e unpropitiollS: drenching rain had set in,
and it was impossible to see five yards in the stormy darkness.
Whole regiments and brigade; got astray, and of all the four
divisions only Paget's Reserve kept its bearings accurately and
reached the chaussee e.xactlyat the destined point. For miles on
each side of llie road swy batialiOIlS were wandering in futile
circles when the day dawned. Instead of marching fifteen miles
under cover of the night, many eorps had got no further than four
or five from their starting-point. Isolated men were scattered all
over the face of the (:ountry~sidc, some OC'CaU5e they had lost their
regiments, others because they had deliberately sought shelter from
the rain behind any convenient wall or rock.
Continuing their retreat for some hours after daybreak, the
troops reached the village of Valmeda, where their absolute ex~
haustion made a halt necessary. The more prudent commanders
made their men lie down in their ranks, in spite of the downpour,
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and eat as they lay. But Baird, from mistaken kindness, allowed
his division to disperse und to seck shelter in the cottages and
barns of neighbouring hamlets: they could not be got together
again when the time to start had arrived, and Dentinck and Mall~
ningham's brigades left an enormous proportion of their men behind.
The same thing happened Oil a smaller scale with Hope's and
Fcns<:r's di\'isions; only Paget's regimcnts brought up the rear in
good order. But behind them trailed several thousand stragglers,
forming a sort of irregular rearguard. Thel"C was more dispersion,
disorder, and marauding in this march than in any other during
the whole I'ctrcat. The plundering during this stage seems to
have been particularly discreditable: the inhabitants of the villages
along the high-road had for the most palt gone up into the hills.
in spite of the dreadful weather. The British seem to have imputed
their absence to them as a crime, and to have regarded every empty
house as a fair field for plunder. As a matter of fact it was not
with the desire of withholding aid from their fi..iends that the GaU.
cians had disappeared, but from fear of the French. If they had
remained behind they would have been stripped and misused by
the enemy. But the unreasoning soldiery chose to regard the
unfortunate pcUSltnts as hostile 1: they wantonly broke up doors
I In defence of the unfortunate GllliciRIIS, whuse patriotism and good faith
ha!! been impugned by so many English narrators of the retreat, it is onl}'
lIecessary to qnote the retlectiousoftwo dispassionate eye-witne&'ies. Leith Hay
(i. 132) writes: 'To cxpectthat the IJellSllutry were to rush from their houses,
auu supply the wants of our soldiers with the only provision that the}·
possessed for their 0\\'11 families-who might in consequence be left in tho
midst of the mountains, at midwinter, to starve~WlI8 imagining fricndly
feeling carried to all unnatural extent, and just as likely to happen as it
would have heen if, Napoleon having invaded Britain, an English yeoman
should IHiVe earnestly requested one of our own soldiers to ll\:ccpt tho last
morsel of bread he had the means of obtaillillg for his children.' Ormsb}'
(ii. 102) says, to mucll the SlIme effect: ( As to t1leir inhospitable reception
of us, aud the coucealment of provisions, in calldour 1 must be their apologist,
all(l declare my conviction that the charge in many instances is unfounded
aut! in others exaggerated. Do tllose who are most loud in tlleir complaints
lIonestly think that an anny of 30,000 Spaniards would be better rcceh'ed ill
England than \\"e were in Spain? 1 doubt it much. The people, dispirited
and alarmed. began to look to self-prescrmtioll as tllo primary or solo object
of their care. Add to this the horror aud dismay which the excesses of our
soldiers struck, and you will not be surprised that "illages and houses were
frequeutly deserted. la it a matter of astonishment that the }X'8-'<Ilntry tied
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and furniture, and stole all manner of useless household stuff.
Even worse outrages occasionally happened: where the inhabitant.'l,
in outlying farms and hamlets, had remained behind, they turned
them out of their houses, robbed them by force, and even shot
those who resisted. In return, it was but natural that isolated
marauders should be killed by the angry country-folk. But the
good spirit of the Galicia.ns was displayed in many pl.aces by the WilY
in which they fed stragglers 1, and saved them from the French by
!>howing them bypaths over the hills. No les... than 500 men who
had lost their way were passed on from vill~rrc to village by the
peasants, till they reaehed Portugal.
'What between deliberate marauding for food or plunder~, and
genuine inability to keep up with the regiment 011 the part of
weakly men, Moore's main body accomplished the march from
Lugo to Betanzos in the most disorderly style. Paget's rearguard
kept their ranks, but the troops in front were marching in a dro,'c,
without any attempt to preserve discipline. An observer counted
one very distinguished regiment in Manningham's brigade ofBaird's
division, and report... that with the colours there were only nine
officers, three sergeants, and three privates when they reached the
gates of Detunzos a.
Fortunately for :Moore, the French pursued the retreating army
with the greatest slackness. It was late on the morning of the ninth
before Soult discovered that the British were gone: the drenching
rain which had so incommoded them had at least screened their
retreat. After occupying Lugo, which was full of dead horses,
into the recesses of their monnbins, intimidated by our presence and con-
founded by our orimes?'
I }o'or instances of kindness sbown by the peasantry see Ormsb}' (H. 13tl).
011 the other Illl.lld the educated classes were often sulky, and even insolent,
because they thongllt that Mooro was tleliLerately n.rnUldollillg Spain from
cowardice. See in Onnsby the anecdotes of the Alcalde of Pinllalla (H. 70)
and the Alcaldcof ViIlllfrallca (ii. 127), as also of tIle abuse wllich lie got from
a' furions callOIl of Lngo; 011 whom hc was billeted (ii. 147,148).
2 Outside Uetanws l'aget halted, stopped the marauding stragglers,. and
had them stripped of tlleir pluurler. HJakeney of the 23th saw 1,500 men
scarclJCtl. < It is imp06Sible to enumerate the differcnt articles of pluDller
which they had crammed into their packs and haversacks-brass candlesticks
bent double, bundles of common knil'es, copper saucepans, every kind of
domestic utensil, lritllOut regard to weight or "alne' (I'. 02).
I Adam Neale, 1'.100. Thc slime hattaIion could show 500 ll.1.yonet., for
tile battle of Corullllu, so the mOll were not far off, liS it would secm.
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broken material, and spoiled provisions, the .Marshal pushed on
Franccschi's Cilvalry in pursuit. But he had lost twelve hours,
and l''1oorc was far ahead: only .stragglers were captured on the
road, and the British rearguard was not sighted till the passage
of the Lndra, nearly halfway from J..ugo to lleta.ll7.0S t. This was
late in the day, and Paget was not seriously molested, though the
enginccrs who accompanied him failed to blow up the bridges
o,·er the Ladra and the 1\[c11dco, partly because their powder had
been spoilt by the rain, partly (as it would seem) from unskilful
handiwork.
The fatiguing retreat was continued through part of the night
of January 9-10, and 011 the following morning all the regiments
reached Bcwnzos, all the sea-coast. The indefatigable Reserve
division took IIp a position 011 a low range of heights outside the
town, to cover the incoming of the thousands of stragglers who
were still to the rear, From this ,'antaorre-ground they had the
oppoi'tunity of witnessing a curious incident which few of the nul'·
rators of the retreat have failed to record. Franceschi's cavalry
had rcSUIIIL'<1 the pursuit, and after sweeping up some hundreds
of prisoners from isolated parties, came to the village at the
foot of the hills whcre the stragglcrs had gathered most thickly.
At the noise of their approach, a good number of the more able-
bodied lIlen ran together, hastily forllled up in a solid mass across
the road, and beat off the :French horsemen by a rolling fire. This
had been done more by instinct than by design: but a sergeant
of the 43rd, who assumed command o\"cr the assembly, skilfully
brought order out of the dl\llgel'~. He divided the mell into two
parties, which retired alternately down the road, the one facing
the French while the other pushed on. The chasscurs charged
them several times, but could never break in, and the whole bOOy
escaped to the English lincs'. They luul co.vered the retreat of
I Le Noble (Campogll6 dUo Mum/lIll &1111, [1. 24) says that l~rallcescbi
made" 'charge' here and took 500 prisonel"ll" The number of priSOllers is
,"ery probablr correct, but it is llardly a 'charge' wben isolated stragglers
are picked up. 'Ille rearguanl was Ilcvcr mulested, and retired witllOUt.
baving to fire 11 shot..
, TIlis sergeant's name was 'Villiam Newmall, He was rewarded by an
ensign's commission in the 1st 'Vest Imlia Regiment,
3 I thillk that it must. he to tltis comll1.t tlUl.t Ollll uf the reminiscences of
• T. S.' of the 71st relates, though he is "ague in his dates. (Sleep was
stealing over me when I perceived a bustle around me. It was all ad"ancell
"p2
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many other stragglers, who ran in from all sides while the combat
was going on. Yet in spite of this irregular exploit, the army
lost many men; on this day and the preecdillg ninth, more than
1000 were left behind-some had died of (:old and fatiguE', some
had been cut dowll by the Frcllch. But the majority had been
captured as they straggled along, too dazed and won} out even
to leave the road and take to the hillside when the cavalry got
among them I.
Soult had as yet no infante,}' to the front, and Maore remained
for a day at Bctanzos, observed by Fmllccschi's and Luhoussaye's
cavalry, which dared not molest him. On January 11 he resumed
his march to CorullUa, with his army in a far better <:ollllitioll than
might have been expected. The wenUler had tunlcd mild and
dry, and the climate of the coastland was a pleasant change from
that of tile mountains 2. The men had been well fed at Bctunzos
with food sent on from Cormma, and, marching along the friendly
sea with their goal ill sight, n.'Covered themselves in a surprising
manner. Their general was not so cheerful: he had heard that
the Reet from Vigo had failed to double Cape Finistcrre, and was
still beating about in the Atlantic. He hud hoped to find it
already ill harbour, and was much concerned to think that he
might have to stand at bay for some days in order to allow it time
to arrive.
party of tho French. Unconscious of my action I started to my feet, levelled
my mugket, which 1 still retained, fired and formed with the other stragglcf3.
There were more of them than of us, but the nction and the approach of
danger in a sl18po whicll we could repel roused our downcast feeliugs... ,
Whae we rau they pursued, the moment we faced about they halted. We
lIe\'er fought bnt with success, never Il'ere attacked hut ""0 force<l them to
retire' (p. 60),
1 The magglers' battle iu frout of 3etaruos is described by Adam Neale
(p. 19G), Blakcney (pp. !Xl, In), and Stoonllls of the ZOtll (p. 70), as well :IS
by Napier and the other historians. 1 find no account of it in Le Noble or
the other French narrators, SUcll as Naylies, St. Cllamans, or lo"antin des
OI!(I,1,rds. Le Noble gil'es instead a wholly fictitious account of au eugage-
ment of .Franceschi with .J<:llglish crlt'(l!ry, in which the latter lost a thousand
men and five guns (p. 34). As the C81'alry had marched for Corunna before
lo'rancesebi came up, and lost only about 200 men in thc wllOle campaign,
I am quite at a loss to understand what can be the fOUlldation of thi5
romance.
S Fanthl des Odoards gives u \,i\'id llnd pictnresque account of the relief
c:\Used to the pursllCrs, by the sudden plunge into fine spring-like weather,
4)1\ descending from the !;UOW$ or 111e interior (p. lOB).
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At Betanzos more sacrifices of war-material were made by the
retiring army. l\foore found there a large quantity of stores in-
tended for La Romnnn, find had to spike and throw into the river
fl\-e guns and some thousands of muskets. A considerable amount
of food was imperfectly destroyed, but enough remained to give
a welcome supply to the famishing lrcnch. It had been intendlil
to blow lip Betanzos bridge, but the mines were only partially
successful, and the 28th Regiment from Paget's Reserve division
had to stay behind and to guard the half-ruined structure ~crainst
Franceschi's cavalry, till the main body had nearly reached Corunna,
and the French infantry had begun to appear.
On the night of the eleventh, the di\'isions of Hope, Bnil'd, nnd
l'raser reached Conllma, while that of Pll.e.~t halted at El Burgo,
four miles outside the town, where the Chll1l8S{>C Cl'OSSes the tidal
river l\fero. Here the bridge was successfully blown up: it WM
only tlte seeond operation of the kind which had been carried
out with efficiency during the whole retreat. Another bridge at
Cambria, n few miles further up the stream, wus also destroyed.
'rhus the French were for the moment brought to a stand. On
the twelfth their lending infantry column came up, and bickered
with Paget's troops, across the impas.s..'l.ble water, for the whole day I.
Dut it was not till thc thirteenth that Fmnccschi discovered a
third passage at Celas, sevcn miles inland, across which he con-
ducted his division. Moore then ordered the Reserve to draw
back to the heights in front of Cormma. Thc French instantly
came down to the river, and begnn to reconstruct the broken
bridge. On the night of the thirteenth infantry could cross: 011
the fourteenth the artillery also began to pass ovcr. But Soult
ad\'anced with great caution: here, as at Lugo, he was dismaycd
to see how much thc fatigues of the march had diminished hi;;
army: Delabol'de's division was not yet up: those of Merle and
Mermet were so thinned by straggling that the Marshal resoh'oo
not to put his fortune to the k'St till thc raILks were again full.
This delay gave the British general ample time to arrange for
his departure. On the thirteenth, hc blew up U1C great stores
of powder which the Junta of Galicia had left stowed away in II
magazine three miles outside thc tOWII. The quantity was not
much less than 4,000 barrels, and the cxplosion was so powerful
that wcllnigh C\'Cl'Y window in Corunna was shattered.
1 Thcre is a good account ofthc bickerillg in Blakeney, pp. 102-.';.
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On the afternoon of the fourtccnth the long-expected. transports
at last ran into the harbour, and MOOl'C began to get on board his
sick llnd wounded, his cavalry, and his gUllS. The horses were in
such a deplorable state that very few of them were worth re-
shipping: only about ~50 cavalry char&ters and 700 artillery
draught-cattle were considered too good to be left behind 1. The
remainder of the poor beasts, more than 2,000 in number, were
shot or stabbed und Hung in~o the sea. Only enough were left to
draw nine guns, which the general intended to usc if he was forced
to gi ve battle before the embarkation WIlS finished. The t1.'St of
the cannon, o\'(~r fifty in number, wet'C safely got on board the fleet.
The personnel of the cavalry and artillery went on shipboard very
little reduced by their casualties in the retreat. The former was
only short of ~oo mell) the latter of 250: they had come off so
easily because they had been sent to the rear since Cacabellos,
and had retreated to Coronna without any check or molestation.
Along with the hussar~ and the gunners some 2,500 or 3,000
iuvalids were sent 011 board. A few hundred more, too sick to
face a voyage, were left behind in the hospitals of Coronna.
Something like 5,000 mell 1\11d perished or been taken during the
retreat; 3,500 had embarked at Vigo, so that about 15,000 men}
all infantry save some 200 gunners, remained behind to oppose
Soult. Considering all that they hOO gone t1u'ough, they were
now in ver}' good trim: all the sick and weakly men had been
sent off, those who remained in the ranks were all war-hardened
veterans. Before the battle they had enjoyed four days of rest
I\ud good feeding in Corullna. Moreover, they had repaired their
armament: there were in the arsenal IlIany thousand sumd of
arms} newly arrived from England for the use of the Galician
army. Moore made his men change their rusty and battered
Illuskets for new ones, before ordering the store to be destroyed.
He also distributed new cartridges, from nn cnormous stock found
in the place. The town was, in fact, crammed with munitions of
all sorts. Seeing that there would be no time to re..cmbnrk thcm,
Moore utilized what hc could, and destro)'ed the rest.
I I obtain tlH~se figures from the PnrliumentaT.1I RetuTI/$ of 1aoo.
•
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SECTION VIII: CHAPTER VI
THE BA'ITLE OF CORUNNA
WUIDl Sir John Maore found tho.t the transports were not
ready on the twelfth, he had recognized that he might very
probably have to fight a defensive nction in order to cover his
retreat, for two days would allow Soult to bring up his main·
body. He refused to listen to the timid proposal of certnin of his
officers that he should negotiate for a quiet embarkation, in return
for giving up Corunno. and its fortifications un}mxlllcd 1, This
would ha,·c been indeed EL tame line of conduct for a general and
an arlllY which had never been beaten in the field. Instead he
sought for a good position in which to hold back the enemy till all
his impedimenta were on shipboard. There were no less than
three lines of heights on which the army might range itself to
resist an enemy who had crossed the Mero. But the first two
ranges. the Monte Loureiro just above the river, Md the plateaux
of Palavea and Pel1asquedo two miles further north, were too
e.'l:tensive to be held by an army of 15,000 men. Moore accord-
ingly chose as his fighting-ground the Monte Moro. tl shorter alld
lower ridge, only two miles outside the walls of Corunna.. It is an
excellent position, about 2,500 yards long, but has two defects:
its western and lower cnd is commanded nt long cannon-range by
the heights of Pefiasquedo. Moreover, beyond this extreme point
of the hill, there is open ground extending as far as the gates of
COl'unna, by which the whole position can be turned. Fully aware
of this fact, Moore told off more than a third of his anny to serve
as a flank-guard on this wing, and to prevent the enemy from
prnhing in between the Monte Moro and the narrow neck of the
peninsula 011 which COrlllllla stands.
Soult, even after he had passed the Mero and repaired the
bridges, was very circumspect in his o.UVfLUI.."CS. He had too much
I There can be no doubt that this strange suggestion was made, 3S :'Iloore
llimsclf meutious it in his disllatcb of JIUI. 13, the last which 1u: wrote.
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respect for the fighting power of the English army to attack before
he had rnllied his whole forre. When Delaborde's division and
a multitude of stragglers had joined him on the fifteenth, he at
last moved forward and scized the heights of Palavca and PClias·
quedo, overlooking the D"itish position. There was oome slight
skirmishing with the outposts which had been left on these
posftion8, and when the French brought down two guns to the
lower slopes by Pulavcu, and began to cannonade the opposite hill,
Colonel McKemdc, of the 5th Regiment, made an attempt to drivc
them off, which failed with loss, and cost him his life.
As the French pressed. westward along these commanding heights,
Moorc saw that hc might very possibly be attacked Oil the following
day, and brought up his troops to their fighting-ground, though
he was still not certain that 80ult would risk a battle. The divi-
sions of Hope and Baird were ranged along the upper slopes of'
the Monte Moro: the ten battalions of the former on the eastem
half of the ridge, ncu.rcst the river, the eight battalions of theltlttcr
on its westem half, more towards the inland. En.ch division hOO
two brigades in the first line and a third in reserve. Counting from
left to right, the brigades were those of Hill and Leith from Hope's
division, and MaIlningham and Bentinck from :Baird's. Behind the
crest CatIin Crawfurd supported the two former, und 'Varde'fl
battalions of Gua.rds the two latter. Down in the hollow behind
the Monte Moro lay Paget's division, close to the village of Eiris 1.
He was invisible to the French, but so plaL-ed that he could imme-
diately move out to cover the right wing if the enemy attempted
a turning movement. Lastly, Fril.Ser's division lay under cover in
Corullna, ready to march forth to SUppOlt Pl\,o-et the moment that
fighting should begin 2. Six of the nine guns (small six.pounders),
which :Moorc had left on shore, were distributed in pairs along the
front of Monte l\foro: the other three were with Paget's reserve.
After surveying the British position from the Peilasquedo
heights, Soult had resoh'oo to attempt the mallreuvre which
l\{oore had thought most probable-to as&mlt the westel'll end
of the line, where the heights are least formidable, and at the
same moment to turn the :Monte Moro by a movement round
its extreme right through the open ground. Nor had it escaped
1 paget had just lost his senior brigadier, AlJ!,truther, w110 died of dysentery
ill Corunnll. that dRy. His second briga\le WIlS commll.uded by Disney.
s His tlVO brigadiers were Deresford amI Fane.
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17tll Uger (three batts.)
70th of the Liuc (four II:IU$.)
06th of the Line (tllree batts.)
4th Swiss Regiment (OIlC b.'1tt.)
him that the ground occupied by Baird's division was within cannOll-
shot of the opposite range. He ordered ten guns to be d~rred
up to the wcstcrnmost crest of the French position, and to be
placed above the village of Elvina, facing Bentinck'5 brigade.
The rest of his artillery was distributed along the front of the
Pci'lasqucdo and Palavea heights, in situations that were less
fl\\'olll'able, because they were more remote from the British lincs.
The hills were steep, no road ran along their sllmmi~ and the
guns had to be dragged by hand to the places which they were
intended to occupy. It was only under cover of the night that
those opposite Elvina were finally got to thci,' destination.
Soult's force was now considerably superior to that which was
opposed to him, sufficiently so in his own estimation to compensate
for the strength of tliC defensive positiolls which he would huve to
assail. He had three infantry divisions with thirty-nine battalions
(Heudelet was still far to the rearh and twelve regiments of cavalry.
with about forty guns '. The whole, even allowing for stragglers
t The foree sWOd as follows :-
Infantry-1st Division, i\1erle (Brigades Reyllaud, Sarrut, 'l1lOmicres).
Each of Merlo's rcgimeuts (of which
2nd Leger (three baUs.) 1three were originally two battalions
4t11 Uger (four b.'1tts.) and onc t}lree battalions strong) had
15th of the Line (three batts.) receil'ed all additional battalion from
36th of the Line (tllree batts.) the <lissolved corps of Junot, before
leaving Astorga.
2nd Division, l\IelThet (Brigades Gauloio, Jar<IOIl, l&febne).
310-1 U (~ batts) The 47th had roceh'ed two, and the
"-tJ ,"th" L~ur (f .bat.~ ) } 31st Ugcr and 2nd Swiss each ouc
/10 e me our "". ha l' f J t' 'rh
122nd of tlle Line (four batts.) tta lOll TOm uno ~ corps. .e
o d S' It· ( .~ ) 122nd was a uew regiment, cOllsoh-
.u WISS cgIffieut two .....tts. .. • .
3rd Swiss Regiment (one batt.) dated from SIX ~attahousof the, SUIJ-
plementary Legions of Iteserve.
3rt! Division, Oclammlc (IJrigndes Foy am] Arllalld).
The 70th and 06t11, from Portugal,
l llad each reech'ed a baU..l.iion from"Iorlc's dil'isioll, wherc tllcy hllll been
J
' servillg iu the autUffill. 'J11e 17th
I~ger lmd bocn transferred from the
GtlL Curp~ tu thc 21Jtl.
Cavalry-LahollSSllYC'S Division of IJmgoons (Hrigaoes Mnrisy ano CaulaiJl~
court).
17th, l3tll, 1!)th, and 27th Dragoons-fonr regiments. l~ over.)
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still trailing in the rear, and for men who had perished in the
snows of the mOlUltains. must have been over 20,000 strong. The
cavalry had 4,500 sabres. and the infantry battalions must still
have o.'·eraged over 500 mell, for in November they had nearly all
been up to 700 bayonets, aod even the toilsome march in pursuit
of Moore cannot have destroyed so much as a third of their
numbers: only MerIe's division had done any fighting. It is
absurd of some of the French narrators of the battle to pretend
that Sou1t had only 13,000 infantry-a figure which would only
I;,';\'C 830 bayonets to each battulion 1.
Soult's plan was to contain the British left and centre with two
of his divisions-those of Delaborde and Merle-while Memet
and the bulk of the can~lry should attack Moore's right, seize the
western end of Monte Moro, and push in between Baird's flank
and Corunna.. If this movement succeeded, the Hritish retreat
would be compromised: Delahorde and Merle {:{mld then as.>ail
Hope and prevent him from goillg to the rear: if. all went
rig4t, two-thirds of the British Mmy mllst be surrounded Rnd
captured,
The movement of masses of infantry, and still more of cavalry
and guns, along the rugged crest and slopes of the Penasquedo
heights, was attended with so much difficulty, that noon was long
passed before the whole army was in position. It was indeed so
late in the day, that Sir Jo}m Moore had come to the conclusion
that Soult did not intend to attack, and had ordered Paget's
division, who were to be the first troops to embark, to march down
to the harbour~, The other corps were to retire at dusk, and ';''0
on shipboard under cover of the night.
But between 1.30 and 2 o'clock the French suddenly took the
offensive: the.battery opposite Elviua began to play upon llaird's
division, columns descending from each side of it commenced to pour
down into thc valley, and the eight c!walry regiments ofLahoussayc
Lorges's Division of Dragoolls (Brigaues Vialanue;; anu Foumier).
13tb, 15th, 22ud, and 25th Dragoons-four regiments.
Fnnceschi's Mhet! Dirisinll (Brig:Jdes DebeIle :Jilt! Girardin [?J).
1st Hussars, 8th Dr:Jgoons, 221\t! CIHI~l\rs> allt! Hanoveriau Chasseuf$-
fonr regimfmt.q.
Artillery-GOO meu (?): exact figures not available.
1 e. g. lA.J Noble in his CIIIIIJKl!J111i du Marlchal &lull, 1808-9, p. 41.
, lllakeuey, p. 114.
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and Franceschi, pushing out from behind the PeJ1a.squcdo heights,
rode northward along the lower slopes of the hills of San Cristobal,
with the obvious design of elltting in between the Monte Moro and
Corunna.
Moore welcomed the approach of battle with joy: he had c\"ery
confidence in his men and his position, and SIlW that it. vidol'}" won
ere his departure would silence the greater part of the inevitable
criticism for timidity and want of enterprise, to which he would
be exposed on his return to England. He rode up to the crest of
his position, behind Baird's division, took in the situation of afl'tliri>
at a glance, and sent back orders to Paget to pay attention to the
French turning movement, and to Fraser to come out from Corunna
and l.'Ontail1 allY advance OIl the part of the encmy\; clwalry on the
extreme right.
For some time the English left and centre were scarcely engagtd,
for MerIe and Delaborde did no more than push tirailleurs out in
front of their line, to bicker with the skirmishers of Hill, Leith,
and Manningham. But Bentinck's brigade was at once seriously
assailed: not only were its lines swept by the baUs of Soult's main
battery, but a heavy infantry attack was in progress. Gaulois
and Jardon's brigades of Mermet's division were coming forward
in great strellgth: tIley turned out of the village of Ehina the
light company of the 50th, whieh had been detached to hold that
tulmnccd position, and then came up the slope of Monte Mol"O,
with a dense crowd of tirailleurs covering the advance of eight
battalion columns. M;eanwhile the third brigade of Mermet's
division was hurrying past the flank of Bcntinck's line, in the
lower ground, with the obvious intention of turning the British
flank. Beyon~ them LahousSll.)'e's dragoons were cautiously feeling
their way forward, much incommoded by walls and broken ground.
All the stress of the first fighting fell on the three battalions
of Bentinck, on the hill above Elvina. Moore was there in person
to direct thc fight: Ba.ird. 011 whom the n'spollsibility for this purt
of the ground would naturally have fallcll, was wounded cnrl)' ill
the day, by a cannon-ball which shattered his left arm I, and was
borne to the rear. When the French came nCtlr the top of the
slope, driving in before them the British skirmishing line, the
COlllmander-in-ehief ordered the 45lnd and 50th to charge down
1 His dispatch ro Castlereagh, Qf Jan, 10, pro"es that he \\'33 wouuded before
Moore fell.
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upon them. The 4th, the flank regiment of the whole line, could
not follow them: it was threatened by the encircling mO\'ement of
the li'rench left, and l\Ioore bade it throw back its right wing so as
to form nn angle en potence with the rest of the brigade, while still
keeping up its fire. The manreuvre was executed with such pre-
cision as to win his outspoken approval-'That is exactly how it
should be dO,lc,' he shouted to Colonel 1Vynch, and then rode oft'
to attend to the 50th and 4~nd, further to llis left.
Here a very heavy combat was raging. Advancing to meet the
French attack, these two battalions drove in the tirailleurs with
the crushing fire of their two-deep line, and then became ellg~l1'ftl
with the supporting columns on the slopes above Elvina. For
some time the battle stood still, but Moore told the regiments
that they must advance to make their fire tell, and at last Colonel
Sterling and Major Charles Napier led their men over the line of
stone walls behind which they were standing, and pressed forward.
The head of the French formation melted away before their volleys,
and the enemy rolled back into Elvina. The 42nd halted just
above the village, but Napier led the 50th in among the houses,
and cleared out the defenders after a sharp fight. He even passed
through with part of his mell, and became engaged with the l-rcneh
supports on the further side of the place. Presently ~[erlnct scnt
do\\'11 his reserves and drove out the 50th, who suffered very heavily:
Charles Napier was wounded and taken, and Stanhope the jUllior
major was kilk>d 1. While the 5()th was reforming, Moore brought up
the divisional reserve, Wnrdc's two magnificent bn.ttalions of Gnunls,
each of which, in consequence of their splendid discipline during
the retreat, mustered over BOO bayonets. With these and the 4-2nd
he held the slope above Ehina in fa(.'C of a very hot fire, not only
f~om the enemy's infantry but from the battery on the opl'nsitc
heights, which swept the ground with a lateral and almost an
enfilading fire. It was while directing onc of the Guards' battalions
to go fox-ward and storm a large house on the flank of the village
that Moore received a mortal wowld. A rol111ol1-ball struck him
011 the left shoulder, carrying it away with part of the collar-bone,
and leaving the arm hanging only by the flesh and muscles above
1 Every student of the Peninsular 'Var sJlOuld read Charles Napier's vivid
and thrilling account of the stonn of Elvina.. WilHnm Napier 1'Cllrintcd
it ill vol. i of llis brother's biography. Charles was within an ace of lJeing
murdered after surreuder, aud was sa\·ed by a gallant French drummer.
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the armpit I, He was dn.shcd from hi:> horse, but immediately
raised himself on his sound arm and bade his aide-de-camp Han1inge
sce that the 4~nd should advance along wiUl the Guards. Then
he was borne to the rear, fully realizing that his wound was lIlortnl:
his consciousness nc\'cr failed, in spite of the pain and the loss of
blood, and he found strength to send a messae,rre to Hope to bid
him take command of the army. ''''hen his bearers wished to
unbuckle his sword, which WM jarring his wounded tlrm and side,
he refused to allow it, saying' in his usual toue and wit.h a very
distind Yoice, "It is well as it is. I had rather that it should go
out of the field with me,''' He WM borne back to Corunna ill
CL blanket by six men of the Guards and 42nd. Frequently he made
them turn him round to view the field of battle, and as he saw the
}'rench line of fire rolling back, he se"eral times expressed his
pleasure at dying in the moment of victory, when his mllch-lriL'(1
arlll} was at last faring as it deserved.
While Bentinck's brigade and the Guards were thus engaged
with Mennet's right, a separate combat was going on l1Iorc to the
west, where Edward Paget and the Reserve division had marched
out to resist the French turning movement. The instant thAt
Moore's first orders had been received, Paget had sent forward the
95th Rifles in extended order to cover the gap, half a mile in
hreadth, between the :Monte Moro alld the heights of San Cristobnl.
Soon afterwards he pushed up the 5~nd into line with the riflemen.
The other three battalions of the division moved out soon after.
Htb'Ct had ill front of him il brigtule-fivc battaliolJs-of Mermct'!>
division, which was trying to slip round the corner of Monte Moro
in order to take Baird in the flank. He had also to guard against
the charges of ;Lahoussaye's cavalry more to his right, and those
uf Frunccschi's chasscurs still further south. Fortunately the
b'found was so much cut up with rough stone walls, dividing
the fields of the villages of San Cristobal and Elvina, that Soult's
cavalry wc!'c unable to cxecute any gencral or vigorous tulvUI\(:c.
Wllcn the British swept across the low ground, Lahoussayc's
dr8.f,'OOns made two or three attempt~ to charge, but, forced to
advance among walls and ral'ines, they never e~'en compelled Paget's
battalions to form square, and were easily driven off by a rolling
fire. The Reserve diyisioll irleadily advance<l, with the 95th and
5~nd in its front, and the horsemen gave back. It was i,: vain
t Letter of his aide-de-camp Hanlinge in James l\Ioore's Life, p. 220.
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that Lahoussaye dismounted the ~7'th Dragoons and ranged them
as Urailleurs along the lower slopes of the heights of San Cristobal.
The dea(Ily fire of Paget's infantry thinned their ranks, and forced
them back. It would seem that th.e 95th, 28th, and 91st hnd
mainly to do with lAhoussaye. while the 52nd and 20th became
engaged with the infantry from the division of Mermet, which was
bickering with the 4th Regiment below the Monte Moro, and
striving to ·turn its flank. In both quarters the advance was
completely successful, and Paget pushed forward, taking numerous
prisoners from the enemy's broken infantry. So far did he admllec in
his victorious onslaught that he approached from the flank the main
}<'rench battery on the heights of Pefiasquedo, and thought that (if
leave had been given him) he would have been able to capture it:
for its infantry supports were broken, and the cavalry had gone off
far to the right. Dut Hope sent no orders to his colleague, and
the Reserve halted at dusk at the foot of the French position.
Franceschi's horsemen meanwhile, on the extreme left of the
French line, had at first pushed cautiously towards Corunna., till
they saw Fmser's division drawn up half a mile outside the gates,
,on the low ridge of Santa Margarita, covering the whole neck.
,of UH~ peninsula. This checked the ca"alry, and presentl)', when
Paget's advance drove in Lahoussaye, Franceschi conformed to the
retreat of his colleague, and drew back across the heights of San
Cristobal till he had reached the left rear of Soult's position, and
halted in the upland ,'alley somcwhere ncur the village of l\Iesoiro.
We left Dentinck's and Warde's brigades engaged on the slopes
above Elvina with Mermet's right-hand column, at the DlOment
of thc fall of Sir John MOOIOC, The sc<.'ond ndvallcc on Eh·ina
had begun just as the Dritish commander-in-chief fell: it was com-
pletely successful. and the yillage was for the second time captured,
:Mermet now sent down his last reserves, and Merle moved forward
his left-hund brigade to attack the village on its eastern side. This
led to a corresponding movement on the part of the British.
Manningham's brigade from the right-centre of the British liue
came down the slope, und feU upon Merle's columns llS they prcssed
in towards the village. This forced the French to halt, and to turn
aside to defcnd themselves: there was a long and fierce strife, during
UlC later hours of the afternoon, between Manllingham's two right-
hand regiments (the W1st and 2j8lst) and the 2nd Uger and
36th of the Line of Reynaud's brigade. It was prolonged till the
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2/81st had exhausted all its ammunition, and had suffered a loss
of 150 men, when Hope sent down the 2/59th, the reserve regiment
of Leith's brigade, to relieve it. Soon afterwards the French
retired, and the battle died away at dusk into mere distant
bickering along the bottom of the "alley, as a few skirmisherb:
of the victorious brigade pursuetl the retreating columns la the
foot of their position.
Further eastward Dclaborde had done nothing more than make
a feeble demonstration against Hope's very strong position on the
heights above the :Mel'O river. He drove in Hill's pickets, and
afterwards, late ill the afternoon, endeavoured to seize the village
of Piedralonga I, at the bottom of the valley which lay between the
hostile lines. Foy, who was entrusted with this operation, took
the voltigeur companies of his brigade, and drove out from the
hamlet the outposts of the 14th Regiment. Thereupon Hill sellt
down Colonel Nicholls with three more companies of that corps,
supported by two of the 9Qnd from Hope's dil'isional resenc.
They expelled the .French, and broke the supports on which the
voltigeurs tried to rally, taking a few prisoners including Foy':>
brigade-major. Delabordc then sent down another battalion,
which recovered the southcm end of the village, while Nicholls
held tightly to the rest of it. At dusk both parties ceased to push
on, and the firing died away. The engagement at this end of thc
line was insignificant: Foy lost eighk'Cn killed nud fifty wounded
from thc 70th of the Linc, and a few lllore from the 86th. Nicholls'f;
casualties were probably even smaller~.
Soult had suflered such a decided reverse that he had no desire
to prolong the battle, while Hope-who so unexpectedly found
himself in command of the British army-showed no wish to make
I Erronoom;ly'called ill most British and French accounts }'alavea Aba;l;o.
The latter \'illage is at the foot of the French line, a little tQ the north.
2 For an account of this combat from tIle French siue see Foy's report to
Delaoorue, }Irillted ill Girod de l'Aiu's Vie 'milu"ire d« G6rrtral Eoy (appenuix),
where the losses of the brigade are gil·ell. Oil the English side the !)2nd lost
three killed and five wounded (see Garuyne's lli8tory cif the 9!!lld Regimmt).
TIle 14th do not separ-J.te tllcir battle-losses from those of the retreat ill their
(aSualty-returns. TIle)' had aixtr-six dead anu missing in the whole cam-
paign, and put on board at Corollna sevent)··twe sick and wounded. Probably
not more than ten of the former a)l(1 thirty of the hitter wer(\ hit in t'lI~
battle; if the casualties lVere any larger 011 January lG the losaes in tIle
retreat must "have been abnonnally small in the 14th Hegiment.
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a counter-attack, alld WllS quite contented to have vindicated his
position. He claimed, in his dispatch, that at the end of the
engagement the ann)" was holding a more advanced line than
at its commencement: and this WKS ill part true, for Elvilltl. was
now occupied in force, and not merely by a picket, and Paget Oil
the right had cleared the ground below the heights of San Cristobal,
which LahOilSSa)'e had been occupying during the action, Some
of the French writers have clai;ncd that Soult also had gained
ground 1; but the only fact that can ~ cited in favour of their
contention is that Foy was holding on to the southern end of
Piedralonga 2, All the eye-witnesses on their side concede that
at the end of the action the marshal's army had fallen back to its
original position 3.
English critics have occasionally suggcsted that the success won
by l}aget and Bentinck might ha"c been pressed, and that if the
division of Fraser had been brought up to their support, the French
left might ha"c ~n turned and crushed -4. But cOlIsidcring tlult
Soult had fourteen or fifteen intact battalions left, in the divisions
of Merle and Delabordc 6, it would have been well in his power
to fight a successful defensive action on his heights, throwing back
his left wing, so as to k~p it from being encircled. Hope Wlli)
right to be contented with his success; enm if he had WOIl a victory
he could have done no more than re-embark, for the anny was not
in 0. condition to plunge on~ more into the Gnlician highlands ill
put'Suit of Soult, who would Illwe been joined in a few days by
Heudelet, and in a week by Ney,
The losses suffered by the two armies at the battle of Corullna
I Of course the untrustworthy Le Noble does 80, :lUd falsifies his map
accordingly.
S Foy's brigade engaged two battalions of the jOth Regiment, ~ides three
companies of OO/Ugeurit of the 86l11; this was all that Delaborde seut fonrard,
There wcre two chif~ de batailfQN among the wonnded,
3 'Chaque armee resta sur sou terraiu,' says St, Cllamans, Soult's senior
aide-tlo-<:amll (the lIUIlI who 80 kindly entreated Clmrles Napier, as the
latter's memoirs show). < A la uuit, qui seule a pu terminer cette (\ltte
Olliniatre, 110US nous sommes retrOllnhl au point d'ou nOIl..'i etions pattis 11
3 heures,' gays Fantill des Odoards, of l\Iermet's dil·isioll (p, ZOO), < Nos
troupes {urent obUgees, par des forces superieures, de renuer daus leuts
premiers postes,' says Na}'Ues, of Lahollssaye's dragoollS (p, 46).
• Blakelley urges this very strongly (pp, 117, liB) j Graham also,
I It would seem that only the 2nd Uger and 36th of the Line of !'I!crle,
Ilnd the 70th of Dell.lborde, lHlll beel! seriously engaged,
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are not easy to estimate. 'TIle Blitish regiments, embarking all the
dui after the fight, did not send in /luy returns of their ctlSlUl.lties
till they reached England. Then, most unfOltunately, a majority'
of the colonels lumped together the losses of the retreat and those
of the battle. It is lucky, however, to find that among the regiments
which sent in proper returns are nearly all those which fought the
bnmt of the a.ction. The 50th and 4~nd of Dcntillck's brigade
were by far the most heavily tried, from the prolonged and
despemte fighting in and about Elvina. The formcl' lost two
officers kilk-d and three wounded, with 180 rank and file: the
Highland battalion thirty-nine rank and file killed and 111 (in- .
eluding six officers) wounded. The Guards' brigade, on the other
hand, which was brought up to support these regiments, suffered
very little; the nrst battalion of the 1st Regiment had only five, the
second only eight killed, with about forty wounded between them.
rn Manningharn's brigade the 81st, with its loss of three officers
and twenty·seven men killed, and eleven officers and 112 men
wdunded, was by far the heaviest sufferer: the Royals may also have
had n considerable C1.lSUnlt'y~list, but its fil:,J"Urcs arc apparently not
to be found, except confused with those of the whole retreat.
Pl\,rret's division in its flank march to ward off the French turning
movement suffered surprisingly little: of its two leading regiments
the 1/ 95th had but twelve killed nnd thirty-three wounded, the
1/59lnd five killed and thirty-three wounded. The other three
battalions, which formed the supports, must have had even fewer
men disabled. Hope's division, with the exception of the 14th
Rnd the 59th, was not seriously engaged: the few battalions which
sent in their battle-losses, apart from those of the retreat, show
figures such as six or ten for their casualties on January 16.
Fraser's whole division neither fired a shot nor lost a-man. It is
probable then that Hope, when in his dispatch he estimated the
total loss of the British army at 'something between 700 and 800,'
was overstating rather than understating the total.
80u1t's losses are even harder to discover than those of Moore's
army. His chronicler, Le Noble', says that they amounted to no
more than 150 killed and 500 wounded. The ever inaccurate
Thiers reduces this figure to 400 or less. On the other hand
Naylies, a combatant in the battle, speaks of 800 casualties; and
1 Belmae gives the same uumber, probably copying Le Noble.
,O.)lAN. I Q q
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weighed anchor and stood out to sea. Four vessels ran on shore,
and three of them could not be got oft': the troops 011 board were
hastily transferred to other ships, with no appreciable loss; from
the whole army only nine men of the Royal \VUbl"Qll Train arc
retumed as having been 'drowned in Corunna harbour,' no doubt
from the sinking of the boat which was transhipping them. General
Leith records, in his diary, that on the vessel which took him home
there were fmgmcnts of no lCiJ.!l than six regiments: wc call hfU'dly
doubt that this must have been one of those which picked up the
men from the stranded transports.
Beresford's brigade embarked from a safe point behind the
citadel on the eighteenth, leaving the toWll in charge of the small
Spanish f,1'Urrison under General Alcedo, which mainminoo lhc
works till all the fleet wez:e flU" out to sea, and then rather tamely
surrendered. This was entirely the doing of their commander,
a shifty old man, who almost immediately after took seryice with
King Joseph I.
The retllTIling fleet had a tempestuous but rapid passttgc:
urged on by a raging south-wester the vessels ran home in four
or fiye days, and made almost eyery harbour between Falmouth
and Dover. Many transports had a dangerous passage, but only two,
the Dispatch and the SmallbrUlge. cume to grief off the Cornish
coast find were lost, the fonner with three officers and fifty-six
men of the 7th Hussars, the latter with five officers and ~09 men
of the King's German Legion 2. So ended the famous 'Retreat
from Sahagun.'
Moore's memory met, as he had feared, with many unjust
aspersions when the results of his campaign were known in England.
The aspect of the f::!6,OOO ragged war-worn troops, who came ashore
on the South Coast, W8.<; so miserable that those who saw them
were shocked. The state of the mass of 3,000 invalids, racked
with feyer and dysentery, who were cast into the hospitals was
eminently distressing. It is seldom that 1I. nation sees its troops
returning straight from the field, with the grime and sweat of
battle and march fresh upon them. The impression made was
1 St. Chamans calls him' un vieu.x faible et sans moyells, mene par llllC
espece de courtisaue,' Mr. Stuart (ill a note to Vaughall) descrilJes him as au
'unscrupulous old rascal.'
2 Cf. 'for their losses the Parliamentary Paptrs for 1809 (pp. 8, {l), and
Beamish's History of t!le Gemwn Legioll.
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a yery unhappy one, and it was easy to blame the General.
Public discontent was roused both against Moore and against
the ministry, and some of, the defenders of the latter took an
ungenerous opportunity of shifting all the blame upon the man
who could no longer vindicate himself. This provoked his numerous
friends into MSCl-ting that his whole conduct of the campaign had
been absolutely blmneless, and that any misfortunes which occurred
were simply and solely the fault of maladministration and unwise
councils at home. Moore was the hero of the Vlhig party, and
politics were drnggc<l into the discussion of the campaign to a
lamentable extent. Long years after his death the attitude of the
critic or the historian, who dealt with the Corunna retreat, was
illVariably coloured by his Whig or Tory predilections.
The accepted view of the present genel'ation is (though most
men are entirely unacquainted with the fact) strongly coloured by
the circumstance that William Napier, whose eloquent history has
supcrscded all othcr llillTativcs of the Peninsular \\Tar, was t\ violent
enemy of the Tory ministry and a personal admirer of l\1oore.
.Kinety years and more haye now passed since the great retreat,
ffi1d we can look upon the campaign with impartial eyes. It is
easy to point out mistakes made by the home b'Ovenuncnt, such
as the tardy dispatch of Baird's cavalry, and the inadequate pro-
yision of money, both for the division which started from Lisbon
und for that which started from Corulllla. But thesc arc not the
most important causes of the misfortnnes of the campaign. Nor
can it be pleaded that the ministry did not support Moore loyally,
or that they tied his hands by contradictory or over-explicit orders.
A glallce at Castlercngh's dispatches is sufficient to show that he
and his colleagues left everything that was possible to be settled
by the General, and that they approved each of his deienninations
as it reached them without any cavilling 01' criticism 1.
Moore must take the main responsibility for all that happened.
On the whole, the impression left after a study of his campaign
is \·cry favourable to him. His main conception when he marched
from Sa.lamanca-that of gaining time for the mllying of the
Spanish armies, by directing a sudden raid upon the Emperor's
communications in Castile-was as sound as it was enterprising.
The French critics who have charged him with rashness ha\'e ,never
1 lu fairness to the governmeut Castle~h's dispatches, 02-10S in the
Pllrli(lll/eIl/aT!f Paperajor 1809, slloulll be carefully studied.
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read his dispatches, nor realized the care with which he had thought
out the retreat, which he knew would be inevitable when his mo\·e~
ment became known at Madrid. He was never for a moment in
any serious danger of being surrounded by the Emperor, because
he was proceeding (as he himself wrote) 'bridle in hand,' and with
a full knowledge that he must 'have a rUll for it' 011 the first
receipt of news that Napoleon was upon the march. His plan
of making a diversion Wll!! a complete success: he drew the Emperor,
with the 70,000 men who would otherwise have marched 011 Lisbon,
up into the north-west of the Peninsula, quite out of the main
centre of operations. Napoleon himself halted at Astorga, but
45,000 men marched on after the British, and were engulfed in the
1ll00mtuins of Galicia, where they were useless for the main operations
of the war. Spain, in short, gained three months of respite, because
the main disposable field-army of her invaders had been drawn of!:'
into a corner by the une.xpected march of the British on Sahagun.
'As It diversiou the movement has llnswered <.'Olllpletel)',' wrote
l\'Ioore to Castlereagh from Astorga.l, Rnd with justice. That the
subsequent retreat to Corunna was also advisable we must concede,
though the arguments in fa"our of attempting a defence of Galicia
were more weighty than has generally been allowed 2.
But when we turn to the weeks that prc<:eded the adVllllCC from
Salamanca, and that followed the departure from Astorga, it is
only a very blind admirer of Moore who will contend that every"
thing was arranged and ordered for the best, 'Illat the army,
which began to arrive at Salamanca on November lS, did not
make a forward move till D~mber 12 is a fact which admits
of explanation, but not of e.xcuse. The main go,;eming fact of
its inactivity was not, as Moore was always urging, the disasters
of the Spaniards, but the misdirection of the British cavahy and
artillery on the roundabout route by Elvas, Talavera, and the
Escurial. For this the British general was personally responsible:
we have already shown that he had good reaSOllS for distrusting
the elToneous reports on the roads of Portugal which were sent
in to him, and that he should not have believed them 3. He
ought to have marched 011 Almeida, with bis troops distributed
between the three available roads, and should have had a compact
1 i\roore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808.
, See the arguments stated on pp. M4-f.i.
S See the facts stated Oil PI" 493-5.
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force of all arms concentrated at Salamanca by November 15.
Even without Baird he could then have exercised some influence
on the course of events. As it was, he condemned himself-by the
unmilitaryact of separating hilllself from his guns and his horse-
men-to a. moilth of futile waiting, while the fate of the campaign
was being settled a. hundred and fifty miles away.
The chance that Napoleon turned his whole army upon Madrid;
and did not send a single corps in search of the British, gave
Maore the grand 0ppOltunity for striking at the French com-
mnnications, which he turned to such good account in the middle
of December. Bu4 though he so splendidly vindicated his repn·
tation by this blow, we caIUlot forget the long hesitation at
SalamunCtl. by which it was preceded, uDr the unhappy project
fm' instant retreat on Portugal, which was so nearly put into
execution. If it had been can·ied out, Moore's name would have
been relegated to a very low place in the list of British commanders.
for he would undoubtedly have evacuated Lisbon, just as he huu
prcpm'Cd to evacuate Corunl1a on the day before he was slain. 'We
kwe his own words to that effect. On November ~5 he put on
paper his opinion as to the defence of Portugal. 'Its frontier,' he
wrote, 'is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open
frontier, all equo.lly rugged, but nil equally to be penetrated. If the
French succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt to resist them in
Portugal. The British must in that event immediately take steps
to evacuate the country 1.' It is fortunate that Sir Arthur
Wellesley was not of this opinion, or the course of the Peninsular
War, and of the whole struggle between Bonaparte and Britain,
might have been modified in a ,,"ery unhappy fashion.
So much must be said of Moore's earlier faults. Of his Inter
onc~ committed after his departure from Astorga, almost as much
might be made. His long hesitation, as to whether he should
march on Vigo or on Corunna, was inexcusable: at Astorga his
mind should have been made up, and the Vigo road (0. bad cross~
route on which he had not a single magazine) should have llCCll
left out of consideration. By failing to make up his mind, and
taking useless half-measures, Moore deprived himself of the services
of Robcrt Crawfurd and 3,500 of the best soldiers of his anu)'.
But, as we have shown elsewhere, the hesitation was in its origin
the result of the groundless hypothesis which Moore had formed-
1 Moore to CasUllreagb, from Salamanca, No\". 25.
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one knows not from what premises-that the Fnmch would not be
able to pursue him beyond Villafnmca.
Still more open to criticism is the headlong pace at which
Maore conducted the last stages of the rehent. Napicr fms tried
to represent that the marches were not wlreasonable: 'in elc\'cn
days,' he 'ITOte, 'a small army passed over a hundred and fifty
miles of good road 1: But wc have to deduct three days of rest,
leaving an average of abont sc\'cnteen miles a day; and this for
January marching, in a rugged snow·clad country, is no trifle.
F'or though the road was 'good,' in the sense that it was well
engineered, it was conducted over ridge after ridge of one of the
most mountainous lands in Europe. The desperate uphill gradients
between Astorgn and Man7Annl, and between VilIafrancn and
Cerezal, cannot be measured in mere miles when their difficulty
is being estimated. The marching should be calculated by hours,
and not by miles. Moreover, Moore repeatedly gave his mcn night·
marches, and even two night-marches on end. Half the hOl'l'ors
of the dreadful stage between Lugo and lletanzos came from the
fact that' the army started at midnight on J anullrY 8-9, only
rested a few hours by day, and then marched again at seven on
the evening of the ninth, and through the whole of the dark hours
between- the ninth and tenth. Flesh and blood cannot endure such
a trial even in good weather, arId these were nights of hurricane
and downpour. 'Vho can wonder that even welI--d.isposed and
willing men lagged behind, sank down, and died by hundreds
under such stress?
All this hurry was unnecessary; whenever the rearguard turned
to face thc French, Soult WM forced to wait for many hours beforc
he could even begin an attempt to evict il For his infantry was
always many miles to the real', and he eould not eRect anything with
the horsemen of his advanced guard against Paget's steady bat·
taliOlls-a5 Cacabe1los sufficiently showed. Napier urges that any
position that the British took up could be turned by side'looads;
this is true, but the flanking mO"cmellt would always take an
iuordil').ate time, and by the moment that the French had started
upon it, the British rearguard could have got, off in sufety, after
having delayed the enemy for the best part of a day. If, instead
of offering resistance only at Cacabellos, Constantino, and Lugo,
::\fool'C had shown fight at three or four other places-e. g. at
1 Napicr, i. 34fl.
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the 118.1.TQW pass of Piedrafita, the paSSl\,cre of the Lndrn, and the
defile of Monte Falqueiro-he need not have hurried his main
body beyond their strength, and left the road strewn with 80
many e.xlmustcd stragglers. French alld English eye-witnesses
alike repeatedly express their surprise that such positions were
left undefended. V\'hile not disguising the fact that a great pro-
portion of the British losses were due to mere want of discipline
and sullen discontent on the purt of the rlUlk and file, wc cannot
fail to see that this was not the sole cause of the disl\.<;ters of the
retreat. The General drove his men beyond their strength, when
he might, at the cost of a few rearguard skirmishes, have given
them four or five days more in which to accomplish their retreat.
Moore arrived at C01'111l111l. on January 11: it was January 16
before Soult had so far collected his army that he could venture
to attack. At any other point, the result of offering battle would
have been much the same. No excuse for Moore can be made
011 the ground of insufficient supplies: at VillafranCiLt Lngo, and
Betanzos he destroyed enormous quantities of fo~, and ofteit So
imperfectly that the French succeeded in living for several days on
what they CQuld save from the flames.
In making these criticisms wc arc not in the least wishing to
impugn MOOl"e'S reputation as a capable officer and a good general.
He was both, but his fault was an excessive sense of responsibility.
He could ne"er forget that he had in his charge, as was said, 'not
It British army, but the British army'-thc one efficient force that
the United Kingdom could put into the field. He was loth to
risk it, thongh ultimately he did so in his admirably conceived
march on Sah~fflln. He had also to think of his own Ctlrcer:
among his numerous friends and admirers he had a re!mtation for
military infallibility which he was loth to hazard. Acting under
a strong sense of duty he did so, but all the while he was anxiously
nskillg himself' Whtlt will they say at home?' It WM this sclf-
consciousness that was Moore's weak point. Fortunately he was a
man of courage and honour, and at the critical moment rccO"ered
the confidence and decision which WM sometimes wanting in the
hours of doubt and waiting.
F'ew men have been better loved by those who knew them best.
To have served in the regiments which Moore had trained at
Shornclilfc in 1803-5, was to be his devoted friend and admirer
for life and death. Handsome, courteous, just, and benevolent,
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llllspnring to himself, considerate to his subordinates, be won all
hearts. 'He was a very king of men,' v,'TOte Charles Napier; and
Charles's more eloquent brother has left him a panegyric such as
few generals have merited and fewer still obtained I,
1 'TllUS cnucfl tllC career of Sir J01Ul MOOI'C,:1 mall wllOile Ulloommon
capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested
patriotism, more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of
a great nation. His tall graceful person, Ilis dark 8CarelliJlg C}'es, strollgly
defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth indicated a noble disposition
and a refined understanding. TIle lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his
mind were adomet.l by a subtle playful wit, Ivhich glwe 1lim in COJn'CrsatiOll
tlle asceudeuc}' which be always preserved by tlle decisil'e \'igour of his action.
He maintained the right \.Iith a vehemence bordering ou fiereeness, and every
important transaction in wbich he was eugaged increased his reputation for
talent, and confirmed llis cltarnct.er as a stern enemy to vice, a steadfast friend
to merit. a just and faithful servant of his COIUltry. The honest loved him,
the dishonest reared him; he did not shun, but scorned and spurned thc base,
nnd, with cltanu;terislie !lropriely, tlley sllUrued at him wllcn he was dead.
. • . If glory be a distillction, for suell a man death is not a lel'eller!'
(Peninrular War, i. 333.)
APPENDICES
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GODOYS PROCL~lATION OP OCT. 5, 1806
ESPANOL~~S!
lis circunstaneias menos arriesga.<las que Jas prescutes hall procurado los
vasallosleales fluxiliar li SUlI soberan08 con dones y rccursos anticipndos a Ins
llcccshlades; pero ert csla )lrevisioll liene el mejor lUg3r la. gelleros.:l. accioa
lIe subdito bacia. I!U sefior. El reiuo de Andalucfa prhoi1egiado por la natura-
leza eu la produccion de caba.l1os de gutI'm ligeros; la pr()I'iucia de Extrema_
dura Illle mutos sCf\'icios de esta clllSC hizo al senor l'elipe V. ~ ven'm COil
Ilacicllcia que la caballerfa del fey de Espalia elite reducitla i incompleta por
falta de caballos? No, no 10 creo ; antes si esper(l que del mismo modo que
los auuelos gloriosos de la generacion presente sirvieron al nuncio de lluestro
rey con i10mbres y caOO1108, asistau ahora los nietos de lIuestro suelo COIl
regimicutos 6 compafifas de hombres diestros en el manejo del caballo, para
quesirl'an y defielldall a all patrill. todo el tiempo que duren las urgencins nctu·
ales, yoh'iendo despues lleuos de gIoria y cou rncjor sume al descanso entre
su familia. Entollees si que cada cual se llisputara los Iallrelcs de la \'ictoria ;
cual dira deberse lisu brazo la sal"/lCioll de su familia; ClIJlIIa de su gofe; CUlllla
de SIl parieme 6 amigo, y todos i una tendt"d.n rawn IXlt"d ntrilmir;;ea si mismos
la sah-acion de la patria. Venid pues, amados compatriotas, ,'cllid a jurar
b:ljO las b.111deras del mas bencfico de los sobenltlO!!: ,'cnid y yo os cubrire COil
el 1113nto de la gratitud, cumpliendoos cuallto desde ahora OS ofretco, si el
Dios de las I'ictorias nos concede una paz tan feliz y duradera cllal le rogamos,
No, no os dewndr! et temor, no la pcrfidia: I'llcstr03 pcchos 110 abrigan t.'\les
I'icios, Ili Jan luga.r a la torpe seduccioll. Venid pues y si las cosas llegasen
UpUllto de no eulazarse Ias armas con !as de nuestros enemig05, no illcurrireis
ell III nota de sospechosos, nl os tjldareis con un dictado impropio de "uestra
lealta,l ypundollor por haber sido ornisos ami llamamicllto,
Pero si mi yoZ uo aIcanzase :i despertar I'uestros anhelos de gloria, sea la de
"uestres inmcdilltos tutores 6 lllldrcs de1lmeblo U'1uienes me dirijo, la que os
haga entender 10 que debeis a Ynestra oloIigacion, a ,'uestro liouor, y :\ la
S<1gralh!. religion que profesais.
San Udefonso, 5 de octuure de 1800.
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'rUAITfi 8lWJl~ t;STII~ 8.3.1.1. NAI'OLWN} t:MI'taU;UlI ms .'IUN9A1S, ROI n'l'fAI.IE,
r.rC., F;T SA :UAJ~i: CATHOLlQVE CI!AltLES 11', nOI D'ClPAGSE, Ere.
Art. le., La province eJltte Minhd et Dnero, la ville d'Oporto y comprise,
sera tlOllllL'C CIl loutc JlTopricW ct souveraillctC AS. i\1. le roi d'Etrllric, avcc
le titre de roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale.
2. La province d'AlelltejoJ et le royaume des AIgarl'es, aeroul donnes Cll
toutc proprictC ct souvcraiuctC au Ilnuoo de la l'aix, clont il jouira 11.1'00 le titre
do prince des Algal'ves.
3. Lcs provinces de Deira, Tras-Ios-Monte5 et de l'Estramadure portugaise,
resteront en depOt jusqu'a la paix generale, et alors 011 disposern d'ciles selon
leg circollsmnccs, ct C{)nfOmlcrnCllt a cc Ijui sera COllvcnu cllhe les !lou:\:
Imutes parties contractalltes.
4. Le royaume de la Lusitanie septentriollale sera possede par les desceu-
dRlls de S. ,\1. le TOi d'~trurie, llcredit.'lircmcnt et Buivaut lcs lois de snc-
cession qui SOllt en u~"'e dallS la (aroille regnallte de S. M. le TOi d'Espagne.
5. La principaute des Algan'es sera posStidtie par les desceudans dn prillce
de la l)aix, hereditniremellt et d'aprcs les lois de succession qui sont en u:age
dall!; la familIa rcgnantc de S. M. le roi 11'F..spag1IC.
G. A diifaut de descelldan8 ou hcritiers Iegitimes uu roi de la Lusitanie
septentrionale ou dn prince des AIgarves, cos pays seTOnt dOWll!S mo)"eull3ut
I'illvcstituro Imr S. M. le roi il'Espagne, l'0llrvu qu'ils ne puissentjamais are
rcWlis sous une lienle personne, ni it. la couronlle d'Espaglle.
7. Le roraume de la Lusitanie septentrionale, et la priucipautii lies
AlgaM'cs, TCCOnllaitrollt comme pTOteeteur S. M. le roi il'Espagne, ct les
sOllveraillS de ces pays ne pourront jamais faire la paix Ili la guerre sans le
cOllscntement du roi cathcilique.
a. Si les provinces de Baim, de Tras-Ios-)lolltc8 et de J'Estmmadure pOl'tU-
guise, rcstunt cn uelJUt, ctuiellt rciulues au terns de la puix gcnerale H la
maison de Bragance, en echange de Gibraltar, la. Trillite, et d'autres ('olonies
que lee Allglais ont conquisee sur l'Espague et sea allUs, le nouvcau souveraill
de ccs provjllccs aurait a l'egard de S. M. C. le roi d'E!lpague les mcme6
soumissions que le roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale, et le prince des AIgan-es,
et il possedera sous les m~mcs conditions.
9. S. M. le roi d'Etrllrie cede en toute proprieu: et souveroilletl! le roy:ullno
d'Etrurie it. S. 1\1. l'empereur des Frall~ais, roi d'ltalic.
10. QUlInd I'occllpation Mfinitivc des provinces du l'ortugal sem eft'ectIlCe,
Ies diffcrt)lls princes qui doh'cnt les possellcr Jlommerollt d'llccord lcs COlll-
missaires pour fixer 109 limites llaturelles.
n. S. M. l'empereur des }o'mll~js, roi d'ltalie, garnntit a S. J\1. C. le roi
(l'Espaglle la possession de sell etats du continent d'Europe, situcs au midi des
Pyrenees.
12. S. 1\1. I'cmpereur de.! Frnlll;ais, roi d'ltnlie, s'obligc i~ rccollnaitre
S, l\f. C. le roi d'Espagne comme cmpereur des deul: Ameriques quand tout
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lzQUII':IIJ)(l:
DUlloc.
EVGI'::'ilo
sera pret, afiu que S. 1\1. puisse prendre ce titre, ce qui pourra arrivel' an terns
de la pllb:: gCllcrnle, DU le plus tarn, d'ici a trois RIlS.
13. Leg llaul:cs Iluissnnccs COlltmctantcs accorderollt les moyens de Caire a
I'amiable une division egale des iles, colonies et autres proprieUs cl'outre-mer
du Portugal.
14. Le present traite fl'Ster:1 secret, it serll rntific, et lcs ratifications setOut
cchall~es 11 Madrid dans vingt jours.
Fait a FOlltaillebleau, le '!7 octobre 1307.
CONVENTION SECHETE.
DUlloo.
EUGt:XiO 12QC1BRl>Q.
Art. ler. Un corps de troupes impiriales fran~ises, de vingt-cinq mille
hommes d'jufallterie et de trois de CRvalerie, entrera ell Bspagnc, it fcra So'!.
junction avec illl corps de troupes espagnoles, ~ompose de lLUit milia homilies
d'infanterie, trois mille de c3valerie, et trente pii:ces d'artillerie.
2. All meme terns, une division de troupes espagnoles dedil: milIe hommes
prcndm pO&SeSSion de la province d'entre i\linho et Duero, et de la lille
d'Oporto, et une autre division de six mille llommes, eomposee pareillement de
troupes espagnoles, prendm possession de l'Alentejo et dn royanme des Algarl'es.
3. Le;; troupes fran<;niscs serolltllourrics et elltrcteunC:ll pur I'F"'IJ.'lgIlC, etleur
wide p.1yee par la France pendant tout le temps de leur pas...«age en Espagne.
4. Depuis le moment Oll les troupes combin~ seront elltrees en l>ortugal,
les provinces ,de .Bcira, 'I'rns-los-l\Iont:es et I'Estrnmadllre portugaise (qui
doh'cnt rester en UCJlot), serout admillist;rces et goul'ernees par le gCllcral
commandant des troupes frau\'3ises, et les contributiolls qui leur serout
imposees seront au pr06t de la lo'rance. Les provinces qui doivent composer
le royaume de la Lusitallie septentrionale et la prillcipalltC des Algarves
seront administreal et goul'eruees par les glineraulC commandant les divisions
espagnoles qui ell prendront possession, et les contributions qui leur Beront
imposees rcsteront au benefice de J'.t::spagnc.
5. Le corp!! dn eentre sera sous lea on:lrcs du comnmnuant des troupes
fran~aises, aus!!i bien que les troupes espagnoles qui lui Ileront reunies.
Cependant, si le roi d'Espagne ou le prince de la Pail: trouvaient convenable
et jugeaient 11 propus de s'y renure, le general commandallt d~ troupes
fran\'3ises et eUes-m~mes seront soumises aux ordres du roi d'Espagne ou du
prince de la Paix.
6. Un autre corps de qunr:lllte miJIe hommes de troupes frallpises sern
reuni it &yonue le 20 no\'embre prochain ou avaut cc tempg..Ia, et it devra etre
pret a marcher sur le l'ortugal, eu passaut par l'EspagncJ si les Anglais
eUl'oient des renfortB et mClmcent d'attaquer le prernier. Cepcndant, cc
nouveau corps de troupes n'eumm que quand les (lea::< hautes parties contrac·
tall~ se se:ront mises d'aceord pour cet det.
7. La presente COll\'elltiOll sera ratifi~, et l'tidmuge ues ratiJica.tious sera
faite au meme temps que le traite d'aujourd'lmi.
Fait a .Fontainebleau, le 27 octobre 1007.
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PAPERS RELATING TO THE 'AFFAIR OF THE
ESCURIAL'
U::"I'TEH. OF CHARU:S IV 1'0 NAPOLEON.
i\10NSIINR ~ION PRY.ItR,
Daus le moment oll je no lll'OCClIllais (Iue \les moycns tle coopber a la
destruction de notre cllllcmi commun; quand je croyais que tous les complots
de I" ci-dC\'llllt reillc de Nflples RvaiCllt etl'! cnsevelis avec sa. ti.lIc, je vois av(lC
une barrenr qui me fait fremir, que I'esprit d'intrigue le pIllS horrible a penetre
jueque daus le sein de mon paIRi50 Helas! mOD cceur saigne en faisant le
fecit d'Ull attentat si afl'reux! mOll tils nine,l'heritier presomptif de mOll
trOllC, avait forme le complot horrible de me dCtroner; iI s'ctnit portC jusqu'a
l'exces d'attenter contre la \,jo de sa mere! Un attentat si affrClL"{ doit etre
puui avee la rigueur la pIIUI exemplaire dcs lois. La loi qui l'appelait it la
succession doit cue revoqnce: un de ses {reres sera plus dig-ne de le l'emplaccr
et daus mon CUlllr et sur le triine. Je slIis dam~ cc moment iI. la rccherclle (le
ses compUees pour approfondir ce plan de la plus noire scgeratcsse; et je jle
venx perdre un seuImoment poUf en instruire V. M. I. et R., en la priant de
m'aidcr do ses Iumicres et de ses conscils.
Sur quoi je prie Dieu, mon boa frere, qu'il daigne a\'oir V. :M, J. et R. en
sa sainte et digne garde.
A St.-Laurent, ce 29 octohre 1807.
U7fTER OF PRINCE Ft~ROINAND TO CHARLES IV.
Sp.Non:
Papa mio : he delinquido, he fll.ltado a V. M. como rey y como padre; pero
me arrepiento, y ofl'CZOO a V. M. Ill. obediClu..oia roas lLUmildc. Nada debia
hacer sin noticia de V. .i\I.; pero Cui sorprendido. He delatado a108 culpa-
bles,)' pido 6. V. M. me perdone por haberle mentido la otra noche, perrni-
liendo be:;;ar sus reales pies ii su recouocido hijo.
San Lorenzo, 5 de noviembre de 1807.
PROCLAMATION OF CHARLES IV, PARDONING THE PRINCE.
ltKAL m;cR....-ro.
l..a \'0",(; de la naturaleza. desanna cl braw de la l'enganZll, y cuando la
inadvertencia reelama la piedad, 110 puede llegal'Se a elIo un padre amorow.
Mi hijo ha dedarado }'a 108 autores del plan horrible que le habian hecho
collcebir unos malvooos: todo 10 ha manifestado en fonna de derecho, y tOOo
COllsta con la escrupulosidad que exige la ley en tales pruebas : su arrepenti-
miento y asombro le hall dictado las represeutaciones que me ha dirigido,
En vista de cUos y a ruego de la rcilla mi nmadll esposa perdono {I mi hijo,
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y le volvcre a mi gracia cualldo con su conducta me de pruebas de una \'erdll-
dera. monna en su frAgil manejo ; y malldo que los mismos jueces que hall
entendido en la causa desde su principio la sigan, permitiendoles asociados si
loo nccc.sita.rcn, y que concluida IIIC t'Qllsultcn la senOOncia. ajustada a la Icy,
seguu fuesen la gt'avedad de delitos y calidad de personas en quienes recaigall;
telliendo pot principio para la fonnacion de cargos IllS respuestas dadas poT el
prfncipe ii. las dcmalldl~ que se le 1mu heeho; piles todas est.'IoU rubrica.das
y firmadas de mi pul'io, asi como 105 papeles aprehelldidos en sus mesas,
escritos por su maM; yesta pl"Ovidencia se comunique i mis collsejos y tri-
bunnies, circulantlola ii mis pueblos, para que recollQU:an ell ella mi piedad }'
justicia, y alivieu la afiiccion y cuidado en que les pWlO mi primer dcerela;
pues en el verlin el riesgo de Sit soberano y padre que c<lillO a hijos los ama,
yasi me corresponden. 'I'clldrcislo cntellditlo para su cumplimiento.
San Lorenzo, .5 de noviemllrc de 1807.
Vo .&1". REV.
IV
ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV
Como los achaques de que adolezco no me permiten soportar por mas
tiempo el gJ:'ln"e peso del gobierno de rnis reinos, y me sea preciso para reparar
mi sallId gw.al' en un cHnm lllas temlllatlo 110 la tr.J.llquilidad de la vida Ilri.
vada, he determinado despues de la was seria deliberacion.abdicar mi corona
ell mi heredero y mi muy caro hijo el principe de Asturias. Por tanto cs mi
real voluntad que sea rccollocillo y ohetlccido como rey y selior natural de
todos mis reinos y domulios. Y para que este mi real de<:reto de libre y
esponUnea abdicacion tenga sn exito y debitlo cumplimiento, 10 comunicareis
al consejo y demas aquicn correspollda.
Dado en AranjuC'l, a19 de m:U"lO tie 1808.
Vo.u REV. A DOll Petlro Cevallos.
V
THE SPANISH ARMY IN 1808
(Mainly from the table in ArtoolLC, 1'01. i, Allpelldix 9.]
N.D.-The numbers are taken from returns made 011 \'arious days between
March and June, 1000. They include only rank aud file. The officers
shoultl have been nilletr-eiglit to a regiment of guartls, SilvCllty to a line
regiment, forty-<lne to a light battalion, thirty-four to a militia battalion,
forty.two to a cavalry regiment. But most corps were under strength iu
officers, no less than in men, in June, 1808, and Artcchc, giving cvery r<ogi.
ment of infantry a complete staff of officers, is clearly over-estimating tllem.
He gh·es e. g. 2,460 officers of line infantry, the possible maximum, while the
B8/aM MilUar fOI" 1808 gives ouly 1,621 present; so with tIIC militia he gives
1,Ba'l officers, whi~e apparently there were only 1,230 actually C.liStillg. It
would seem that his gross total of 7,222 officers oug1lt to be cut down to
6,Oll. For the rank and file we get :-
608 Al'PENDICES
ROYAL GUARD.
C...VALJll'.
Nu""berI. Quarlered in
Life Guardll • 616 l Old Castile
Ro}-aJ. Carabi- JInd )ladrid.
neers. . . 610
Total 1,165
Is-PA.l<."Tnv.
.'1.u.mIJn-#. Quartered ill
Halbenliers lMadrid(one eompy.) 1~2' .
SpanishG~rds I1,2 Bareelona.
(three oot13.) 3,294 3 New Castile.
Walloou 1 Madrid.
Guards (three . 12 Barcelona.
batl8.) . , 2,683 3 Portugal.
Total 0,029
Th'F.L'ITRY OF THE LL.~E.
N.R-Each regiment had three battaliolls of four companies, and should
ba\"e numbered 2,100 bayonets.
Kumbtrt. Qutlrlutd in Numhen. Quarlertd in
Africa . SOOll,3.Andalum. }'orward 24,1712S. Sebastian. Na\'8rre . 822 Galicia.
America SOB 111\ew Castile. OnlCIle$ .\liIi- \ 1Estremadura.2J 3 Valencia. la"" 700 2,3Andalusia.
Arngon 1,294 Galicia. Priueesa 1,009 Denmark.
Asturias 2,103 Denmark. I'rincipc 1,267 Gnlicia.
Borboll 1,M4 Balearic hIes. Reinll. 1,530 AndaluEia.
","""
I ,2f14 AlHlnlusia. II S. Sebastian.
Cantabria . 1,024 Ceuta(Afriea). Hey. 1,3M 2 Portugal.
Ceuta . 1,23S
" "
3 Gnlicia.
ConlOI'B '93 Andalusia. Saragossa . 1,00111,2 Portugal.Cn",", OO'l
"
· 3 AndalllSia.
EEpafia 1,030 Ceuta(Africa). Savoia . 036 ValCllda.
Eatremadlll'll . 770 Catalonia. Seville. · 1,100 Oalicia.
Gmnada 1,113 Balearic Isles. • Soria 1;111 Balearic Isles.
Guadalajara 2,009 Denmark. Toledo. .1,058 f1, 2G!1licia.
J 1,2Andaltlsia. 3 Portugal.
Jaen 1,756 3 Ceuta Valencia 023 Mureia.
(Ameli). Volunteers of I
Loon 1,10:; Galicia. Castile. · 1,487 "
Majorca 1,74011,2 Portugal. VoluntariOl; de 11 Portu!!'al.
3Eetremadura. In Corona . 1,200 2, 3 CaUda..
l\Ialaga
"'"
Andalus.ia. Volulltari06del 7421 Madrid.
l\1urcia 1 762 t1,2 Portugal. Estado .
, 3 Andalusia. Zllffiorn · 2,OOfl Deumark.
."orward . 24,171 Total 44,300
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1st of Cata~
loom
[,IGHT INFANTRY.
~.H.-'fhe regiment Ilall onl)' a siugle hattalion of six companies. It should
have llumbered 1,200 bayonets.
Numbert. Quartered in Numbert. QUilrtered in
f A 1 3O'j Madriu alltl 1<"0rll'8nl 8,474-1st 0 ragon, "'_ "'. .
""rag-ossa. Mild of Cata- IG r .
2nd of Arngon 1,225 Balearic Isles. lonia (',85 a IC13.
.. '--t 1001 I! Andalusia. Go,o". "I t Portugal.
0.11''''''' 1'0. ., t Portugal. ... U 1,14" t Andalusia.
1st of Baroe- 1Denmark. 'l'arragona I 142 1! Pampelunll.lonll. . . 1,266 ~ , JEstremadura.
21111 of Baree- 1 300 IBalearic Isles. Vohmteers of \ ! Portugal
Iona.. , NavaITe 963 t Gllliem.
1,153j f Portugal.. Volunteers of II PortugaLCaml)Q Mayor ! AndalUSla. Valencia. 1,242 t Andalusia.
1,1641 Denmark.
Forward 8,4-74 Total 13,655
Andalusia.
Valencia.
Andalusia.
Galicia..
Andalusia.
FOREIGN INFANTIlY.
N.R-The Swiss Regiments had two battalions, the others three.
Numbers. Quartered in No. Numben. Quarlel-ed ill
[lUSH. Forward 2,004
Irlanda 51311 Estremadura. SWJ.SS.2,3 Alldalusia. I. Wimpfen 2,079 Catalonia.
Hibeniia 8,5'" 11 Asturias. 2. ROOing 1,5731 New Castile.M 2, 3 Galieia. Senior
Ultouia 351 Gerona. 3. Reding
1,8001Andalusia.hAI,U/'i. Junior
Naples . 288 Galicia. 4. Besclmrd 2,051 Balearic Isles.
5. Traxlcr 1,757 i\1urcia.
G. Preux . 1,708 Mall rid.
~
Forward 2,004 Total 12,001
i\llLITIA.
N.B.-The four grenadier regiments had two battalions each, amI sllould hal'c
1Joon 1,000 strong; the rest one batb.lioll, 600 strong.
Number8. Quarteredill Number8. Quarltred in
I'rov. BreD. of Fonvard ~JD25
Old Castile ],606 I'ortug".ll. AlCl\Mr GM
New Castile 1,430 Portugal. AI'ita . 574
Andalusia 1,413 Andalusia. Dadajos 589
Galicia. 1 377\1 Galicia. Betanzos 599
, 21'ortugal. Burgos 677
}'orward 5,825
0;11,\1'1. I
'"
Forward 8,769
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.:YumberlJ. Quartered in lrlum!Jer8. Quartertd ill
Forward 8,769 Borward 19,680
Rujalance. 594 Andalusia. l\1ondofiedo 69' Galicia.
Chinchilla ". "
.Monterrey 69'
"Ciudad Real . 67S
"
Murein 564 Mureia.
Cindad Rodrigo
"'" "
Orense ,., Galleia.
Compostella Mm Galicia. Ol'iedo
'"
Asturias.
Cordova 564 Andalusia. Plaseneia . 693 Andalusia.
Cuenta 59"
"
Pontevoo.ra ,.. Galieia.
Ecija 5lllJ
"
Ronda. 674 Andalusia.
Granada
"" "
Salamanca 600 Galicia.
Guadix.
"'" "
Santiago 500
"Jaen 564
"
Segovia 69'
"Jerez 574
"
Seville.
'"
Andalusia.
Laredo. 571 Santander. Siguenza 679
"1<on 591 Galicia. Soria 582 Valencia.
Logrofio '58 Andalusia. Toledo. 57' Andalusia.
1.0"". 582
"
Toro
"" "Lngo 5lllJ Galleia, Truxillo 561
"Majorca 610 Balearic hIes. .Tuy 5" Galieia.
M•• 401 Andalusia. Valladolid 59"
"-- --Forward 19,580 To"" 30,527
NumberB. Quartered in
Forward 3,646
HUSSAM.
1st Numallcia 630 Valencia.
2nd Lusitauia 654 Madrid.
3rd Olivenza . 668 Portugal.
4th Voluntari09 I
5'.
New Castile.
de Espalia
5thMariaLuisa 600 EstremaduTll.
6th Espafioles 692 Balearic Isles.
Total 7,2083,646
.Numbers.
577
581
50.
00'
628
400
Fonvard
CAVALRY.
N.B.-Each regiment llad five 6ql1lulrons, Jlnd sbould have Ilumbcred about
700 sabres.
I. HEAVY C..r.VAJ"ll.v.
Number,. Qllflrtere4 in RJ.;gimetl1. NumLerll. Quartered in
634 Denmark. Forward 2,023
GG8 Old Castile. 7th Alcantara 689 Portugal.
673 New Castile. 8th. Espafia . 663 Andalusia.
616 Denmark. 9th Algarve. 672 Denmark.
OIG Catalonia. 10th Calatrava 670 Andalusia.
617 Andalusia. 11th Santiago 049 Portugal.
12th l\Iontcsa. 667 -Andalusia.
Total 7,232
2. 1.JOIIT CAVALR.Y.
Quarre1'lJll in
Madrid.
Portugal.
Denmark.
Audalllliia.
Denmark.
Andalusia.
Regiment.
1st Hey
2nd Reina
3rd Principe .
4tb Infante .
6th Dorbon .
6th }'ll.rnesio .
CAZADOltll3.
1st Re}'
2nd Reina
3rd Alm:mz.a .
4th Pavia. .
Mh Villaviciosa
6th Sagonto .
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A scheme was on foot for converting eight of the light regiments into
dragoons. Several of tllem are designated sometimes as dragoons, sometimes
6S cw.adores or hussars.
N.B.-'ne 14,4,10 troopers had only 0,526 horses!
ARTILLERY.
Am\alusia.
Galicia.
QUllrtered illNumbert.
Forward 2,289
3rd Rcginlcnt 1,018
4th " 1,043
1. FU:LD.
Numbe78. Quarltma ill
1st Regiment 1,143 Catalonia..
2nd 1 146\ Valenci~ and
., , MurCta.
Forward 2,289 Total 0:\,410
Each regimcot consisted of ten batteries; of the whole forty, si.'\: were hone-
artillery. 477 men (four batteries) were in Denmark.
2. GARltlSON.
Two I Brigades' and fifteen' Compafiias Fijas I at various places, in all 1,934.
Adding general staff, &e., the total of the artillery, field and garrison, wa.~
292 officers and 6,6'79 men.
EJ.~GTh"EERS.
IGO officers and a battalion of sappel'1l. The latter was quartered at
Alcala de Henares, and had a strength of 022 men, besides 127 detached in
Denmark.
0,G79
14,4,w
GENERAL TOTAL (Rank and }ile oul}').
Illf(J.nlry. Oat'lJiry. Artillery. Engineer,.
0,02{l 1,156
44,300
13,555
12,001
30,627
Royal Gual'd
Iufantry of the" Line.
Light Infantry
Foreign Infantry
l\lilitia
ea,,",,,
Artillery
Ellgineerl! .
107,590 15,505 6,G79 1,049 = 1:.10,013
Add 5,911 officers, and we get a gross total of 136,824.
•
llr2
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8,481
7,8-18
6,538
24,918
1,764
1,297
Comm8llucr, General JUNO'l'. Chief of the Staff, Gencral Thicbault.
Men,
1st Division, General D&LABQRDt: (Brigades Ariil and Brenn.icr):
15th of the Lino (3td batt.), 1,033; 47th ditw (2ntl batt.), 1,210;
70th ditto (1st and 2nd batt8.), 2,299; 80th ditto (1st and 2nd
hatts.), 2,116; 4th Swiss (1st halt.), 1,190.
Total, seven battaliollS .
2nd Di,'ision, General LOISON (HrigadllS CharIot aILd Thomiercs) :
2ud Ugcr (3rd batl.), 1,255; 4th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,196;
12th ditto (Srd batt.), 1,302; 16th ditto (3rd halt.), 1,314;
32nd of the Line (3rd batt.), 1,206; 68th ditto (3rd hatt.),
1,:ID4j 2nd Swiss (2ud batt.), 700, Total, !lCVCU battalions
3rtl Divi5ioll, General 'fnAV01' (Brigades Graindorge aud Fusier):
31st Ugcr (3rd batt.), 653; 32nd ditto (3rd batt.) ooa; 26th of
the Line (3rt! batt.), 537; 66th ditto (3td and 4th batts.), 1}004;
82nd ditto (3rd batt.)} 001; Ug«m dll Midi (1st batt.), 797;
Hanoverian Legion, 703. Total, eight battalions
Cavalry Division, General KELLt:IUlANN (Brigades Margaron and
Maurin) :
26th Chasscllrs, 244; 1st Dragoons, 201; 3rd ditto, 230 j 4th
ditto, 202 ; 6th ditto, 249 j 9th ditto} 257 j 15th ditto} 245
Artillery, Train} &c.
'rotal of the Corps {tweuty-two battalions} seven squadrOlls)
1. '18'r CORPS 0.10' OBSERVATION 010' 'fHE GIROl\o'DE' [ARMY
OF PORTUGAL].
· .
2. '2:m COUPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE' GIRONDE.'
Commander, General DUP()J<T. Chief of tlle Staff} General Legendre.
Men.
1st Division, Gwersl BARBOu (Brigades Paulletier and Chabert) :
Garde lie Paris (2nd batt.<J. of 1st and 2nd Regimellts)} 1,454 ;
3rd Legioll of Heserve (1st and 2nd batts.), 2}057; 4th ditto
{1st, 2nd} aml3rd hatts.), 3,084; i\Iarine:8 or the Gll3rd, 032;
4th Swiss.(2nd hatt.)} 709. ' Total, nine battalions 7,036
2nd Division, General VWEL (Hrigad& l'oinsot and CIls.saglle):
1st Legion of Ueserve (three batts,), 3}Oll ; 6th ditto (three balts.),
2,695; 3rd Swiss (1st batt.), 1,178. Total, seven battalions G,88-l:
3r(l Division, General FRHIlIo: (Brigades L!l.vlllllnd Uostolland) :
15th Lager (2nd hatt.), ],100; 2nd LegiOl1 of Reserve (three
batts.), 2,870; 2nd Swiss (1st hatt.), 1,174.
Total, he battalions . 6,201
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Cavalry Division, Oenerall'l'U'.:llJA (Brigades Rigaud and Dupre):
1st l'rovisiOlllll Cuirassiers, 778; 2nd tHUo, 68] ; 1st ProvisiOlla1
Chasseurs, 556; 2nd ditto, 662; 6th Provisioual Dragoons, 02{J.
Total, fifteen squadrons .
Artillery, Train, &c.
Total of tIle Corps (twenty-<me battalions, fifteen squadrons)
613
Ahn.
3,300
1,204
24,428
3. 'CORPS 0.1' OBSlmVATION 'oF THE OCEAN COAST:
7,140
D,699
8,393
29,341
2,850
],2llO
Commander, Marshal :MOI'U:lW. Chief of the Staff, General Harispe.
. Nell.
]st Divisiou, General i\tU8/(IKlt (Brigade. Brun find Iscmhurg) :
]st Provisional Regiment of Infantry (four .batts.), 2,088; 2nd
ditto, 2,183; 3rd ditto, 2,118; 4th ditto, 2,232; Wcstphalian
hatI.1lioll,I,078. Total, I;(lvcn!.een battalions
2nd Dh'i~ion, General GOIi1'.IIT (Brigades Lefrane and Dufour) :
5th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,095; 6th ditto, 1,&1;
7th ditto, 1,812 ; 8tJI ditto, 1,!l21 ; Irish Legion, 664.
Total, sc\'enteen battalions '
3rd Dil'ision, General MORl.ol' (Brigades Bujet anll.Lefebl're) :
9tll l'rovisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,448; 10th ditto, 2,146 ;
11th ditto, 2,002; })russian battalion, 4D3.
Total, thirtooll IJattaliollS .
Cavalry Divil;ion, Geneml GROUCIIY (Brigades Prive and Watbier);
1st !'ro\'isioJ1aI Dragoons, 6GO; 2nd ditto, 812; 1st Provisional
Hussars, 5Di ; 2nd ditto, 721. To1.11, twelve squadrons
Artillery, Train, &e.
Total of tile Corps (forty-scvclI battalions, twelve squadrons)
4. 'CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF TIlE PYRENEES:
Commander, Marslml BIll;snllulll. Chief of the Staff, General Lefelwre-
DeslloueUes.
1st Division, General J\hmI.K (Brigades Dannagnae and Gaulois) ;
47th of tl,e Line (ht halt.), 1,235; SGlll llitto (two companies),
231; 300 Swiss (2nd bati.),721 ; 1st Regiment de Marche (two
1l.1tts.), 005; ]st Supplementary Regiment of the Legions of
Reserve (two batts.), 2,000. Total, six aud a tluarter battalions
2nd Division, General VERJ)l}."R (Brigades Sabatllier and Ducos) :
17th Pro\'isional Regiment (four hatts.), 2,110; 1Bth ditto, 1,92B;
]3tIl ditto, 2,18.5; 14th ditto, 2,2M. ,'rot...l, sixteen battalions
Cavalr), Division, General WSAI.M::
IOtll Chasseurs, 4.09; 22nd ditto, 460; &eadrOlt de JlJarche of
Cuirassiers,103. Total, seven squadron~
Artillery, Trnin, &c.
5,248
8,5J8 .
',082
408
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Detached troops belonging to the Corps of BessieTes.
(1) Garrison of Pampelnua, General D'AooULT :
16th of the Line (4th hatt.), 435; 47th ditto (3nl bIItt.), 297;
70th ditto (Srd oo.tt.), 488 ; 5t]l &ood1Vm de Mu/relw of Cuiras-
siers, 329; ArtilleryJ 63 .
(2) Garrison of San Sebaatiau, Geueral Tuoun:l'IOT:
2nd Supplementary Regiment of the Legions of Reserve (4th
hatt.), 890; DepOt Battalion, 1,240; Cavalry DepOt, 60;
Artillery, 28 .
'fotalof the Corps (twcnty-seveu and a quarter battalions, nine
squadrons) .
1,612
2,218
]9,086
6. 'COUPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE EASTERJ.~ !>¥RENEES:
Commander, General DunESlI!:. Chief of the Staff, Colonel :Fabre.
Mm.
1st Division, General CuABRA1'; (Brigades Goulas and Nicolas).
2nd of the Line (3rd halt.), 610; 7th ditto (ht and 2nd battii.),
],786; 16th ditto (3rd !.mU.), 789; 37th ditw (3n1 batt.),656;
5Gtll ditto (4th batt.), 833; 93rd ditto (3rd batt.), 792; 2nd
Swiss (3rd hatt.), 580. Total, eight battalions 6,OiS
2101.d Division, General LUCHI (Brigades Milooewitz and? ):
2nd Italian Line (2nd batt.), 740; 4th ditto (3rd hatt.), 387 j
lith ditto (2nd batt,), 806; Royal Vi/ilBli (1st batt.), Sl9;
1st Neapolitan Line (lohnd 2nd batts.), 1,9*4.
Total, six battalions . 4,596
C..anlolry Brigarle, General BessicfC3 :
3rd Provisional Cuirassiers, 409; 3rd I'rOl'isioual Cbasseurs, 416 823
Cavalry Brigade, General Sehwartz:
Italian ChasseUl"S of the Prince Royal, rot; 21lu Neapolitau
Chasseura,388 00'2
Artillery, Train, &c. 356
Total of the Corps (fourteen battalions, nine squadrons) 12,714
6. Bfl'ERlAL GUARD.
Commander, General DORSJ::NNJ,:.
1st .Fusiliers (three batts.), 1,570; 2nd ditto, 1,499; MarineS of
the Guard [detached to Dupont's Corps]. Total, six battaliOilS .
Dragoons, 252; Cllasseurs and Mamelukes, 321; Ge1UJa1'/lIU
tfi/ite, 304; Polish Light Horse, 737 j Guard of the Duke of
8erg,148 .
Artillery, &c..
Total (six battalions, nine squadrons)
3,060
1,762
1,681
-6,412
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7. TlWOPS WHICH ENTERED SI'AIN AltrER THE OUTBREAK
OF THE WAR, IN JUNE, JULY, Ai\TJ) AUGUST.
Dh'ision i\I0UTQ~ (Brigades Rey Rnd lle)'oaud):
2nd I-Cger (ht and 211d hatts.); 4th ditto (1st, 2nd, and 4tl1
batts.) j 12th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.); 15tll of the Line (1st
and 2nd batts.); Garde de POril (one batt.)
Brigade of General BAZA/'(OOl;RT :
14th of the Line (1st and 2nd baUs.), 1,488; 44tll ditto (1st amI
2nd balts,), 1,614
l'olish Brigade (Colonel Chlopiski) :
ht, 2nd, and 3nl. of the Vistula (each of two batts.)
Four Batailfon8 de HareM (Nos. 4, 5, G, 7)
Divisioll of General R£lLLF. at l'erpignan [for details see p. 320]
l>ivisioll of Gellcral'Cu,\llOT « Reserve of Perllignan ')
Portuguese Troops, before Saragossa (two batts.)
Natiollal Guards of the Pyrenees, before Saragossa (two batts.)
General DepOt at Bayonne
Battalions, companies, and smaller dmft.s sent to join llleir corps ill
J line-August , ,.
EiCaaNJllft de Marche, Polish Lancers, Cavalry of the Imperial Guard
Artillcry, drafts
Eugiueers, ditto
'fotal
1S,100
3,102
3,951
2,281
8,370
2,667
653
911
7,659
8,G87
3,911
851
101
48,204
GENERAL TOTAL.
Junot's Corps .
Dupout's Corps
MOllcey'e Corps
Hessierca' COrp!!
Duhesme'e Corps
Imperial Guard
Troops which entered Spain in June, July, anti
August.
Men.
24,918
24,428
29,341
19,086
12,714
6,412
48,204
165,103
N.R-The organization Rnd the greater part of thc figures comc from the
bble at the end of vol. h' of :Foy's history of the Peuillsular War. But
1\ few corrections arc made where more detailed infonnatiOll is available,
especially in thc SC\'Clltll section, where Foy is incolllllletc(c.g. he omits one of
Mouton's brigades).
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VII
PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREACHERY AT
BAYO:NNE
}'llOTES'£ OF CHARLES IV AGAINST IllS ABDICATION.
Protesto y declaro que todo 10 que manifiesto en mi decreto del 19 de
marw, abdicando la corona en mi Ilijo, fue forzado por precaver mayores
males y la efusion de sangre de mis queridos vasallos, y pot tanto de ningun
valor.
Yo El, RY,V.
AranjUe"iiJ 21 tie marzo de la08.
LE'ITER OF NAPOLEON TO FERDINAND VIl.
1\10" FUElu:,
J'ai rerra la lettre de V. A. R. Elle doit avoir acquis la preuve, daus leg
papiere qu'elle a en du roi son pere, de l'interet que je lui ai toujoul'9 pom.
elle me IlCnnettrn, tlllns la circollstanee actuellc, de lui parlet (wee franchise
et IOy3ute. En arrh',Ult a Madrid, j'~perai.s porter mOll illustre ami a quel.
ques refonnes necessaires dans ses Ebb, et It doonel' que1que satisfa.etion
iil'opillion publique. Le renvoi dn llrince de la llab: me paraissait nkessaire
pour SOil bouheur ct celni de ses IJeul,lllS. Lcs affaires till Nonl ont retanlc
mOll voyage. Les eV€llemeus d'Aranjuez out eu lieu. Je ne nis point juge
de cc qui s'est passe, et de la conduite du prince de la Paix; mais cc queje
sais bieu, c'est qu'il est dnllgereux pour les rois d'nccontumer les peuples
;\ repamlre du sang et a se faire justice eux-memO!;. Je prie Dieu que
V. A. R. n'cn fa.se pas elle-meme un jour l'experience. II n'est pas de
l'illteret de l'Espagne de faire du mal It un prince qui a epouse une prilleessc
dll sang roynl, ct Ijui a si loug-tcmlJS r6gi le roynllme. JI 11'11. plus d'amis;
V. A. R. Jl'CU aura. plus, Hi jamals clle est malhcurcJlsc. Les peuples se
"Cllgellt volontiers des llOmmages qu'ils nous rendent. Comment, d'ailleurs,
pourrait-oJ;l faire le prod~s au prince de la Paix, sailS le faire ala reille et au
roi votro pero? Ce procl~s alillJeutera les hailJes et les pal'iBiOIlS factieuses; le
rtisultat en sera. funeste pour votre couronne; V, A. It d6:hire par la sos
droit<;. Qu'e1le ferme I'oreille a des conseils faibles et periides. Elle n'a
pas le droit dejugcr le prince de la Paix: scs crimes, si on lui en reproclle,
se penlont dans les Ilroit<; dn trollC. J'ai souvcnt manifeste 10 desir que le
prince de la Paix fut eloigne' des affaires. L'amitie du roi Charles m'a port.e
souvent ii me taire, et a dCtonrner les yeux des faiblCS3es de SOil attachement.
l\Iistfrobles llOmmes que IlOUS somllles! fuibl~ ct crrcur, c'est llotrc devise.
l\Jais tout cela peut se concilier. Que le prince de la I'aix soit exile
d'Espagne, et je lui offre un refuge en .France. Quallt a I'abdication de
Cl1arles IV, cUo a CH lien lims Ull moment oll 1IlC!l anuecs COllvraiellt lcs
Espagnes; et, au.'l: reux de I'Europe et de la posterite, je paraitrais n'avoir
envoytl milt de troupes que pour precipiter du troue mon alli€ et mon ami.
Comme souveraill \'oisin, iI lIl'est penuis de vouloir eOllnaltrc, avant de rCCOIl-
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naitre, cette abdication. Je le dis a v. A. R, nux Espagnols, au monlle
cntier: Si I'abdication du roi CIlIIrles e.;;t de pur mOllvemcnt, s'illl'y a pas
C'M force pnT l'illsurrection et I'cmclltc d'AranjuC'li, jc ne fais 311CUne difficultc
de I'aclmettre, et je reeo)luais V. A. R. comme roi d'Espagne. Je desire
done causer avec elle sur cet objet. La circonspection que je porte depuis UIl
rnois dans ces alfaires doit lui etre garaut de l'appui qu'elle trOllvera en moi,
~i, i'l SOil tour, dei! [,!.CtiOllS, de quclfJ1I6 nature flll'dIes snicut, vcnaicnt i
l'inquio::ter sur son trOnc.
QWllld le roi Charles me fit part de l'evenement du mois d'octobre denlier,
j'en fus dou]ourcllscmcnt nffcctl!, ctjo pense avoir colltribllC, par Iles insiJlU3-
tioJls fluO j'ai fsites, A la oouue issue de l'affaire de n::SCurial. V. A. R.
avait bien des torts; je n'eu veux pour preuve que la lettre qu'eUe m'a ecrite,
et que j'ai comrtamment voulu oublier. Roi a son tour, elle saura combien
J~ droits dll trOIlC sont E:ICr(,:s. Toute dcnmrche Jlr(,\s d'lIll sOHvcrnin etnmger,
de la part d'\I.ll prince hcrl,.;Iitaire, est crimillelle. V. A. R. doit se defier des
ecarts et des emotions populaires.
On pourm commcttre quelques meurtres sur mes soldats isoles, mais la
ruine de l'EsJlaglle ell semit le rellultat. J'ai deja \'u :wec peine qll'11
Madrid 011 ait repalldu des lettres <lu capitaine-general de la Cataloglle, et
fait tout cc qui pouvait uOllller tlu mouvement aux tetes. V. A. It connait
mu pensCe tonte enticre: cUe voit que je flotte cntre diverses iUCC3 qui ont
besoill d'Ctrc fixellS. ElIe pent Ctre certaillo que, dans tous les cas, je me
comporterai avee eIle comme avee le roi son pere. Qu'elle eroio amOll dCsir
de tout conduer, et de trouver des occasions de lui donner des preuvll.'l de
mOll affection et de lUll. 113rfaitc estime.
Sur cc, jc prie Dieu qu'il vous ait en sa saillte ct dignc garde.
NAPOU~·:ON.
Ba)"onuc, le 16 ani! ]800.
SECOND ABDICATlON OF CHARLES IV.
Art. Jet". S. M. le roi Charles, ll'ayallt en \'ue pendant tOl1te sa \·ie que le
bonlleur de 8CS sujets, et constant dans le principe, que toos 103 acte.'J d'ult
60uvcrain ne doivcnt Hro £'lits (iue pour llrrivcr 1'1 cc IJllt; Ies circonrt.'lIlCCil
actuclles ne pouvallt etre qU'une source de dissensions d'autant plus funestes
que Jes factions ont divl,e.sa propre famille, a riselu de ceder, comme i1 cede
par le present, a. S. M. l'empcreur Napoleon, tous set! droits sur le trolle (les
.Esp.1gnes et des Iudes, comme au seul qui, au point ov. en sont arri\'ees les
cheses, pcut retabllr I'ordre : entendant q,ue ladite eession u'nit lieu qll'afilt
de faire jouir ses sujcts des deux conditions sulwllltes :
1°. L'integrite dn l'O),aume sera ma;nrenlle. Le prince que S. M. I'em-
pereur Napoleon jugera devoir placer sur le trOne d'Espagne sera indepen~
dallt, ct Ics limitcs de l'Espagllc ne souffrirollt l\ucunc alteration.
20. La religion catholique, apostolique et romaine sera la seule eu Espagne.
line pourra )' Hre tolere nucuue religion reformee, et encore moins InfidCle,
sllivant l'usage etaLli jusqu'aujonrd'lllli.
II. TollS actes faits coutre eeux de nos fideJ.cs sujets, depuis la nh'olution
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rl'Ar-.1ujuez, soul nuls et tIe nulla valour, et leurs proprietes leur sarout
reudues.
Ill. Sa majeste le roi Gbarles ayant ainsi assure la prosperite,l'integTite et
l'indepcndnncc de I!C:S sujcts, &. Majeste I'Em}lereur s'cugage iI. uOllllcr refuge
dall! ses ebb> all roi Charles, it la reine, a sa famille, au prince de la Paix,
ainsi qu'iJ. ceux de leurs serviteurs qui voudront les suine, lesquels jouiront
cn ~'rllllCe d'Ull mug equimlclll u. cclui qu'ils poSl>blaicnt cn Espagnc.
Tile remaining seven articles 118\'c refcfcnce to the estate!! and revenues
ill France, which the Elll\lCTOr makes over to Charles IV and his famil}'.
RES'G~ATJON at<' HIS RIGHTS BY PERDJNAND VII.
Art. I. Sou Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies adhere a la cession faite
par le roi Charles, de scs droits au trolle d'Espagne et des ludcs, en fM'cur de
Sa. l\fajeste l'Empereur de;> }'rall\~is, roi l1'Italie, et rellollce, Cll tant que tie
1lesoin, au.,\: droits qui lui sont aequis, comme prince des Asturies, a la cou-
reline des Espagnes et des Indes,
n. Sa MajestC l'Empcreur des j<'rnn~ais, roi d'ltnlic, llccorde ell Fram~e It
Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies le titre d'Altesse Royale, avec toue
les honueurs et prerogatives dont jouissent lee princes de son rang, Les
des<:endans de"'Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies conserveront le titre
flo IfrillW et Wllli tI'Altesse S~rinissillle, et nurOllt tolljOllrs le memo raug en
Frallce, que lea princes dignitaires de l'Empire.
The remainillg five articles have reference to tIle estates and revenues in
France, which the Emperor makes Ol'er to Ferdinalld.
VIII
nrn CAPITULATION OF BAYLEN
1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARl\'lY OF CASTANOS
N,B.-* marks nil old regimcut of tile regular army; t a militia regi-
ment; : a regiment of new IOl'ies.
ComIlJallder-in-elIief, Liellt.-Gelleral FltANClSOO XAI'IEIt CASTANOS.
Chief of the Staff, Major-Geueral Tomas Moreno,
1st Division, General 'l'XOI>(lItO Rt:nING:
• WallOOll Guards (3rtl batt.), 832; • Rein3, 7!l5; • Corolla, 824 ;
*Jaen, g22~; *lrIanda, 1,824; t3rd Swiss, 1,100; • .Barbastro
(half batt.), 331 ; tJaen, 500; tlst of Grallada, 52G; :Caza.
dores of Antcqucra, 343; rrcjas, 436, Total
Cavalry attached-to the 1st Divisioll:
tl\lOIltc.sl1., 120; *.'aruesio, 213; • .Drag01lu de la Rei1U1, 2]3;
*NulIlaucia, 100; ·OlivenZIL, 140; :wucers of Utrera and
Jerez, 114. Total
Mell.
8,453
THE AR)IY OF CASTANOS
One llOrse-battexy (six guns), one field-battery (fOUT gullS)
Two companies of sappers
'fotal of the Division
2ml Division, Major-General Marqui!! COUPIGSY :
"Ceuta, 1,200; *Ordenes MilitaTes, l,oro; tCranada, 400;
tTruxillo, 200; t Blljalllllce, 403; tCUClIca, .'iD} j tCiudad
Real, 420; Und of Granada, 450; t3n! of Granada, 470;
tVolun~rsof Catalouia, 1,17B, 'fotal
Uavalry attached to 2nd Division:
*Borbon, 401; ·Espafia,120. Total
Oue horse-battery (six gum)
One cornpally of 8aPIUlr8
Total of Uw Division
3rd Division, .Major-General FUll: Jwu; :
·ConIova, 1,106; "'Light Infantry of Valencia (half batt.), 359 ;
""ditto of Campo-MayoT, 800 j tBurgos, 415; t Alcazar, 400;
t ll!l'sencia, 410; tGuadix, 459; tLorea, 490; tSel'iUe, 267.
Total
619
MCll.
200
100
9,i19
7,2:m
521
100
100
7,1)50
4,700
Cavalry atJ:aehed to 3rd Division:
·Calat6va, 222; 'Santiago, B6 ; *Sagullto;IOI ; *l'riuciJlc, 300.
Total 709
Total of tllC Divisiol\ .
4th Dil'isioll (Reserl'e), l.icut.-Gcncral MANU~L LA PJ::fi'A :
*Africa, 525; *nurgos, 2,089 ; 'Sarag~~ (3rd balt.), 822;
'Mureia (3rd bat1.), 4.20; '2nd Swiss, 243; 'Marines, 50;
tProvincial Grcnadiers of Andalusia, 912; tSigucn1.n, 502.
Total
Cavalry attached to 4th Division:
'Pavia,641
Artillery, two horse-batteries (moIre guns)
Sappers, one company
Total of the Division
5,416
541
(?) 302
100
0,500
Total of the army, 20,500: viz. infantry, 25,051; cavalry, 2,671; artillery,
G02; sappers, 366, with twcnty-eigllt guns.
N.B.-'l'hc force of the two tlying column:s of <.:01. Cruz.!\1urgcoll nlld the
Conde de Valdecafias is not ascertaiuable. 'l1ley were both composed of lIew
levies: Arteche puts the former at 2,000 foot, and the latter at 1,000£oot and
400 horse. Other authorities giveCruz.Murgcoll 3,000 meu.
lt should be noted that Castafi08' field-army does not comprise the whole
lIlllnber of men under arms in Andalll.'lia. Mort of the regular regiments had
left behind their tllird battalion, which Wag being completed with rccroits,
anti "'as not fit to take the field. Of all the regimcnts only llurgos, Irlanda,
au(l Ordenes Militares seem to have gone forward three battalions strong.
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2. CORRESPO~'DENCE OP THE FR"~NCH GENERALS.
«I.) GENEUAL DUPOl\'T TO GENERAL "EDEL.
Je vous prie, mOll cller general, de vous porter le plus rapidemcnt possible
sur Baylcn, pour y (nire votre jOllction ILvec le corps qui IL combattu anjour-
d'hni a :i\lellgib.'T et qui s'est replie sur cetlo ville. Le si"ieme regiment
provisoire et deux escadrons, l'un de dragons et l'autre de cbas.<>eurs, sout
Tennis it \'otTO division.
,f'cspi:re que I'cnucmi seMI rejetC demain sur Mcngibar, au del," dn lieuvc,
et que les postes de Guarraman et de la Caroline resteront en surete; Us sout
(1'une grande importance.
l.orsque vous l\UrllZ Ohtel111 cc succCs,je desire que vous TCllnissiczu Andujar
uno partio tie vos forces, :Lfill de comhattre I'Cllllcmi qui se trouve devant
nons. Vous nc laisserez aBaylcn que cc qui sera u('CeSSaire pour sa defenge,
Si l'ennemi oceupe BaeZ3, il faut ren cJlasser.
RcCCI'ez mes a!$Urtlllces d'amitil'i.
Andujar) le 16 juiIlet 1808.
Le general DUI'Ol'"T.
(~.) GE:'\'EHAL VEDEL TO GEXEJ{AL DUl'ON'T.
i\lon general,
II L"lt huit henre~ ct r1ernic. ,"arrive it. Baylcu} oil je n'ai trouvt! Il(ll'llOtl11C,
Le gemiral Dufour en est parti ii. minuit et a marche sur Guarraman. Commc
illl'a laisse persolllLC pour m'instruire des motifs de cette dCmarcJle,je tie
puis riell dire de positif a cet cgard ; mms le hruit commun ctant que leg
troupes cUllemies, qui ont atbqut! hier le gcmir,,1 Belair, se sont dirig€es
ave<: celles qui etaiellt it. Ubeda, veTS les gorges, lmr Linhans et Sainte-
Hl'ilcne, on doit penser que le general Dufour s'est mig ii. leur l)Oursuite, alin
de les comba.ttre,
Comme les instructions de Votre E;<;cellence portent que je dois faire mll
jonctioll avee le corps qui s'tftait replie sur Baylen, ql10ique hal'assC et fatigue,
je l13rtirlli d'ici IJOur me rCllIlrc CIlCOro ILnjounl'hlli 11 GuaTramall, alin de
regagner la journee que l'ellllcmi a sur moi, l'atteiudre, le battre, et Mjoller
ainsi se;; projets sur les gorges.
,le vais ccrire au gCllcrlll Oufour, IMlllr l'illformcr de mon mouvcment,
savoir quelqlle chose tIe positif sur sa marclal et sur les donllees qu'il pent
avoir de celle de l'ellnemi.
Le gCueral de dhisioll,
Baylell, le 17 juillet 1808.
(c.) GENERAL DUPON'l' TO GENERAL VEDEL.
J'ai r~u I,otre lettre de Baylen; d'apres le mouvement de l'ennemi, le
general DufouT a tree-bien fait tle le gagner de vitesse sur la Caroline et sur
Saiute-Helhlll, pour occul;cr la t.ete t1~ gorges; je vois avec plaisir que I'OUS
Lc gell~ral UllPONT.
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vuus hll.tez de vans reuuir illlli, alin de t:ombattre avce avalltage, si l'eullemi
se presente. Maia, au lieu de se rendre a Sainte-Helene, l'enllemi pent
suivre [a vicillc route, qui de B.'l.CUl. va il Gu~mada, ct (Iui est 1'IIraUClc ilia
grande route; s'il prend ce parti. il raut le gagner encore de vitesse au
deoollche de eette route, afin de l'empeeher de penetrer dans la :Mallche.
D'apres <le que "ous me dilcs, ce corps no serail que d'environ dix mille
!Jommes, et vous iltes ell meSllrc lie la baitre completclllcnt; s'il est plus
considerable, maureuvrcz poUf suspendre 83. marche, DU pour le contenir dans
les gorges, en attendant que j'arrive ayotre appui.
Si \'OUS lrOllVc</; l'euuemi ala Caroline, ou SUJ' tout autre point lie la grande
route, tichez de le battre, pour me venit rejoindre et repousser ce qui est
dev3ut Andujar.
Mille amities.
Andujar, le I i juillet 1808.
N.D.-It will oosoen that by letter (a) Dupont deliberntelYdivides his army
into two halves. By letter (6) Vedel shows that he made no reconnaissances,
hut acted merely on (le bruit commun.' Hy letteJ:' (c) Dupont accepts Vedel's
erroneous views without auspicioll, anI! alltltori:tes Ilinl to go off ou UI6 wild-
goose cha~ which he was projecting,
3. CAPITULATION.
I.eurs Excellences !loBI. le comte de Casa Tilly et le general don li'rancisco
Xavior Castai'ioo, commandant en chef l'annee d'Espagnc en Andalousie,
voulant dOilller uue prcuve de leur lLaute cs.time il. SOli Exccllellco M. le
general comte Dupont, grand aigle de la Legion (l'honueur, commandant en
chef le corps d'observatiOll de la Gironde, aillsi qu'a l'armee sous sea ordres,
pour la bello et glorieusll defcuse qu'ils ont faite contrc ulle armce illlinimellt
sllperieure en ilombre, et qui lea ellveloppait de toutes parts; sur la dcmaude
de M.le geueral de brigade Chabert,commandant de la Legion d'honneur, et
dlargc des lllcills l)()uvoirs du Soli Excellenco 10 gelleml 011 chef de l'annee
franoyaise, en preEence de Son ExcelIeuce 1\1. le general comte Marescot,
grand aigle de la Legion d'houneur et premier illspecteur dn g~nie, ont
arrete Ies COll\'clltions SUivlllltes ;
Art. ler. Les troupes frall,.a.ises sous 108 ordres de Son Excellence M. le
gen~ral Dupont SOllt prisonllieres de gnerre, la division Vedel et Ics "nUcs
troulICS frallpises CIl Audalousill excepeecs. I
2. La division de 1\1. lc gt!neral Vedel, et generalement toutes 105 troupes
fralllfUisus ClI Alldalousie, qui ne 80nt pas dans la llosition de celles comprises
dailS l'article lW, el'acllerollt l'Audalousie.
3. Les troupes comprises dans l'article 2 conserveront gelltfralemellt tous
Icurs bagages, et, Ilollr eviter tout sujet de trouble pendant la marchc, eUes
remettrout laur artillerie, tmin et autros arm05, a l'armce eSllllgl\ole, IIui
s'ellgage a105 leur rewire au momcnt de leur embarquement.
4. I..e9 troupes comprises daus I'artide 10>' dll tntite sortirout de leur cmulI
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avec les honneurs de la guerre ; chaque bataillon ayant deux canons en tkte;
les soldatJl armes de lears fusils, qui serout dcpo~s 1\ quatre cents toises
du camp.
5. Les troupes de M. le general Vedel et autres, ne de\'ant pas deposer le.
arrues, les placeront en faisceaux sur le front de baudiere; eUes y lllisseront
auss.i lenr artillcrie et leur traiu. 11 eu sern. dresse proces-verbal par des
officiers des lieu.x armees, et le tout leur sera remis ainsj qn'il est com'enn
dans l'article 3.
G. 'routes lea troupes fraIH,aises en AudalOllsie se rendrout it S:m.LUCBr et
a Rota, par journe0!l d'etalle, qui II(l pourn)nt exceder quatre Iieues de poste,
a\'cc le!! sejonrs necessaires, pour y etre embarqnees sur des vaisseaux ayant
equipage espagnol, et transportics en France an port de .Rochefort.
7. Les tronpel3 franyaises serout emharquties auss.itOt apres leuT arril'L>e.
L'annee cspagnolc assure leur traversie COlltte toutc agressiou llostile.
8. MM. les officiers gellllranx, superienrs et autres, cOllserveront leurs
annes, et les BOldatJlleurs sacs.
9. Leg logements, \'ivres et fOUTrages, pendaut la marche et la tTaversee,
serout fonmis aMM. les officiers generaux et autres yayaut droit, ainsi qu'a
'la troupe, dans la proportion (le leur grade, et sur le pied des tronpes espa.
guolcs en temps de gl1erre.
10. Le8 cllevaux de MlU. les officiers generaux, supirieuril et d'etat-major,
daus la proportion de leur garlie, seront transportis en France, et nourrie snr
le pied de gncrre.
11. MM. lea officiers generaux cOlloor\"erollt chacun une I'oiture et uu
fOllrgon; MM. les officiers superieurs et d'etat-major, une voiture seulement,
sans cue soumis it ancun exameo, mai8 81l1U CQtllrooenir au.r ordonnance8 et aux
loi/J du rtJyaulM,
12. Sout excepMes de l'article precedent les voitures prises en AudaJousie,
dont l'exameu sera. fait par M. le general Chabert.
13. Pour cviter la difficulti d'embarquer les che\'aux des corps de ClIvalerie
et d'artillerie, compris (lans l'artide 2, lesd.its chevaux serout hisses en
Espagne, et seront payes, d'apresl'estimatioll de deux comruissaires fran~is
et espagnol, et acquitti.'l par le gouvernemeut espagnol.
14. Lcs blesses et mallltles de I'armce fran~ioo, lais.s€s dans Ics hOpitaux,
seront traitis a\'ec le pIns grand .'loin, et seront transporMs en France sous
boune et sure escorte, aussitot apres leur guerisoll.
15. Comme, en dh'crses rCllcontres et pnrticulicrcmcnt i In prise de Cor.
doue, plusieurs soldats, au mepris des ordres des gellcraux et maJgre les
efforts des officiers, se sont porUs it des exces qui rout im!vitables dans les
villes qui opposent encore de la resistance all moment d'ctre prises, MM.
les gelleraux et autrcs ufficiers prelldront les mellul"ClI uecessaires pour
retrouver les vases !>acres qu'on pourrait avoir enleves, et lea restituer, s'ils
existent.
16. Tous lea employes civils, attaclu!s a l'annee fram;aise, ne sont pas
consideres comme prisonniers de guerrc; Us jouiront cependant, pour lenr
transport en J-rnnce, de tons les avalltagcs dc la troupe, dans la llroportion
de leur emploi.
17. Les troupes frallpises commenceront a evacuer l'Andalousie le 23
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juillct, a quatre heures dll matiu. Pour eviter la grande cllaleur, la rnarche
des troupes s'efFectuera de unit, et se oonformera aux jourllee:;- d'etape qui
seront regUes par MM. les officier3 d'ctat-.major fl"8n~ et espagno]s, en
Cvita.nt le passage des villes de Cordoue et de Seville.
18. Les troupes franoraises, pendant lenr marche, seront escortees par la
troupe de ligne espagnolc, it raiSOll de trois cents hommes d'escorte par
cololluc de trois mille hommes, et i\BI. les oflicicrs gcncrlIoux scrOllt esoorti!l
par des detachemcnts de cavalerie et d'infanterie de ligne.
10. Les troupes, dans leur marche, serollt toujours precedees par des
commilJlll.ires fram,ais et espagnols, qui deVTollt assurer lea logemcnts ct les
vivres neeeasaires, d'apres les ctam qui leur seront remis.
20. La presente capitulation sera porlie de suite aSou Excellence M, le
due de Rovigo, commamlllnt ell chef Ics troupes frnll~aises ell Espague, pUl"
un officiel" fran~ais qui devra etre escorte par des troupes de ligne espagnoles,
21, n est convenu par les deux armees qu'il sera ajoute, comme articles
snpplCmentaires, i la capitulation, ce qui pent [Io\'oi!', ctc. omis ct cc qui pour.
rait encore augmcnter le bicn-etrc des troupes frnn~aises pendant leur sejour
en Espagne, et peudant la traversee.
Signi,
X,\VIER CASTANOS. i\1ARESCOT, General de Division.
CO"m~ ill'. Tn.I,Y. CllAullnT, General de Brigade.
VE.>;TURA ESCAI.A.NT~, Capitan-Gellernl de Granada.
SUPPLEME/'Ii'TARY ARTlCU:S OF AUGUST 6.
Art. lOll'. On a dej!\ S<JlIicite dn rei d'Angleterre et de l'amirnutC angluisc
des passe-ports pour la surete dn passage des troupes frall~aises.
2. L'emba~nement s'efl'ectuern sur des vaisseaux de l'escadre espagnole,
ou sllr toilS autrc9 w.timents de transport Ilui scront IIcccssnires pour collduire
le total des troupes fran~ises,au moins par division, acommencer par celle
du general Dupont, et immediatement apres, celle du general Vedel.
3. Le Mbarquemeut s'effcctucm sur les cdtestlu Languedoc ou de Provence,
ou bien au port de Lorient, selon que le voyage sera jug€ plus commode et
plus court.
4. On emooTlJucr", des vivres pour un mois et Illu~,afillde pr6'enir tous Ics
accideuts de la navigation.
.s. Dans le cas qu'oll ll'obtillt pas de I'Angleterre les pASSe-ports de suretC
qU'OIl a demand6s, alors on traitera des moycns les plus propres pour le
passage pur terre.
G. (,llaque division des troupes fran~aises sera cautonnee sur dilferents
points, dans UIl rayon tle l\uit it tlix lieues, en attendant que le susdit
embarquemellt ait SOli effet.
Aiusi fait cl seville, le 6 aout 1800.
SigIlJ,
X.WIER CASTARos.
•
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LEITEll OF THE CAPTAL\'-GE~EUAL OF ANDALUSIA,
ILEl'UDlATl,NG 'I'H~~ CAPITur~ATION.
Monsieur le gewfral Dupont,
Je n'ai jamais eu ni de mauvaise foi, ni de fausse dissimulation: de la vieut
cc qucj'l!crivis h V. K, sous la date un 8, dkte, d'apres mOll caractCre, par la
plus grando C&Ulleur, etje suis nlc1uf de me I'oir oblige, (laf I'otro repollsc Oil
date d'lIier, de repeter en abrege ce quej'ens l'hollueur de dire aIors a V. E.,
et ce qui ceTt'l,inemelLt ne pent mallquer de se verifier.
Ni la C31litulatioll, ui l'u]Jprobalioll de la jUllte, lIi lUl ontre expres de !lotto
souveraill cheri, no peuvent rondre possible ce qui ne l'est pas; il n'y a point
de batiments,lli de moyons de s'on procurer ponr le transport de votre armee.
Quelle plus gramlc l'rcuvc IltlO cello de rctcnir ici tres-dispemlicuserncnt les
prisolluiers de >,otre corps, pour 1\'3.\'oil' point de quoi les transporter sur
d'autres points hors du cOlltinellt?
Lorsque le g~n~ral Castafios promit d'obtenir des AlIglais t1eii passe-ports
()(Iur le passage de votre armee, i1 IW !,ut s'ohliger il autre diose qu'a le<!
demander avec instance, et c'est ce qu'il a fait. Mais Cotmueat V, E, put-elle
croire (llle la nation britaunique accederait nIn missal' passer, certaine qu'elle
allnit lui fuire la guerrc sur un autre poiut, ou p.cut-etre sur le memo?
Je me per8uade que 11i le ghllfra/ C(ulaii08, ni V, B, ne CTurrmt que ItldUe ~'(Jpitu­
latioll pIU tire e.xkufie: le but du premier jut de 8Qrtir d'ell/barN/8, et ctlui de
V. JjJ, d'obtenir dei! CQ'ndilioll8 qui, quQique im]J08ltiblu, MIUJrIl88e1lt f/l redditiml
illdi8pell8tlble. Chaclm de tIOlU oUillt ce 'fllit diriroit, et tIlUi1tiemmi it eJit IlreM-
IfUire que Ul loi impiri6U8e de la neces8itJ C(JII/maude.
Le caraethe national ne permet d'en user al'cc le!! Franyais que d'apres
cctte loi,et lIOll d'aprt.'S colic lies rcpresaillcs j V. E. m'ublige de lui cxprimer
des \'€rites qui doh'eut (ni Ctrc ameres. Que/ droit a·t-elle d'exiger /'e..fteutioll
imJK!8¥ible d'ulle capituUltiQII acec !lne Ilrmee qui tilt entrie ell E8pa!JI16 80lU le
wilt: dlJ t'alli/llu:e intime et fit: 1'1111ioo, qui a emllrisolHlI! '1Imro roi et 8U jr.l.llrifttJ
rQyule, saccuge 8e/1 palai8, aua.r¥i't<i el 1JQ!i 868 sI/jets, ddtruit 8ea oolllpagnes et
wnwhi 8tl couronne? Si V. E. ne ycut s'attirer de plus cn plus la juste
illdign"tioll des llCuplcs, (1110 jo tl'lwllille taut a rcprimcr, flu'clle cesse de
semblables et d'anssi illtolerables reela.mations, et qu'ellc cherclle, par Ea
cOllduite et sa resignation, a affaiblir la vive sensation des horreurs qu'elle
a commises reccmlllcnt iI Cordouc. V. Eo croit bicll assurCTllcnt quo mOll
but, elllui faisant cet avertissement, 11'11. d'autre objet que son propre bien;
le vulgaire irr€flechi ne pense qu'a payer le mal par le mal, ~ns apprecier 16j
circOllstances, et jc ne IICUX m'clllllecher do renure Y. B. respon6able des
resultats funestes que pent cntraincr sa repugnauee it. ce qui 11C peut mallquer
d'etre.
.Los disjlO8itious flue j'ai dOlllllics iJ. D. Juun Crcngh, et qui out eM com-
lUuuiquees a V. E., sont les memes que celles de la junte supreme, et sont, en
outfC, illdispensables dans les eircOnstallCes actueHes; le retard de leur
exccutiou afarmc les (lCUllles et attire des iuconvCllicnts : deja ledit Creagil
m'a fait part d'un aecidellt qui me donlle les plus grandes craintes. Quel
stimulant pour la 1J!Jpulace, de Sllt'oir qll'Ull Belli 80ldat EMil 1/Orteur de 2,1110
livrnt touTIlQia!
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C'eat tout ce que j'ai it repolldre ii. la depeche de V. E., et j'espere que
celle-ei sera la dernihe reponse relative aces objets, demeurant, sut' toute
autre chose, daus le desir de lui ctre agreablc, ctallt son affcctiollue ct
sincere serviteuf,
MORLA.
IX
THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA
L DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF
PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH AR).l¥,
'The Generals eonunanding-in~hief of the British and French armies in
Portugal having detennillcd to negotiate and conclude a treaty for theevacua..
UOD of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered
into on the 22nd ill3tallt for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the
undermentiolloo office~ to negotiate the same in their names: viz. Oll thtl
part of the General-in,;hief of the British army, Lieut.-Col. MurNl.Y, Quarter-
master-General, and on the part of the French army, M. KellerwaWl,
Gencml of Division, to whom tlley lIave given authority to negotiate and
conclude a Convention to tllat effect,subject to their ratification respectively,
and to that of the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of
the'I'agus. These two officers, after exclll\.llging their full powers. have agreed
upon the articles whicll follow ;-
I. All the places and f011.6 iu the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the
French troops shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in whicll
tlley are at the momcnt of thc signature of the present Convcntion.
II. TIle French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arffi8 and baggage:
they shall not be considered prisoners of war ; and on their arrival in France
they shall be at liberty to serve.
Ill. TIIl~EnglishGOI'enunent sllall furnish tile means of C()nveyallce for the
French army, whicll shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France
between Uochefort and L'Orient inclusively.
IV. The lo'rench arm}' shall carry ""ith it all its artillery orlo'rcnch calibre,
with the horses belonging to it, and the tunlbrils supplied with sixty rounds
per gun. All other artillery arms and ammunition, as also the military and
naval anreuals, Sllall be given up to the BritislL army and navy, ill tile state
in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the Convention.
V. The }'reuch army shall carry away with it all its equipment, and all
that is comprellCndCll under the name of IJroperty of tllC ILnny, that is to say
its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field commissariat and
field hospital, or shall be allowed to dispose of suell part of the same 011 its
llCCount, as the Commandcr-in-ehief may judge it unnccC6Sllry to embark. In
like IlliIJlllet all individuals of the arm,. shall be at liberty to dispose of all
their private property of ever,. description, with full security hereafter for the
purchasers.
O.IJAN. J ss
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VI. The tal'alry are to embark their llOrsesJ as also theGeneralg and other
officers ofalll"'J.oks: it is, however, fully lllH]crstootl Umt the moons of con-
veyance 1 for llOrses at the disposal of the British Commander-in-ellief are
very limited: some additional couverance may be procured in the port of
Lisbon.
VII. In order to facilitate tlle embnrkation, it slllloll take plaoo ill t]II"OO
divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of
the places, of the cavalry and artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the
IlJ1llY. The first division sball cmb.'lrk within se\'ell days from the ratification
of the Convention, or sooner if pIl!lSihle.
VIII. The garrisons of Elvas, reniche, and Palmella will be embarked at
Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the llCaN!St harbour. TIley will be
accompanied Oll their mareh by British commissaries, charged with providing
for their subaistence and accommodation.
IX. All the French sick and wounded who cannot be embarked are
entrusted to the British army.... The English Government shall pro\ide
for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of 160 or
200 mell at a time 2.
X. As soon as the \'essels employed to carry the army to France shall have
disembarked it ... every facility shnll be given them to return to England
without delay: they shall have security agaiust capture uutil their arrival in
a friendly port 2.
XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, or within a distance
of about two leagues from it. The British army will a.pproach to "ithill
tllfOO leagu~ of the capital, so as to leave about one league between the two
armies.
XII. The forts of St. Jnlian, the Bugio, and Cascaes S!ISU be occupied by
the British trOOllS 011 the ratification of the COllvelltiou. LislMJII sud its forts
aJld batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and the Fort
St. Joseph on the other inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of
the 800()lld division, as sltall be also the harbour aud all tllC armed vessels in
it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition.
The fortresses of Eh'as, Almeida, Pcniche, and Palmella shall be given up so
soon \I.S British troops cau arrive to occupy them: in the meantime the
British GClleral-in-chief will give notice of the !"'fflcnt Convention t.o the
garrisons of thOl;e places, as also to the troops ill front of them, ill order to
put a stop to further hOl;ti1ities.
XIII. Commissaries shall be appointed on both silles t.o regulate and
accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.
XIV. Should there arise any doubt as to the meaning of allY article, it
shall be explained favourably to thc .'rench army.
XV. From the date of the ratificatioll of the present Convention, all arrears
• Of transports fitted for carrying horses Dnlrymple only had at this moment
those which had brought 180 horses for the 90th Light Dragoons,300 of the
lmh commissariat, and 560 of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the Germl\.ll Legion,
which had just arrived with Moore. .
• These at'ticlcs arc shot'tened of some unimportant verbiage and details.
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of contributions, requisitions, and claims of the French Government agaill.!lt
the subjects of Portugal, or other indi\'iduals residing in this country, founded
au the occupation of Portugal by the French troops since December, 1807,
which may not Inwe been paid up are cancelled; and all sequestratiolls laid
upou tlleir propeny, movable or immo\"able, are remo\'ed, and the free
disposal of the same is restored to tlwir pro!>er owuers.
XVI. All subjects of F'J-..mce, or of powers in friendship or alliance with
I'ranee, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally ill this country, shall be pro-
tected. Their property of every kind, mO\'3ble and immovable, shall be
f'CSlmctW, aud tllOy 811:111 00 at liberty either to lIC(:olll[mny the French army
or to remain in Portugal. In eitllcr case their property is guaranteed to
them with the liberty of retaining or disposing of it, and of passing the sale 1
of it into "'ranee or any other eountry where they may fix their residence, the
space of oue year being allowed them for that purpose.
It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement;
only, however, lIS regardslea.viug the port, and that none of the stipulations
above mentioned can be made the pretext of any comme~ialSlleCulatioll.
XVll. No native of Portugal shall be rendered aceountable for his political
conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the lo'reuch
army. Ami all those who have continued in the exercise of their em)iloy-
mellts, or who have accepted situations uuder the French Government, are
plaeed under the protection of the British eommRuders. They shall suffer no
injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be
obedieut or llot to the :J<'rencb GovernUlellt. They are also at liberty to avail
themselves of the stipulations of the sixteenth article.
XVIll. The SpanLsh troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbol1
shall he givcn up to the General-in-chief of Ule British army, who engages to
obtain of the Spaniards to restore such Frencb subjects, either military or
civil, as may hal'e been detained ~ in Spain, withont having been takeu in battle
or in collSCII"cnoo of military 0llCratiolls, but 011 the occasion of the occur-
rences of t]le 29th of May last, and the days immediately following.
XIX. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks
of prisoners malle in' Portugal since the commenoomeut of the present
hostilities.
X.X. Hostages of the rank of field-<lfficers shall be mutually, furnished on
the part of the British army and ml.Vy, aD/Ion that of the Frenclj lIrmy, for
the recillrocal guarantee of the present Convention.
'nle officer representing the British arm)' to be restored 011 the completioll
I The meaning of this odd and crabbed phrl1.'le is shown by the French dupli-
CIlte of the Convention-' d'cn faire passer le produit ell FrurH...e.' Murmy sholllO
have written' the proceeds' instead of' the salc.'
i Murray's English doe!! not here transJatc Kellennann's French, the latter
has •detenus en Espagne,' i. e. 'at present prisoners in Spain,' not' who may
have been detaincd in Spain.' For the persons intended were primarily General
Quesnel, his statr, and escort, who hlLd been seized in Portugal and thcn taken
into Spain. The clause also eO\'ercd some French officers and commis8lLries who
had been seized at Badajoz and elsewhere while making their way to Lisbon, at
the moment when the insurrection brolw out
.. 2
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of the articles which concern the anny, and tile officer of tile navy on the
w£embarkation of the French troops in their own country. TIle like is to
take place on the part of the French anny I.
XX1. Jt sball be nllOlI'OO to the GCllcml-in-chief of the French anny to
seud 311 officer to France Ivitb intelligence of the present Convention. A
vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to carry him to Bordeaux or
Rocbefort.
XXlJ. TIHl British Admiml will be invited to twCOmmodate His Excellency
the Commander-in-<:hief~ and the other principal French officers on board of
ships of war.
Done and concluded at Lisbon this thirteenth day of August, 1808.
GEOR(lE MtlRlUYJ Quar.-Maa.-Gen.
KUL£fUIANN, General lie Division.
Three unimportant supplementary articles were added, one stipulating that
French civilian prisoners in the bands of the English or Portuguese should
be released, another that the F~ench army should subsist ou its own maga-
zinC!; till it emba~kell, 0. third tll(..t the B~itish should allow the free entry of
provisions into Lisbon afte~ the s:iguature of the Convention.
2. REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.
011 a cOlIsidc~ation of all cireumstanccs, as set fo~th in this Report, wc most
hnmbly submit our opinion, that no furthe~ military proceeding is necessary
on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments
rCSIKletillg tlJe fitness of the Convention in the relntivc situation of the two
armies, it is our unanimous declaration, t1lat unquestionable zeal and firm-
ness appear tll~o1tghout to have been exhibited by Lieut.-Gellerals Sir Hew
Dalrymple, Si~ Harry nn~rard, and Si~ Arthur Welles1ey, lIS well lIS that the
a~dour amI gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, 011 overy oocasion
during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre
on Your Majesty's arms.
All which is most Ilutifully submitted.
(Signed)
DA\'!D DUNnMJ, General.
MOllU, Generol
PE'l'F.R CR.UG, General.
Dec. 22, 1808.
H.:.ATlIP(Y,liO, General.
PElIBROKE, Lieut.-Geu.
G. Nuo~r, Lieut.-Gell.
01.. NICHOLUl, Lieut.-Gen.
3. LORD MOIRA'S 'OrmION.'
I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments ou
the nature of the Convention, bccnuse that I have alre....dy joined ill the
tribute of applause due in othe~ respects to the Officei'll concerned. My
• The hostage for the English army was Col. Donkin. I cannot find out who
was the naval hostage.
• i. e. Junot and his chief officers p~eferred the hospitalities of a man of \l'ar
to the hard fare of a transpo~.
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opinion, therefore, is only opposed w theirs ou n question of judgment, where
their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to reudar the
profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful. Militarr
duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualif)< the deductioll.'l
which I have made during this investigntion.
An Armistice simply might 1I0t have been objectionable, because Sir Hell'
Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moorc's division, might
see more adVllntnge for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what
the Frcnub could draw frOIll it. But as tile Armistice involved, aud ill fact
e'Jtablished, the whole principle of the Convention, I cauuot separate it from
the latter.
Sir Arthur Wcllcsloy has stated that he considered llis force, at the oom-
IllCUl:emeut of the march from the Moudego river, as suffident to drive ilie
French from their positions OIl the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined
by aOOl'e 4,000 British troops, under Genem.ls An8truther and Acland. The
Fronch mako all attack with their whole disllOsable strength, and arc repulsed
with heavy loss, though bnt a part of the British army is brought iuto action.
It is difficult to COnceive that the prospects which Sir Arthur Wellesley
entertained could 00 unfal'ounlbly alteretlloy these e\'ellts, even had liot the
certainty of speedy xeiuforeements to tIle British army existed.
It is urged, that, had the .French beeu pushed to extremity, they would
have cru&<;et] the Tagus, and have protrncted the campaign ill suuh a manlier
as to have frustrated the mON important view of the Dritisll Geuerals,
namely, sending succours into Spain.
This measure nln.st have been equally feasible for the FreTlch if no victory
had been obtained over them; but I coufees that tlle chance of such all
attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple
notices what he calls (the critical alld embarraased state of Junot,' before
tlmt Gener-M IIa8 been pressed by tile British army; and, ill cxJllauation of
that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the
victorious Spanish anny in Andalusia, which cut off tIle retreat of the French
in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made tho
situatiou of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translatiOIl
of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nOr does any
otlH~r reJlrcseutation give ground to suppose, that Junot could have con-
templated the measure, as holding forth auy prospect but ultimate ruin, alter
much preHminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to
JllllOt'S opinion, arises from Ilis sending the very moruing after the battle
of Vimiera, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficielltly
indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence,
but could noL even prolong the contesL to take the chance of accidents. He
seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource.
I humbly couceive it to have been erroneous to rcgnrd tho cIlUlncipntioll
of Portugal from the French, as tIle sole or the prindpal object of the
expedition.-Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must
he a .prominent ohject in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to
Harrow their InCUllS of injuring llil, or those whose cause we are supportiug.
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This seemg to have been so little considered in the Convention, that the
terms appear to ha\'c extricated Juoot's army from a situation of infinite
distress, ill which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in
a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, ill a quarter too, where
it must interfere with our m9St urgent and interesting COI1Cerll.'l.
Had it been impracticable to reduce the FrenlJh army to lay down its arms
unconditionally, still all obligation not to serve {or a specified time might
have been insisted upon, or Belfeisle might hayc been prescribed as the plaee
at whicJl they should he lauded, ill order w pnwcllt the possibilit}, of tlleir
reinforcing (at least fOr a long time) the armies employed (or tbe subjugation
of Spain. llerbaps a stronger consideration tlmn tIle merit of those terms
presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of thc highest
importance, as it might influcncc U1C confidence of tile StJalliaros, or invite
tile nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country,
and c<H>pernte with itfor their deliverance. TIle ad\'antages ought, therefore,
to have been more than usually great, which sJlould be deemed sufficient to
balanCll tIle objection of granting to:l very inferior army, hopeless ill circum-
stances, and broken in spirit, such temlS as might argue, that, notwith-
standing its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No
ndVfl.ntages seem to have been gained that would not have equally followed
from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as
to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea; because it
appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had
. beeu undertaken previons to the Convention; aud this is \\-ithout reasoning
on subsequllllt facts.
I trust that these reasons will \'ludicate me from the charge of presumption,
in maintainillg an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most
respectable Officers; for, e\"Cn 'if the reasons be essentially erroneOIIS, iftho)'
are conclusil'(l to my mil\ll (as I must conscientiously affirm them to be), it is
a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the Convention.
)\JOfRA, General.
December 27, 1808.
x
THE CENTRAL JUNTA OF REGENCY
liST OF THE MEMBERS.
N.R-The notes lIS Ul individuals are extracted from Arguelles.
i. ~'or AJl.AGo:o<. Don Francisco P"'1"'l'OX, Brigndier-General [younger brother
ofJoscph l)alafox, the Captain-General]. Don Lorenzo CALVODE ROZ.\6
[lntendant-GeneraI of the Army of Aragon, long a banker in Madrid].
2. For ASJ'URIA8. Don GllSpar Jon'.L!.Al>'OS (Councillor of State, sometime
Minister of Justice]. TIle Marquis of C"''''I'O SAGlwUtO, Lieut.-General.
3. For the CANARY IsLANDS. The Marquis of VILl.ANVEVA DF.L rOAno.
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4. For Qw CAST'''.;' Don Lorcnzo Bo"WAZ [Prior of Zamom]. Don Fran-
cisco Xa,'ier CAll/) [a Professor of the University of Salamanca].
~. For C4TALONU, TIle Marquis of Vll.IML [Grandee of Spain]. The Baron
de SABA$ONA.
6. For CORIHIVA. The Marquis J1F- hA J:'UEIlf,A [Grandce of SlmillJ. DOll
Juan HABIl [a men;hant of ConlovaJ.
7. For ESTHKlIAI)URA. Don Martin G~AY [llltendant-General of Estrema-
dnra). 0011 Fclix QVAI.LE [Treasurer of the Army of Estremadura].
8. For GAJoleu. TIle Comic de GJaJONll~:. DOli Alltonio AIJAU.V, [all advocate].
9. For GRA:lMM, Don Uodrigo RIQUU.1lE[llegentofthe Chancellery]. Don
Luis .FUN»! [Canon of Santiago].
10.•'or JA...I<. Don F1'llllcisco CA8'I'ANEOO [Canon of Jncn]. DOll Scbn.'ltiall
Joc.U'iO [AccoullUl.uL-Gellernl].
n. For LEON. Don Antonio VALD.:.s [Bailiff of the Knights of Malta, some-
time Minister of Marine]. The Viscollde de QUlNT.ANILI~A..
12. For 1\Lm!Ull. The M!l.rquis of ASTOlW... [GrnlJ(lce of Spain]. Don POOro
SU.\'A [Patriarch of the Iudies].
13. I<'or the BALEARIC I~. Don Tomas VERI [Lieut.-Col. of Militia]. 'flle
Coude de AVAiYA1<S.
14. For MUIICIA. TIle ComIe de Fl,(llllll...~BI .... Nc.A [sometime Secrct.'1ry of
State]. 1lJe ManiuisD~VlLL.AR.
Hi, For NAVARRE. Don Miguel BALA..'\"zA and Don Carlos AuATRLt. [formerly
rel,resentativCll in the Cortes of NavarreJ.
16. For SEVILLf:' The Archbishop of LAoDlCY_\ [Coadjutor-Bishop of Seville]'
The Conde de 'flUY.
17. For Tof,f;uu. Don P!'l'lro R1VUIO [Canon of Toledo]. Doll Jose Gll.rcia
LtTOR.Rt: [all advocate]. ,
18. I<'or VAu:N"CIA, 'ne Conde ,de CoSTA.\llNA [Grandee of Spain]' The
Principe 1'10 [Grl\ndoo of 8pnin I\lld 1\ LiclIt.-Co1. of Militia.].
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THE SPA1'lISH ARMIES, OCT.-NOV. 1808
N,B.-" signifies an old lille or light regiment; t a militia battalion;
.t a newly raised corpa.
1. THE ARMY Of' GAJ..ICIA [RP.TUR~ ot' OCT. 31].
GeJl(lr.J.1 H.....KE.
QUicer8. Men.
Vanguard Brigade, General.i\IENDlZABAL:
"2nd Catalonian Ligllt Infantry (one batt.) j ·Volunteers of
Navarre (one batt.); • two batts. of United Grenadiers;
·Saragossa. (one hatt.); "one compauyof sappers .
let Division, General F'ICUllliO... ;
"Rey (two hatts.); ":Majorca (one hatt.); "Hibernia (one
hatt,); ·one hatt. of united light companies; t.i\londo-
!ledn; tBa1l1ikm. Lite'l'(lMO j • one comp..'111)' of l'appers
.7
.6
2,707
3,032
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2nd l)il'isionJ General M.utTI:>'E1WO :
"'NavaITe (two batts.); ·Naples (two batts.); tPolltevedra;
tSegovia; t'Volunteers of Victory , (one hatt.); sappers,
one company; Cavalry: .. Reina (two squadrons); .. Mon-
t.esa (one squadron) j and one uct.'1chmcnt of mixed regi_
ments. [The cavalry was 302 sabres in all.] 117 4,949
3rd Division, General R1QUF.IJfE:
'OerOlm LiglLt Infantry (OIiC batt.); ·Scville (two b.'l.t18.);
.. Marines (three batts.); tCompostella (one batt.); onc
company of sappers . 110 4,677
4th Dh'ision, General CAUlIAJAI. :
.. Darbastro Light Infantry (one batt.); .. Principe (two batts.);
"'Toledo (two batts.); "'two batts. of United Grenadiers;
*Arngon (one batt.)j tl~ugo; tSlIoOtiago. 143 3,388
6th Division [from DenmarkJ, General COllde do SAN ROMAN:
.. Zamora (three batts.); ·Princesa (three batts.); '"1st Bar·
oeloua Light Infantry (onc hatt.); ·1st Catalonian Light
Infantry (ono butt.) j OllO COIup..my of SllWOrs . 16!l 5,13li
Allturian Division: General ACEVEDO :
*Hibemia (two batts.); tOviedoj 1Castropol; 1Grado;
1Cangas de Oni~ j !Clmga.~ do 'I'inco; tLcnll.; tLuarc., j
tSalas; 1Villaviciosa 233 1,40()
neserve Brigade, General MA.I1V :
·Volmlteers of the Crown (one batt.) j ·United Grenadiers
(one butt.) j tMilitia Grenadiers (two batts.); tBataU(J'Il
del Gelleral (one batt.) 90 2,935
Detached Troops on the line of communications-Reynosa,
Burgos, Astorga:
• Saragossa. (one batt.); ·Buenos Ayres (one batt.); • Volun-
teers of the Crown (one batt.); tSantiago; tTuy j tSah-
manca; 1 Batalkm del General (one butt.); "'lid seven
detaclled companies of various corps 181 6,671
Detached troops left with the Artillery Reserve:
t .Betanzos; t Monterrey 40 000
Artillery Reserve (thirty-eight guns) . 33 1,000
Total .1,288 42,600
N.R-The four cavalry regiments from Denmark, Rey, Infante, VillBI"i-
ciosa, and Almanza did not join Blake, being without horses, hut marched OD
'foot to EstrelTlaclura to get mouuted. TIley l][ul147 officers and 2,262 mell.
2. THE AnMY OF ARAGON.
General J oseph P ,U.Al'{lJ(.
1st Division, General O'NEILl.E:
• Spaniah Guards (ooe batt.), 6O!l; '" Estremadura (one batt.), 600;
·lst Volunteers of Aragon (ono batt.), 1,141; Ust Light
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Infantry of Saragossa, 614; : 4th Tercio ofAragon, 1,144; 1211d
of Valenein, 869; tlst Volunteers of .Murein, 1,029; t2nd ditto,
968; tHue>ca, 1,219; :Cazadores de Femando VII (Arago-
nese), 38G j tSuizos de Aragou,826; 1Escopeteros de Navarra,
227; "Dragoollll (del Rey,' 169; artillery, 79 j sappers, 47.
Total . 11,926
[From a return of Nov. 1,1808, in the English Record Office.]
2nd Divisioll, General SAINT ~1.ARCH:
·Volunteers of Castile (three batts.); tSoria.; rruria (three
bntts.); 1Voluntoors of .Borbon (olle bntt.); tAlicante (three
batts.) ; tChell'a (one batt.); tCazadores de Fernalldo VII
(Yaleuciau)(one hatt.); t Segorbe (one hatt.); "Dragoons of
Numancia (620 sabres); onc company of sappers. Total 9,060
[TIlis total is from Vaughan's diary. He was present wlUll!
PaWox reviewed the division on Nov. 1, and took down the
figures. ]
3rd Dh'isiou, General Coude de WUN [detached to Catalonia,
Nov. 10] :
pst Volunteers of Saragosss., 638; t3rd Volunteers of ArsgOIl,
693; tFemando VII de Aragon, 648; :Daroca, .003; tIA
Reunion, 1,286; tReserva del General, 934; artillery, G4;
one troop of cavalry (Caudores de Fernando VII), 22. Total 4,GOO
[The figures are from a mb1e in Artcche, Hi. 400.]
Reserve at Saragossa :
'Ibere WIlS a mass of troollS ill theAragollcsc capital whieh Imd not yet been
brigaded, and in part had not even beeu anned or cloUled in October. They
included the following regiments at least; 2nd Volunteers of Aragon ; 1st,2nd,
3nI, and ,fith Tercios of Aragoll; 2nd Light Battalion of Saragossa. j and the
battalions of Cnlatayud, Doyle, BnrllMtro, JaClI, Taustc, Tcruel, amI Torrcro j
besides (in all probability) some eight or ten otller corps which are found
existing in December, when the second siege began, though they cannot be
proved to have existed in October. III tlJllt month, however, there mart
have been at least 10,000 armed mell in the Aragonese l'CSCn'c, pcrlJal1S ns
many as 15,000.
Total of the Anny of Aragon, at lea8t 33,674 men, of which only 789 were
cavalry.
3. ARMY OF ESTREMADURA.
General GALLUZZO [afterwards the Conde de BKL\·t:m:ltt:].
1st Division, Conde de Bt;LV:&lU:RIo.:: [aftenvards General DIo.: Aws]
• Spanish Guards (4th batt.); • Majorca (two hatts.) j • 2nd Light
lofautry of Catalonia (oue hatt.); t Provincial Grenadiers {one
hatt.}; one company oftirailleurs . 4,160
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3,580
300
Mm.
300
400
3,300
"'8
440
Cavalry, .. 4th Hussars « Volunteers of Spain ')
Sappers, two companies; artillery, two batteries.
2nd Division, General EhNFaTROSA:
*Walloou Guards (4th balt.) j !BadajOlI (two batts.); :::Valcncia
de Alcalltara; :Zafra
Cavalry, 6th Hussars (Maria Llli9ll.)
SapllCrs, two companies; artillery, two batteries .
3rd Division, General TRus:
tBadajoz; lTruxillo (one batt.)j l:Merida; :tLa.Sereua
Cavalry, 2nd Hussnrs (Lnsitania) •
Total of tlle Army, 12,846, of which 958 were cnvalry.
[RD.-From the Madrid GazetUJ of Oct. 21, 1800, comparell with the
table in Arteehe, iii. 496.]
4. ARMY OF THE CEi\'TRE.
Geneml CA8T~oe.
,\fen.
1st Division, Coode de VJJ.LARU;zo :
• Walloon Guards (two bntts.); .. Reina (three batts.); ·Corona
(two batts.); *Jaell (three bat1a.); *Irlanda (three batls.);
.. Barbastro (one batt.); tJaen . (about) 8,500
Out of t]lese fifteen ba.tt3lious nine were detached to the rear in
or about Mndrid, and were not present 011 the Ebro.
2nd Division, Geneml GltIMMU-lOiT:
'Ceuta (two OOUS.); Ordenes Militares (three ba.tts.); fTruxillo;
tBujalallee; tCue.uca; tCiudad Real; 1Tiradores de Espaiia;
: Volulitoor;l of Catalonia; 1Tiradores de Cadiz; :j:Cannona (about) 6,000
3rd Division, General RllsGEJ.,:
• Cordm'a (two iJattil.); .. Volunteers of Valencia (one hatt.) j
'Campo Mayor (one OOtt.); t'foledo; tBurgos; t AI=r ;
t Plaseneia; tGua.dix j t Seville no. 1; t Lorca; tToro.
Oot of these thirtt.'C1l battaliolls fOllr were detached to the reaT, and
were not present on the Ebro. . (about) 6,500
4th Divisioll, General LA PE~A :
.. Mrica (two battil,); "Bllrgos (two batts.); "Sarnglml3 (one oott.);
• :Mureia (two bads.) j t Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia
(twobatts.); tSiguem:.a.; 1Navas de'folosa; :tBaylen; 15th
Battalion of Seville . . (about) 7,WO
5th [Morcian-Valellcian] Division, General Roe.\. [vice General L[.4.YAS) :
.. Savoya (two balts.); .. Valencia (three batts.); .. America (three
batts.); tMurcia; t A\'ila; 1Liria; tCazadores de Valencia
(three batts.); 10rihuela (two hatts.); TIradores of Xati\'a alld
Cartngenn (two companies); 1Penas de San Pedro: . (about) 8,000
[One regiment was left at Ar..mjue','; as l(Uard w the Juota, with Geneml
Llamas in .::omrnand.]
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, Am}' of Castile,' General I'I(lNA,TELLI [after Ocl. 30, General C.mTAOJAL) :
MtJ/l.
'Cantnbria.{tll'o batts.); t Leon Militia; tGrenadiers' del General'j
tCazadores de Cucnea ; pst, 2nd, and 3rd Vo\unteersofLeoll;
:1st, 2nd, alld 3rd Tereios of Castile; tTiradores de Castilla;
:Volunteers ofBenRvente; tVolunteers ofZamora; tVolunteen
of Lerlcsma . . Total (abollt) 11 ,000
'1110 first-named fOUT corps were made into a detached brigade
under Cartaojal on Oct. 30: tIle others (except !.Benavente in
garrison at llurgos) wore dispersed among the Andalusian divisions
for misbehaviollr at Logrolio Oil Oct. 26.
Cavalry: '" Farncsio; '" MOlltesa ; '" Heina ; .. Oliveuza i '" Boroon ;
.. Kspafin ; '" CaJatrnva j • Santiago; '" Sagunto; *I'rineipe;
'Pavia; .. Alcalltara. Very few of these regiment81Lad more
than three squadrons at the front, some only one. The total
was not more than 3,600 sabres, el'en including one or two
newly mised free-e<Jrl'llJ of insignificant strength
(about) 3J 500
Total of the Anny of the Centre, about ,'il,OOO mOll, of whom only about
42,000 were on tile Ehro; the remaining 0,000 were ill or about Madrid,
and were inwrporated in San Juau's C Army of Reserve,'
5. ARMY OF CATALONIA.
[Morning state of Nov. 0, 1808.]
General VIVEl;.
Vanguard Division, Brig'ddicr-GoIlCI".ll A'NAIU:&:
*U1tonia, 300; *Dorbon (one batt.), MlO; *2nd of Barcelona,
1,000; 1st S";SS (Wimpfen) (one batt.), 400; list Tereio of
Gerona,OOO; i2ndditto,400j tTcreiooflgualadaJ400; iditto
ofCervera, 400; tIst ditto ofTarragona, 800; tditto of Figuera8J
400 •
Cavalry, :t Hu9Sllrs of San Narciso
1st Division, General Conde de CAlJ)AGUES :
'2nd Walloon Guards (one batt.), 314; 'Soria (two balts.), 780;
'Borbon (detachment), 161 ; '2nd of&woia (two batts.), 1,734 ;
'2nd Swiss (uetnchment), 270; 1Tcrcio of TOrWsaJ 984;
tlgualada and Cervera (d~tac11mellts), 245 ; 'sappers, 50,
Cavalry: 'Husares Espai'ioles (two squadrons), 220; 1Cazadores
de CataluOa, 180
Artillery, 0110 battery (six gUllS) •
2nd Dh'ision, General LAGUN... :
t Provinci.a.l Grenadiers of Old Castile (two batts.), 072; tditto of
Nell' Castile (two batts.), 924 ; 1Volulltcers of Samgossa, 150;
sappers, 30
Mrn.
',500
100
4,628
400
70
2,076
636 APPENDICES
Cavalry, .. Husares Espafioles
Artillery, one battery (lle\'ell guns)
MlPl.
200
..
3rd Division, GClIcral LA SY.RNA:
'"Granada (two batU.), 961; t2nd Tereio of Tarragoua, 022;
t' Dh'ision of Ann; 326; :Compa6ias Sueltas, 260. 2,458
4th Division, General MH.AIfS:
pst Tercio of Lerida, 872; tditto of Vich, 976 ; tditto of Mall-
resa, 937 ; tditto of Valles, 926 3,710
Reserve:
·Spanish Guards, 60; "Grenadiers of Soria, 188; "ditto of
Wimpfcll, 169; General's bodyguard, 340; saPllcrs,20 777
Cavalry, .. Husares EspaflOles 80
ArtUlery (four guns) . SO
Total of the Army. 20,033, of which 780 are cavalry.
These five armies formed the fTout line. Their total strength was IIH,z.tl,
if th 9,000 mOll loft behind at Madrid are deducled.
TROOPS IN THE SECO?\'D LINE.
l. ARMY 01<' GRANADA [MARCHING TOWARDS CATALONIA].
General RIillIKG.
1st Division:
'"2nd Swiss (Rediug), 1,000; 11st Regiment of Granada [alias
Jliberia](two·batts.), 2,400; tBaza(twobatts.), 2,400; :Almeria,
(two batts.), 2,400 .
2nd Division:
tSanb Fe (two batts.), 2,400; tAnWquerd. (one batt.), 1,200;
tLoxa (two batts.), 2,400
Cavalry, tHussars of Gmnada
Artillery (six guns)
Total of the Anuy
Men.
8,200
0,000
6jO
130
16,000
N.B.-This return is from a dispatch from Granada in the Madrid Gazette
of Oct. 28, corroborated by another of Nov. 5, aunoullciug the arrh'al of the
force at Murcia.
2. GAWCIAN RESERVES.
Officers.
'Detached Troops in gnrrison in GaHeia:
*Majorea(onebatt.); *.Lcoll(onebatt.); *Aragoll(OIlOba.tt.) 77
etached troops on the Portuguese frontier:
• Leon(one hatt.) j tOrensc; and four detached companies.
125
2,010
1,600
3,610
Me".
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3. ASTURlAN RESERVES.
[N.B.~This force is exclusive of the troops under Aeevedo in the Army of
.make. TIle lIumbers II.J'O from a moming slate of Dooember. J
Men.
tCovadonga,360; lDonCarlos,336; tFerdinandVII,316; tGihon,
686; tlnfiesto,4B9; tLlancs,420; tLuanco,400; tNfniu,528:
lPravia, 681 ; tRiva de Sella, G86; :Siero, 585. Total 0,285
4. ARMY OF RESERVE OF MADRID.
N.D.-This force, which fought at the Somosierra, consisted of parts of the
Armies of Andalusia. and Estremadura; il:.!l numbers have alro.'ldy been
counted among the troops of those armies.
General SAN JUAN.
Men.
From the 1st I)jvisioll of Andalusia:
"Walloon Guanls (one oott.), 600; *Reina (two battll.), 927;
'" Jaen (two batts.), 1,300; ..Irlanda (two hatts.), 1,106; .. Corona
(two batlJl.), 1,039 . 4,M2
From the.3rd Division of Andalusia:
·Cordova (two batts.), 1,300; tToledo, 600: tAlcazal", 600;
t3rd of Seville, 400 . 2,700
From the Army of Estremadura:
tBadajoz (remains of two batts.) . 566
C'm;tilian Levies :
tlst Voluuteers of Madrid (two batts.), 1,600; t 2nd ditto, 1,500 . 3,000
Cavalry: 'Principe, 200; 'Alcantara, 100; 'l\JOlltesaJ 100;
tVolunteers ofi\Jadrid, 200 GOO
Artillery (twenty-two guus) 300
Total 12,118
N.B.-Ofthis force the following battalions fled to Madrid, and aftef"Wards
joined tile Anny of tile Centre :-lst Volunteers of Mallrid, Corona, half 3rd
of Seville, Reina, Alcazar. The following fled to Segm'ia, and joined the
Anny of Estremadura :-Jaeu, Irlanda, Toledo, Badajoz, 2nd Volunteers of
M.1drid, Wn.llooll Guards, amI half 3rd of Seville.
5. ESTREMADURAN RESERVES.
[Left in garrison at lladajozJ when the three divisions of Galluzzo marched
to lUadrid.]
tLealcs de Fernando VII (three batts.), 2,256; :Plasencia (oue
batt.), 1,200; tBadajoz (one batt.), 752 4,208
CA.\'8.lry: lCazadores of Llereull., 200? Cn.zadores of Toledo, 2oo? 400
Total 4,608
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[For these (01'00'1 compare Madrid Gu;sctte of Oct. 21, giving orgnnizntiou
of Ule Army of Thlremadura, with the list of troops wllich marolled forward to
Burgos in first section of this Appendix. The above regiments remained
behind, and are found in existencc in Cuesta's anny next spring. Sce
APllelldix 10 vot. ii giving his forces.)
6. BALEARIC ISLES.
There apparently remained in garrison in the Balearic hIes, in November,
the following t1'ooI18:-
*4th Swiss (Hcsclmrd) (two batts.), 2,121; -Granada (one batt.), 222;
·Soria. (one batt.),413; tMajorca, 604. Total 3,360
7. MURCIAN AND YAI~ENCIAN RESgRVES.
[Mostly 011 the march to Sal'"~ ill November,IOO8. TIlt) liguresmainly
from a retUI'll qC Jan. 1 are too low for the November strength. J
-5th Swiss (Thaxler), 1,757; t18t TIradores de Murcia,B13 ; t2nd
ditto, 124 j t3rd Volunteers of Murcia, 1,Hn; 15th ditto, 1,077;
:t Florida-Blanca, 3.'i2; prd of Valencia (tigUn}.'l wallti~g; ? 6(0).
Total 6,714
8. ANDALUSIAN RESERVES.
'"Espaiia (three hatts.), 1,039; tJer&, 074; tMalaga, 401;
tRollda, 574; t.Ecija, 600. Total 3,177
12ml of Seville, 600; 14th ditto, 433; tC=Uores of Malaga. (oue
batt.), 1,200; :tVelez Malaga (three batts.), 2,400; tznd of
Antequera (one batt.), 1,200; :to.sUIla (~wo batts.), 1,061. Total 6,7fl4
In addition, the following regular regiments had eacJl, as it would seem,
left the cadre of oue battalion behind in Andalusia to recruit, before marching
to the Ebro to join Castal'los :-Africa, Burgos, Cantabria, Ceuta, Corona,
Cordovll, i\lurchl. '~fhat tlte tot.1-1 of their numbers may 113ve been ill
November and December, it is impossible to say-perhaps 400 each may be
allowed, giVillg a total of 2,300. Of cavalry regiments there must have
beeu iu existenoo ill Andalusia tllC nucleus of the following Ilew regimellbl:-
:tTejas; :tMootanas de Coroova; :tGranada. Their force was trilliug-a
single squadron, or at most two. If we gi\'e them 600 men in all, we shall
llrob&lJly be not tilr wrong. Sal'eml regular cavnlry regiments had left tho
cadre of one or two squadrons behind.
The existence of all these regiments in November-December can be proved.
'111e 2nd llnd 4th of 8evillo reached Madrid in time to join in its defence
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against Napoleon, and then fled to join the Anny of the Centre. The figures
giveu are their January strengths, when they had already suffered severely.
The i\Iabga regiment's figure is from Madrid Ga;:rctte of No\'. 2!.l, recording
its march out to Granada. The militia battalions Jerez, Malaga, ROllda,
Eeija were all in existence in June, they did 1I0t march to the Ebro, and
are found in .the Army of the Centre in the spring of 18Ol), Espaiia was
1l.llparellUy in garrison at'Centa, and only brought up to Ule front early in
1009. Velf2 Malaga, 2nd of Antequera, and Osuna are first heard of under
Del 'Fala.eio in Janullry, 1800. They must have been raised by December at
t]IC latest.
The total of the Andalusian reserves "accounted for ill thi!l table is 13,371.
but no such number coultl have been sent forward in December, as many of
Ule battalions were not properly a.rmed, much less uniformed. But SOllle
of the volunteers, all the militia, and the regular regiment EspaiIa-perhaps
6,000 or 7,000 in all-should have been at Madrid by Dec. 1. Only 1,000
bayonets actually reached it before Napoleon's arril·al.
It would seem then that the second line of the Spanish. Anny com;isted of
something like the followin~numbers :-
Army of Reserve of Madrill
Reding's Gl'3.nadan Dh'isions
Galiciau Resen'cs
Asturian Reserves
.&tremaduran Reservcs
Balearic Isles Reserves
Murcian and Valencian Resel'1!cs
AlHlalusian Reaerves
Cavalry from Denmark, in march for Estremadura
Total
Mm.
12,118
15,000
3,610
3,2M
<,008
3,:J60
5,774
13,371
2,252
66,378
Some of the battalions (e. g. the Valencians and l\Iurcians who went to
Saragossa) must have been much stronger in December; on the other hand,
others (e. g. the Estremauurnns) arc prulmbly over-estimatcd: t1Hly t;howtJu
no such figures as those givell above, when tlley took the field early in 1809.
N.B.-Ill several armies, notably in t1lose of Aragoll wd the Centre,
there are doubtful points. It is impossible to speak with certainty of the
number of battalions which some corps took to the front. It will be noted
that all the numbers given are much larger than those attributed by Napier
(i. 504) to the Spanish armies. I have worked from detailed official figures,
the greater part of which seem perfectly trustworthy.
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XII
THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN
IN NOVEM.BElt, 1808.
N.B.-The distribution of the regiments is that of November. The detailed
strength of the corps, hOlvever, comes from an October return, and there had
been several changes at tllll end of that month.
1ST COUl'll. Manilal VJC'roll., Duke of Belluno.
2nd Division (Lapisse) :
16th Uger, three batts.
8th of the Line, three batts.
4lith " three hatts.
54th " three batta.
Corps Cavalry (Drigade Beaumont) :
2nd Hussars.
26th Clmsseurs.
3rd Division (Villatte) :
27th Leger, three hatts.
G3rd of the Lino, three hatts.
94th " three hatts.
!16th " three harts.
'nil) gross total of this corps 011 Oct. 10 was 33,937 men, of whom 2,201
were detached, and 2,939 in llOspital. The 4th Hussars, originally belonging
to this corps, was trausferred to the 3rd Corps by November.
1st Division (Ruffin):
Uth Uger, three halts.
24th of the Line, three batts.
96th " four batts.
2ND CORPS. Marshal BESSd:RDl : after Nov. 9, Marshal SoUl-T.
1st Division (l\Iouton, afterwards
Merle) :
2nd Ugcr, three hatts.
4th " three batts.
16th of the Line, three batts.
36th " tllrOO batta.
[Garde de Paris, one batt.]
2nd Division (MerIe, afterwards Mer·
met) :
31st Uger, three balts.
47th of the Line, two batts.
70tll " one batt.
86th " one hatt.
1st Supply. Regt.j
of tile Legions = 122nd of thl,l
of Reserve Line,four hatts.
2nd ditto
2nd Swiss Regiment, one batt.
3rtl" " ono hatt.
3rn Division (Bonnet) : Corps Cavalry (Division I..6salle) :
13th Pro\,. lkgt. I... 119th of the 9th Dragoons (transferred from
14th " Linc,four batts. l\lilhaud).
17th " 1= 120tb of the 10th Chasseurs.
16th " Line,four hatts. 22nd "
Lasallc, with tlle 9Ul Dl".\gOOIl8 alld IOtll Ch::lsseurs, W(lS detached after
Gamonal (Nov. 10) and replaced by Franceschi's division. The corps received
4th Division (Grandjean) :
5th Uget', three haWl.
2nd Legion of Reserve, four hatts.
1st of the Vistula, two hatts.
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in .r"Huary n. reinforcement of twenty-two battaliolls from the dissolved
8tll Corpll, wllich formed two llCW dh'igio1l9 wider Delaborde and Rendelet.
The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 33,054 men, of whom 7,394
were detached and 5,536 in hospital.
2nD CoRPS. Marshal MONCEY, Duke of Conegliano.
1st Division (Maurice Matllieu,after- 2nd Division (Musuier):
wards Grandjean): Ist Pro\,. Regt. I= 114th of the
Htll of tile Line, four batts. 2nd" Line, four halts.
44th " tllree batts. 3rd" I= 115th of the
70th " ouc hatt. 4th" Line, four batts.
2nd of the \listula, two batt8. [One Westphaliau batt. J
3rd " two halts.
3rn Division (Morlot) :
I)t]l ProI', ncgt. I= llGtlt of the
Line, two halts.
9th' " \ _ 117th of the
10th" Line, fonr hatts.
[One Prussian halt.]
[One Irish hatt.]
Corps Cavalry (Brigade \Vatllier):
lal Provisional ClIir.u;sicrs (= 13tl1 ClIirnssiers). 1st Provisional Hussars,
2nd Provisional Ligllt Cavalry (Hussars and Chasseurs).
Grandjeall's division (No. 4) was afterwards absorbed in Morlot's [Decem-
iJcr], with tllC exception of the 1st of the Vistula, sent to join !\fusllicr.
The cavalry was afl:el"ll'ards strengthened by the 4ill Hussa1'8 from tlle 1st
Corps. The 121st of the Line (four hatts.) arrived in December, and joined
Morlot. 'flJe battalions in square brackets were left bcllind ill the garrisons
of Biscay and Navarre.
'nJe gross total of the corps on Oet. 10 was 37,690 men, of whom 1l,082
were detaclled in garrisons, &0. and 7,622 in hospital.
(Tn COIU'S. i\Iarshal Lt:t'IIDVRE, Duke of Dantzig.
1st Division (Sebastiani) : 2nd Division (Leval) :
28tll of the Line, three batts. Nassau Contingent, two hatts.
321111 " three baUs. Baden " two hatts.
~h " three hatts. Hesse-Dannstadt " two hatts.
76th " three hatts. :Frankf?rt "oue hatt.
Dlltch "two hatts.
3rd Division (Valence): Corps Cavalry (Brigade lI1aupctit):
4th of the Vistula, two batts. 6th Dragoons.
7th " two hatts. 3rd Dutch Hussars.
Oth " two hatts. Westphalian OheoolJ.$-Uge-r8,
'I1Je gross total of tllis corps on Oct. 10 was 22,895 men, of whom 95S were
cletaclled and 2,170 in hospital.
OllAN. I Tt
642 APPENDICES
6TH CoRPS. Marshal i\IOIlT1ER, Duke of 'frel'iso.
1st Division (Suchet): 2nd Ui\"jgion (Gllz.an):
17th Uger, th~ batts. 21st Leger, three batts.
34th ortlle Line, four hatts, 26th " three batts.
40th " three balts. lootll of the Line, three halts.
64th " three hatts. l03rtl" three hatts.
88th " three batts.
Corps Cavalrr (Brigade Delaage) :
10th Hussars. 21st Ch.'1!;.scuts.
11le gros;; total of this corps 011 Oct. 10 was 24,M2 mOll, of whom 188
were detached and 1,971 in llOspital.
6'l'r1 CORPS. Marshal K.;v J Duke of F.lchitlgen.
1st Divisiou (Marclllllld) : 2ud Division (Lagrange, afterwards
6th of the Line, three rotts. Maurice l\Iathieu) :
39Ul" three batts. 2lith Ugcr, four batts.
<roUt" three IWltt'!. 27t11 of the Line, three hatts.
76th" tllree roUs. 50th" four hatts.
S!ltb " tllree halts.
Corpil Cnvnlry (Brigade conlCrt):
3rd Hussars. 15th Chasscurs.
'.DIe gross total on Oct. 10 was 00,033 men, of whom 3,331 were detached
and 5,WB in hospital. 'Ibis total, hO"'cvcr, includes a. division under i\1crmct,
whose battalions were transferred to the 2ml aml3rd Corps, wlleu the cam-
paign began in November. TIle 6th Corps, including its cavalry and artillery,
hOO probably IIOt more tlum 20,000 net wben it took the field in its final fonn.
4,t1l Division (Souham) :
. 1st Uger, three batts.
3rd" one batt.
7th of the Line, two batts.
42nd " three batt;;.
ll7th " oue hatt.
General GouvJOs ST. CvJl.
2nd Division (General Lccchi) :
2nd Italian Line Rcgt., oue oo.tt.
4th" "olle batt.
5th" " onc batt.
ltaliall Chll",_"Seurs (Ve/ilea), oue
""tl.
1st Neapolitan Line Hegt., tll'O
balts.
7TH CouPS.
1st Division (Chabran) :
2nd of tlLe Line, one batt.
7th " tlYO hatts.
10th" one hatt.
37th" one balt.
56t11" one hatt.
93rd" one batt.
2nd SWiM, ono hart.
3rd Division (Reille) :
32nd Uger, one batt.
16th of tile Line, olle batt.
50th " oue bait.·
113th" two bati$.
Prov. Rcgt. of !'crpignau, four
"""'.5th Legion of Resen'e, one batt.
Clw$uurlt dell Mrl/lfagllell, one batt.
R:lttalion of the Valais, onc batt.
Brigade Fontane :
Italian Royal Chasseura.
7th Italian Dragoons.
Unattached Regiment:
24th Dragoons.
•
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5th Division (Pino): 6th Division (Chabot) :
]st Italian Light Regt., three batts. 2nd Neapolitan Line Rcgt., two
2nd " "threebatl.i>. hatts.
4th Italian Line Regt., two batts. Chasseurs of the Pyrenees Orien-
St1I" JJ one batt. tales, onc hatt.
6th" .. three batts.
7th" " onc batt.
Corps Cavalry :
BrigiUle BessierC5 :
3rd Provisional Cuirassiers.
3rd " Chasseu1'S.
Brigade Schwartz :
ltalinn C1msseurs of tllC Prince
Royal.
2nd Neapolitan Chasseurs.
The gross total of this corps Oil Oet. 10 was 42,382 men, of whom 1,302
were -detached and 4,948 in hospital. But tMs does not include several
regimenu which did not join St. err from Italy tillloug after the date of the
return. In JRlluary, 1800, he bad 41,386 men present with the colours, and
O,Ii8D in hospital, besides 543 priwners. 'nlcre Imd also been considerable
losses in the fighting. Probably the corps in November-Deeember was well
over W,OOO strollg'.
Srn CoRPS. General JUNOI', Duke of Abrantes.
Dissolved in December, 1808. 'The troops were drafted liS follows:-
1st Division (Delaborde) :
15th of the Line, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Merle'sDiv., 2nd Corps.
47th " two batts. " J\lenuet's"
70th " three batts., received one more bntt. from Mcnnet's Di\',
80th " two batts. ., " "
4th Swiss, one batt.
This divisiou, therefore, in January, 1800, consisted of four battalions 70th,
tbree battalions 86th, and one battalion 4th Swiss. It was scnt to join Sonlt,
and strengthened h}' three battalions of the 17th Uger, thus blWing eleven
battlllions at Corulllla.
2nd Division (Loisoll):
2nd Leger, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in MerIe's Div., 2nd Corps.
4th " one OOU. JJ " " "
12t11 " one batt." " DessoIles' Dh·.
15th " oue batt.
32ndoftheLine,onebatt., draftedtojoin its regt. inSebastiani·sDiv.,4thCorps.
68th " one batt. JJ " " "
2nd Swiss, one batt., drafted to join·the batt. in Menuet's Div., 2nd Corps.
The remaining battalion of this divisioot that of the 16th Uger, was
draft(!(]. to join Heudelet's Division, and became part of the 2nd Corps.
Tt2
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ard Division (Heudelet) :
31st U'ger, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Mermet's Div. of 2nd Corps.
321ld " one batt. 8211d of tllC Line, one batt:.
26th of tllC Line, two batts. Legion du Midi, one hatt.
66th " two batts. Hanoverian Legion, one batt.
N.B.-The last-named eight battalions, afterwards joined by oue from
Loisou's Divisioll, were formed illto the 4th Division of the 2nd Corps.
The whole corps cavalry of the 8th Corps was composed of provisional
regiments, which were dissolved, and sent to join their units.
The 8th Corps on Oet. 10 bad a gross total of 25,730 men, of whom 2,137
were demehccl, and 3,523 in 1lospitAI.
UESERVE.
(1) Independent Ueserve Division (General DmoLLES):
12th Uger, three barts. 51st or the Line, three hatts.
43rd of tllC Line, three batts. 65th" three hatts.
(2) Guards of the King of Spain (General SAl.J.ONV) :
Four battalions of Infantry. One regiment of Ca\'alry.
(Two regiments, mainly Sllallillh desertel'll, were added ill January,)
The total is COllfuscd ill the returll ofOct. 10 with that ofthc Imperial Guard,
and includes also some regiments left in garrison in the north, e,g. the lIStl1
of the Line; including these the Reserve amounted. to 13,000 men.
"m;SERVE OF CAVALRY.
Division of Dragoous, W,TOUR-i\fAOlIOURG:
Brigades Oldeubourg, Perreimond, Digcoll.
1st, 2nd, 4t11, 14th, 20th, and 26tb Dragoons.
The gross total of the division on Oct. 10 Wag 3,6!l5 sabres.
Division of Dragoons, MU,l{&UD :
The 12th, 16th, and 21st Dragoons.
(TIle 5th and 9th Dragoons, originally belonging to this division, were
transferred to Lefebvre and Lasalle respectively.)
The grosg total of the division on Oet. 10 was 2,940 sabres, probllbly
including onc of the transferred regiments.
Division of Dragoons, LAHotrSSA.YF.:
Brigades D'Avcllay and Marisy. (Ou D'Avenay being transferred to an
independent provisional brip;ade, Caulaineonrt replaces him.)
17th, 18th, 19th, and 27th Dragoons.
The grosg total of this division 011 Oct. 10 was 2,020 sabres,
Dil'ision of DrtlgOOns, LoRGl':S:
Brigades Vialsnlles and Fournier.
13th, 15th, 22nd, and 25th Dragoons.
TIle gross total of this divisiou on Oct. 10 was 3,101 sabres.
Dh'ision of Dragoons, i\IJI.LET (KW..Llo:IIMANN after Jan. 1809) :
3rd, 6th, lOth, and 11th Dragoons.
The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 Wag 2,003 Sllbrcs.
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Division of Light C:walry, l<'UANOJ-:sCIII :
8rigades Debelle and Girardin (?).
6th Dragoons. 'Supplementary Regiment' of
22nd OhatUllrIJ d C/u:I.>al. O/u.188Curt a OI1(JlX1./.
Hanoveriall Chevuuz.UgeI'8.
The Provisional Chasseufs were dissolved in Jan. 1609, and replaced by the
lirt Hussars. 111C 22nd belonged to the original corps-cavalry of 80ult.
TIle numbers of this division (which had not yel been put together 011
October 10) seem unobtainable, sal'C tllat the 1st Hussars was 712 strong.
Probably Franceschi's total would be about 2,400 sabres.
IMPERlAL GUARD.
Infantry:
Two regiments of Grenadiers (four batts.), two regiments of Chasseurs (four
batt9.), two regiments of Fusiliers (s~ batls.).
Cavalry :
Due regiment each of Olw.88eUr8 d Oheool, Grenadiers, Dragoons, Gendannea
Il'tlite, Polish Light Horse, onc squadron of Mamelukl"l. 36 guns.
The total Wl\S about 8,000 infantry aud 3,600 llOf'SC, with 600 gunners.
N.B.-A few late-eomillg regiments, aud a few ullits not attached to any
tlivisioll, are not included in the above tables,e. g. the 118th, 121st,and 122ud
ltegimellts of the Line, and the 27th Chasseur;;. Nor are there included the
tlept1t of umlistrilmtetl conscripts at BayOlUlC, nor the battalions of National
Guards forming movable colnmns inside the French fi:ontier. But the 19,371
artillery of the army are included in the corps, divisions, aud brigades.
4,763
8,598
34,801
74
165
3,946
363
107
3,633
Detached.
2,201
7,304
11,082
9"
198
3,381
1,302
2,137
6,200
8,860
Total.
33,937
33,054
37,690
22,895
24,652
38,033
42,382
25,730
17,OS9 }
12,100
13,120
GROSS TOTAL OF THE WHOLE ON OCTOBER 10.
Hl'J8pital fir Effective
missing. present.
2,939 28,797
6,636 20,124
7,622 19,086
2,170 19,770
I,Oil 22,303
6,061 29,601
4,948 36,132
3,623 20,070
1st CofJ.1S
2nd Corps
3rd Corps
'ltll Corps
5th Corps
6th Corps
7th Corps
8th Corps
Reserve Cavalry
Imperial Guard
Reserve of Inflllltry (Dessolles,
Josepl\'s Guards, &c.)
Troopson the march from Germany I
not distributed to the corps
Columns inside the French frontier I
(National Guards) . .
314,612 32,643 37,844
Ell:clusive of the depot of conscripts at &'yolllle.
244,126
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XIII
SIR JOHN ~IOORE'S ARMY,
l'l'S STRENGTH Al'.'D ITS WSSES.
N. B.-The first column gives tile strength of each of Baird's regiments 011
Oct. 2, and of 1\1oorc'8 regiments on Oct. 16, deducting from the latter mall
left behind in Portugal. 'Ine second column gives the men present with tlle
colours 011 Dec. 19, but not those in hospital or 'on command' on that dar.
'fllese last amounted 011 Dec. 19 to 3,931:1 and I,M respectively. 'TIle tllird
column gives the numbers disembarked in England in January.
ToI.al
HffccUlJC Diremborked
8lrength in Itrength. inEngllmdi'l Deficiency.pre.reltt onOd. 1808. DI:c.19,1800. hm. ]809.
Cavalry (Lord Paget).
7th Hussars 672 4!l7 675 97 1
10th
"
67'
'"
6" 24
16th " .... 674
'"
"'0 24
18th Light Dragoons . 624
""
047 77
3rd" " KG.L. 433 347 371
'"- 3,078 -- 2,450 -- 2,800 -- 278
1stDivision (Sir I).lininl).
Warde's Brigade:
1st Foot Guanls, 18t halt. 1,340 1,300 1,266 74
" "
2nd batt. 1,102 1,027 1,036 <J6
Bentinck's Brigade:
4th Foot, 1st batt. 81111 754 74<> 149
42nd " 1st batt. 018 IlllO 1'7 161
,0tI,
"
1st OOtt. 863 704 'OIl 264
l\faullingham's Brigade:
1st Foot, 3rd batt. 723 '07 .., 216
26th 1st batt.
.'0 7" 662 208
" 478 24l81st 2nd batt, . 719 6"
" -- 6,,,,," -1,370
-- 7,424 - 6,712
2ud Division (SirJ .H OllC).
Leith's Brigade:
oIst Foot. 61' 616 '00 107
'9th
"
2nd hatt.. 640 "7 '07 14'76th
"
784 6", 614 170
Hill's Brigade: [Estimate)!
2nd Foot 600 616 401 2Q5
,th
"
1st oo.tt. 69' Il33 654 23!l
14th " 2nd batt. 630 "0 Ml2 138
32nd " 1st batt. 800 7," 610 lB7
-- .')·,032 -- 4,482 -- 3,843 f---l,l@
-- -- -- --
Carried forward 15,634 13,644 12,688 2,846
1 Includcs fifty-six mcn d.rowllcd ot! rcturn voyage to England.
2 'lbe 76th Uegilllcnt failed to send ill its disembarkatioll :return, so tll3t its
loss has to 1lC 3\'ernged.
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Total Effective Disembarked
8tTf!1lgth /)1£ Idrength ill- Eng/ami 111 lJeficieucU·lW/Wlll! 011Oct. 1008. J)ec.lU,ISOB. Jail. 1800.
Brought forward 10,534 13,644 12,688 2,84G
Camu Crawfllrd's
Brigade:
36th Foot, 1st hatt. . llO4 736 661 24.'l
715t
"
1st batt. . 76< 724 626 136
92IJd
"
1st hatt. . 912 900 783 128
-- 2,480 -- 2,360 -- 1,970 -- alO
3rd Division
(Lt.-Cell. lo'raser).
Beresfol'd's Brigade:
6th :I<'oot, 1st batt. 882 783 491 391
9th
"
18t h.'Itt. !)-ifi 607 572 373
23,d
"
2ud batt.. "l() 496 418 172
43rd
"
2nd batt.. '98 4lI 368 230
Faue's Brigade:
38th :1"oot, 1st batt.. 900 8~ 707 143
70th
"
1st hatt.. 932 83ll 777 1'"
82nd
"
1st hatt. . ll39 812 802 228
- 5,677 -- 4,770 - 3,936 -- 1/;92
Reserve Division
•(l\Iaj.-Gen. E. Paget).
Anstruther's Brigade:
20th .Foot . 541 4fI9 428 lI3
to2ud
"
1st hatt.. 862 828 710 143
'Mth
"
1st hatt.. 863 820 706 107
Disney's Brigade:
28th Foot, 1st batt.. 926 700 624 30"2
9Jst
"
1st hatt. . 746 83ll /i34 212
- 3,938 - 3,695 -- 3,011 -- 027
1st Flank-Brigade
(Col. R. Crnwfurd),
43rd Foot, 1st batt. , BB' 817 810 86
.52nd
"
2nd OOtt, 623 381 '02 161
95th
"
2nd OOtt, 74' 702 648 96
-- 2,262 -- 1,900 -- 1,920 -- 342
2nd rlallk-Brigade
(Brig.•Gen. C. Alten).
1st Lt. &tt. K.G.L. ail 803 708 183'
2nd
" "
880 86' 618 262 2
-- 1,7.51 - 1,0.58 -1,326
--
426
Artillery, &c. 1,4.').5 1,297 1,200 23.5~
Staff Corps 137 133 !lO 38
-- -- - --
'fotal 33,234 2il,3.5i 26,109 7,03.5
I Includes t"'ellt}'-two men drowned 011 retnrn \'oy~e to England.
2 Includes 187 men drowned on retu:rn voyage to England.
3 Includes twenty~two drowned 011 return vo)'age to England, and nine
drowned ill Coruuna harbour.
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It \\ill be noted thllt if to the 29,337 of the second coLumn there arc added
the 3,038 sick and the 1,087 men Ion command; tJIO gross total of tbe
army on Dec. 19 must have been 34,002, a figure wllich exceeds that at tIle
bottom orthe first column. It would seem, therefore, that about 1,748 men ill
small detachmcuts joined the army at Salamanca and elsewhere before
Dec. 19. They must represent drafts and COll\'oy-escorts coming up from
Portugal. The apparent deficiency for the campaign therefore is 3,783.
But it must Itot be supposed that tlleSC 8,733 mell wefe a11100t hctweell Sala.
manca and Corunnll: from them we must deduct (1) tlle 296 casualties by
shipwreck while returning to t:ngland ; (2) .589 rank and file who tBeaped
indil'idually to POrlugal, llJl(1 wero then enrolled (along with Hie convalescent
sick left behind hy 1\1oore'8 regiments) ill the two' battalions of detachments'
which fought at Talavera; (3) the number of sick discharged from Salamanca
on to Portugal ill the oon\'OYS cscorWd by the 5j6Oth and 3rt! IteKimeut.s. I e..m
nowhere find the number of these invalids stat!!d, but it must Ilave been large,
as the total of the sick belouging to the whole anny was nearly 4,000 in
December. It will be l\ very modest estimate if we give 1,600 for t1H>SC of
them who were at Salamauca, the head-quarters hospital of the anny, and
were capable o(being mO\'ed back to Portugal.
We may therefore dOO\lCt under these three heads about 2,3M men. '11lis
figure t..,kcll from 8,783 leaves 0,398 for the rcallosa in the call1paign.
But eveu from this total 400 more must be deducted, fol" 400 Britisl,
convalescents were released by the Galician insurgents from Freuch captil'ity
and !lent ha.ck to Lisbon ill the spring of ]809. [< Further ll>lpers relative
to Spain and Portugal; p, 7 in Parliamentary Paper, for lBW.}
On the whole, theu, about 5,W8 meu were actually lost. Napier's estimate
of 3,233 (L .502) for the total loss is certainly too low, Of tllCS6 2,189 were
priSOUerB sent to France. [Schepeler, ITable of prisoners sent to France,
1800-]3' on p. lOO.} 'I1le remaiuing 3,800 perished in battle, by the road,
or iu hospital.
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Acevedo, gellcrnl, commands division
under Blake, 40B ; wounded at Es--
pin0S8, 416; murdered by the French,
.20.
Aelaml, brigadier-general, arrives at
I'cniche, 241 i at \Timicro, 249-58;
gives evidence before the Court of
Inquiry, 294.
Afrallcesados, party of tlle, in Spain,
07.
AllIgon, l'alafox tlefcatetl at, 145.
.'\10000, gelleral,governor ofCorunlla,
surreuders to SOult, S!)6.
A1001oo, combat of, 12D.
Alexander, Emperor of Russia, his
meetill~withNllpoleonut .Erfurl, 377.
AndalUSIa, province of, rises against
theFrcuch,69; its geography, 74,80.
AuBtrutIler, Lrigallier-general. arri"es
ill l'ortugal, 248 ; at Vimiero, 2W-
H1 ; in commalld at Almcidll, 494 ;
dies at Corullnll, 590.
Alltonio, DOll, brother of Charles IV,
'~inted lLead (If the J uota of
I eney, 40; goes to &.youne, 62;
at alCIII;ay,06.
Army, the Spanish, ita character and
organizatioll, 89-95: ue also Tables
>llId Appendices v, viii, &c,
Anny of Spain, the French, cbaracter
of the first, 103--7; of the second,
107-13: 8et also Tables and Ap-
pendices vi, &c,
Artillery, tllC, of t1l(~ Spanish army,
94, 95; of the }i'rellCb army, 112;
tactics of the, 120--2.
Asturias, Princeoftbe: 8U Fel"dinand.
Asturias, province of the, declares war
ou France, 65; senus emissa.ries to
l'lngland, G6; sends troops to Blake's
army, 382, 384.
IJaget, Juan, leader of Catalall miqlle-
letu, 318, 322, 32lJ,
Baird, Sir David, general, lands at
CorUlllla, 484, 491, 498; advances
to Astorga, 500; joins l\Ioore at
Mu)'orga, 582; wounded at Corunua,
584,589.
Barcelona, treacheroWlly seized by
Duhesme,36; operations round, 302,
318.
Baylen, battle of, 187-92; CoIII'elltiotl
of, 197-9; text of the Convention,
Apl)Cnd.ix, 621-3.
Bayoune, French troops at, 6-12, 34;
trCl.lchery of Napolcol) at, 51-(t
Beaullarnais, Marquis of, Frel\ch am-
bassador at Madrid, his negotiations
wiUI Fertlinand, I'riuce of the As-
turias,19,20; refuses to ackllowledge
t"erdinand as King, 43, 46.
Belesta, general, joins Blake with his
division, 200.
Belvedere, Comic de, defeated at
Gamonal,421-3.
Bembibre, the llritish at, 666.
Bemn'ente, combat of, MO-5t.
Bentinck, Lord William, British mili-
tary representative ill Mndrid, 365;
endeavours to get information from
tlte Junta, 438; his correspondence
wiUl Moore, 504; at CorUll1l3, 584.
Benladotte, Jean Baptiste, marshal,
l'rincp. of Ponte COI"VO, ill command
ou tlle Baltic, 3GB; tricked by La
Romana, 373.
Bes"i~res, Jeuu Bnptiate, marshal,
Duke of Istria, leads a OOt']NJ d'armlc
into Spain, 40; his first operations.
125, 126; operations in Korthern
Spain, 140, 142, 166-72; victory at
MediJm de Ril) Seco, 169-72; re-
presses rising in Discay, 3.56; super-
sedcd by Soult, 418; pursues Inftlu·
tado,470.
Bessieres, general, leads French
cavalry in Catalonia,:309, 318.
BetaUZ08, the stragglers' battle at,
during Moore's retreat, 57!).
Bilbao, taken and sacked by Merlin,
356 ; taken by Blake, 383; taken by
Lcfebnc, 400.
Biscay, rising in, 355, 356.
Blake, Joachim, captain-geueral of
the province of Galicia, 163 j his dif-
ferences with ('uasta, 16.5 ; defeated
at i\lcd.illa de Rio Sceo, 168-72; his
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0llCrntions in Biscav, 382, 38-1, 400;
defeated at Zorno~·a, 407; at Val-
maeetla, 4ll; at Espinosn, 413-6;
e;;capes inw tlle Asturiau hills, 427;
superseded by La Romana, 427.
Bonaparte, Jose"h : 8ee Joseph Napo-
leon.
Bonaparte, tOllis, King of Holland,
refustl> the crOWll of Spain, 40.
Bonnet, general, at Gmnonlll, 422;
occupies Santander, 429.
Bowes, general, B. F., commands
hrilfoldc undor Wclleslcy, 232; ut
Rolilfa, 237; at Vimiero, 24.9-69.
Ere-nuler, general, at RolilfA, 239;" at
Vimiero, 263""9.
Durgos, taken and sacked by Napoleon,
424.
Durrard, Sir Harry, SOCOlld. in com-
mand of British troops in Portugal,
220; arrives at i\laceira Bay, 250;
assumes command at Vimiero and
refuses to ad\'alll.:e, 260,261 ; joins ill
negotiations for the Conyention of
Cintra, 268; summoned before the
Court of Inquiry, 294.
Cnbczon, comuat of, 141.
CacabellOll, combat of, .561-9.
Caldagues, {;ount of, Icader of Catalnu
levies, 3"27; reliel"cs Gerona, 328-30.
Canuing, George, Foreign Secretary,
gives assistance to tile AstnriallS, 66;
permits the embarkation of Dupont's
troops nftcr HuylclI, 202; Ilis speech
Oil the Spanish insurrection, 222;
sends Robertson to La. Romana,
3il; bis replies to the Notes of
France and Russia, 373, 3j!!.
Camffa, general, arrested by Junot,
206,200 ; released by Convention of
Cintra, 273.
Carlos, Don, brother of l<'erdinand
VII, sent to Bayonue to meet Napo-
loollf..47,4S; confillC(1 atValell~"aY,M.
Castanos, general, in command of
Andalllsian army, 127; opposes Du-
pont atAndujar, 171; receiVes capitu-
lation of Dupont, 107 ; marches 011
i\Iadrid, 340 ; commands tile < Army
of the Ventre,' 38.5-431 ; defeated at
'fudela, 441-4; Ilis retroot, 447-9;
superseded, 440.
Clllltclar, Mart/uis of, Ilcfcnds 1I1adrid
against Napo eon, 463--0.
VasUercagh,Rohcrt, Stewart, viscount,
llis policy, 221,223,224; his confi-
dence ill \Vellesley, 22.5; commcnds
1VellesleytoDalrymple,2G3; receives
Wellesley's report Oil the Spanish
'VaT, ZB!l, 290; his corrcspolldcnl.:e
with Moore, 487, 493, 500, ti18, 62'2,
629,6'18, M4, 697, 600.
Castro Gonzalo, combat of, 648.
Catalouia, province of, revolts against
the Frenl.:h, 70; gcograpb}· of, 82,
303-U; tile struggle in, 301-33.
Cl\\"alry, tactics of, in the Peninsular
'Var, 117-20; the Spanish, il<l weak-
ness, 92, 93, 120; the French, lOS.
Cervellon, Conda de, captain-general
of Valencia, llis iIlC3\IUCity, 134-fJ.
Ce\"allos, Don Pedro, minister of
Forcign Affairs, o.ecompanies Ferdi-
llaud VII to Bayollne, 48; Ms inter-
view with Napoleon, 51, 52; takes
officeullderJo;;eph,1,4; re:1111)(lillh.~1
minister by the Supreme Junta, 359.
Chabert, genoml, at Baylell, 187,IS!!;
negotiates termsofsurrender,100,1D7.
Chabran, general, his expedition to
Tllrragona,3O!1; reeal1(!11 by Duhesmc,
312; checked at Granollers, 3ID.
Charles IV, King ofSpain,hischaracwl',
13; arrests Ferdinand, Prince of the
Asturias,forhightreaSoll,21; pardons
Lim,23; compelled todi~raceGodo)',
41; abdicates in favoUTofFel'diusnd,
42; withdraws his abdication, 41,;
summoned to Bayonne bl ~apoleoll,
53; abdicates infavour ofNapoleon,M.
Chariot, general, at Villliero, 264, :!~;).
Charmilly, colonel, emissary seut hl'
Frerc to Mool'C, .520-3.
Cintra, Convention of, 263-72; its
terms, 272-8; Court of 1nquiry Oil,
291-3(H).
Claros, DOll Juan, leader of Catalan
milJ"lWktClf, 321, 32B.
Coelmme, Lord, harasses Duhesme's
troops,324,331; blookatlell1lan.:eluIl1l,
327.
Colbert, general, at Tudela, 44J-4 ;
slain at CacalJelloe, 669.
Colli, Baron, his attempt to release
Fcrdinand from Va\cll~ay, 18.
Collingwood, Lord, commanding Medi-
terranean }<'Ieet, refuses to allow cm-
barkation of Dupont's troops, 201.
COllstantino, combat of, 672-3.
Cordova, sack of, by DUPOllt's troops,
130.
Cortc6, proposal to SllmmOIl the, 362.
Corunna, Baird la.uds at, 484, 491,
4nS; arrival of Jloorc at,!iS1 ; IJattle
of,533-95.
Cotton, admiral, rcscnts the tcrms vf
tbe Convention of Chltrs., 271, 272;
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concludes an arrangement with
Silliavin, 284, 285.
Coupigny,gcncral, commands a divi-
sion ill Caslaiios' army, 177, 160; at
Bllylcll, J87, 1!)1; delegate to the
Ami)' of the Centre 396.
Crawfurd, Catlill, coionel, oommands
11 brigade unuer Wcllesle}', 232; at
Vimiero, 249-58; at Corlillll3, 384.
Crawfurd,Robert, colonel commanding
Light Brig-.lde, bloll'9 up the bridge
at Castro Gonzalo, 54ll; retreats to
Vigo, ti64; his exccllent discipline,
505.
Cl'u~-Murgeoll,colonel,atHaylell,]01 ;
his defence of Lerill, :IDol.
Cnom, Gregorio de la, captain-gcllcral
of Old ClL'ltilc, his reluctance to take
arms against the .French, 6tI; his
character and capacity, 141 j defeated
at CaoowlI, 141 ; at l'Irllllina tie Rio
Seeo, 165-72; his extravagant claims,
347,348,357; removed from his com-
mand,359.
Dalrymple, Sir Hew, gol'cruor of Gih-
raltar, receives command of Dritish
troops ill Portugal, 226 j arrives at
Villliero, 263; his lack of confidence
in Wellesley, 263-6; negotiates the
QlIlventioll of Cintca, 2tl8--72 j his
want of consideration for Portuguese
authorities, 279, 283,286; his dila.-
toriness, 287; summoned before the
Court of Inquiry, 2!l4; censured by
the Cummander-ill-ehief, 299.
Debelle, general, surprised by Paget
at Sahagun, 1)36,.536.
Delaborde, general, marches against
W ellesley, 236; defeated at Rolii\a,
236-40 j at Vimiero, 246-62; at
Coruilna, 586-91.
Oespeila l)erros, pass of, 7!!, BO.
Digeoll, general, at Tudela, 441, 443.
Duhesme, general, leads 1111 army into
Catalonia, 36; at Harcelona, 302;
failure of expeditions against Catalan
insurgents, 310, 312 j marches on
Gerolla, 314; his repulse and retreat,
316-8 j be1!ieges (;eroIlJl. again un·
sut-cess{ully, 325--30 j retreats on
Barcelona, 331.
Dupout, gcneral, lends Second Corps
of Observation of the Gironde into
~pain, 34; composition of his army,
104, 107, 126; his first operations,
]27; combat of .oUcolea, 129 j sacks
Coroo\'a, 130; retreats to Alldujnr,
J32; defeated at Daylen, 190--2;
capitulates, 197; imprisoned by Na-
poleoll, 335.
Eclulvarri, DOll Pedro de, defeated by
Dupont at lUoolen, 128, 120.
Escoiqlliz, Juan, canon of Toledo, his
influence on :Ferdinalld VII, 16, 17;
!,romIlts the negotiations lIith Nilpt)-eon, 19, 20; acoolll1"1.nies Ferdinalld
to Bayonne, 48; hIS illurview with
Napoleon, 52.
Escurial, tile affair of the, 23.
ESl'illOsa de 108 Monwros, battle of,
413-6.
Etruria, King of, evicted by Napoleoll,
as j promised Northern Portugal,9.
El'ora, defeat of the l'ortuguese at,
218.
:Fane, general, H., commands brigade
ullllcrIVellt'Sley, 232 j atltoti\'a, 287,
23l.J; at Vimiero, 240-61.
Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, ae-
eUJle(l Oftrea.'lOlI,12,21 ; his eharaetel',
16-19; his intrigue with Napoleon,
20; his arrest !lud !lCljuittal) 21, 23;
pacifies the mob at Arall~uez, 41;
becomes King on his father s abdica-
tiou, 42; enters Madrid, 43; his title
not recognized by the French, 43, 46;
tries to llropitiateNalJOloon,47 j meets
Napoleon atDayollne,47-51 j isforced
to abdicate, 54; confined at ValenljllY,
55.
Fergusoll, general, It, commands bri-
g'.i1eunderWelle~Jey, 232; at Roli~a,
237, 289; at Vimiero, 249--60; gh'es
evidence before the Court of Inquiry,
294, 295.
:Filanghieri, captain-general ofGalicia,
murdered by soldiery, 66, 67.
101orida Blaaca, Count, political in·
fluenceof,346; presidentofthe Junta
General, 359.
Fontainebleau, treaty of, 8-11.
Foy, general, his opinion of Englisll
infantry, 115; of English cavalry,
lIO; at Vimiero, 265; at Coruulla,
591.
Francesclli, general, scatters La. Roma·
na's troop!! at combat of illlInsilla, M2 ;
in the pass of .Foncebadon, 563; pur·
sues Moore's army at lletanzos, 57!! ;
at COrUnn3, 589.
}'rancisco, UOll, YOWlger brother of
Ferdilland VI (,arrested by Murat,GO.
Freire, llernardillo, general, appointed
hood of Portugucsc :armies, 212 j tlW11'-
rels with Wellesley, 233; resents the
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terms of the Convention of Cintra,
270,277,270.
.'rere,John Hookham,British minister
in Spain, brings subsidies to Corullna,
36.5, 400; urges Moore to advance,
506, 519, 520; his controversy with
Moore, 623, 624.
Frere, general, IllCCts i\lOJlccy with re-
inforcements, 130.
Galicia, province of, revolts against
the F'rench, G6 ; its importance, 69;
geography of, 80, 81; militaryopera-
tions in, 163-75.
GlIlluzzo, captain-general of Estrema-
dura, attacks F'n:mcll garrison at
Eh'as, 276; refuses to draw off his
troops, 279; recalled to Amlljuez,
420; commands the anny of San
Juan, 481.
Gamonal, coml~1t of, 422, 423.
George Ill, King, bis reply to the
Corporation of London about the
Convention of Cintra, 293.
Gerona, fortress of, held by the
SI)anish, 70; besieged by Duhcsmc,
316,317; second siege of, 325-31.
Girondc, First Corps of Observation of
the, 6, 7 (see JUIlOt); Se.:olld C01"J?s
ofObservlltiOIl ofthe, 12(see Dupollt).
Gobert, geneml, reinforces Dllpont,
179; defeated and mortally wounded
nt Mengilmr, 181, 182.
Godo}', Manuel, I)rince of tIlll Peace,
prime minister of Charles IV of
~pain, llis proclamation of Oct. »,
1800, ;1,; hiS part in the Treaty of
FOlltailitlblclIU, 9, 10; his c1mrllcter
aud policy, 12-5; his enmity to
Prince fo'erdinnnd, 20, 21; tries to
Ilrllpitiate Napoleon, 36; proposes
the flight of the Spanish Court, 40,
41; disgraced and banislled, 41 ; sum-
moned to Bayonne by NapolC<lll, 53;
his responsibility for the state of the
Spanish army, 9G-8.
Goulns, general, repulsed at Hostal-
ricll,325,
Craham, colOllel, T., brings news of the
fall of Matlrhl to Moore, ,~2o.
Crimarest, gClleral,at Tudela,442,443.
Guadarramll, the, NapulL'OII's passage
of, 043.
Heredia, Don Joseph, commands the
Anny of Estremtufura, 462, 466, 471,
516.
Hill, gelleral, R., commands brigade
uuder Wellcsle)', 232; at Uoli'la,
237,238; at Virniero, 240, 263; at
Cotunna, 501.
Hope, Sir John, general, his advance
on Elvas, 280, 487; his circuitous
march to join Moore, 610, 511; at
Corunua,584 ; takes command of the
army on Moore's deatll, fj01.
Ibarnavarro, Justo, brings the news of
the treachery at'Bayollne to Madrid,
59.
Infalltado, Duke of, confidant of Fer_
dillalld VII ill thll affair of the
Escurial, 19, 22,23; in Biscay, 356;
defends i\fndrid against Napolcon,
403.
Inquisition, the, GOOoy's attitude to·
towards, 15; abolislled by Napolellll,
474-6.
Izquierdo, Eugenio, agent of GOOo)',
draws np the Treaty of .'ontailleblellu,
0; sends disquieting reports from
Paris, 36.
John, Prince-Re~entofPortugal,com-
pelled to sublmt lo tlla Continental
System, 7; attacked by Napoleon,
29; his flight from Lisbon, 30,
JOlles, Felix, general, commands a
division in Castauos' army, 1j7.
JoseI'h Napoleou Bonaparte, accepts
the crown of Spain, 46; enters Ma-
drid, lj3; his charncter, 174; his
J'lightfrom Madrid, 175 ; at iIliranda,
340; his retunl to Madrid, 470.
J ounlall,Jeall BaI'tiste, marshal, COlII-
mands the troops of King JoseI'll,
383,384.
JOVellanos, Gaspar de, refuses the
Ministry ofthe Interior under J oseph,
114; a member of Ute Junta General,
354; his Liberal"iews, 3tH, 362.
Junot, general, Duke of Abrantes,
leads }'rencb army into Spaill, 6; his
invasion of I'ortugal, 26; his march
on Lisbon, 27-30 ; his rule in Por·
tugal, 206; his difficultiea in Lisbon,
213,214; defeated at Vimiem, 247-
61; negotiates the Convention of
Cintra, 266-72; evacuates Portugal,
260; retires to Spain, 450, 461.
Junta, or Council ofnegcncy,lIppointml
by Ferdinand VII, 48; its dealings
with Murat, 66, 69; sends petition
to Napoleou asking for Josepfl Bona-
parte as King, 63.
Junta Gtlueral, creation of the, 352;
its composition, 3,54 ; in sessioll, 3.H-
66; flies to Sel·mc.
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Juntas, the provincial: Me GalicillJ
Alltlalusia, Catalonia, &c.
KClltes, Sir Richard, Ildmirnl COln-
manding the fleet ill tlle Baltic, 370 ;
effects the escape of La Romana and
hi8 troops, 314.
Kellermann, Fran~ois Christophe,
general, retires on Lisbon, 216; his
success at Alcacer do Sal, 242 j at
Vimiero, 246-.56; negotiates the
CQIJI'cntioll of Cintrll, 2U6-72.
l\indelan, general, treachery of, 372,
374.
Lahoussaye, general, commands dra-
goons at ClIcabellos, .569; lit Con-
stantiuo, .572, 673; at Corwma, .539.
Lake, colonel, killed at Roli~, 238.
LaIlIlCS,Jcan, marshal, Duke of ~Ionte­
bello, wins battle of Tudela, 436-44.
l..apissc,gelleral, at ~::SpinOSll,414, 415;
sent against Salamanca, 51H.
Lasalle, genernl, at Cabezon, 141 ; at
Mediua de Hiu Seco, 167-71 ; at Ga-
moual,422.
Laum, Marquis of, defeated at Tudela,
144, 145; at Mallen, 14.5; sent to
Catalonia to oppose Dullesme, 307.
Lecchi, general, seir.eB fortress of Bar-
celona,37; besieged ill Barcelona by
Palacio, 327, 328; with Duhesme at
Rlrcelona,318.
Lefehl're, Francis Joscph, marshal,
Duke of Onutzig, defeats Hlake ILt
Zoruoza, 407 j at Valmaceda, 4Il.
Lefebvre, general, reinforces Bessie-
res, 337; wounded at Corulina, .594.
Lefebvre- Desnouettes, general, sent
ngainstSnragossa,12.5,142; victorious
at Mallen, IH,146; his siege of Sara-
gossa, 14.5-.52; su~rsedcd by Verdier,
1.52; at bnttlc of I'udela, 444; Woken
prisoner at Benavente, 560.
kite, general, defeated by Loisoll at
Evora, 218; his difficulties with Gal-
Inzw,2i9.
Leith, general, J., takes part in Blake's
retreat, 426-9 ; commands a brigade
under l\Ioore, .501, .528, 633.
Leith Hay, major, his views on Span-
ish pll-trioti~m, .5Q.5, [',77.
Leopold, Prince, of Sicily, intrigues
for the Regency of Spain, 360.
Liger-Belair,geuerjll, ilefeated at Mell-
gibar, un.
Lisbon, seized by ,Tunot, 30, 31; its
importance,209; condition of, under
Junot, 213, 214; surrendered to the
Britisll Ly the Com'cntion of Cintra,
273.
Llamas, Valeucian general, at the
council of war in Madrid, 3.57; at
Aranjuez, 385.
Loison, general, in Northern Portugal,
213 j retires on ALrantes, 216; his
victory at Evora, 218; recalled to
Lisbon, 218; at Vimiero, 246-.52.
Lopez, colonel, Spanish attache witll
Moore, 488, 404.
Louis ]>],iHppc, Duke of Orlcuns, his
intrigues about the Spanish Regenc}',
'00.
Lugo, combat of, 674, 576.
Mlldrid, dcscrilltion of, 76; its lack of
importance politically, 75; its advan-
tages RS a ccnue of roads, 86; Joseph
Bonaparte enters, 173; abandoned
br. Joseph, 175; its resistance to
Nnpolooll, 462-9; N:lpoluou :It, 473-
85.
Maison, general, at Espinosa, 411i.
Malusl,ina,gcneral,defeated by Sebas-
tiani,410.
Mansilla, combat of, 5.52.
Marnnsin, general, evacuates Algarve,
212; stonns Beja, 215.
Mllrgaroll, general, at Vimiero, 240-
".Maria Luisa, queen of Charles IV of
Spain, ller chllracter, 14; illtriA"ues
with Murat against Fcrdinalld VII,
44,45; at Bayollllu, .53.
Mataro, stormed and sacked by Du-
hesme, 315.
Matllieu, Maurice, geueral, at Tudela,
441-3.
lUediuade Rio Seco, wlttle of, 168-72.
Mengibar, combat of, 161.
Mede, general, scnt against Sanmu-
del', 126, 142; at Caoozoll, 141; at
Medul3. de ltio Seco, 100-71; at
Gamona!, 422 ; at Cacabcllos, iiOl.l;
at Constantillo, 573; at CorUllna,
660-00.
Milans, Francisco, leader of Clltalall
8Qmalene8, repulseg Chabran, 310;
0PllOSC$ Dullesme, 325, 328-
Milhaud, general, at Gamonal, 422.
jfique!etu, thc, of Catalonia, 302,306.
Moira, }<'rancis Hawdou, Lord, 011 the
Inquiry iuto the Convention of Cin-
tJ'll,294-6.
Moncey, Bon Adrieo Jeannot dc, mar-
shal,Duke ofConcgliallo, leads Corps
of Observation of the 0<lean Coast
into Spain, 34; composition of his
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army, 126; his expedition agaimt
Valencia, 133; his repulse at Valen-
cia, 136; retreats on Madrid, 138;
at 'rudela, 441.
Monteiro Mor, the (Conde de Castro
l\Iarim), resents the teI'llU! of the
COllvelltion of Cilltra, 27\}, 2&1.
l\Iontijo, Conde de, his operations on
the Ebro, 381 ; lieltl-dcputy of the
Junta, 395.
1\Ioore, Sir John,general, returns from
tlle Baltic, 224, 226; lands in Portu-
Jr;l1, 270. 486; advances into Old
"tastilc, 451,485; his difficulties of
transport, 406-91; at Salamanca,
4B6-612; resolvcs to retreat, liOO,
510; bis clLange of plans, 522, 523;
his quarrel witb Frere, 523, 624; ad-
'·flUCes to Sahagun, 1)37 ; his retreat
before Napoleon, 536-69; is joined
by La Romnlln at Astorga, li52; re-
treats beforc Soult, 556-88; willS
battle of CorUlma, 53Il, 51l9; his
denUl and burial, 501i; his character
and achievements, 50'7-602.
Moria, Don Tomas de,gcJlCral, repudi-
ates tlle Capitulation of Daylen, 201;
defends Madrid against Napoleon,
4G3 ; negotiates the surremkr of the
city, 469; takes office nnderJoseph,
472; his letter to Moore• .517, 618.
Mortier, Edouarll Adollllm Casimir
Joseph, Duke of Treviso, arrives in
Spain, 481.
Mouloll, gelleral, at Medina de Rio
Seco, H3!l-71 ; at Gamonal, 422.
Muuster, GCOI-gC Earl of, his ollinioll
of the Spanish arm)",!>a.
Murat, JonclLim, Grallll-Dukc of BerS',
C<lmmauds Frellch forces in Spain,
38; llis clll\racter IInd CIIopllcity, 39 ;
enter6 Madrid, 43; refuses toacknow-
ledge Ferdirnmd VI] as king, 43 ; in-
trigues with Charles IV and l\laria
Luisa against Ferdinalld, 44; induces
tlLe old kinK to whildraw his alxlica-
tion, 45; his dealings with the Junta
at Madrid, ,'i8, oiO; quells insurrec-
tion in Madrid, GO, Cl; leal'es Sp.1in,
] 23 ; his intrigues with Fouch{ (md
Talleyraud, 500. .
Napier, Sir \Villiam, r'ncral, historian
of the Peninsular \\ ar, his strictures
on the Spllniards, 8\), 499 ; errors in
his estimates of numbers, 251,421,
G30; his testimony ro the Catalans,
302 ; misinfonned with regard to La
Romana's army, 416; his defence of
1\I0ore's strateg)", 491,697, GOO; his
eulogy Oll :\foore, GO'~.
Napiec, Major Charles, wounded and
taken prisoncr at Corunna, 688.
Napoleon, his projects against Spain.
2-11; intrigues with l:'crdilllLnd,
Prince of the Asturias, 2()...3; his
treacherl at Ba)"onne, 51; offers
JOSCll!J Honaparte the kingdom of
Spaio, 4C; his original p~ of cam·
paign ill Spain, 123-6; his wrath at
the Callitu13tion of Baylen, 334, 33S;
his new scheme of operations in
8J1nill, 337--40; his treaty witli the
Cur Alexander, 3ii; his. letter to
King Gwrge Ill, 378; IIrri\"Cii ill
Spain, 397 417; defeats Belvedere
at Gamonal, 422 ; advances on ilIa-
drill, 449; crosses the SomosicITll,
463-61 ; enters Madrid, 466-9; his
scbeme of refonns for Spain, 475,
476; hisJlllrsuit of l\Ioore, 538-47;
halts at Bena\"ente, 55\}; returns to
fo'ralllJe 5(1].
Ney, l\lichel, marshal, Duke of El-
chingen, arrives in Spain, 341 ; fails
to catch the retreating arm)" of Cas-
tanos, 446, 448; loins in the pursuit
of !\loore, .'i45, 547, Wl, 562.
Nightingale, general, M., commands
brigade Ijnder Wellesle)", 232; at
Uolir;a, 2.17; at Vimiero, 249--.59.
O'FaTTell, general, Spanish Minister
of \\rar• takes office under Joseph,
174.
O'Neille, general, his blunuers at Tu·
dcla, 430-44.
Oporto, Bishop of, Dom Antonio do
Castro, heau of the l'ortugueseJullta,
211 ; his illtcrl"iew WiUl Wclleslc)',
228; resents tIle CouI'elltion of Cin-
trn, 277,278; his letter of complaint,
201.
O·Sulliv3n, Manuel, captain, repulses
Gonlas from Hosrolritlh, 325.
l'aget, Edward, general, commancls
Reserl'C Division of i\Ioore's arm)',
633,664; bis success at Cacabellos,
li68 ; at COrlstantino, 673 ; at Corum la,
'09.
Pagct, Henry IAlrd, surprises the
French at Sahagun, 536; at Dcna-
,·ente, 1550, 55].
PaIacio, Marquis del, leads troops from
Balearic Isles to Catalonia, 323;
CalJtain-General of Catalonia, 327;
inl·ests Barcelona, 327.
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I'alafox, }'rancisco, Deputy of the Su-
preme Junta, 355; usurps command
of tile arm}' of Gasblios, 433.
Palafox, Joseph, leads the revolt
against the French in SarngosSo'l, 67;
Captaill-General of Ar~"l)n, 69; his
character, 143; his defence of Bara-
gO~~J 143, 163-62 ; defeated at Ala-
gOI1, 145; at Epila, Uil; Ms fantastic
plalls, 391, 434--5.
"ampeluna, citadel of, seized by D'Ar-
magnae, 36.
I'eil!l, Manucl La, general, commands
division in Castai'los' army, 177;
arrives at Barlcn, l!l2; threatens
Du!mut, Hlo ; llis cowardice at Tu·
dela, 442-5; escapes from Ney, 470.
J'iKu3telli, general, commands Army
of Castile, 385; retreats before Ney,
303; removed from llis command,
3ll.5.
Polish Light Horse, charge of the, at
tllC SomOllierra, 459.
I'ortlaud Cabinet, the, resolves to aid
risiug'S in Spain and Portugal, 221,
~'22. .
l'ortugal, kingdom of, compelled to
submit to. the Continental Systcm, i j
conquest of, by French troops, 26-32;
its army dissolved, 31 j insurrection
of, 2oo-1B; evacuated by tllC .Prench,
270, 280.
Pr-lilt, Mgr. de, Archbishop of Ma-
lines, his memoirs, .5, 10, 17, 459,
473.
Ucding, Teoooro, ~eDeral, commands
(1iI'ision under Castaii08, 177; at
l\Ieugibar, 181, 182; mardllJS Oil
Bayleu, 18.5; at battle of Dayleu,
187-01; marches for Catalonia,
387-8.
Heille, general, succours Duhesme,
319 ; repulsed from RoMs, 321.
Hoads, the, of Spaill, 78-86.
Rohertson, ReI'. James,cmissaryfrom
Calmiug to La Romana,371 ; Sllcce!:'8
of his missioll, 372.
Jtoea, geneml, commands ValcDciall
dirisioll at Tude1a, 441.
Roli~a, combat of, 236-40. .
UOlnaua, La, Marquis of, 6cnt to Ule
Baltic with Spanish troops, 00, 367 ;
escapes with his army on British
I'essels, 371-4; supersedes Blake in
command of the army ofGalicin, 427;
proposes a junction with Moore, .515,
520, .533, .534; joins M.oore at As-
torga, 5.53; retreats tlLrough the l13sg
of Foncebadoll, 563.
ltosas, resists Reille's attack, 3.21.
Saoothier, general, at Mediua de Kio
Seeo,109-71.
Sahng-uD, combat of, 530.
St. eyr, Laurent GOUViOll, geneml,
supersedes Dullesme in cat.alonia,
332.
Saint :March, general, at Tndela, 441.
San Juan, general, defeated at t116
Som06icrra, 455-60; murdered by
his 011'11 troops, 471.
Sail Iloman, Vount of, commands di-
vision from the Baltic at Espillosa,
413-0.
Santa Cru1., Marquis of, leads the
revolt in the Asturias, 6.5.
SamgoSS3, lirstsicge of, 145-62 ; story
of dIe' Maid of; 104.
Savllry, Anne Jean Maric Rim!,
geneml, Duke of ROl'igo, at Madrid,
46; induces Ferdilland to meet
Napoleon, 40 j takes comllland at
Madrid on Murnt's departure, 123,
166,175; at the passageofthe 801110-
sicITll, 4.50.
Schwartz, geueral, scut against Le-
rida,309; retreatstollarcelona,311.
Sebastiani, general, at 201'l10"1.a, 407 ;
defeats Malaspina, 416.
S6gur, PhiliJlve ue, his uescription of
the passage of the Somosierra, 46!).
Sheri(lan, Richard Brinslcy, his S}M!eCll
on the Spanish insurrectioli, 222.
Siniavin, admiml commanding Russian
fleet ill the 'I'agns, refuses to aill
JWlOt, 200; concludes terms with
Admiral Cotton, 272, 264{ ,.,.
Smith, Sir Sydney, admim , blockades
Lisbon, 29.
Somllo, ea1ltaill-gCncral, murdeL'Cd ill
Cadiz, 67.
Soligllnc, gCllcml, at Vimict'O, 233-9.
&mlltene8, irregular levies of Cat,1-
lonia, 70, 306, 311.
Somosierra, combat of Ute, 450-00.
Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu, marslHl1,
Duke uf Dalmatia, arrives in Spain,
418; victorious at Gamonal, 422,
423 ; occupies Santander, 4W; sue·
eessful at Mansilla, 552; Itis IlUl'6uit
of l\Ioore, 557--83; refuses batUe at
Lugo, 6i4; ligltts at CorUlllla, 663-
91; places inscriptions over Moore's
graYC, fm5.
Spencer, generaln.,brin¥s:division from
.sicily and Gibmltar tOJOill Wellcslcr,
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230; his e"idence at the Inquiryillw
the Couvention of Cintm, 294, 296.
Strangford, Lord, British ambassador
at Lisbon, 29, 30.
Stuart, Charles, British minister at
Madrid, his remarks 011 the inactiyity
of the Supreme Junta, 80S, 604;
urges Moore to advance, 519; comes
as emissary from Jo'rere to Moore,635.
Surtces, sergeant, his remarks on
Spanish officers, 99.
Symes, colonel, ill., his report on La
ltomana's force, 534.
Tactics, the, of the French, 114-0;
of the British, 114--22. .
Tallerrand,Cllarles Mauricede Talley-
Taud Perigord, l)rince of Benevento,
upposes the illva!!ion of Spaill, 11 ;
receives Ferdinand VIr, DOll Carlos,
and Don Alltollio at Valenply, 55, 06.
Ta)'lot, lieut.-eololleI, commands the
20th Hegt. at V[micro, 2.56.
Thi~ooult, l'aul, genllrnl, chief of
the staff to JUllot, at the council of
war at Tortes Vedra.s, 266; his iu-
terview witll Napoleon, 269; hie evi-
dence about the French peculations
at Lisbon, 281.
Thomieres, general, at Vimiero; 254,
2M.
Toreiio, historian of tlle Peninsular
'Var, goes to London as an emissary
from l116 Asturias, 6U.
Traut, colonel, commands division of
Portuguese under ,\rellcsler, 234 j at
Roli\3, 237 ; at Vimiero, 249.
Tudela, combat of, H4, 14,'); battle
of, 439-44.
Valdez, don Antollio, imprisoned by
Cuesta, 359.
Valencia, massa.cre of the }'rcncli
colony in, GB; Moncey'e expedition
against, 133-6.
Valmaceda, combat of, 411.
Vaughan, Charles, secretary to the.
British minister in i\llIdrid,his papers,
24,143,134; his opinion of the Cell-
tral Junta, 365; brings the news of
Tndela to Moore, 508.
Vedel, genernl, reinforces Dllpont,
17(1 ; marches on La Carolina, 183;
arri,'es late at .Ba.ylen, l{13; retreats
on Ln. Carolina, 198; retnrusto B.1Y-
lell,199.
Verdier, general, at the siege of Sara-
gossa, 152; retreats to 'J'ndelo) 161.
Victor, Clauue Perrin, lImrsllal, Duke
of Belluno, his operations against
Blake, 400, 413; at Esr,inlY.tI3, U4-U.
ViIlatte, general, at Zorllo~l, 407;
h.is escape from Acevedo, 410; at
,Espinosa, 414.
Villoutrcys, captain, o.sks suspcnsion
of hostilities from Redillg, 102 ; im-
prisoned by Napuleoll, 335.
Vimiero, battle of, 247-(]1.
ViI'l'S, general, neglects to help Cau·
lonia, 323.
'Velleslcy, general, Sir Arthllr, dis-
embarks at Figueira, 218 ; his inter·
view with the Bishop of Oporto Slid
tlte Supreme Juuta, 228; at Rolil,'ll,
23G-40; at Vimiero, 247-61; llis
differences Ivith Hllrrard IIIl<I Dnl-
rymple, 260--.5; his views on the
future of the war, 288 j retlll'IlS to
England,2oo; summolled before the
Court of Inquiry on the Convention
of Cintra, 2!J4.; llis evirlence against
Durrardalld Dalrymple, 29.5; returns
to Lisbon, 300; his tactics, lt4-22.
"rilsoll, Sir Robert, orgallizes the
Lusitalliall Legion, 200. .
Zaa:alo, llernard, tile Etudeut, leader
ot revolt in Coimbrn, capturcs Figu-
eira,217.
Zamora, resists Lapisse's attack, 562.
Zornom. battle of, 407.
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